British Journal of Sociology最新文献

Whether students educated in different ability tracks in secondary education develop different levels of civic and democratic engagement is yet unclear. To explore this issue, we focus on how schools bring students of different tracks and family backgrounds together, and whether such between-school differences are associated with varying growth rates in civic and democratic engagement during secondary education. Using newly collected 4-year panel data starting at the very beginning of the Dutch tracked educational system, the Dutch Adolescent Panel on Democratic Values (DAPDV), we study developments in institutional trust, societal interest, voting intention, and political knowledge. Growth curve models show that much of the variation between tracks and between schools is rather stable, although track differences in institutional trust became more pronounced. Although schools that are more compositionally diverse vary from homogeneous schools, track differences are largely present already at the start of secondary education. Within-individual transition models show that students moving up to more advanced tracks do gain in political knowledge.

This article contributes to current debates on the ethics of critical scholarship in an era of authoritarian consolidation and institutional erosion. It introduces intellectual solidarity as an ethical stance and reflexive dislocation as a methodological practice that together offer a grounded response to the complicities and constraints of academic life today. Drawing on personal experiences of academic migration-from the Philippines and the United States to Germany and the Netherlands-it explores how authoritarian logics are embedded in institutions often assumed to offer refuge, including the university. These logics manifest through marketisation, surveillance governance, and epistemic austerity. Situated within critical traditions of engaged scholarship, this commentary argues that sustaining sociology's relevance requires more than reflexivity-it demands a commitment to epistemic humility, public accountability, and institutional courage. In calling for a renewed public vocation of the social sciences, it offers intellectual solidarity and reflexive dislocation as provisional tools for thinking, acting, and relating in times of systemic crisis.

This article advances the study of racial extremism by analyzing how its practices of violence and sexuality are marked on the bodies of participants in the form of scars, physical stances, abuse, tattoos, pregnancy, injury, strength and size, using an extraordinarily rich and extensive set of narratives collected from lengthy in-person interviews with 47 former members of U.S. extremist white supremacist groups. It asks how embodied practices of violence and sexuality enable extremist white supremacist groups and actors, how embodied practices of violence and sexuality disable these groups and actors, and how gender matters in embodied practices in these groups. As a lens into embodied practices of violence, interview narratives about participants' preparation and deployment of their bodies in violent situations are analyzed, with attention to the gendered nature of these processes. Similarly, interviewees' narratives about their racialization of sexuality and sexual transactions are analyzed to understand embodied practices of sexuality and their gendered aspects. The embodiment of racist violence is found to be important in making racial extremism a visceral aspect of the lives of its adherents. This is highly gendered, as women and men use and experience violence in different ways. The embodiment of racist sexuality is found to be an iterative process of assessing one's sexuality and the value of one's sexual body to others, a process that serves as a portal to women's victimization while allowing some women to gain access and influence in a highly misogynistic world.

People with higher education hold more positive attitudes towards immigrants than those without. Previous studies have attempted to net out selection mechanisms to examine whether there is a causal effect of higher education on attitudes towards immigrants. However, parental higher education has been largely neglected as a likely source of this selection. Using UKHLS data on individuals and their parents for the UK and employing the khb decomposition model, we examine if and why parental education influences attitudes towards immigrants. First, we show that, net of individual educational attainment, individuals whose parents have a university degree are more likely to have more positive attitudes towards immigrants. More highly educated people have more positive attitudes, but parental education reinforces this association or compensates for low educational attainment. Second, we illustrate that the relationship between parental higher education and attitudes towards immigrants is mediated by two mechanisms: parental socialisation and individual education. In contrast, socio-economic positioning while growing up makes a negligible contribution. Our findings suggest that formative years are crucial for the development of attitudes towards immigrants later in life and that educational inequalities of today affect the attitudes towards immigrants of tomorrow.

In this research note, we map the power elite in Greenland, amidst the current geopolitical interest in the nation. Using social network analysis, we identify a power elite of 123 individuals as the central circle in an extensive affiliation network data on 3412 positions held by a total 2052 individuals in 456 affiliations. We find an integrated and cohesive power elite dominated by actors from politics and public and private enterprises. When comparing this central circle to the previous studies of power elites in the former colonial power and current sovereign, Denmark, the political sector and the state are stronger in Greenland at the expense of the private sector. However, while the elite is integrated, we also identify potentials of fracturing. Thus we find a division between politicians—who are more likely to have childhood and educational ties to Greenland—and other elite groups—in particular private business—who are more likely to have academic degrees, be male and live in the Capital, Nuuk. The network of the elite is also clearly clustered around the strength of affiliation with Greenlandic society. We conclude by discussing how the potential fracturing of the Greenlandic elite along ethnic division lines may lead to a lack of cohesion and legitimacy entering the current geopolitical tensions surrounding the world's largest island.

This article contributes to sociological scholarship on climate change by examining the development of the voluntary carbon offset market in Finland. While intended to address the collective challenge of climate change, voluntary carbon offsetting has faced criticism for commodifying emissions and shifting responsibility to specific actors. Enabled by voluntary carbon markets, emissions and climate impacts are attributed to companies and individuals, reflecting the idea that each entity possesses its ‘own’ emissions that they can choose to offset. However, this attribution does not happen on its own. The present study thus examines how the collective problem of acting on climate change is coordinated through particular moral engagements. We focus on the socio-legal formatting of the voluntary carbon offset market in the context of Finland, a Nordic welfare state. We trace the trajectory of Compensate, a key Finnish offset provider whose activities sparked public controversy and led to criminal charges for violating the country's Money Collection Act as well as a legislative reform aimed at formalising voluntary offsets. The controversy centred on the nature of voluntary offsets and whether to consider them to be generally beneficial climate actions or self-interested activities. Based on the theory of the sociology of engagements, our analysis shows how actors engage in moral and political coordination in order to foster and sustain engagements with climate change. More broadly, our case demonstrates that producing and facilitating engagement with climate change through a voluntary market is not merely a matter of implementing effective instruments and arrangements—leading ultimately to the individualisation of climate action—but a result of complex moral and socio-legal formations. We conclude that the formatting of particularised climate engagements is a collectively produced process that necessitates an analysis of the shared moral coordination involved.

This paper suggests that catastrophe insurance schemes should be considered within the framework of public goods and commons, and as a form of polycentric organization whose success depends on collective action. The first section situates catastrophe insurance within the "state withdrawal hypothesis:" while neoliberalism is usually understood as promoting a shift from social and solidary insurance programs to private, market-oriented ones, this does not apply to catastrophe insurance. The second section shows that one of the reasons for the persistence of public intervention in catastrophe insurance is its public good dimension: market best practice would indeed promote risk-based premiums leading to unaffordability issues and the disappearance of the good. Such insurance gaps are perceived as a "public bad." Catastrophe insurance is thus a hybrid public good: it benefits from a large number of users and is threatened by their exclusion. The final section highlights the polycentricity of insurance systems and the challenge this poses to collective action for the sake of prevention.

Over the past 20 years, the insurance industry has been experimenting with technological innovations that deeply affect its business model and social function. This article explores the use of digital technologies to monitor policyholders' behaviour and personalise their insurance coverage. Information extracted from behavioural data can be used to produce individualised predictions and design proactive insurance policies, which aim to prompt policyholders to act on the possibility of future damages before they happen. This innovation could bring many benefits in terms of efficiency (improving loss ratio) and foresight (improving risk assessment), but also a renewed focus on individual responsibility for losses. As a consequence, we argue, the collective management of future uncertainty could be undermined, jeopardising the insurance solidarity that makes mutual protection viable.