Studies in History and Philosophy of Science最新文献

This paper investigates conceptions of explanation, teleology, and analogy in the works of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Georges Cuvier (1769–1832). Richards (2000, 2002) and Zammito (2006, 2012, 2018) have argued that Kant's philosophy provided an obstacle for the project of establishing biology as a proper science around 1800. By contrast, Russell (1916), Outram (1986), and Huneman (2006, 2008) have argued, similar to suggestions from Lenoir (1989), that Kant's philosophy influenced the influential naturalist Georges Cuvier. In this article, I wish to expand on and further the work of Russell, Outram, and Huneman by adopting a novel perspective on Cuvier and considering (a) the similar conceptions of proper science and explanation of Kant and Cuvier, and (b) the similar conceptions of the role of teleology and analogy in the works of Kant and Cuvier. The similarities between Kant and Cuvier show, contrary to the interpretation of Richards and Zammito, that some of Kant's philosophical ideas, whether they derived from him or not, were fruitfully applied by some life scientists who wished to transform life sciences into proper sciences around 1800. However, I also show that Cuvier, in contrast to Kant, had a workable strategy for transforming the life sciences into proper sciences, and that he departed from Kant's philosophy of science in crucial respects.

We argue that the societal consequences of the scientific realism debate, in the context of science-to-public communication are often overlooked and careful theorizing about it needs further empirical groundwork. As such, we conducted a survey experiment with 130 academics (from physics, chemistry, and biology) and 137 science communicators. We provided them with an 11-item questionnaire probing their views of scientific realism and related concepts. Contra theoretical expectations, we find that (a) science communicators are generally more inclined towards scientific antirealism when compared to scientists in the same academic fields, though both groups show an inclination towards realism and (b) academics who engage in more theoretical work are not less (or more) realist than experimentalists. Lastly, (c), we fail to find differences with respect to selective realism but find that science communicators are significantly less epistemically voluntarist compared to their academic counterparts. Overall, our results provide first empirical evidence on the views of scientists and science communicators on scientific realism, with some results running contra to the theoretical expectations, opening up new empirical and theoretical research directions.

In this essay I suggest that we view design principles in systems biology as minimal models, for a design principle usually exhibits universal behaviors that are common to a whole range of heterogeneous (living and nonliving) systems with different underlying mechanisms. A well-known design principle in systems biology, integral feedback control, is discussed, showing that it satisfies all the conditions for a model to be a minimal model. This approach has significant philosophical implications: it not only accounts for how design principles explain, but also helps clarify one dispute over design principles, e.g., whether design principles provide mechanistic explanations or a distinct kind of explanations called design explanations.

This paper provides a conceptual history of the development of early universe particle physics in the 1970s, focusing on the development of more sophisticated tools for constructing gauge-theories at finite-temperature. I start with a focus on early investigations into spontaneous symmetry restoration, and continue through the development of functional methods up to equilibrium finite-temperature field theory. I argue that the early universe provides an ideal setting for integrated modelling of thermal, gravitational, and particle physics effects due to its relative simplicity. I further argue that the development of finite-temperature field theory played an important secondary role in the rise of the effective field theory worldview, and investigate the status of the analogies between phase transitions in particle physics and condensed matter physics. I find that the division into “formal” versus “physical” analogies is too coarse-grained to understand the important physical developments at play.

This paper takes its cue from an unpublished manuscript by the Victorian polymath William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882). I elucidate how he attempted to integrate science and religion through natural theology. I argue that Jevons’s manuscript shows that he took the theory of probability to be the most appropriate tool for finding evidence of divine design in natural phenomena. Jevons thus took part in the nineteenth-century natural theology debate, specifically between William Whewell and Charles Babbage. This debate was about both how to interpret the analogy between natural and human contrivances, and about the tools which should be used in natural theology. After introducing the manuscript, I present Jevons’s religious ideas about Unitarianism and the relationship between chance and design in his writings. I show Jevons’s commitment to natural theology and his idea that humans, due to their finite intellect, should use the theory of probability to investigate divine providence. I then compare Jevons’s position to Whewell’s and Babbage’s Bridgewater Treatises. I show how they had different conceptions of natural theology compared to Jevons, and different ideas about the tools that should be used to investigate natural laws.

The historical challenges to bridge the gaps between developmental biology and population or statistical genetics under the explanatory dominance of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis during the 20th century have been thoroughly documented. However, although several attempts to integrate these fields have been made, most have been deemed unsuccessful. As an example of those efforts, in this paper I discuss the work of James Meadows Rendel, a student of J. B. S. Haldane and disciple of Conrad Hal Waddington. I present his largely forgotten or unrecognized, but innovative, ideas about canalization and the role of development in phylogeny as a valuable piece to connect these fields that could still have important ramifications for today's evolutionary biology. In fact, it is expected that the legacy of J. M. Rendel will be rediscovered, and more importantly, incorporated and extended by future researchers, in light of the growth of evolutionary developmental biology in the last decades. What is more, this case offers a chance to critically revisit standard historiographies about the dichotomy between developmental and population genetics research frameworks in 20th century biology.

A prevailing view holds that the main goal of mental health promotion is to maintain and improve positive mental health, which is not merely defined by the absence of mental disorders, but by the presence of certain abilities. There are, however, challenges associated with this view that this paper aims to identify and explore. We start by highlighting three requirements for an ethically and politically justified mental health promotion scheme: (i) using a positive concept of mental health that (ii) respects the neutrality principle while (iii) not being overly permissive. Then, we argue that the WHO's positive concept of health violates (ii), and continue by exploring three philosophical accounts (i.e., Nordenfelt, 1995, 2017; Graham 2010; Wren-Lewis & Alexandrova, 2021) that could potentially provide a solution. We show that these face a dilemma of their own: they either violate (ii) or (iii), and they can rectify one issue only by violating the other. Considering the problems linked to the positive notion of health, the final section explores the alternate route of rejecting proposition (i) and instead embracing a negative concept of health. We argue that this option does not present a more advantageous solution. We conclude by highlighting the necessity for additional research to tackle the challenges we identified.

This paper examines how a certain threshing machine was developed and improved by Jobst Heinrich Voigt and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz between 1699 and 1700. While this machine was based on various mechanical principles and instruments, including the pinned drum mechanism first noted by Georg Philipp Harsdörffer, it was later reconceptualized as a ‘mathematical’ machine. I claim that such a positioning was not unique to this machine, but part of a wider movement during the 18th century that considered various artisanal instruments as mathematical, as well as agricultural and artisanal knowledge as scientific. Examining the development and subsequent reception of this machine, I show that during the first decades of the 18th century these conceptions gave rise to a double image of this machine, and hence of agricultural knowledge in general: on the one hand, this machine was considered as more efficient and productive (while still in need of improvement); on the other hand, it was viewed, either implicitly or explicitly, as something that should be studied by mathematicians, thus reflecting a changing image of mathematics.

I propose a technique for identifying fundamental properties using structures already present in physical theories. I argue that, in conjunction with a particular naturalistic commitment, that I dub ‘algebraic naturalism’, these structures can be used to generate a standard of metaphysical determinacy. This standard can be used to rule out the possibility of a virulent strain of ‘deep’ metaphysical indeterminacy that has been imputed to quantum mechanics.