Studies in History and Philosophy of Science最新文献

This article explores the emergence of molecular approaches in German genetic research during the 1958–1968 decade as a period of contingency and alternative possibilities. We introduce “Narratives of Contingency” as an analytical framework to examine how scientists construct a specific narrative - linking past experiences with expectations of future conditions - in order to outline and navigate pathway-decisions in the present.

We apply this framework to Hans-Jörg Rheinberger's developmental model of molecular genetics and illustrate how the stages he identifies - the direction of the field, institutional developments, and epistemological demarcations - were already central themes in the comparative practices underlying narratives of contingency in this early period. Narratives of contingency can thus serve as a systematic framework for analyzing the processes through which new scientific fields, institutions, and epistemic horizons emerge, and possibly also for identifying historically plausible fork moments or alternative pathways not taken.

The debate between the revisionist and received views of the relationship between Thomas Kuhn and logical empiricism has until now focused on the relationship between Kuhn and Rudolf Carnap. Here, I consider the relationship between Kuhn and two other members of the Vienna Circle's left-wing; Otto Neurath and Philipp Frank. It is argued that the attribution of the historical turn in philosophy of science to Kuhn obscures the historical awareness displayed in important works by members of the Vienna Circle, and thereby distorts its legacy. Both Frank and Neurath recognised the role for history in theorizing about science, and drawing upon these insights lead them to considerations of scientific theory-choice, rational disagreement, and the role of extra-scientific values in science, that anticipate those later made famous by Kuhn. It is also argued that the Left-Vienna Circle's programme for Unified Science, the replacement of traditional philosophy with a bipartite metatheory of science, provides a clearer and potentially more radical role for the history of science within the philosophy of science than Kuhn's. To reach this conclusion, it is demonstrated that some members of the Vienna Circle maintained a far less robust distinction between contexts of discovery and justification than has typically been attributed to them.

In this paper, I will focus on the nature of theoretical concepts, i.e., the psychological entities related to theoretical terms in science. I will first argue that the standard picture of theoretical concepts in twentieth-century philosophy of science understood them as representation-oriented common taxonomic concepts. However, I will show how, in light of recent pragmatist approaches to scientific laws and theories, several important theoretical concepts in science do not seem to fit such picture. I will then argue that these theoretical concepts should be understood instead as goal-derived concepts, since their construction and use exhibit the typical characteristics that cognitive scientists assign to goal-derived concepts. I will furthermore argue that the existence of theoretical concepts that are goal-derived concepts represents yet another example of the central role that human goals play in science.

The prevailing narrative in the history of science maintains that the ancient Greeks did not have a concept of a ‘law of nature’. This paper overturns that narrative and shows that some ancient Greek philosophers did have an idea of laws of nature and, moreover, they referred to them as ‘laws of nature’. This paper analyzes specific examples of laws of nature in texts by Plato, Aristotle, Philo of Alexandria, Nicomachus of Gerasa, and Galen. These examples emerged out of the closely intertwined Platonic and Pythagorean traditions, and these philosophers' texts make reference to laws of nature when describing arithmetical methods, arithmological doctrines, or medical theories. Nicomachus' laws of nature are especially noteworthy, because they have features that historians look for in the search for the origin of the modern concept of laws of nature. Nicomachus' laws of nature are mathematical, universal, and necessary. This paper raises the possibility that the ancient Platonic and Pythagorean traditions influenced the subsequent development of the idea of laws of nature in medieval and early modern Europe, including the conception of laws of nature deployed by Johannes Kepler and Isaac Newton.

Although Mary Hesse remains an influential figure within the history of the philosophy of science her reflections on the role of the human imagination in science have, to date, been mostly neglected. In her first, and often overlooked monograph—Science and the Human Imagination—Hesse described the imagination as composed of four dimensions. Defined as the historical, the critical, the fertile and the creative imagination, these dimensions played, for Hesse, various roles in both the philosophy and practice of science.

Suffice to say, Hesse's discussion of the role of the imagination in science challenges the idea that philosophy and science are logically determined forms of practice through an appeal, as will be argued, to Immanuel Kant's seminal reflections on the ‘indispensable function’ of the imagination. Accordingly, a detailed elucidation of Science and the Human Imagination not only situates Hesse's reflections within the long history of the philosophy of the imagination; it revitalises anew contemporary debates on the role of the imagination in the philosophy and practice of science.

This paper, in a nutshell, is a plea for community participation in research along with an adapted idea for how such participation should be shaped and understood. I will give varied examples of the ways in which scientists viewing a perceived problem solely from an external perspective has led to mistakes. If we do not properly take into account the knowledge and values of people with a condition, we are liable to pursue the wrong sorts of treatments. In particular, I provide examples of three ways (exemplified in the cases of “female hysteria”, autism, and chronic fatigue syndrome) scientists are liable to pursue treatment of what they perceive to be at least partially mental illnesses that they/we shouldn't. I present the idea of deliberative research—the concept is based on that of deliberative democracy. The idea of deliberative democracy is that decisions should be made on the basis of reasons that would be acceptable to the target population. I similarly argue that research decisions should be made on the basis of reasons that would be acceptable to the target population, even if it requires other experts to determine how those reasons are best to be respected in the context of a particular project.

Evolution requires selection. Molecular/chemical/preDarwinian evolution is no exception. One molecule must be selected over another for molecular evolution to occur and advance. Evolution, however, has no goal. The laws of physics have no utilitarian desire, intent or proficiency. Laws and constraints are blind to “usefulness.” How then were potential multi-step processes anticipated, valued and pursued by inanimate nature? Can orchestration of formal systems be physico-chemically spontaneous? The purely physico-dynamic self-ordering of Chaos Theory and irreversible non-equilibrium thermodynamic “engines of disequilibria conversion” achieve neither orchestration nor formal organization. Natural selection is a passive and after-the-fact-of-life selection. Darwinian selection reduces to the differential survival and reproduction of the fittest already-living organisms. In the case of abiogenesis, selection had to be 1) Active, 2) Pre-Function, and 3) Efficacious. Selection had to take place at the molecular level prior to the existence of non-trivial functional processes. It could not have been passive or secondary. What naturalistic mechanisms might have been at play?

There has been a lot of discussion about Heisenberg’s Umdeutung paper of 1925, which is universally credited as the first formulation of modern quantum mechanics. Much of this discussion has been characterized by puzzlement over the manner in which Heisenberg arrived at his formulation, supposedly through Bohr’s atomic theory in conjunction with two philosophical principles, namely the Correspondence Principle and the Observability Principle. I provide textual, contextual, and philosophical evidence that the “prescriptive-dynamical framework” – recently advocated in the literature on independent grounds – is the perfect perspective from which to understand Heisenberg’s work and the significance of the two principles he utilized to arrive at it.

Neuroscientists routinely use reverse inference (RI) to draw conclusions about cognitive processes from neural activation data. However, despite its widespread use, the methodological status of RI is a matter of ongoing controversy, with some critics arguing that it should be rejected wholesale on the grounds that it instantiates a deductively invalid argument form. In response to these critiques, some have proposed to conceive of RI as a form of abduction or inference to the best explanation (IBE). We side with this response but at the same time argue that a defense of RI requires more than identifying it as a form of IBE. In this paper, we give an analysis of what determines the quality of an RI conceived as an IBE and on that basis argue that whether an RI is warranted needs to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Support for our argument will come from a detailed methodological discussion of RI in cognitive neuroscience in light of what the recent literature on IBE has identified as the main quality indicators for IBEs.