Journal of Financial Economics最新文献

We study the extent to which time-variation in market betas influence estimates of CAPM alphas. Given the observed variation in conditional market betas, market risk premia, and market variance, the required compensation for conditional market risk can, in theory, be as large as the unconditional equity premium. We implement the conditional CAPM using state-of-the-art methods in a broad global sample. We find that accounting for conditional risk helps explain the return on all the major anomalies we consider and that conditional risk explains two percentage points of alpha for value, investment, and momentum strategies in recent years.

This paper studies the rise of direct lending using a comprehensive dataset of investments by business development companies (BDC). We exploit three exogenous shocks to credit supply, including new banking regulations and a major finance company collapse, to establish that BDC capital acts as a substitute for traditional financing. Using firm-level data, we further document that firms’ access to BDC funding stimulates their employment growth and patenting activity. Beyond credit provision, BDCs contribute to firm growth through managerial assistance.

We examine the pricing of sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs), where the cash flows depend on the bond issuer achieving one or more Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) goals. Investors are willing to accept a 1–2bps lower yield due to the bond’s ESG label, providing evidence of investors caring about environmental impact. Furthermore, we find the average probability of missing the target is 14%–39% so firms set ESG targets that are easy to reach. We find that the SLB market is efficient: the prices of SLBs depend strongly on the size of the potential penalty and there is no evidence of mispricing. Finally, our results suggest that SLBs serve as financial hedges against ESG risk.

RMBS sponsors contributed to the rise of new product features in securitized mortgages prior to the 2008 financial crisis. Using a regulatory shock to sponsor competition , we show securitization influences the design of mortgage contracts, empirically demonstrating a unique, feedback loop of product differentiation from the derived security (MBS) to the underlying asset (loans). Product differentiation in Prime MBS collateral rises faster than that of non-prime in the early boom period (2000–2004), a strategic choice by MBS sponsors in the face of increasing competition. At very high levels of competition, product differentiation targets non-prime (marginal) borrowers. We develop a theoretical framework for sponsor-induced product differentiation that explains these empirical findings.

We propose a model of the financial system in which banks are individually prone to runs and connected through fire sales. Strategic complementarities within and across banks amplify each other, making heterogeneity in bank risks a key factor shaping the fragility of each bank and the entire system. As long as different banks are interconnected, an increase in heterogeneity stabilizes all banks. Reductions in asset commonality, bank-specific disclosures, and even broad-based policies such as asset purchases and liquidity requirements can enhance stability by increasing bank heterogeneity.

Using granular data on U.S. hotel investments over the past two decades, we show that industry-specialist PE firms achieve higher net income from operations and higher capital gains from sale than generalist PE firms for comparable properties. Those results are driven by specialists implementing more and larger cost savings without compromising revenues. Fundamentally, specialists utilize their hotel-specific operating expertise to produce superior performance outcomes. We show that specialists across investment sectors possess deeper industry-specific operating expertise. Our results suggest that specialist PE firms can compete with their generalist rivals by leveraging such expertise in a chosen market niche.

We develop a general equilibrium model of self-fulfilling bank runs. The key novelty is the way in which the banking system’s assets and liabilities are connected. Banks issue loans to entrepreneurs who sell goods to households, which in turn pay for the goods by redeeming bank deposits. The return on bank assets is thus contingent on households being able to withdraw their deposits. In a run, not all households that wish to consume manage to withdraw, since part of banks’ cash reserves end up in the hands of households without consumption needs. This misallocation of liquidity lowers revenues of entrepreneurs and bank asset returns, thereby rationalising the run. Interventions that restrict redemptions in a run can be self-defeating due to their negative effect on demand in goods markets. We show how runs can sometimes be prevented with combinations of deposit freezes and redemption penalties as well as with the provision of emergency liquidity.

We propose no-arbitrage term structure models with volatility factors that follow GARCH processes. The models’ tractability is similar to canonical affine term structure models, but they fit yield volatility much better, especially for long-maturity yields. This improvement does not come at the expense of a deterioration in yield fit. Because of the improved volatility fit, the model performs substantially better in pricing Treasury futures options. We conclude that the specification of the volatility factors is critical. Modeling volatility as a function of (lagged) squared innovations to factors improves on models where volatility is a linear function of the factors.

We develop a structural credit risk model, which allows us to price equity/credit indices and their options through the asset dynamics of index constituents. We estimate the model via MLE and find that equity and credit index option prices are well explained out-of-sample. Contrary to recent empirical findings, the two option markets are not inconsistently priced through the lens of our model. Returns on both options, while extreme, do not indicate any evidence of mispricing. Our analysis suggests that jointly addressing the pricing of various instruments requires properly attributing three different sources of systematic risk: asset, variance, and jump risks.