Joshua Wilde, Wei Chen, Sophie Lohmann, Jasmin Abdel Ghany
At the onset of the first wave of COVID‐19 in the United States, the pandemic's effect on future birthrates was unknown. In this paper, we assess whether digital trace data—often touted as a panacea for traditional data scarcity—held the potential to accurately predict fertility change caused by the COVID‐19 pandemic in the United States. Specifically, we produced state‐level, dynamic future predictions of the pandemic's effect on birthrates in the United States using pregnancy‐related Google search data. Importantly, these predictions were made in October 2020 (and revised in February 2021), well before the birth effect of the pandemic could have possibly been known. Our analysis predicted that between November 2020 and February 2021, monthly United States births would drop sharply by approximately 12 percent, then begin to rebound while remaining depressed through August 2021. While these predictions were generally accurate in terms of the magnitude and timing of the trough, there were important misses regarding the speed at which these reductions materialized and rebounded. This ex post evaluation of an ex ante prediction serves as a powerful demonstration of the “promise and pitfalls” of digital trace data in demographic research.
{"title":"Digital Trace Data and Demographic Forecasting: How Well Did Google Predict the US COVID‐19 Baby Bust?","authors":"Joshua Wilde, Wei Chen, Sophie Lohmann, Jasmin Abdel Ghany","doi":"10.1111/padr.12647","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12647","url":null,"abstract":"At the onset of the first wave of COVID‐19 in the United States, the pandemic's effect on future birthrates was unknown. In this paper, we assess whether digital trace data—often touted as a panacea for traditional data scarcity—held the potential to accurately predict fertility change caused by the COVID‐19 pandemic in the United States. Specifically, we produced state‐level, dynamic future predictions of the pandemic's effect on birthrates in the United States using pregnancy‐related Google search data. Importantly, these predictions were made in October 2020 (and revised in February 2021), well before the birth effect of the pandemic could have possibly been known. Our analysis predicted that between November 2020 and February 2021, monthly United States births would drop sharply by approximately 12 percent, then begin to rebound while remaining depressed through August 2021. While these predictions were generally accurate in terms of the magnitude and timing of the trough, there were important misses regarding the speed at which these reductions materialized and rebounded. This ex post evaluation of an ex ante prediction serves as a powerful demonstration of the “promise and pitfalls” of digital trace data in demographic research.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141857766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alice Mesnard, Filip Savatic, Jean‐Noël Senne, Hélène Thiollet
Migrant destination states of the Global North generally seek to stem irregular migration while remaining committed to refugee rights. To do so, these states have increasingly sought to externalize migration control, implicating migrant origin and transit states in managing the movement of persons across borders. But do externalization policies actually have an impact on unauthorized migration flows? If yes, do those impacts vary across different migrant categories given that both asylum seekers and other migrants can cross borders without prior authorization? We argue that these policies do have an impact on unauthorized migration flows and that those impacts are distinct for refugees and other migrants. Using data on “irregular/illegal border crossings” collected by Frontex, the Border and Coast Guard Agency of the European Union (EU), we first find that the geographical trajectories of refugees and other migrants who cross EU borders without authorization are distinct. Using a novel method to estimate whether individuals are likely to obtain asylum in 31 European destination states, we find that “likely refugees” tend to be concentrated on a single, primary migratory route while “likely irregular migrants” may be dispersed across multiple routes. Through an event study analysis of the impact of the 2016 EU–Turkey Statement, a paradigmatic example of externalization, we show that the policy primarily blocked likely refugees while deflecting likely irregular migrants to alternative routes. Our findings ultimately highlight how externalization policies may fail to prevent unauthorized entries of irregular migrants while endangering refugee protection.
{"title":"Revolving Doors: How Externalization Policies Block Refugees and Deflect Other Migrants across Migration Routes","authors":"Alice Mesnard, Filip Savatic, Jean‐Noël Senne, Hélène Thiollet","doi":"10.1111/padr.12650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12650","url":null,"abstract":"Migrant destination states of the Global North generally seek to stem irregular migration while remaining committed to refugee rights. To do so, these states have increasingly sought to externalize migration control, implicating migrant origin and transit states in managing the movement of persons across borders. But do externalization policies actually have an impact on unauthorized migration flows? If yes, do those impacts vary across different migrant categories given that both asylum seekers and other migrants can cross borders without prior authorization? We argue that these policies do have an impact on unauthorized migration flows and that those impacts are distinct for refugees and other migrants. Using data on “irregular/illegal border crossings” collected by Frontex, the Border and Coast Guard Agency of the European Union (EU), we first find that the geographical trajectories of refugees and other migrants who cross EU borders without authorization are distinct. Using a novel method to estimate whether individuals are likely to obtain asylum in 31 European destination states, we find that “likely refugees” tend to be concentrated on a single, primary migratory route while “likely irregular migrants” may be dispersed across multiple routes. Through an event study analysis of the impact of the 2016 EU–Turkey Statement, a paradigmatic example of externalization, we show that the policy primarily blocked likely refugees while deflecting likely irregular migrants to alternative routes. Our findings ultimately highlight how externalization policies may fail to prevent unauthorized entries of irregular migrants while endangering refugee protection.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141755166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When the COVID‐19 pandemic began in early 2020, speculation was rife both in public and academic spheres over its possible effects on birth rates and partnership behavior. Now, over four years later, we still know surprisingly little about the effect of COVID‐19 on fertility and family dynamics. In this paper, we outline three main takeaways from the scientific literature produced on this topic in the past four years. We argue that (1) we still do not have enough data to answer basic questions about the effect of COVID‐19 on fertility and family dynamics, (2) the data we do have suggest an unexpectedly incoherent and heterogeneous response, and (3) the estimated effects we do have are suspect since shifting and theoretically unexpected prepandemic fertility behavior made identifying a strict causal effect of the pandemic problematic.
{"title":"Fertility and Family Dynamics in the Aftermath of the COVID‐19 Pandemic","authors":"Natalie Nitsche, Joshua Wilde","doi":"10.1111/padr.12648","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12648","url":null,"abstract":"When the COVID‐19 pandemic began in early 2020, speculation was rife both in public and academic spheres over its possible effects on birth rates and partnership behavior. Now, over four years later, we still know surprisingly little about the effect of COVID‐19 on fertility and family dynamics. In this paper, we outline three main takeaways from the scientific literature produced on this topic in the past four years. We argue that (1) we still do not have enough data to answer basic questions about the effect of COVID‐19 on fertility and family dynamics, (2) the data we do have suggest an unexpectedly incoherent and heterogeneous response, and (3) the estimated effects we do have are suspect since shifting and theoretically unexpected prepandemic fertility behavior made identifying a strict causal effect of the pandemic problematic.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"79 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141726340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Venezuelan exodus represents the largest known displacement of people in recent Latin American history. The regional crisis caused by this mass Venezuelan migration drove the development of multiple interagency initiatives (such as the R4V platform) as well as academic attempts to keep track of outflow intensity. However, little is known about the age and gender composition of the emigrants since most existing literature to date has focused primarily on total volume and country‐specific shares of migration outflows. This study examines the demographics of recent outflows from Venezuela, the chronology of associated changes, and the demographic implications for those remaining in the country. Official counts of Venezuelan‐born populations compiled in seven main destinations are used to estimate annual outflows by age and gender from 2011 to 2021. Changes in the demographic composition of emigration are traced using parameters of the Rogers–Castro model, specifically the children‐to‐labor force dominance, and by decomposing the age contributions to the annual gross migraproduction rate. In the early phase of the crisis (2014–2017), emigration flows had high child dependency ratios. As the crisis entered its most acute phase (peaking in 2019), the mean age of migrants increased. Outward migration has resulted in the current Venezuelan population having 20 percent fewer women of reproductive age and 17.8 percent fewer individuals of working age. Consequently, the share of the population aged 60 or older has increased.
{"title":"The Demography of Crisis‐Driven Outflows from Venezuela","authors":"Jenny Garcia Arias","doi":"10.1111/padr.12651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12651","url":null,"abstract":"The Venezuelan exodus represents the largest known displacement of people in recent Latin American history. The regional crisis caused by this mass Venezuelan migration drove the development of multiple interagency initiatives (such as the R4V platform) as well as academic attempts to keep track of outflow intensity. However, little is known about the age and gender composition of the emigrants since most existing literature to date has focused primarily on total volume and country‐specific shares of migration outflows. This study examines the demographics of recent outflows from Venezuela, the chronology of associated changes, and the demographic implications for those remaining in the country. Official counts of Venezuelan‐born populations compiled in seven main destinations are used to estimate annual outflows by age and gender from 2011 to 2021. Changes in the demographic composition of emigration are traced using parameters of the Rogers–Castro model, specifically the children‐to‐labor force dominance, and by decomposing the age contributions to the annual gross migraproduction rate. In the early phase of the crisis (2014–2017), emigration flows had high child dependency ratios. As the crisis entered its most acute phase (peaking in 2019), the mean age of migrants increased. Outward migration has resulted in the current Venezuelan population having 20 percent fewer women of reproductive age and 17.8 percent fewer individuals of working age. Consequently, the share of the population aged 60 or older has increased.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"79 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141726341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Migration theorizing has coalesced around sets encompassing several frameworks. Despite many contributions of these collections, contemporary migration theorizing exhibits three important shortcomings, which this paper aims to address. First, sets of theories have traditionally not explicitly and jointly addressed fundamental questions in migration, namely (i) key motivations beyond those related to “labor” (turmoil; environmental strain; family, or self‐realization factors); (ii) how important axes of social difference produce distinct motivations and mechanisms (e.g., by gender and sexuality); (iii) the (in)direct roles of the state; (iv) important spatial considerations, that is, immobility, internal versus international movement, step/onward/secondary migrations; and (v) key issues of temporality, that is, return migration, its timing, and intentionality. Engaging with classical and contemporary scholarship, I provide an updated, revised, and broadened set of frameworks and analytical lenses that better incorporate these issues. Second, the most common typology used to categorize frameworks into “initiation” and “continuation” suffers from ambiguity and imprecision. I offer a new classification, typifying mechanisms as more/less endogenous to prior migrations. Third, scholarship has advanced little in systematically examining whether/how theories relate to each other. I provide a basic taxonomy of mechanism “competition,” “coexistence,” co‐occurrence, and interrelation. I conclude by proposing a new and expanded set of frameworks and analytical lenses, reflecting on the implications of these modifications.
{"title":"Worlds in Motion Redux? Expanding Migration Theories and Their Interconnections","authors":"Fernando Riosmena","doi":"10.1111/padr.12630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12630","url":null,"abstract":"Migration theorizing has coalesced around sets encompassing several frameworks. Despite many contributions of these collections, contemporary migration theorizing exhibits three important shortcomings, which this paper aims to address. First, sets of theories have traditionally not explicitly and jointly addressed fundamental questions in migration, namely (i) key motivations beyond those related to “labor” (turmoil; environmental strain; family, or self‐realization factors); (ii) how important axes of social difference produce distinct motivations and mechanisms (e.g., by gender and sexuality); (iii) the (in)direct roles of the state; (iv) important spatial considerations, that is, immobility, internal versus international movement, step/onward/secondary migrations; and (v) key issues of temporality, that is, return migration, its timing, and intentionality. Engaging with classical and contemporary scholarship, I provide an updated, revised, and broadened set of frameworks and analytical lenses that better incorporate these issues. Second, the most common typology used to categorize frameworks into “initiation” and “continuation” suffers from ambiguity and imprecision. I offer a new classification, typifying mechanisms as more/less endogenous to prior migrations. Third, scholarship has advanced little in systematically examining whether/how theories relate to each other. I provide a basic taxonomy of mechanism “competition,” “coexistence,” co‐occurrence, and interrelation. I conclude by proposing a new and expanded set of frameworks and analytical lenses, reflecting on the implications of these modifications.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141602637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For decades, educational inequalities in mortality have widened and mortality among the least educated has stalled, even as overall mortality has improved, and an increasing proportion of young people have completed secondary and tertiary education. While researchers recognize that these trends are in part related to changing selection into education groups, there has been no unifying framework for understanding why the trends may be related. This article provides a unifying framework by introducing a concept called the “convex inequality regime,” a diminishing returns relationship between relative education and mortality. In populations where convex inequality regimes prevail, even without any changes in the institutions governing inequality or any changes in overall mortality conditions, education transitions result in an increase in mortality for the less educated and an increase in mortality inequality between education groups. The model also shows that lifespan variation increases for lower education groups because convex inequality regimes tend to increase relative mortality more rapidly at younger ages during an education transition. Even after an education transition is complete, inequality between education groups will continue to increase for decades due to the momentum of inequality, a cohort replacement phenomenon where younger more unequal cohorts replace older more equal cohorts.
{"title":"Does Inequality Have Momentum? The Implications of Convex Inequality Regimes for Mortality Dynamics","authors":"Arun S. Hendi","doi":"10.1111/padr.12649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12649","url":null,"abstract":"For decades, educational inequalities in mortality have widened and mortality among the least educated has stalled, even as overall mortality has improved, and an increasing proportion of young people have completed secondary and tertiary education. While researchers recognize that these trends are in part related to changing selection into education groups, there has been no unifying framework for understanding why the trends may be related. This article provides a unifying framework by introducing a concept called the “convex inequality regime,” a diminishing returns relationship between relative education and mortality. In populations where convex inequality regimes prevail, even without any changes in the institutions governing inequality or any changes in overall mortality conditions, education transitions result in an increase in mortality for the less educated and an increase in mortality inequality between education groups. The model also shows that lifespan variation increases for lower education groups because convex inequality regimes tend to increase relative mortality more rapidly at younger ages during an education transition. Even after an education transition is complete, inequality between education groups will continue to increase for decades due to the momentum of inequality, a cohort replacement phenomenon where younger more unequal cohorts replace older more equal cohorts.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141566087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Arnstein Aassve, Letizia Mencarini, Elena Pirani, Daniele Vignoli
The study makes use of the 2016 Household Multipurpose Survey of Family, Social Subjects, and Life Cycle to demonstrate that family‐related behavior is now rapidly changing in Italy. The country is often taken as a stronghold of traditionalism. We, instead, highlight recent and substantial changes in cohabitation, dissolution, and nonmarital fertility in the country. In doing so, we carefully assess the predictions made by the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) and show that trends in Italy are monotonically moving in the direction of the SDT. There are, though, important differences across educational groups and regions, that is, family‐related behavior is also changing in the South of Italy in much the same way but not at the same speed as in the rest of the country.
{"title":"The Last Bastion is Falling: Survey Evidence of the New Family Reality in Italy","authors":"Arnstein Aassve, Letizia Mencarini, Elena Pirani, Daniele Vignoli","doi":"10.1111/padr.12645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12645","url":null,"abstract":"The study makes use of the 2016 Household Multipurpose Survey of Family, Social Subjects, and Life Cycle to demonstrate that family‐related behavior is now rapidly changing in Italy. The country is often taken as a stronghold of traditionalism. We, instead, highlight recent and substantial changes in cohabitation, dissolution, and nonmarital fertility in the country. In doing so, we carefully assess the predictions made by the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) and show that trends in Italy are monotonically moving in the direction of the SDT. There are, though, important differences across educational groups and regions, that is, family‐related behavior is also changing in the South of Italy in much the same way but not at the same speed as in the rest of the country.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141521341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using data from 60 countries, we measure how much couples agree on sex preferences for children and whether differences in sex preferences are associated with gender gaps in children's education. Results show extensive disagreement in sex preferences for children, with husbands far more likely to want more sons but their wives more likely to prefer having equal numbers of boys and girls, wanting more daughters, or having no preference. India has the highest share of agreement on sex preferences (59 percent), and Niger has the lowest (32 percent). The association between couples’ sex preferences and gender gaps in education differs considerably by country. In some countries, girls have worse outcomes when their parents agree on son preference and better ones when parents agree on daughter/no preference. But there are numerous counter‐examples as well. Gender gaps in education appear more often when wives hold son preference but not their husbands than the reverse combination. Agreement on daughter/no preference is the only category that is systematically associated with better outcomes for girls relative to boys (although even here there are caveats). Balanced preference (wanting as many boys as girls) is an ambiguous category with heterogenous patterns in terms of educational gender gaps.
{"title":"Spousal Agreement on Sex Preferences for Children and Gender Gaps in Children's Education","authors":"Vida Maralani, Candas Pinar","doi":"10.1111/padr.12640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12640","url":null,"abstract":"Using data from 60 countries, we measure how much couples agree on sex preferences for children and whether differences in sex preferences are associated with gender gaps in children's education. Results show extensive disagreement in sex preferences for children, with husbands far more likely to want more sons but their wives more likely to prefer having equal numbers of boys and girls, wanting more daughters, or having no preference. India has the highest share of agreement on sex preferences (59 percent), and Niger has the lowest (32 percent). The association between couples’ sex preferences and gender gaps in education differs considerably by country. In some countries, girls have worse outcomes when their parents agree on son preference and better ones when parents agree on daughter/no preference. But there are numerous counter‐examples as well. Gender gaps in education appear more often when wives hold son preference but not their husbands than the reverse combination. Agreement on daughter/no preference is the only category that is systematically associated with better outcomes for girls relative to boys (although even here there are caveats). Balanced preference (wanting as many boys as girls) is an ambiguous category with heterogenous patterns in terms of educational gender gaps.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141495508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Studies have often found that recent immigrants have better mental health than natives, whereas established immigrants have no such advantage. This could be interpreted as evidence for immigrants' mental health deteriorating with residence duration—the “unhealthy assimilation hypothesis.” However, the methods used in the literature are unfit to assess whether the mental health differences between recent and established immigrants are due to individual‐level deterioration in mental health, compositional differences between immigration cohorts, or selective remigration. This is because previous studies mostly rely on cross‐sectional data, incur in overcontrol bias, and/or fail to disentangle variation with time since arrival from variation with age or between cohorts. In this article, I propose a novel analytical strategy to test the unhealthy assimilation hypothesis. Using fixed‐ and random‐effect regressions stratified by immigrants' age at arrival and data from waves 1–11 of the UK household longitudinal study, I find no evidence that immigrants' mental health deteriorates with time since arrival: immigrants' mental health trajectories are in line with natives' trajectories with age, and the cross‐sectional finding of more established immigrants having worse mental health is driven by differences between individuals who migrated at different times.
{"title":"Unhealthy Assimilation or Compositional Differences? Disentangling Immigrants' Mental Health Trajectories with Residence Duration","authors":"Claudia Brunori","doi":"10.1111/padr.12642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12642","url":null,"abstract":"Studies have often found that recent immigrants have better mental health than natives, whereas established immigrants have no such advantage. This could be interpreted as evidence for immigrants' mental health deteriorating with residence duration—the “unhealthy assimilation hypothesis.” However, the methods used in the literature are unfit to assess whether the mental health differences between recent and established immigrants are due to individual‐level deterioration in mental health, compositional differences between immigration cohorts, or selective remigration. This is because previous studies mostly rely on cross‐sectional data, incur in overcontrol bias, and/or fail to disentangle variation with time since arrival from variation with age or between cohorts. In this article, I propose a novel analytical strategy to test the unhealthy assimilation hypothesis. Using fixed‐ and random‐effect regressions stratified by immigrants' age at arrival and data from waves 1–11 of the UK household longitudinal study, I find no evidence that immigrants' mental health deteriorates with time since arrival: immigrants' mental health trajectories are in line with natives' trajectories with age, and the cross‐sectional finding of more established immigrants having worse mental health is driven by differences between individuals who migrated at different times.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141495617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The worldwide expansion of female educational opportunities in recent decades has prompted demographers to assess the frequency with which women marry up (hypergamy) or down (hypogamy) with regard to education. A series of articles documented dramatic and nearly universal declines in hypergamy over time and across female educational advantage. However, this previous work investigated hypergamy only in the context of unequal educational pairings, excluding couples with equal levels of education (homogamy) from their analyses. Here, we argue that the prevalence of hypergamy should instead be assessed in relation to all marriages. We apply this approach to the case of Latin America, where women have made important gains in schooling relative to men. Using census microdata spanning 105 birth cohorts in 16 countries, we demonstrate that, rather than declining, hypergamy has increased in most countries over time and remains relatively stable across female educational advantage. Meanwhile, the prevalence of educational homogamy has declined considerably in most countries and across the axis of female educational advantage, an important trend that emerges only when homogamy is incorporated into the analysis.
{"title":"No End to Hypergamy when Considering the Full Married Population","authors":"Daniela R. Urbina, Margaret Frye, Sara Lopus","doi":"10.1111/padr.12643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12643","url":null,"abstract":"The worldwide expansion of female educational opportunities in recent decades has prompted demographers to assess the frequency with which women marry up (hypergamy) or down (hypogamy) with regard to education. A series of articles documented dramatic and nearly universal declines in hypergamy over time and across female educational advantage. However, this previous work investigated hypergamy only in the context of unequal educational pairings, excluding couples with equal levels of education (homogamy) from their analyses. Here, we argue that the prevalence of hypergamy should instead be assessed in relation to <jats:italic>all</jats:italic> marriages. We apply this approach to the case of Latin America, where women have made important gains in schooling relative to men. Using census microdata spanning 105 birth cohorts in 16 countries, we demonstrate that, rather than declining, hypergamy has <jats:italic>increased</jats:italic> in most countries over time and remains relatively stable across female educational advantage. Meanwhile, the prevalence of educational homogamy has declined considerably in most countries and across the axis of female educational advantage, an important trend that emerges only when homogamy is incorporated into the analysis.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141495704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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