European Journal of Political Economy最新文献

A fully-funded philanthropic economic project in precolonial Georgia was proclaimed as providing a new start in life for England's poor. The project has been praised for altruism and for being socially progressive through equal land assignment and prohibition of slavery. The project failed as an economic venture but was successful in providing the foundation for Georgia eventually becoming a possession of the British crown. I adopt a political-economy perspective to investigate whether the philanthropic project was a façade for political intent.

The growth/income inequality nexus is surrounded by theoretical as well as empirical ambiguities. These ambiguities can be lifted by focusing on the nature of inequalities and not their level. Inequalities may be the result of productive profit-seeking activities or unproductive rent-seeking activities. To re-assess empirically the growth/income inequality nexus, we first propose a strategy to approximate the nature of inequalities by an indicator of institutional quality. We propose an indicator of institutions' productivity which describes the prevalence of institutions favourable to the search for profit and institutions fostering the search for rents, and conversely. It is an indirect measure of the predominance of rent-seeking activities over profit-seeking ones, and conversely. Then, using a panel data covering the period 1990–2020 for 114 countries (88 developing countries and 26 developed countries) and relying on the two-way fixed effects technique to test our estimator, we show that countries where institutions' productivity is high, growth is positively related to income inequality. Conversely, growth is negatively related to income inequality in countries where institutions' productivity is low. There is thus a positive relationship between productive inequalities and growth in countries where profit-seeking institutions dominate the institutional setting. By analogy, in countries where rent-seeking institutions are dominant there is a negative relationship between unproductive inequalities and growth. Contrary to previous public policy recommendations, inequalities should not be tackled since they are pro-growth in countries with high levels of institutions’ productivity.

We examine whether firms’ business confidence – defined as their perceptions of risk and sentiment associated with the COVID-19 pandemic – is affected by ex ante health system capacity and ex post government responses. Using firm-level data from 53 countries, we find that ex ante proactive measures, such as healthcare spending and the availability of medical staff, favorably impact firms’ confidence. This effect is, however, moderated by the COVID-19 case load. We also find that the ex post reactive measures, such as health and containment actions and the overall quality of the government response, also bolster business confidence. These effects on confidence vary by firm size and the level of development of the economy, but are largely impervious to prior epidemic experience.

In this paper, we investigate whether voters hold local politicians accountable for the performance of local schools. We examine this effect for the 2013 and 2017 Danish local elections using register data and polling station-level voting records. We find robust evidence of retrospective voting from pooled and fixed effects estimations. Exploiting the micro-level character of our data, we present evidence that higher-income citizens are more sensitive to changes in school performance, while other demographic and political characteristics do not appear to have mattered.

Since the global financial crisis of 2008, the level of perceived corruption in Italy has risen markedly, diverging significantly from the perceived corruption of other high-income countries and from the corruption as experienced. We propose that newspapers, in order to maximize their profits, have given directed emphasis to episodes of political corruption, which has contributed to the increase in perceived corruption. The consequence has been loss of parliament's credibility and a deterioration in the quality of the Italian political class.

This paper explores a behavioural mechanism through which income inequality may be associated with population health. We consider a model with heterogeneous agents in which agents' preferences are characterized by income inequality aversion. Our analysis shows that spending on health-producing goods is inversely related to the agents’ degree of inequality aversion. A Veblenesque mechanism drives this relation: inequality averse poor agents wish to enjoy consumption levels closer to the average consumption levels in the economy but can only do so by reducing their expenditures on health. This leads to adverse outcomes for individuals and adverse political economy implications for health. In the political economy context, agents characterized by high inequality aversion vote for lower levels of government health spending. To specifically test this mechanism, we construct empirical measures of inequality aversion. Then, using these measures for a panel of 147 countries spanning 2008–2019, we find a significant negative impact of inequality aversion on allocations of public spending for healthcare. These results remain robust to different model specifications.

This paper shows that adopting fiscal rules (FRs) decreases the use of capital controls and increases cross-border financial integration. This result is robust to alternative measures of fiscal rules, capital controls, and international financial integration — it is also robust to alternative econometric approaches. It also shows that the adoption of fiscal rules increases financial integration. This paper innovatively employs a formal instrumental variables (IV) approach to tackle the endogeneity of the decision to adopt fiscal rules. The adoption of FRs is instrumented using the age dependency ratio (ADR). This strategy is particularly effective because adopting FRs is more likely when the ADR is relatively low, a finding well established in the empirical literature. Governments impose capital controls to channel domestic savings into the public sector, finance their excessive fiscal deficits, and reduce their borrowing costs. However, the uncertainty over the government's future fiscal policies may lead to capital flight. FRs ‘tie the hands’ of governments and induce them to commit themselves to fiscal discipline. Moreover, FRs can also reduce the government's borrowing costs. These effects of FRs render capital controls less necessary and lead policymakers to lift capital controls, resulting in higher cross-border financial integration.

Does inequality undermine support for democracy? While previous research has either focused on macro-level associations or alleged a uniform relationship between inequality and individual democratic support across countries, this paper documents the importance of the current regime type and of the source of inequality for such a linkage. Exploiting differential transition to democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union allows to investigate the association of democratic support across regimes with differing levels of democracy. Inequality is found to erode democratic support in democracies and to foster democratic beliefs in non-democracies. In other words, inequality always subverts individual-level support for the current regime type. Further, evidence is provided for the relevance of disentangling the sources of economic inequality in line with fairness concerns: While unfair inequality (generated by factors beyond an individual’s control) and total inequality both are significantly correlated to democratic support, unfair inequality appears to be the relevant inequality component driving this association.

This paper examines whether major output collapses are more likely under autocracy. Using data on 123 developing countries over 1971–2016, we model the joint evolution of output growth and political institutions as a finite state Markov chain with a two-dimensional state space. We study how countries move between states. We find that growth is more likely to be sustained under democracy than under autocracy; output collapses are more likely to deepen under autocracy; and stagnation under autocracy can give way to outright collapse. Democratic countries appear to be more resilient.

In the wake of a massive thrust on designing policies to tackle climate change, we study the role of climate policy uncertainty in impacting the presidential approval ratings of the United States (US). We control for other policy related uncertainties and geopolitical risks, over and above macroeconomic and financial predictors used in earlier literature on drivers of approval ratings of the US president. Because we study as many as 19 determinants, and nonlinearity is a well-established observation in this area of research, we utilize random forests, a machine-learning approach, to derive our results over the monthly period of 1987:04 to 2023:12. We find that, though the association of the presidential approval ratings with climate policy uncertainty is moderately negative and nonlinear, this type of uncertainty is in fact relatively more important than other measures of policy-related uncertainties, as well as many of the widely-used macroeconomic and financial indicators associated with presidential approval. More importantly, we also show that the importance of climate policy uncertainty for the approval ratings of the US president has grown in recent years.