European Journal of Political Economy最新文献

英文中文

Heterogeneity of institutions and model uncertainty in the income inequality nexus 收入不平等关系中的制度异质性和模型不确定性

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102670

Pinar Deniz , Thanasis Stengos

This study revisits the drivers of income inequality with political institutions at the core. We take a multidimensional institutional approach by defining political institutions in terms of governance, political freedom, political fragmentation and political scale. We carry out an extensive empirical analysis of the role of political institutions by decomposing it into distinct elements and providing available proxies for each dimension. Considering the difficulty and the lack of consensus and clarity regarding model selection in the literature, we follow a model averaging methodology to deal with the issue of model uncertainty and model specification that impacts the role of institutions. We combine an analysis of club convergence, a clustering mechanism according to the long term income trajectories of the countries, with Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to determine the most important variables that affect inequality out of a large set of potential determinants for each homogeneous country clusters in terms of their development path. Our results show that drivers of income inequality do not act the same irrespective of different economic development patterns and that there is no “one size fits all” policy prescription that links political institutions and income inequality.

本研究以政治体制为核心，重新审视了收入不平等的驱动因素。我们采用多维制度方法，从治理、政治自由、政治分裂和政治规模等方面对政治制度进行定义。我们将政治体制分解为不同的要素，并为每个维度提供可用的替代指标，从而对政治体制的作用进行了广泛的实证分析。考虑到文献中关于模型选择的困难以及缺乏共识和清晰度，我们采用了模型平均法来处理影响制度作用的模型不确定性和模型规范问题。我们将俱乐部趋同分析（一种根据国家长期收入轨迹进行聚类的机制）与贝叶斯模型平均法（BMA）相结合，从大量潜在决定因素中确定影响不平等的最重要变量，并根据每个同质国家的发展路径进行聚类。我们的研究结果表明，无论经济发展模式如何不同，收入不平等的驱动因素并不相同，在政治体制与收入不平等之间并不存在 "一刀切 "的政策规定。

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引用次数: 0

Political parties’ ideological bias and convergence in economic outcome 政党意识形态偏向与经济结果趋同

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102669

Zeeshan Hashim , Jan Fidrmuc , Sugata Ghosh

In democracies, policies are jointly shaped by voters' preferences and politicians' (or parties’) ideological biases. We explore the relative importance of the latter on some key economic outcomes – growth rate, inflation and inequality – in a broad sample of 71 democracies from 1995 to 2019. We find evidence that both left-wing and right-wing governments deliver convergent outcomes as regards growth, inflation and inequality. The same applies to the policy outcome of economic freedom. This indicates that consolidated democracies maintain continuity in economic policies, and a change in government from one political ideology to another with a different ideology does not significantly alter economic policy outcomes. However, we find divergence in hybrid regimes; inequality and economic freedom are reduced under leftist governments, and economic freedom is enhanced by rightist governments.

在民主国家，政策是由选民的偏好和政治家（或政党）的意识形态偏见共同塑造的。我们在1995年至2019年的71个民主国家的广泛样本中探讨了后者对一些关键经济结果（增长率、通货膨胀和不平等）的相对重要性。我们发现有证据表明，左翼和右翼政府在增长、通胀和不平等方面的结果趋同。这同样适用于经济自由的政策结果。这表明巩固的民主国家保持了经济政策的连续性，政府从一种政治意识形态转变为另一种不同意识形态并不会显著改变经济政策的结果。然而，我们在混合制度中发现了分歧；左派政府会减少不平等和经济自由，右派政府则会加强经济自由。

引用次数: 0

Presidential versus parliamentary: Political system and stock market volatility 总统制与议会制：政治制度与股市波动

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102674

Yosef Bonaparte

We utilize panel data from 60 countries to analyze whether the political system -presidential versus parliamentary-impacts stock market volatility. Our findings show that presidential systems exhibit lower volatility compared to parliamentary systems. We identify two main factors underlying this result: political stability and coalition dependence. Specifically, presidential systems demonstrate greater political stability and less coalition dependence, which contribute to reduced stock market volatility. Additionally, we show that the lower stock market volatility in presidential systems does not come at the cost of stock market performance. In fact, some evidence suggests that presidential systems positively enhance stock market performance. Our results are statistically significant and robust, accounting for subsamples and employing various specifications and econometric models, including a global portfolio that establishes each country's Beta. Collectively, our study highlights the significant role of political systems in the study of law and finance.

我们利用来自60个国家的面板数据来分析政治制度-总统制与议会制-是否影响股市波动。我们的研究结果表明，与议会制相比，总统制表现出更低的波动性。我们确定了导致这一结果的两个主要因素：政治稳定和对联盟的依赖。具体而言，总统制表现出更大的政治稳定性和更少的联盟依赖，这有助于减少股市波动。此外，我们表明，在总统制下，较低的股市波动性并不是以股市表现为代价的。事实上，一些证据表明，总统制对股市表现有积极的促进作用。我们的结果在统计上具有显著性和稳健性，考虑了子样本并采用了各种规格和计量经济模型，包括建立每个国家Beta的全球投资组合。总的来说，我们的研究突出了政治制度在法律和金融研究中的重要作用。

引用次数: 0

How central bank independence shapes monetary policy communication: A Large Language Model application 央行独立性如何影响货币政策沟通：一个大型语言模型的应用

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102668

Lauren Leek , Simeon Bischl

Although central bank communication is a core monetary policy and accountability tool for central banks, little is known about what shapes it. This paper develops and tests a theory regarding a previously unconsidered variable: central bank independence (CBI). We argue that increases in CBI alter the pressures central banks face, compelling them to address these pressures to maintain their reputation. We fine-tune and validate a Large Language Model (Google’s Gemini) to develop novel textual indices of policy pressures regarding monetary policy communication of central banks in speeches of 100 central banks from 1997 to 2023. Employing a staggered difference-in-differences and an instrumental variable approach, we find robust evidence that an increase in independence decreases the narrow focus on price stability and increases financial pressures discussed in monetary policy communication. These results are not, as generally is assumed, confounded by general changes in communication over time or singular events, in particular, the Global Financial Crisis.

尽管央行沟通是央行的核心货币政策和问责工具，但人们对它的形成机制知之甚少。本文发展并检验了一个关于以前未考虑的变量：中央银行独立性（CBI）的理论。我们认为，CBI的增加改变了央行面临的压力，迫使它们应对这些压力，以维护自己的声誉。我们对一个大型语言模型（b谷歌的Gemini）进行了微调和验证，以开发新的文本指标，反映1997年至2023年100家央行的讲话中有关央行货币政策沟通的政策压力。采用交错差中差和工具变量方法，我们发现强有力的证据表明，独立性的增加减少了对价格稳定的狭隘关注，并增加了货币政策沟通中讨论的金融压力。这些结果并不像人们普遍认为的那样，受到长期传播的普遍变化或个别事件（特别是全球金融危机）的影响。

引用次数: 0

Social welfare and the group size paradox 社会福利和群体规模悖论

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102673

Paul Pecorino

Tullock (1967) argues that the welfare costs of tariffs and monopoly extend beyond traditional deadweight loss measures to include both resources devoted to obtaining the transfer and resources spent resisting the transfer. This includes resources spent lobbying the government for the implementation of a favorable policy. Olson (1965) argues that lobbying activity frequently provides a nonexcludable good to an interest group and therefore may be subject to a free-rider problem. I use a Tullock (1980) style contest to analyze how the free-rider problem, the extent of the deadweight loss and bias in the policy process interact in determining the social loss resulting from lobbying activity. For plausible parameter values, an increase in the ability of the group potentially subject to the transfer to overcome the free-rider problem worsens social welfare by increasing expenditure in the transfer-seeking game even as it makes the distortion inducing transfer less likely. There are also plausible parameter values under which an increase in the bias of the policy process towards the group seeking the transfer raises social welfare by reducing expenditures in the transfer seeking game even as it makes the distortion inducing transfer more likely.

Tullock (1967)认为，关税和垄断的福利成本超出了传统的死重损失衡量标准，既包括用于获得转让的资源，也包括用于抵制转让的资源。这包括为实施有利政策而游说政府所花费的资源。Olson（1965）认为，游说活动经常为利益集团提供非排他性商品，因此可能会出现搭便车问题。我采用 Tullock（1980 年）式的竞赛来分析搭便车问题、死重损失程度和政策过程中的偏差如何相互作用，以决定游说活动造成的社会损失。在参数值合理的情况下，如果可能接受转移支付的群体克服搭便车问题的能力增强，则会增加寻求转移支付博弈中的支出，从而使社会福利恶化，即使它使诱发扭曲的转移支付的可能性降低。还有一些可信的参数值，在这些参数值下，政策过程对寻求转移的群体的偏向性增加，会减少寻求转移博弈中的支出，从而提高社会福利，即使它使诱发扭曲的转移更有可能发生。

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引用次数: 0

Rule of law and economic performance: A meta-regression analysis 法治与经济绩效：元回归分析

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102677

Egnate Shamugia

This paper employs a meta-regression analysis to investigate the influence of the rule of law on economic performance. We analyze 72 empirical studies (466 estimates) on the relationship between the rule of law and economic performance. Our findings indicate the presence of publication selection biases; however, they also confirm a positive and moderate effect of the rule of law on economic performance. We also identify spatial, development level, measurement practices, and methodological specifications as the main sources of heterogeneity in the results of the primary studies.

本文采用元回归分析的方法探讨了法治对经济绩效的影响。我们分析了72项关于法治与经济绩效关系的实证研究（466项估计）。我们的研究结果表明存在出版物选择偏差；然而，它们也证实了法治对经济绩效的积极和适度影响。我们还确定了空间、发展水平、测量实践和方法规范是主要研究结果异质性的主要来源。

引用次数: 0

Weapons and influence: Unpacking the impact of Chinese arms exports on the UNGA voting alignment 武器与影响：解读中国武器出口对联合国大会投票路线的影响

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102666

Xiaoyu He , Yawen Zheng , Yiwen Chen

Despite the research exploring factors shaping China’s influence, such causal influence from the perspective of Chinese arms transfers remains to be seen. In this study, we use arms exports and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting data from 140 non-OECD countries between 1990 and 2021 to estimate the causal effect of Chinese arms exports on the recipients’ voting alignments with China in the UNGA, with the voting alignment measured by the proportion of votes that a recipient casts in agreement with China. By using the interaction between the annual exchange rate and cross-country frequencies of receiving arms to construct an instrument, we isolate cleaner exogenous variations in Chinese arms exports. The 2SLS estimates reveal that Chinese arms exports lead to a significant increase in the share of votes cast in favor of China. We also offer plausible explanations for our findings, suggesting that arms recipients may be incentivized to align with China due to the strategic necessity of maintaining their ruling authority and the long-term dependence on Chinese arms supplies.

尽管研究探索了影响中国影响力的因素，但从中国武器转让的角度来看，这种因果影响仍有待观察。在本研究中，我们使用1990年至2021年间140个非经合组织国家的武器出口和联合国大会（UNGA）投票数据来估计中国武器出口对受援国在联合国大会上与中国投票结盟的因果效应，投票结盟是通过受援国与中国达成一致的投票比例来衡量的。通过使用年度汇率和跨国接收武器频率之间的相互作用来构建一个工具，我们分离出中国武器出口的更清洁的外生变化。2SLS估计显示，中国武器出口导致投给中国的选票比例显著增加。我们还为我们的研究结果提供了合理的解释，表明由于维持其统治权威的战略必要性和对中国武器供应的长期依赖，武器接受国可能会被激励与中国结盟。

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引用次数: 0

Starting young: How age limits shape political participation 从年轻开始：年龄如何限制政治参与

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102672

Chloe Nibourel , Mattias Folkestad

Using rich data on Swedish politicians, this paper documents the importance of the first experience of an election on future political participation. A difference-in-discontinuity design, based on the interaction between the month of birth and the timing of elections, allows us to compare the behavior of individuals who can vote and run for office in an election for the second time to individuals of similar age who participate for the first time. We find that, while turnout rates of both groups remain the same, more demanding measures of political engagement, such as running for office and being elected, rise by 10%–14% and 60%–70%, respectively, with the second participation. We discuss the role of parties’ screening in generating these results. We then explore the consequences of lowering the minimum age limit to 16 years old on the age profiles of politicians.

利用瑞典政治家的丰富数据，本文记录了第一次选举经验对未来政治参与的重要性。一个基于出生月份和选举时间之间的相互作用的不连续性差异设计，使我们能够比较第二次在选举中投票和竞选公职的个人与第一次参加选举的年龄相仿的个人的行为。我们发现，虽然两个群体的投票率保持不变，但更苛刻的政治参与措施，如竞选公职和当选，分别上升了10%-14%和60%-70%，与第二次参与。我们讨论了各方筛选在产生这些结果中的作用。然后，我们探讨了将最低年龄限制降低到16岁对政治家年龄概况的影响。

引用次数: 0

Social mobility and political stability 社会流动性和政治稳定性

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102665

Weicheng Lyu

This paper investigates the occurrence of revolutions in an economy consisting of elites and ordinary citizens. In the economy, elites obtain a disproportionate share of income and maintain their children’s status within the elite class by nepotism. Meanwhile, nepotism obstructs the path for capable individuals to enter the elite class, thereby enhancing the citizens’ relative advantage in capable manpower. In response, citizens may resort to revolutions for a larger share of national income. As the citizens’ relative advantage rises, the difficulty of launching a revolution declines; once it reaches some threshold, a revolution occurs. However, social mobility imposes institutional constraints on nepotism, thus playing a pivotal role in determining the occurrence of revolutions. In this context, we offer an explanation for the periodicity of dynasties and propose an optimal scheme to increase social mobility and prevent revolutions.

本文考察了一个由精英和普通公民组成的经济体中革命的发生。在经济中，精英们获得不成比例的收入份额，并通过裙带关系维持子女在精英阶层中的地位。同时，裙带关系阻碍了有能力的个人进入精英阶层，从而增强了公民在有能力的人力资源方面的相对优势。作为回应，公民可能会通过革命来获得更大的国民收入份额。随着公民的相对优势上升，发动革命的难度降低；一旦达到某个阈值，就会发生革命。然而，社会流动性对裙带关系施加了制度约束，从而在决定革命的发生方面发挥了关键作用。在此背景下，我们为王朝的周期性提供了一个解释，并提出了一个优化方案，以增加社会流动性和防止革命。

引用次数: 0

Do large, sustained economic freedom reforms hurt or improve women's economic rights? 大规模、持续的经济自由改革会损害还是改善妇女的经济权利？

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102671

Tibor Rutar

Does economic freedom come at the expense of women's economic rights, or does it instead help improve them? Presently, there are almost no studies investigating this issue, and what evidence exists is mostly correlational. This paper presents findings from matching analyses with the explicit aim of addressing the likely endogenous relationship between economic freedom and respect for women's economic rights. Using the latest data (up to 2022), estimates from matching methods, as well as supplementary regressions based on conditional mixed-processes, all point to economic freedom having an improving effect. Two components of economic freedom – sound money and freedom of international trade – seem most likely to drive the aggregate result. The uncovered positive aggregate effect is robust to an extensive set of control variables, tweaks in the operationalization of treatment, and varying the post-treatment period.

经济自由是以牺牲妇女的经济权利为代价，还是反而有助于改善妇女的经济权利？目前，关于这一问题的研究几乎没有，存在的证据大多是相关的。本文提出了匹配分析的结果，其明确目的是解决经济自由与尊重妇女经济权利之间可能的内生关系。使用最新的数据（截至2022年），匹配方法的估计，以及基于条件混合过程的补充回归，都表明经济自由具有改善效果。经济自由的两个组成部分——稳健货币和国际贸易自由——似乎最有可能推动总体结果。未发现的正总体效应对一系列控制变量、处理操作过程中的调整以及处理后时间的变化都具有鲁棒性。

引用次数: 0

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European Journal of Political Economy

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