Studies in History and Philosophy of Science最新文献

Charles Bell was famous for the discovery of the separate motor and sensory roots of the spinal and facial nerves, although in recent years his right to priority has been challenged by historians and scientists. But Charles Bell did discover something even if has not been accorded the status of a scientific fact. Between 1821 and 1823 he unveiled the ‘respiratory nervous system’, a distinct system of nerves that acted as the ‘organ of the passions’, which he then elaborated upon in his 1824 Essays on the Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression. As Bell and his allies attempted to claim priority in the spinal and facial nerves, the respiratory nerves were pushed to the background, subordinated to the motor and sensory nerves. This essay, therefore, redefines Charles Bell's major discovery as the ‘respiratory nerves’, providing a detailed description of their anatomy and physiology and the way in which they underwrote Bell's theory of the emotions. It also demonstrates how his aesthetics were intertwined with his research programme. It then connects the respiratory nerves to Thomas Dixon's assertion that Bell was one of the founders of the modern psychological category of the emotions, providing a deeper and more nuanced genealogy of the emotions, including the impact that Bell had upon William James's seminal article ‘What is an Emotion?’

The objective of this paper is twofold. First, I present a framework called historical coherentism (Chang, 2004; Tal, 2016; Van fraassen 2008) and argue that it is the best epistemological framework available to tackle the problem of coordination, an epistemic conundrum that arises with every attempt to provide empirical content to scientific theories, models or statements. Second, I argue that the problem of coordination, which has so far been theorized only in the context of measurement practices (Reichenbach, 1927; Chang, 2001; Tal, 2012; Van fraassen 2008), can be generalized beyond the philosophy of measurement. Specifically, it will be shown that the problem is embodied in classificatory practices and that, consequently, historical coherentism is well suited to analyze these practices as well as metrological ones. As a case study, I look at a contemporary debate in phylogenetics, regarding the evolutionary origin of a newly identified archaeal phylum called Methanonatronarchaeia. Exploring this debate through the lens of historical coherentism provides a detailed understanding of the dynamics of the field and a foothold for critical analyses of the standard rationale used by practitioners.

Studies of the Early Modern debate concerning absolute and relative space and motion often ignore the significance of the concept of true motion in this debate. Even philosophers who denied the existence of absolute space maintained that true motions could be distinguished from merely apparent ones. In this paper, I examine Berkeley's endorsement of this distinction and the problems it raises. First, Berkeley's endorsement raises a problem of consistency with his other philosophical commitments, namely his idealism. Second, Berkeley's endorsement raises a problem of adequacy, namely whether Berkeley can provide an adequate account of what grounds the distinction between true and merely apparent motion. In this paper, I argue that sensitivity to Berkeley's distinction between what is true in the metaphysical, scientific, and vulgar domains can address both the consistency and the adequacy problems. I argue that Berkeley only accepts true motion in the scientific and vulgar domains, and not the metaphysical. There is thus no inconsistency between his endorsement of true motion in science and ordinary language, and his metaphysical idealism. Further, I suggest that sensitivity to these three domains shows that Berkeley possesses resources to give an adequate account of how true motions are discovered in natural science.

This article examines how deduction preserves certainty and how much certainty it can preserve according to Descartes's Rules for the Direction of the Mind. I argue that the certainty of a deduction is a matter of four conditions for Descartes. First, certainty depends on whether the conjunction of simple propositions is composed with necessity or contingency. Second, a deduction approaches the certainty of an intuition depending on how many “acts of conceiving” it requires and—third—the complexity or difficulty of the acts of thinking, which is determined by the content of the thoughts and on external factors. Fourth, certainty depends on the intellectual aptitude of the person using the deduction. A deduction lacks certainty when it relies on memory such that it is not apprehended with immediacy. However, the mental capacity and speed of a mind can be increased by training the special mental faculties of perspicacity and discernment. Increasing one's intellectual aptitude allows for more steps of a deduction to be inferred in fewer acts of conceiving, thereby helping preserve the certainty of a deduction.

To a large extent, the evidential base of claims in the philosophy of science has switched from thought experiments to case studies. We argue that abandoning thought experiments was a wrong turn, since they can effectively complement case studies. We make our argument via an analogy with the relationship between experiments and observations within science. Just as experiments and ‘natural’ observations can together evidence claims in science, each mitigating the downsides of the other, so too can thought experiments and case studies be mutually supporting. After presenting the main argument, we look at potential concerns about thought experiments, suggesting that a judiciously applied mixed-methods approach can overcome them.

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the possibility of temporal nonlocality, mirroring the spatial nonlocality supposedly evidenced by the Bell correlations. In this context, Glick (2019) has argued that timelike entanglement and temporal nonlocality is demonstrated in delayed-choice entanglement swapping (DCES) experiments, like that of Ma et al. (2012), Megidish et al. (2013) and Hensen et al. (2015). I will argue that a careful analysis of these experiments shows that they in fact display nothing more than “ordinary” spacelike entanglement, and that any purported timelike entanglement is an artefact of selection bias. Regardless any other reason one may have for challenging the assumption of temporal locality, timelike entanglement as evidenced by these experiments is not among them. I conclude by discussing what lessons on the nature of entanglement might be drawn from an examination of DCES experiments.

The problem of context, which explores relations between societal conditions and science, has a long and contentious tradition in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science. While the problem has received little explicit attention in recent years, two contemporary positions remain evident. First is the resources model, which seeks to maintain the autonomy of scientists by denying contextual influence, restricting the role of contexts to providing a pool of ‘novel inputs’. Second is the contextual shaping position which recognizes that societal conditions influence science but remains conceptually vague and theoretically undeveloped. This paper argues, given current disciplinary conditions, the problem of context deserves renewed attention. In this paper I first review the history of the debate from the 1930s, highlighting several anxieties that continue to hamper the open study of the problem. After this historical review, I provide a critique of the resources model and assess the possibilities and shortfalls of the contextual shaping position. By addressing past and present perspectives, my goal is to move firmly beyond narrow accounts of context, as exemplified by the resources model. Instead, I propose a renewed program of research in which rich empirical studies are combined with equally rich theoretical work directed toward developing conceptual tools better able to capture the multiple intricacies evident in context-science relations.

This paper is about the relationship between R.A. Fisher’s fundamental theorem of natural selection (FTNS) and the two major pieces that Fisher wrote on indeterminism, “Indeterminism and Natural Selection” (1934) and Creative Aspects of Natural Law (1950). I argue that the FTNS presents a picture of natural selection that is interestingly different from what we find in these two indeterminism pieces, pace some recent work that advances the opposite conclusion. I also identify as the source of this difference both the mathematical form of the FTNS (i.e., a differential equation) and Fisher’s meta-scientific commitment to advancing “general” claims about evolution.

The paper presents a case study of the data analysis in the CDHS scattering experiment of particle physics performed in 1983. The case study compares the function of computer simulation in the data analysis with recent philosophical work on the role of simulations in high energy physics (HEP) and the theory-ladenness of the data. In the data analysis of CDHS, computer simulations entered an iterative process of probabilistic data correction. The computer simulation was a crucial ingredient of the data analysis that served to increase the accuracy of the measurement. The way in which simulation was used corresponds in a certain sense to the function of “models as mediators” (Morgan and Morrison), by mediating knowledge about measurement errors and the way of correcting them. I argue that this use of simulation did not give rise to a vicious circle of adjusting data to theory and vice versa but only to a weak, or benign, theory-ladenness of the data compatible with scientific realism. In the publication of the CDHS results, the measurement outcomes are called “observed data”, indicating a realist attitude of the physicists towards the measured quantities which does not exactly fit in with entity realism or theory realism.