With the large-scale operation of microgrids, multiple microgrids are facing severe deviation penalty risks caused by the inherent uncertainty of renewable energy sources, which significantly increase their operation costs. Shared energy storage, as an effective technical means for multi-microgrid coordination, can reduce the deviation of multi-microgrid by regulating power supply and demand in real time, absorbing the surplus power generated by multi-microgrid and supplementing the power shortage caused by renewable energy sources’ uncertainty. However, shared energy storage alone still lacks a targeted and systematic model to transfer and mitigate the deviation penalty risks of multi-microgrid. To address this gap, this paper proposes a risk transfer model for multi-microgrid-shared energy storage based on symmetric Nash bargaining game. The risk transfer is realized through insurance service provided by shared energy storage. Microgrids purchase insurance power from shared energy storage in the day-ahead market, and shared energy storage provides compensation power to reduce microgrids’ deviation penalty costs during real-time operation. To solve this risk transfer model efficiently, we decompose it into two steps and adopt the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers. Finally, three simulation scenarios are set up to verify the model. The results show that the proposed model significantly reduces the deviation penalty costs of microgrids by up to 75.70%. The symmetric Nash bargaining game adopted by the model balance the distribution of benefits among all participants after considering risk transfer, and the total operation cost of the microgrids are reduced by up to 59.38%.
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