Pub Date : 2025-10-21DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102081
Majid D. Beni
Eliminative structural realism is in line with mereological nihilism. This contrasts with reconciliatory, non-eliminativist versions of structural realism, such as rainforest realism, which aim to accommodate quotidian ontology. Recently, the ordinary object ontology of rainforest realism has been defended by drawing on cognitive sciences. This paper critically examines philosophical arguments and scientific evidence, particularly from predictive processing, to argue that these sources do not support the ontology of ordinary objects but instead favour an organism-oriented form of eliminativist structural realism.
{"title":"Tables turned on table talk","authors":"Majid D. Beni","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102081","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102081","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Eliminative structural realism is in line with mereological nihilism. This contrasts with reconciliatory, non-eliminativist versions of structural realism, such as rainforest realism, which aim to accommodate quotidian ontology. Recently, the ordinary object ontology of rainforest realism has been defended by drawing on cognitive sciences. This paper critically examines philosophical arguments and scientific evidence, particularly from predictive processing, to argue that these sources do not support the ontology of ordinary objects but instead favour an organism-oriented form of eliminativist structural realism.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 102081"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145349593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-21DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102078
Raphaël Authier
This article raises the question of the meaning given by Buffon to the notion of history, through a reexamination of three aspects of a problem which has become traditional in a series of critical discussions: to what extent can Buffon's Histoire naturelle be considered as historical? This article aims to clarify Buffon's position by specifying the reasons for which his study of living beings cannot be considered as transformist or evolutionist, by showing that his work nevertheless constitutes a decisive milestone in a movement towards a historical understanding of the objects of natural sciences, and by highlighting the transformation of the very meaning of the concept of history in Buffon's texts. The gap between the Buffonian conception of the living world and that of inorganic nature, as well as the evolution of his thought from 1749 to 1778, cannot be underestimated.
{"title":"Buffon's new concept of history","authors":"Raphaël Authier","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102078","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102078","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article raises the question of the meaning given by Buffon to the notion of history, through a reexamination of three aspects of a problem which has become traditional in a series of critical discussions: to what extent can Buffon's Histoire naturelle be considered as historical? This article aims to clarify Buffon's position by specifying the reasons for which his study of living beings cannot be considered as transformist or evolutionist, by showing that his work nevertheless constitutes a decisive milestone in a movement towards a historical understanding of the objects of natural sciences, and by highlighting the transformation of the very meaning of the concept of history in Buffon's texts. The gap between the Buffonian conception of the living world and that of inorganic nature, as well as the evolution of his thought from 1749 to 1778, cannot be underestimated<em>.</em></div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 102078"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145349568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-21DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102079
Kevin C. Elliott , David B. Resnik , Wendy Lipworth
Philosophical scholarship on science and values has gradually shifted away from asking whether values have any legitimate role to play in scientific judgment and decision-making and toward considering how to responsibly manage value influences to protect the integrity, rigor, reliability, and trustworthiness of science. This scholarship has focused primarily on helping individual scientists deal with cases in which they are aware of the values at stake and are able to make conscious choices about whether to incorporate them into their judgment and decision-making. This means that accounts of the relationship between science and values tend to focus on consciously perceived values and value influences and tend to overlook the effects of subconscious values on scientific judgment and decision-making. In this paper, we aim to show how greater attention to subconscious value influence on judgment and decision-making can deepen our understanding of the relationship between science and values and provide useful guidance for managing value influences. To achieve our goal, we first examine the literature on values, interests, and conflicts of interest (COI) to demonstrate the potential for values to be subconscious and/or to exert subconscious influences on scientific judgment and decision-making. Next, we discuss some of the specific ways those subconscious influences could affect scientific reasoning. Finally, we show that most contemporary proposals for managing values in science are not well-suited to handling subconscious values or value influences, and we briefly point to some management strategies that merit further development.
{"title":"Subconscious value influences on science","authors":"Kevin C. Elliott , David B. Resnik , Wendy Lipworth","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102079","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102079","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Philosophical scholarship on science and values has gradually shifted away from asking whether values have any legitimate role to play in scientific judgment and decision-making and toward considering how to responsibly manage value influences to protect the integrity, rigor, reliability, and trustworthiness of science. This scholarship has focused primarily on helping individual scientists deal with cases in which they are aware of the values at stake and are able to make conscious choices about whether to incorporate them into their judgment and decision-making. This means that accounts of the relationship between science and values tend to focus on <em>consciously perceived</em> values and value influences and tend to overlook the effects of <em>subconscious</em> values on scientific judgment and decision-making. In this paper, we aim to show how greater attention to subconscious value influence on judgment and decision-making can deepen our understanding of the relationship between science and values and provide useful guidance for managing value influences. To achieve our goal, we first examine the literature on values, interests, and conflicts of interest (COI) to demonstrate the potential for values to be subconscious and/or to exert subconscious influences on scientific judgment and decision-making. Next, we discuss some of the specific ways those subconscious influences could affect scientific reasoning. Finally, we show that most contemporary proposals for managing values in science are not well-suited to handling subconscious values or value influences, and we briefly point to some management strategies that merit further development.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 102079"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145349559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-18DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102080
Ilvie Prince
One of the main reasons for discontinuing hormonal contraceptives or switching to less effective methods is the experience of perceived side effects. Users are particularly bothered by symptoms that health professionals consider to be mild and generally tolerable. Although these symptoms are important to users, they are rarely mentioned in evidence-based guidelines; on the contrary, medical professionals often assume that there is no evidence of a link between minor adverse symptoms and hormonal contraceptives. I will argue that this position and the following communication towards is fundamentally grounded in flawed epistemic standards and unsuitable value influences that do not reflect all the epistemic interests relevant to clinical practice. These problematic value influences set a high, unproductive evidence standard.
{"title":"On “minor” adverse effects: some misconceptions affecting the handling of epistemic risks in medical research","authors":"Ilvie Prince","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102080","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102080","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>One of the main reasons for discontinuing hormonal contraceptives or switching to less effective methods is the experience of perceived side effects. Users are particularly bothered by symptoms that health professionals consider to be mild and generally tolerable. Although these symptoms are important to users, they are rarely mentioned in evidence-based guidelines; on the contrary, medical professionals often assume that there is no evidence of a link between minor adverse symptoms and hormonal contraceptives. I will argue that this position and the following communication towards is fundamentally grounded in flawed epistemic standards and unsuitable value influences that do not reflect all the epistemic interests relevant to clinical practice. These problematic value influences set a high, unproductive evidence standard.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 102080"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145326913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-01Epub Date: 2025-08-07DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.005
Kelle Dhein
{"title":"Response to Wehner et al. (2023).","authors":"Kelle Dhein","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"113 ","pages":"11-12"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144805093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-24DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.006
Michael Jacovides
{"title":"Hume and the rotting turnip","authors":"Michael Jacovides","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"113 ","pages":"Pages 98-107"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145151639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-08DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.002
Giora Hon
{"title":"Is interdisciplinarity a synonym for the search for alternative views of nature?","authors":"Giora Hon","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"113 ","pages":"Pages 85-87"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145018906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-08DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.005
Alessandra Basso , Anna Alexandrova
We examine considerations that enter into design and evaluation of measures in social science, categorizing them into four drivers: epistemic, ethical, pragmatic, and metrological. We call them drivers to highlight their role in guiding researchers’ decisions without determining them. Through an analysis of the World Inequality Report 2022, we reveal tensions among these drivers, illustrating the complex interplay between the various demands a measure must satisfy. Our analysis highlights the need for case-by-case compromises to address these tensions, as optimizing one driver often comes at the expense of another. We explore the extent to which these compromises shape measurement practice and the principles that guide researchers in balancing them. While existing literature on measurement assumes that tensions can be resolved with good practice and use, we argue that developing a good measure requires balancing multiple demands, recognising that it might be impossible to meet all of them simultaneously.
{"title":"Measurement requires compromises: the case of economic inequality","authors":"Alessandra Basso , Anna Alexandrova","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine considerations that enter into design and evaluation of measures in social science, categorizing them into four drivers: epistemic, ethical, pragmatic, and metrological. We call them drivers to highlight their role in guiding researchers’ decisions without determining them. Through an analysis of the World Inequality Report 2022, we reveal tensions among these drivers, illustrating the complex interplay between the various demands a measure must satisfy. Our analysis highlights the need for case-by-case compromises to address these tensions, as optimizing one driver often comes at the expense of another. We explore the extent to which these compromises shape measurement practice and the principles that guide researchers in balancing them. While existing literature on measurement assumes that tensions can be resolved with good practice and use, we argue that developing a good measure requires balancing multiple demands, recognising that it might be impossible to meet all of them simultaneously.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"113 ","pages":"Pages 88-97"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145018905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-31DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.004
Matti Sarkia
This paper discusses the status of consumer sentiment indicators in macroeconomic forecasting, and argues that economists have been ambivalent between several different interpretations of the cognitive ontology of consumer sentiment: deflationism (motivated by an emphasis on economic fundamentals or rational expectations), doxastic realism (motivated by the ideas of privileged epistemic access and wisdom of the masses), and affective realism (motivated by the idea of animal spirits and willingness to spend as causal forces for the economy). These different psychological interpretations of consumer sentiment are argued to have implications for economic policy and macroeconomic forecasting owing to their contrasting assumptions about the mechanisms by which consumers acquire their views about the economy, and the ways in which their attitudes influence private consumption.
{"title":"What are consumer sentiment indicators a measure of?","authors":"Matti Sarkia","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper discusses the status of consumer sentiment indicators in macroeconomic forecasting, and argues that economists have been ambivalent between several different interpretations of the cognitive ontology of consumer sentiment: deflationism (motivated by an emphasis on economic fundamentals or rational expectations), doxastic realism (motivated by the ideas of privileged epistemic access and wisdom of the masses), and affective realism (motivated by the idea of animal spirits and willingness to spend as causal forces for the economy). These different psychological interpretations of consumer sentiment are argued to have implications for economic policy and macroeconomic forecasting owing to their contrasting assumptions about the mechanisms by which consumers acquire their views about the economy, and the ways in which their attitudes influence private consumption.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"113 ","pages":"Pages 74-84"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144922070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-30DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.007
Emily Hauptmann
{"title":"Standing out or looking for cover? Strategies for defending public funding for the social sciences in the U.S.","authors":"Emily Hauptmann","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"113 ","pages":"Pages 64-73"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144920179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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