Studies in History and Philosophy of Science最新文献

In the article, mainly based on the reference to the entries in the diary of Th. Dobzhansky, a geneticist and one of the founders of the “synthetic theory of evolution”, examines how Dobzhansky tried to combine science, primarily evolutionary theory, and religion. It is argued that although Dobxzhansky was a believer during whole his life, he became a peculiar believer who revised for himself and for others the former, primarily religious answers to the “ultimate questions” of existence, and posed these questions in a new, evolutionary way. Even more, he tried to substantiate and justify religion and his belief in God through the evolutionary theory, to demonstrate that science and religion are not incompatible, and to offer his believe in the usefulness of science and religion to each other. This Dobzhansky's attempt was perceived and evaluated ambiguously by both scientists and religious figures. In addition, Dobzhansky owing to his search for these answers, made a number of world outlook and general cultural conclusions for himself and presented these conclusions in articles and books written not only for colleagues in the scientific community, but also for other people.

We propose that the epistemic functions of replication in science are best understood by relating them to kinds of experimental error/uncertainty. One kind of replication, which we call “direct replications,” principally serves to assess the reliability of an experiment through its precision: the presence and degree of random error/statistical uncertainty. The other kind of replication, which we call “conceptual replications,” principally serves to assess the validity of an experiment through its accuracy: the presence and degree of systematic errors/uncertainties. To illustrate the aptness of this general view, we examine the Hubble constant controversy in astronomy, showing how astronomers have responded to the concordances and discordances in their results by carrying out the different kinds of replication that we identify, with the aim of establishing a precise, accurate value for the Hubble constant. We contrast our view with Machery's “re-sampling” account of replication, which maintains that replications only assess reliability.

The first formal definition of randomness, seen as a property of sequences of events or experimental outcomes, dates back to Richard von Mises’ work in the foundations of probability and statistics. The randomness notion introduced by von Mises is nowadays widely regarded as being too weak. This is, to a large extent, due to the work of Jean Ville, which is often described as having dealt the death blow to von Mises’ approach, and which was integral to the development of algorithmic randomness—the now-standard theory of randomness for elements of a probability space. The main goal of this article is to trace the history and provide an in-depth appraisal of two lesser-known, yet historically and methodologically notable proposals for how to modify von Mises’ definition so as to avoid Ville’s objection. The first proposal is due to Abraham Wald, while the second one is due to Claus-Peter Schnorr. We show that, once made precise in a natural way using computability theory, Wald’s proposal constitutes a much more radical departure from von Mises’ framework than intended. Schnorr’s proposal, on the other hand, does provide a partial vindication of von Mises’ approach: it demonstrates that it is possible to obtain a satisfactory randomness notion—indeed, a canonical algorithmic randomness notion—by characterizing randomness in terms of the invariance of limiting relative frequencies. More generally, we argue that Schnorr’s proposal, together with a number of little-known related results, reveals that there is more continuity than typically acknowledged between von Mises’ approach and algorithmic randomness. Even though von Mises’ exclusive focus on limiting relative frequencies did not survive the passage to the theory of algorithmic randomness, another crucial aspect of his conception of randomness did endure; namely, the idea that randomness amounts to a certain type of stability or invariance under an appropriate class of transformations.

Abraham Flexner's 1910 report on medical education is widely regarded as a watershed moment in the history of modern medicine in the US and beyond. Most commentators focus on its administrative and managerial impact, despite Flexner dedicating a sizeable portion of his report to a theoretical account of the kind of medicine that he seeks to implement. Close attention to these sections reveals a surprisingly coherent account of medicine that, based on a Deweyan Pragmatist philosophy of science, unites scientific investigator and medical practitioner in a new experimental paradigm of science. Flexner can develop an account that goes beyond a mere epistemic redefinition of medicine, providing the profession with a social, cultural, and ethical identity that avails itself of the extremely wide purview that Dewey granted to modern science. Due to the subsequent narrowing of philosophy of science to a delimited academic subdiscipline, these broad Pragmatist philosophical commitments at the roots of Flexner's scientific medicine remained a largely unexplored intellectual legacy.

Scientific medicine and homeopathy are interesting case studies for the ongoing project of demarcating science from pseudoscience. Much of the demarcation literature formulates abstract criteria for demarcating science from pseudoscience generally. In service of a more localist approach to the demarcation problem, I reconstruct a specific demarcating difference, the like comparison criterion, invoked by nineteenth century adherents to an early model of scientific medicine. If it is to remain relevant today, I argue that the like comparison criterion must be updated in our current era of epidemiological, evidence-based medicine to recognize the importance of assessing study bias and mechanistic implausibility in contemporary medical science.

Faced with the mathematical possibility of non-Euclidean geometries, 19th Century geometers were tasked with the problem of determining which among the possible geometries corresponds to that of our space. In this context, the contribution of the Belgian philosopher-mathematician, Joseph Delboeuf, has been unduly neglected. The aim of this essay is to situate Delboeuf’s ideas within the context of the philosophies of geometry of his contemporaries, such as Helmholtz, Russell and Poincaré. We elucidate the central thesis, according to which Euclidean geometry is given special status on the basis of the relativity of magnitudes, we uncover its hidden history and show that it is defensible within the context of the philosophies of geometry of the epoch. Through this discussion, we also develop various ideas that have some relevance to present-day methods in gravitational physics and cosmology.

A trained physicist, Kurd Lasswitz (1848–1910) is best known as a novelist, the father of modern German science fiction, and as a historian of science, the initiator of the modern historiography of atomism. In the late 19th century, Lasswitz engaged in an intense dialogue with the emerging Marburg school of neo-Kantianism, contributing to shaping most of its defining tenets. By the end of the decade, this research had grown into a two-volume Geschichte der Atomistik (1890), which remains the most successful example of neo-Kantian historiography of science. Lasswitz combined attention to historical detail with the search for the intellectual tools (Denkmittel) without which the ‘fact of science’ would be impossible. In particular, Lasswitz regarded Huygens’ kinetic atomism as a historical model of a successful scientific theory, shaped by the interplay of two conceptual tools: (a) substantiality, the requirement for identity of the subject of motion through time, which found its scientific expression in the extensive atom; (b) variability, the intensive tendency to continue in an instant, which found its conceptual fixation in the notion of ‘differential’. By raising the problem of individuality in physics, Lasswitz offers a unique perspective on the utilization of the history of science in 19th-century neo-Kantian thought.

In the 1960s, the demonstration of interference effects using two laser-beams raised the question: can two photons interfere? Its plausibility contested Dirac’s dictum, “Interference between two different photons never occurs”. Disagreements about this conflict led to a controversy. This paper will chart the controversy’s contour and show that it evolved over two phases. Subsequently, I investigate the reasons for its perpetuation. The controversy was initiated and fuelled by several misinterpretations of the dictum. I also argue that Dirac’s dictum is not applicable to two photon interference as they belong to different contexts of interference. Recognising this resolves the controversy.

There are many arguments against the possibility of experimenting on the whole universe. This system seems to be too big to be manipulated, it exists in only one exemplar and its evolution is a non-repeatable process. In this paper, I claim that we can nonetheless talk about experimentation in cosmology if we use Woodward’s non-anthropocentric notion of intervention. However, Woodward and other interventionists argued that an intervention was necessarily an exogenous causal process and thus that no intervention on a closed system such as the universe was possible. I discuss their argument and I determine the conditions under which a consistent notion of endogenous intervention on the universe can be defined. Then, I show that there is at least one cosmic phenomenon satisfying these conditions: the photon decoupling. Finally, I draw some conclusions from this analysis regarding a realist approach of cosmology.

We inquire into the role of Turing’s biological thought in the development of his concept of intelligent machinery. We trace the possible relations between his proto-connectionist notion of ‘organising’ machines in Turing (1948) on the one hand and his mathematical theory of morphogenesis in developmental biology (1952) on the other. These works were concerned with distinct fields of inquiry and followed distinct paradigms of biological theory, respectively postulating analogues of Darwinian selection in learning and mathematical laws of form in organic pattern formation. Still, these strands of Turing’s work are related, first, in terms of being amenable in principle to his (1936) computational method of modelling. Second, they are connected by Turing’s scattered speculations about the possible bearing of learning processes on the anatomy of the brain. We argue that these two theories form an unequal couple that, from different angles and in partial fashion, point towards cognition as a biological and embodied phenomenon while, for reasons inherent to Turing’s computational approach to modelling, not being capable of directly addressing it as such. We explore ways in which these two distinct-but-related theories could be more explicitly and systematically connected, using von Neumann’s contemporaneous and related work on Cellular Automata and more recent biomimetic approaches as a foil. We conclude that the nature of ‘initiative’ and the mode of material realisation are the key issues that decide on the possibility of intelligent machinery in Turing.