Pub Date : 2025-08-29DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.003
Katie H. Morrow , Marie I. Kaiser
We explore the causes and outcomes of scientific conceptual change using a case study of the development of the individualized niche concept. We outline a framework for characterizing conceptual change that distinguishes between epistemically adaptive and neutral processes and outcomes of conceptual change. We then apply this framework in tracing how the individualized niche concept arose historically out of population niche thinking and how it exhibits plurality within a contemporary biological research program. While the individualized niche concept was developed adaptively to suit new research goals and empirical findings, some of its pluralistic aspects in contemporary research may have arisen neutrally, that is, for non-epistemic reasons. We suggest reasons for thinking that this plurality is unproblematic and may become useful, for instance, when it allows for the concept to be applied across differing research contexts.
{"title":"The individualized niche: A case study in scientific conceptual change","authors":"Katie H. Morrow , Marie I. Kaiser","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore the causes and outcomes of scientific conceptual change using a case study of the development of the individualized niche concept. We outline a framework for characterizing conceptual change that distinguishes between epistemically adaptive and neutral processes and outcomes of conceptual change. We then apply this framework in tracing how the individualized niche concept arose historically out of population niche thinking and how it exhibits plurality within a contemporary biological research program. While the individualized niche concept was developed adaptively to suit new research goals and empirical findings, some of its pluralistic aspects in contemporary research may have arisen neutrally, that is, for non-epistemic reasons. We suggest reasons for thinking that this plurality is unproblematic and may become useful, for instance, when it allows for the concept to be applied across differing research contexts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"113 ","pages":"Pages 54-63"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144911771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-28DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.010
Yotam Harel
Franz Boas is widely regarded as a revolutionary anthropologist, maybe even the “founding grandfather” of modern anthropology. In this paper, I examine whether, besides his scientifically pioneering work in anthropology, Boas was also a pioneer with respect to the metaphysics of race. I argue that while Boas reconstructs a biological realistic (deterministic) position about race as the popular position about race he argues with, Boas’ own position about race is best understood as anti-realism. Hence, I state that Boas accepts the biological (deterministic) meaning of race but seems to hold that given this meaning, human races are not real. I thus suggest that Boas may be taken to have led an ontological turn in the metaphysics of race rather than a semantical one, holding that human races do not exist. Boas, then, seems to be a pioneer in holding that races are not real, and his novel scientific evidence regarding so-called human races enabled him to develop his anti-realist position about race. However, I also argue that in contrast to the great influence of Boas’ scientific revolutionariness, surprisingly, his ontological turn has been almost completely unnoticed.
{"title":"Boas and the metaphysics of race in the biological race debate","authors":"Yotam Harel","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Franz Boas is widely regarded as a revolutionary anthropologist, maybe even the “founding grandfather” of modern anthropology. In this paper, I examine whether, besides his scientifically pioneering work in anthropology, Boas was also a pioneer with respect to the metaphysics of race. I argue that while Boas reconstructs a biological realistic (deterministic) position about race as the popular position about race he argues with, Boas’ own position about race is best understood as anti-realism. Hence, I state that Boas accepts the biological (deterministic) meaning of race but seems to hold that given this meaning, human races are not real. I thus suggest that Boas may be taken to have led an ontological turn in the metaphysics of race rather than a semantical one, holding that human races do not exist. Boas, then, seems to be a pioneer in holding that races are not real, and his novel scientific evidence regarding so-called human races enabled him to develop his anti-realist position about race. However, I also argue that in contrast to the great influence of Boas’ scientific revolutionariness, surprisingly, his ontological turn has been almost completely unnoticed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"113 ","pages":"Pages 46-53"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144908884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-25DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.008
Max Dresow
Few scientific terms are as colorful as the “Cambrian explosion”: the name given to the rapid increase in animal diversity and abundance between about 540 and 520 million years ago. But for all its popularity, considerable uncertainty surrounds the history of the expression. Discussions of explosive evolution date to the early twentieth century and gained in popularity during the 1940s. Still, these discussions did not emphasize— and many did not even mention— the Cambrian Period, instead focusing on later explosions as a means of characterizing a distinctive mode of evolutionary activity. So how did the Cambrian explosion come to overshadow all other evolutionary explosions to become “the Cambrian explosion”? And how have these developments shaped discussions of the nature and significance of the event? This paper examines these questions, beginning in the nineteenth century and focusing especially on the events of the twentieth century. In doing this it illuminates the contingent history of a term— and a set of ideas— that has played an outsized role in discussions of historical contingency in biology.
{"title":"How the cambrian exploded: Contingency in the history of science and life","authors":"Max Dresow","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Few scientific terms are as colorful as the “Cambrian explosion”: the name given to the rapid increase in animal diversity and abundance between about 540 and 520 million years ago. But for all its popularity, considerable uncertainty surrounds the history of the expression. Discussions of explosive evolution date to the early twentieth century and gained in popularity during the 1940s. Still, these discussions did not emphasize— and many did not even <em>mention</em>— the Cambrian Period, instead focusing on later explosions as a means of characterizing a distinctive mode of evolutionary activity. So how did the Cambrian explosion come to overshadow all other evolutionary explosions to become “<em>the</em> Cambrian explosion”? And how have these developments shaped discussions of the nature and significance of the event? This paper examines these questions, beginning in the nineteenth century and focusing especially on the events of the twentieth century. In doing this it illuminates the contingent history of a term— and a set of ideas— that has played an outsized role in discussions of historical contingency in biology.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"113 ","pages":"Pages 34-45"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144893014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-23DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.009
Ryan E. McCoy
This paper provides a methodological argument for local knowledge inclusion within climate research, as well as highlights the unique ethical and epistemic challenges in doing so. I first discuss the limitations of “top-down” modeling methods for garnering certain kinds of local climate information, as well as the need to understand local factors that mediate climate impacts. This in turn motivates the use of “bottom-up” approaches that incorporate local knowledge and engage directly within community members. I then clarify what local knowledge is and argue that it constitutes a form of experience-based expertise that can in certain contexts become contributory expertise. In discussing what it means for local knowledge to be contributory, I show how local knowledge meets criteria for useable climate information, as well as why we should assess usefulness internal to local knowledge frameworks. I then highlight specific areas where local knowledge can play this contributory role within climate research, as well as further challenges for local knowledge inclusion.
{"title":"The contributory role of local knowledge in climate research","authors":"Ryan E. McCoy","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper provides a methodological argument for local knowledge inclusion within climate research, as well as highlights the unique ethical and epistemic challenges in doing so. I first discuss the limitations of “top-down” modeling methods for garnering certain kinds of local climate information, as well as the need to understand local factors that mediate climate impacts. This in turn motivates the use of “bottom-up” approaches that incorporate local knowledge and engage directly within community members. I then clarify what local knowledge is and argue that it constitutes a form of experience-based expertise that can in certain contexts become contributory expertise. In discussing what it means for local knowledge to be contributory, I show how local knowledge meets criteria for useable climate information, as well as why we should assess usefulness internal to local knowledge frameworks. I then highlight specific areas where local knowledge can play this contributory role within climate research, as well as further challenges for local knowledge inclusion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"113 ","pages":"Pages 24-33"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144890045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-18DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.004
Frank Cabrera
Although William Herschel (1738–1822) is most well-known as an astronomer and instrument-maker, he also had interests in speculative philosophy (e.g., metaphysics), as several papers he read at the Bath Philosophical Society reveal. These papers, arguably, are the context in which Herschel engaged most directly in philosophical argumentation and are thus worthy of greater scholarly attention. In this article, I focus on Herschel's paper entitled “On the Utility of Speculative Inquiries,” in which he debates the legitimacy of speculation with an unnamed interlocutor, referred to as the “Gentleman.” In section 1, I briefly discuss Herschel's intellectual background. In section 2, I review some of the main points of contention between Herschel and the Gentleman. In section 3, I situate their dispute within a broader intellectual context by reference to the distinction between “experimental philosophy” and “speculative philosophy” (ESD). In section 4, I discuss the possible identity of the Gentleman, favoring the itinerant teacher of experimental philosophy John Arden over the more well-known Joseph Priestley. In section 5, I argue for the historical significance of this exchange, specifically that Herschel's debate provides support for the superiority of the ESD as a historiographical framework over the more familiar rationalism vs. empiricism distinction (RED). In section 6, I examine three further arguments Herschel provides to defend speculative inquiry. I conclude in section 7 by connecting Herschel's arguments to contemporary debates in general philosophy of science on the role that speculation plays in advancing scientific progress.
{"title":"William Herschel's defense of speculative inquiry","authors":"Frank Cabrera","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.08.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Although William Herschel (1738–1822) is most well-known as an astronomer and instrument-maker, he also had interests in speculative philosophy (e.g., metaphysics), as several papers he read at the Bath Philosophical Society reveal. These papers, arguably, are the context in which Herschel engaged most directly in philosophical argumentation and are thus worthy of greater scholarly attention. In this article, I focus on Herschel's paper entitled “On the Utility of Speculative Inquiries,” in which he debates the legitimacy of speculation with an unnamed interlocutor, referred to as the “Gentleman.” In section 1, I briefly discuss Herschel's intellectual background. In section 2, I review some of the main points of contention between Herschel and the Gentleman. In section 3, I situate their dispute within a broader intellectual context by reference to the distinction between “experimental philosophy” and “speculative philosophy” (ESD). In section 4, I discuss the possible identity of the Gentleman, favoring the itinerant teacher of experimental philosophy John Arden over the more well-known Joseph Priestley. In section 5, I argue for the historical significance of this exchange, specifically that Herschel's debate provides support for the superiority of the ESD as a historiographical framework over the more familiar rationalism vs. empiricism distinction (RED). In section 6, I examine three further arguments Herschel provides to defend speculative inquiry. I conclude in section 7 by connecting Herschel's arguments to contemporary debates in general philosophy of science on the role that speculation plays in advancing scientific progress.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"113 ","pages":"Pages 13-23"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144861102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-29DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.003
Matthias Ackermann
Computer simulations are commonly employed when researchers work with analytically intractable or practically unsolvable mathematical modeling equations. In such cases, scientists seem to deal with two different but interrelated kinds of models: a mathematical model and a simulation model. This raises at least two philosophically interesting questions. First, does one or the other model figure centrally in the activity of generating an explanation in such situations? And second, what could an account of explanation involving both mathematical models and simulation models look like? I will argue that, in a large set of cases, the simulation model serves the central role in explanatory discovery. On this basis, I will then present a counterfactual account of simulation model-induced explanation. I claim that on this approach, we often find that the simulation model possesses an explanatory autonomy from its underlying mathematical models and conclude by relating this notion to extant views on the autonomous role of scientific models.
{"title":"Explaining with simulation models","authors":"Matthias Ackermann","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Computer simulations are commonly employed when researchers work with analytically intractable or practically unsolvable mathematical modeling equations. In such cases, scientists seem to deal with two different but interrelated kinds of models: a mathematical model and a simulation model. This raises at least two philosophically interesting questions. First, does one or the other model figure centrally in the activity of generating an explanation in such situations? And second, what could an account of explanation involving both mathematical models and simulation models look like? I will argue that, in a large set of cases, the simulation model serves the central role in explanatory discovery. On this basis, I will then present a counterfactual account of simulation model-induced explanation. I claim that on this approach, we often find that the simulation model possesses an explanatory autonomy from its underlying mathematical models and conclude by relating this notion to extant views on the autonomous role of scientific models.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"113 ","pages":"Pages 1-10"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144721857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-18DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.06.012
Jesse Hamilton , Jacqueline Mae Wallis
There have been increasing calls to improve the integration of local expertise into both scientific research and evidence-based policy development, especially for urgent problems like climate change. There are both epistemic and ethical benefits of better involving local communities in these knowledge-generating processes. Here we present a community science process model for integrating the expertise of local communities, developed through field analysis of a community science endeavor in the Galápagos Islands. We call this kind of collaboration “embedded ecology.” The process of embedded ecology is modeled by what we call the Partnership Flywheel, which includes phases for ideation, planning, implementation, and learning. The importance of sustained collaboration between external practitioners and a local community cannot be overstated, which is one reason the flywheel is iterative, allowing the focus to be on sustained project generation and improvement. After discussing the practical elements of the Partnership Flywheel process model, we argue that its simplicity and replicability are essential for any process model aimed at improving the integration of local expertise in community science, thereby addressing both current and enduring challenges in the field. In sum, we present and explore a new community science process model thus advancing a recently growing literature on the theory of participatory research.
{"title":"Embedded Ecology: The Partnership Flywheel for integrating local expertise","authors":"Jesse Hamilton , Jacqueline Mae Wallis","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.06.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.06.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>There have been increasing calls to improve the integration of local expertise into both scientific research and evidence-based policy development, especially for urgent problems like climate change. There are both epistemic and ethical benefits of better involving local communities in these knowledge-generating processes. Here we present a community science process model for integrating the expertise of local communities, developed through field analysis of a community science endeavor in the Galápagos Islands. We call this kind of collaboration “embedded ecology.” The process of embedded ecology is modeled by what we call the Partnership Flywheel, which includes phases for ideation, planning, implementation, and learning. The importance of sustained collaboration between external practitioners and a local community cannot be overstated, which is one reason the flywheel is iterative, allowing the focus to be on sustained project generation and improvement. After discussing the practical elements of the Partnership Flywheel process model, we argue that its simplicity and replicability are essential for any process model aimed at improving the integration of local expertise in community science, thereby addressing both current and enduring challenges in the field. In sum, we present and explore a new community science process model thus advancing a recently growing literature on the theory of participatory research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"112 ","pages":"Pages 179-189"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144655790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-12DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.001
Rangga Kala Mahaswa , Ainu Syaja
This article explores the shifting dynamics of local wisdom (kearifan lokal) as a research category within Indonesian academic discourse, particularly as reflected in journal publications that prominently feature the term in their titles. Although local wisdom is frequently equated with Indigenous knowledge, such conflation remains only partially accurate. While there are points of intersection, notable conceptual divergences persist underscoring the need to examine how local wisdom is understood, invoked, and positioned within the epistemological landscape of Indonesian scholarship. Drawing on a brief survey conducted through Publish or Perish software, the article outlines a provisional typology that captures how local wisdom is articulated across academic contexts. These findings suggest that local wisdom functions less as a stable or singular body of knowledge, and more as a discursive space shaped by a range of intellectual idealisms, situated commitments, and methodological compromises. Researchers engaging with this theme appear to navigate a delicate tension: between preserving the emic, often orally transmitted dimensions of local knowledge, and responding to disciplinary expectations rooted in scientific rationalism. At the same time, there is evidence of a latent ethnonationalist sentiment that further complicates the positioning of local wisdom within broader efforts to decolonize knowledge production in Indonesia.
{"title":"Questioning local wisdom in Indonesian Indigenous research","authors":"Rangga Kala Mahaswa , Ainu Syaja","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article explores the shifting dynamics of local wisdom (<em>kearifan lokal</em>) as a research category within Indonesian academic discourse, particularly as reflected in journal publications that prominently feature the term in their titles. Although local wisdom is frequently equated with Indigenous knowledge, such conflation remains only partially accurate. While there are points of intersection, notable conceptual divergences persist underscoring the need to examine how local wisdom is understood, invoked, and positioned within the epistemological landscape of Indonesian scholarship. Drawing on a brief survey conducted through <em>Publish or Perish</em> software, the article outlines a provisional typology that captures how local wisdom is articulated across academic contexts. These findings suggest that local wisdom functions less as a stable or singular body of knowledge, and more as a discursive space shaped by a range of intellectual idealisms, situated commitments, and methodological compromises. Researchers engaging with this theme appear to navigate a delicate tension: between preserving the emic, often orally transmitted dimensions of local knowledge, and responding to disciplinary expectations rooted in scientific rationalism. At the same time, there is evidence of a latent ethnonationalist sentiment that further complicates the positioning of local wisdom within broader efforts to decolonize knowledge production in Indonesia.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"112 ","pages":"Pages 170-178"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144614336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-12DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.06.010
Yael Silver , Ayelet Shavit
Interaction with local communities is commonly known as academia's "third mission," yet academia-community rifts are still common, running deeper in marginalized communities. A first step toward bridging the gap is clarification. We review core concepts (e.g., 'outreach,' 'accessibility,' 'engagement'), sort them into two model frameworks – "Ivory Tower" and "Reciprocal” or “Win-Win” – and describe their distinct structures. Both are helpful in relevant contexts. However, their default application hampers certain epistemic values, enacts unjust hierarchical boundaries, and indirectly ties diversity with personal alienation and ethnic divergence. Therefore, another model is suggested: “Communal Academia.” We unfold how this model foregrounds activism, heterogeneity, and pluralistic interaction. Imaginary and real-life examples demonstrate the practice-based advantages of this framework, and the philosophical relevance of a communal approach is reflected upon.
{"title":"Communal philosophy? A possible framework for academia-community interaction","authors":"Yael Silver , Ayelet Shavit","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.06.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.06.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Interaction with local communities is commonly known as academia's \"third mission,\" yet academia-community rifts are still common, running deeper in marginalized communities. A first step toward bridging the gap is clarification. We review core concepts (e.g., 'outreach,' 'accessibility,' 'engagement'), sort them into two model frameworks – \"Ivory Tower\" and \"Reciprocal” or “Win-Win” – and describe their distinct structures. Both are helpful in relevant contexts. However, their default application hampers certain epistemic values, enacts unjust hierarchical boundaries, and indirectly ties diversity with personal alienation and ethnic divergence. Therefore, another model is suggested: “Communal Academia.” We unfold how this model foregrounds activism, heterogeneity, and pluralistic interaction. Imaginary and real-life examples demonstrate the practice-based advantages of this framework, and the philosophical relevance of a communal approach is reflected upon.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"112 ","pages":"Pages 161-169"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144604854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-10DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.002
Sven Ove Hansson
A directly action-guiding experiment (trial) is an experiment performed to determine whether or to what extent some potential practical intervention has the desired effects. Clinical trials and agricultural field trials are prominent examples. Directly action-guiding experiments have been used in farming and various crafts since long before modern science. The trialability of a desired outcome is the (degree of) facility with which interventions that bring it about can be found and experimentally verified. This article introduces a framework for analyzing trialability in terms of eleven dimensions. The framework is applied to a comparison between trialability in traditional agriculture and traditional (prescientific) medicine. It turns out that trialability is in several respects greater in agriculture than in medicine. This finding can contribute to explaining why directly action-guiding experiments were common in agriculture long before they were introduced in medicine.
{"title":"Trialability","authors":"Sven Ove Hansson","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.07.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A directly action-guiding experiment (trial) is an experiment performed to determine whether or to what extent some potential practical intervention has the desired effects. Clinical trials and agricultural field trials are prominent examples. Directly action-guiding experiments have been used in farming and various crafts since long before modern science. The <em>trialability</em> of a desired outcome is the (degree of) facility with which interventions that bring it about can be found and experimentally verified. This article introduces a framework for analyzing trialability in terms of eleven dimensions. The framework is applied to a comparison between trialability in traditional agriculture and traditional (prescientific) medicine. It turns out that trialability is in several respects greater in agriculture than in medicine. This finding can contribute to explaining why directly action-guiding experiments were common in agriculture long before they were introduced in medicine.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"112 ","pages":"Pages 153-160"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144588657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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