Journal of Financial Economics最新文献

RMBS sponsors contributed to the rise of new product features in securitized mortgages prior to the 2008 financial crisis. Using a regulatory shock to sponsor competition , we show securitization influences the design of mortgage contracts, empirically demonstrating a unique, feedback loop of product differentiation from the derived security (MBS) to the underlying asset (loans). Product differentiation in Prime MBS collateral rises faster than that of non-prime in the early boom period (2000–2004), a strategic choice by MBS sponsors in the face of increasing competition. At very high levels of competition, product differentiation targets non-prime (marginal) borrowers. We develop a theoretical framework for sponsor-induced product differentiation that explains these empirical findings.

We propose a model of the financial system in which banks are individually prone to runs and connected through fire sales. Strategic complementarities within and across banks amplify each other, making heterogeneity in bank risks a key factor shaping the fragility of each bank and the entire system. As long as different banks are interconnected, an increase in heterogeneity stabilizes all banks. Reductions in asset commonality, bank-specific disclosures, and even broad-based policies such as asset purchases and liquidity requirements can enhance stability by increasing bank heterogeneity.

Using granular data on U.S. hotel investments over the past two decades, we show that industry-specialist PE firms achieve higher net income from operations and higher capital gains from sale than generalist PE firms for comparable properties. Those results are driven by specialists implementing more and larger cost savings without compromising revenues. Fundamentally, specialists utilize their hotel-specific operating expertise to produce superior performance outcomes. We show that specialists across investment sectors possess deeper industry-specific operating expertise. Our results suggest that specialist PE firms can compete with their generalist rivals by leveraging such expertise in a chosen market niche.

We develop a general equilibrium model of self-fulfilling bank runs. The key novelty is the way in which the banking system’s assets and liabilities are connected. Banks issue loans to entrepreneurs who sell goods to households, which in turn pay for the goods by redeeming bank deposits. The return on bank assets is thus contingent on households being able to withdraw their deposits. In a run, not all households that wish to consume manage to withdraw, since part of banks’ cash reserves end up in the hands of households without consumption needs. This misallocation of liquidity lowers revenues of entrepreneurs and bank asset returns, thereby rationalising the run. Interventions that restrict redemptions in a run can be self-defeating due to their negative effect on demand in goods markets. We show how runs can sometimes be prevented with combinations of deposit freezes and redemption penalties as well as with the provision of emergency liquidity.

We propose no-arbitrage term structure models with volatility factors that follow GARCH processes. The models’ tractability is similar to canonical affine term structure models, but they fit yield volatility much better, especially for long-maturity yields. This improvement does not come at the expense of a deterioration in yield fit. Because of the improved volatility fit, the model performs substantially better in pricing Treasury futures options. We conclude that the specification of the volatility factors is critical. Modeling volatility as a function of (lagged) squared innovations to factors improves on models where volatility is a linear function of the factors.

We develop a structural credit risk model, which allows us to price equity/credit indices and their options through the asset dynamics of index constituents. We estimate the model via MLE and find that equity and credit index option prices are well explained out-of-sample. Contrary to recent empirical findings, the two option markets are not inconsistently priced through the lens of our model. Returns on both options, while extreme, do not indicate any evidence of mispricing. Our analysis suggests that jointly addressing the pricing of various instruments requires properly attributing three different sources of systematic risk: asset, variance, and jump risks.

We provide the first analysis of the risk exposure and risk-adjusted performance of impact investing funds, private market funds with dual financial and social goals. We introduce a dataset of impact fund cash flows and exploit distortions in VC performance measures to characterize risk profiles. Impact funds have a lower market $\beta$ than comparable private market strategies. Accounting for $\beta$, impact funds underperform the public market, though not necessarily more so than comparable strategies. We consider alternative pricing models, accounting for sustainability and emerging markets risk. We show investors’ wealth portfolios and taste change the perceived financial merit of impact investing.

We document aggregate outflows from corporate bond mutual funds days before and after the announcement of increases in the Federal Funds Target rate (FFTar). To rationalize this phenomenon, we build a model in which funds’ net-asset-values (NAVs) are stale and investors strategically redeem to profit from the mispricing when they learn about the increases of FFTar. Consistent with the model’s predictions, we find that stale NAVs and loose monetary policy environments weaken (strengthen) outflows sensitivity to increases in FFTar during illiquid (liquid) market conditions. Our results highlight when and how monetary policy could systematically exacerbate the fragility of corporate bond funds.

A critical question facing speculators contemplating to trade on private information is whether their signal has already been priced in by the market. In our model, speculators assess the novelty of their information based on recent price movements, and market makers are aware that speculators might be trading on stale news. An asymmetric response to past price movements ensues: after price increases, buy volume – because it may result from stale news trading – has a lower price impact than sell volume (and vice versa after price decreases). Consequently, return skewness is negatively related to lagged returns. We find strong support for these and other predictions using a comprehensive sample of US stocks.