Pub Date : 2025-09-11DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102740
Theo S. Eicher , Reina Kawai Eskimez , Monique Newiak
Macroeconomic volatility often entails policies that may disproportionately impact vulnerable populations. Some economies address weak economic fundamentals with IMF-supported reform programs, which have been shown to impact gender inequality. To accurately evaluate program effects, however, requires well-matched counterfactuals: How would gender disparities have evolved in the country in the absence of the program? We analyze 125 IMF-supported programs (1994–2022) using custom-tailored control groups that match each IMF-supported program country's gender/economic trends, including fiscal spending, debt, and reserves. For most countries, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that IMF-supported programs have no effect on gender inequality, as the observed gender outcomes were not statistically significantly different from those in controls with similar fiscal spending, debt, and reserves trajectories but no programs.
{"title":"Effects of IMF-supported programs on gender inequality","authors":"Theo S. Eicher , Reina Kawai Eskimez , Monique Newiak","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102740","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102740","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Macroeconomic volatility often entails policies that may disproportionately impact vulnerable populations. Some economies address weak economic fundamentals with IMF-supported reform programs, which have been shown to impact gender inequality. To accurately evaluate program effects, however, requires well-matched counterfactuals: How would gender disparities have evolved in the country in the absence of the program? We analyze 125 IMF-supported programs (1994–2022) using custom-tailored control groups that match each IMF-supported program country's gender/economic trends, including fiscal spending, debt, and reserves. For most countries, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that IMF-supported programs have no effect on gender inequality, as the observed gender outcomes were not statistically significantly different from those in controls with similar fiscal spending, debt, and reserves trajectories but no programs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102740"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145050167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-10DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102754
Nicola Nones
Do individual policy-makers matter for fiscal policy and, if so, under which conditions do they matter the most? Does a formal training in economics lead policymakers to implement a distinct set of fiscal policies? Do economists-turned-policymakers follow through with what they presumably teach in their classroom? This article aims to answer these questions with respect to fiscal consolidation (austerity) by analyzing a sample of Western and European countries between 1978 and 2019. By focusing on a subset of fiscal policies that are weakly orthogonal to the business cycle, I abstract from the most contentious debates in macroeconomics which revolve around the ‘best’ fiscal response to economic shocks (the infamous austerity vs stimulus debate). As such, I investigate the effects of economists on fiscal policy in a most-likely-case approach, i.e. when economic theory is by and large in agreement on what the best course of action is. Across a variety of specifications, modeling choices, estimators, and temporal and spatial sub-samples, I find no evidence that either the Head of the Executive or the Finance Minister's formal education in economics is (unconditionally) associated with fiscal consolidation policy. Nevertheless, the analysis reveals some political and institutional conditions under which economists-turned-Heads of Government are indeed more likely to implement fiscal consolidation. Governments led by economists are more likely to implement fiscal consolidation when the government is less fractionalized, when they are supported by a parliamentary majority, and when there are fewer institutional constraints on the executive.
{"title":"Do as I say, not as I do? Economists policymakers and fiscal consolidation","authors":"Nicola Nones","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102754","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102754","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do individual policy-makers matter for fiscal policy and, if so, under which conditions do they matter the most? Does a formal training in economics lead policymakers to implement a distinct set of fiscal policies? Do economists-turned-policymakers follow through with what they presumably teach in their classroom? This article aims to answer these questions with respect to fiscal consolidation (austerity) by analyzing a sample of Western and European countries between 1978 and 2019. By focusing on a subset of fiscal policies that are weakly orthogonal to the business cycle, I abstract from the most contentious debates in macroeconomics which revolve around the ‘best’ fiscal response to economic shocks (the infamous austerity vs stimulus debate). As such, I investigate the effects of economists on fiscal policy in a most-likely-case approach, i.e. when economic theory is by and large in agreement on what the best course of action is. Across a variety of specifications, modeling choices, estimators, and temporal and spatial sub-samples, I find no evidence that either the Head of the Executive or the Finance Minister's formal education in economics is (unconditionally) associated with fiscal consolidation policy. Nevertheless, the analysis reveals some political and institutional conditions under which economists-turned-Heads of Government are indeed more likely to implement fiscal consolidation. Governments led by economists are more likely to implement fiscal consolidation when the government is less fractionalized, when they are supported by a parliamentary majority, and when there are fewer institutional constraints on the executive.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102754"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145106345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-09DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102733
Justin T. Callais , Vincent Geloso , Alicia Plemmons , Gary A. Wagner
William Baumol proposes that there are two types of entrepreneurship: productive or unproductive. Productive entrepreneurship, characterized by innovation and efficient resource allocation, fosters economic growth and can act as a potent magnet for migration. Conversely, unproductive entrepreneurship, which often involves rent-seeking and regulatory circumvention, deters migration and potentially provokes out-migration. To test this link from the types of entrepreneurship and migration, we use a new index of entrepreneurship (productive and unproductive) in conjunction with a dataset covering migration to and from Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) from 2005 to 2019. Our analysis reveals that regions high in productive entrepreneurship experience significant net in-migration, while those dominated by unproductive entrepreneurship see the opposite effect.
William Baumol提出有两种类型的企业家精神：生产性的和非生产性的。以创新和有效资源分配为特征的生产性企业精神促进经济增长，并能成为吸引移徙的有力磁石。相反，往往涉及寻租和规避监管的非生产性企业家精神阻碍了移民，并可能引发外迁。为了从创业和移民的类型来检验这种联系，我们使用了一个新的创业指数（生产性和非生产性），并结合了一个涵盖2005年至2019年迁入和迁出大都市统计区（MSA）的数据集。我们的分析表明，生产性创业高的地区经历了显著的净移民，而那些以非生产性创业为主的地区则出现了相反的效果。
{"title":"Baumol’s migrants: Productive and unproductive entrepreneurship and between-MSA migration","authors":"Justin T. Callais , Vincent Geloso , Alicia Plemmons , Gary A. Wagner","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102733","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102733","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>William Baumol proposes that there are two types of entrepreneurship: productive or unproductive. Productive entrepreneurship, characterized by innovation and efficient resource allocation, fosters economic growth and can act as a potent magnet for migration. Conversely, unproductive entrepreneurship, which often involves rent-seeking and regulatory circumvention, deters migration and potentially provokes out-migration. To test this link from the types of entrepreneurship and migration, we use a new index of entrepreneurship (productive and unproductive) in conjunction with a dataset covering migration to and from Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) from 2005 to 2019. Our analysis reveals that regions high in productive entrepreneurship experience significant net in-migration, while those dominated by unproductive entrepreneurship see the opposite effect.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102733"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145020212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-05DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102753
Songkhun Nillasithanukroh
Businessperson politicians perform well in elections worldwide. What electoral strategy do they employ to win votes? This article highlights private sector employment as an underexplored resource in distributive politics. I argue businessperson politicians leverage their firms to mobilize employees as campaign workers, exchanging jobs for electoral support and services. Using list experiments in Thailand, I find evidence of this exchange: 36.5 % of employees voted for their employer, 27.0 % attended employer's campaign rallies, 17.5 % persuaded acquaintances to support their employer, 18.2 % distributed short-term benefits to voters, and 8.5 % distributed long-term benefits. I also provide evidence that businessperson politicians use private employment to circumvent restrictions limiting use of public resources for electoral gains by showing employees hired within two months before election were more likely to provide services than those hired outside this period, suggesting these hires were intentionally brought to support campaign activities during election season.
{"title":"Businessperson candidates and their employees: How do businessperson candidates use their firms to get elected?","authors":"Songkhun Nillasithanukroh","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102753","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102753","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Businessperson politicians perform well in elections worldwide. What electoral strategy do they employ to win votes? This article highlights private sector employment as an underexplored resource in distributive politics. I argue businessperson politicians leverage their firms to mobilize employees as campaign workers, exchanging jobs for electoral support and services. Using list experiments in Thailand, I find evidence of this exchange: 36.5 % of employees voted for their employer, 27.0 % attended employer's campaign rallies, 17.5 % persuaded acquaintances to support their employer, 18.2 % distributed short-term benefits to voters, and 8.5 % distributed long-term benefits. I also provide evidence that businessperson politicians use private employment to circumvent restrictions limiting use of public resources for electoral gains by showing employees hired within two months before election were more likely to provide services than those hired outside this period, suggesting these hires were intentionally brought to support campaign activities during election season.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102753"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145020213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-04DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102741
Nicolás Albacete, Pirmin Fessler, Peter Lindner
We analyze a large-scale experiment on redistributive preferences using data from the Austrian segment of the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey. Austria, characterized by low wealth taxation but high wealth inequality, provides an ideal context. We estimate the causal effect of information about one’s wealth rank on preferences for wealth taxation. While the average treatment effect is statistically insignificant, individuals who overestimate their wealth position exhibit a positive response, whereas those who underestimate it show a negative response. The impact of information varies based on prior beliefs, yet the overall effect remains null.
{"title":"Wealth distribution and redistributive preferences: Evidence from a randomized survey experiment","authors":"Nicolás Albacete, Pirmin Fessler, Peter Lindner","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102741","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102741","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze a large-scale experiment on redistributive preferences using data from the Austrian segment of the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey. Austria, characterized by low wealth taxation but high wealth inequality, provides an ideal context. We estimate the causal effect of information about one’s wealth rank on preferences for wealth taxation. While the average treatment effect is statistically insignificant, individuals who overestimate their wealth position exhibit a positive response, whereas those who underestimate it show a negative response. The impact of information varies based on prior beliefs, yet the overall effect remains null.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102741"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144997701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-03DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102749
Mohammad Reza Farzanegan , Nader Habibi
This study examines the impact of international economic sanctions, imposed on Iran due to its nuclear program, on the development of its middle class. Specifically, it investigates how Iran's middle class would have evolved absent sanctions post-2012. Using the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) with nested optimization, we construct a counterfactual scenario for Iran based on a weighted average of comparable countries that mirror pre-2012 Iran but without significant sanctions. Our SCM results indicate that sanctions led to an average annual reduction of 17 percentage points in the size of Iran's middle class from 2012 to 2019. Our Synthetic Difference-in-Differences (SDID) analysis, however, provides a more conservative estimate of a 12 percentage points average annual loss, reinforcing the robustness of the findings. These estimates capture the total effect of sanctions, encompassing both their direct economic shocks, and Iran's policy responses. These results are validated through extensive sensitivity checks, including in-space and in-time placebo tests, leave-one-out analyses, and bias-corrected SCM. We also identify real GDP per capita, merchandise imports and exports, investment, industry value added, informal and vulnerable employment as key channels through which sanctions negatively impact the middle class.
{"title":"The effect of international sanctions on the size of the middle class in Iran","authors":"Mohammad Reza Farzanegan , Nader Habibi","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102749","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102749","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the impact of international economic sanctions, imposed on Iran due to its nuclear program, on the development of its middle class. Specifically, it investigates how Iran's middle class would have evolved absent sanctions post-2012. Using the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) with nested optimization, we construct a counterfactual scenario for Iran based on a weighted average of comparable countries that mirror pre-2012 Iran but without significant sanctions. Our SCM results indicate that sanctions led to an average annual reduction of 17 percentage points in the size of Iran's middle class from 2012 to 2019. Our Synthetic Difference-in-Differences (SDID) analysis, however, provides a more conservative estimate of a 12 percentage points average annual loss, reinforcing the robustness of the findings. These estimates capture the total effect of sanctions, encompassing both their direct economic shocks, and Iran's policy responses. These results are validated through extensive sensitivity checks, including in-space and in-time placebo tests, leave-one-out analyses, and bias-corrected SCM. We also identify real GDP per capita, merchandise imports and exports, investment, industry value added, informal and vulnerable employment as key channels through which sanctions negatively impact the middle class.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102749"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144989979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102748
Francesco Barilari , Nicola Mastrorocco , Matteo Paradisi
We study how population aging interacts with voters’ representation, engagement with politics, and the content of political agendas. Leveraging the European Social Survey, we observe that over the past two decades, individuals under the age of 50 have become a minority within the voter population. This shift has been exacerbated by a decline in the turnout propensity of those under 50, juxtaposed with an increase among older age groups. The evolution of turnout propensity has unfolded gradually across cohorts: each successive cohort entering the eligible voter population has exhibited lower turnout rates compared to its predecessors and has failed to converge to previous levels throughout its lifecycle. The disengagement of younger workers has been more pronounced in countries that have aged faster. Moreover, these dynamics have coincided with a shift in the political agenda. Through an analysis of political manifestos, we demonstrate a switch towards topics appealing to older voters, notably retirement policies. Similarly to the case of turnout, this shift has been stronger in countries where the population has aged more.
{"title":"Population aging, voting, and political agendas","authors":"Francesco Barilari , Nicola Mastrorocco , Matteo Paradisi","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102748","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102748","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study how population aging interacts with voters’ representation, engagement with politics, and the content of political agendas. Leveraging the European Social Survey, we observe that over the past two decades, individuals under the age of 50 have become a minority within the voter population. This shift has been exacerbated by a decline in the turnout propensity of those under 50, juxtaposed with an increase among older age groups. The evolution of turnout propensity has unfolded gradually across cohorts: each successive cohort entering the eligible voter population has exhibited lower turnout rates compared to its predecessors and has failed to converge to previous levels throughout its lifecycle. The disengagement of younger workers has been more pronounced in countries that have aged faster. Moreover, these dynamics have coincided with a shift in the political agenda. Through an analysis of political manifestos, we demonstrate a switch towards topics appealing to older voters, notably retirement policies. Similarly to the case of turnout, this shift has been stronger in countries where the population has aged more.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102748"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145050168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102745
Marcela Gomez-Ruiz , Paolo Li Donni , Maria Marino
This study introduces a novel empirical strategy to analyse the dynamic occurrence of violent and nonviolent protests (VP and NVP) in Africa. The strategy allows us to jointly model VP and NVP, accounting for both observed variables and unobserved time-varying factors. In doing so, we offer insights into the persistence of protest (i.e., the influence of one type of protest on the dynamics of the same type of protests over time), cross-effects between the two protest types (i.e., the influence of one type of protest on the dynamics of the other type over time), as well as protest determinants. Our findings, based on the Social Conflict Analysis Dataset (SCAD), reveal strong persistence in both VP and NVP, with past protests significantly correlating with future ones. Additionally, we show that violent and nonviolent protests are dynamically interlinked, with cross-effects between the two events. Some determinants, like repression, correlate with both VP and NVP, while others, such as education and technology, influence only one type of protest. Finally, by controlling for persistence, we explore how unobserved time-varying factors shape protest dynamics in Africa.
{"title":"Dynamics of protest: Understanding violent and nonviolent protest in Africa","authors":"Marcela Gomez-Ruiz , Paolo Li Donni , Maria Marino","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102745","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102745","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study introduces a novel empirical strategy to analyse the dynamic occurrence of violent and nonviolent protests (VP and NVP) in Africa. The strategy allows us to jointly model VP and NVP, accounting for both observed variables and unobserved time-varying factors. In doing so, we offer insights into the persistence of protest (i.e., the influence of one type of protest on the dynamics of the same type of protests over time), cross-effects between the two protest types (i.e., the influence of one type of protest on the dynamics of the other type over time), as well as protest determinants. Our findings, based on the Social Conflict Analysis Dataset (SCAD), reveal strong persistence in both VP and NVP, with past protests significantly correlating with future ones. Additionally, we show that violent and nonviolent protests are dynamically interlinked, with cross-effects between the two events. Some determinants, like repression, correlate with both VP and NVP, while others, such as education and technology, influence only one type of protest. Finally, by controlling for persistence, we explore how unobserved time-varying factors shape protest dynamics in Africa.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102745"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145106344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-27DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102732
Youngseok Park
This paper examines how economic sanctions affect internal resource allocation in North Korea. Drawing on insights from the political economy of authoritarian regimes, I propose that as sanctions intensify, the regime reallocates resources to maintain elite loyalty at the expense of weapons development. Using satellite-based nighttime lights data as a proxy for regional economic activity, I find that sanctions increase light intensity in elite-dominated areas like Pyongyang, while brightness declines around nuclear facilities. These findings suggest that sanctions may unintentionally reinforce regime stability by redirecting resources toward the ruling elite.
{"title":"A dictator’s retort to economic sanctions: Evidence from North Korea","authors":"Youngseok Park","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102732","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102732","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines how economic sanctions affect internal resource allocation in North Korea. Drawing on insights from the political economy of authoritarian regimes, I propose that as sanctions intensify, the regime reallocates resources to maintain elite loyalty at the expense of weapons development. Using satellite-based nighttime lights data as a proxy for regional economic activity, I find that sanctions increase light intensity in elite-dominated areas like Pyongyang, while brightness declines around nuclear facilities. These findings suggest that sanctions may unintentionally reinforce regime stability by redirecting resources toward the ruling elite.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102732"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144912191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-26DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102738
Michael Berlemann , Marina Eurich , Timur Eckmann
For governments, the occurrence of natural disasters creates the opportunity to demonstrate their willingness and competence in providing prompt and efficient disaster aid. A number of studies has investigated the political consequences of providing disaster aid by analyzing the effects of such aid on subsequent election results. However, the findings of these studies have not yielded a coherent picture. This paper makes a contribution to the existing literature by employing high-frequency (daily) survey data on presidential approval. The combination of this data with wildfire data and information on Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) aid approvals and denials reveals that Barack Obama gained in support among survey respondents for whom FEMA aid was approved by the president, while he was not punished for denials of FEMA assistance. We show that this effect is exclusively driven by respondents without party affiliation and that the effect is temporary.
{"title":"Make it burn? Wildfires, disaster aid and presidential approval","authors":"Michael Berlemann , Marina Eurich , Timur Eckmann","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102738","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102738","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>For governments, the occurrence of natural disasters creates the opportunity to demonstrate their willingness and competence in providing prompt and efficient disaster aid. A number of studies has investigated the political consequences of providing disaster aid by analyzing the effects of such aid on subsequent election results. However, the findings of these studies have not yielded a coherent picture. This paper makes a contribution to the existing literature by employing high-frequency (daily) survey data on presidential approval. The combination of this data with wildfire data and information on Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) aid approvals and denials reveals that Barack Obama gained in support among survey respondents for whom FEMA aid was approved by the president, while he was not punished for denials of FEMA assistance. We show that this effect is exclusively driven by respondents without party affiliation and that the effect is temporary.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102738"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144895914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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