Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102640
Daniel Meierrieks
We examine the relationship between terrorism and economic inequality for 163 countries between 1980 and 2018. We provide robust evidence that more terrorist activity results in higher levels of income inequality, where this relationship is especially pronounced for democratic countries. As an extension, we also study the role of terrorism in wealth inequality, uncovering similar linkages. Our findings imply that democracies see lower levels of income inequality in the absence of terrorism but increases in inequality as terrorist activity grows, while inequality in non-democratic countries is not affected by terrorism. Exploring potential transmission channels, we show that terrorism does not have distributional consequence by damaging the economy. Rather, in democracies terrorism leads to lower levels of redistribution via taxation and transfers. This finding is consistent with our theoretical argument that terrorism elicits a policy response in the form of lower levels of redistribution especially from democratic governments due to their dependence on broad electoral support to stay in power.
{"title":"The effect of terrorism on economic inequality in democracies and non-democracies","authors":"Daniel Meierrieks","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102640","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102640","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the relationship between terrorism and economic inequality for 163 countries between 1980 and 2018. We provide robust evidence that more terrorist activity results in higher levels of income inequality, where this relationship is especially pronounced for democratic countries. As an extension, we also study the role of terrorism in wealth inequality, uncovering similar linkages. Our findings imply that democracies see lower levels of income inequality in the absence of terrorism but increases in inequality as terrorist activity grows, while inequality in non-democratic countries is not affected by terrorism. Exploring potential transmission channels, we show that terrorism does not have distributional consequence by damaging the economy. Rather, in democracies terrorism leads to lower levels of redistribution via taxation and transfers. This finding is consistent with our theoretical argument that terrorism elicits a policy response in the form of lower levels of redistribution especially from democratic governments due to their dependence on broad electoral support to stay in power.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102640"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102621
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci , Giovanni Immordino , Francesco F. Russo
One fourth of the 196 countries we surveyed adopts some form of day fines — that is, fines that increase with the wealth of the offender — and does so for moderate, non-monetary violations. We offer a model of optimal deterrence with decreasing marginal utility of wealth and unequal wealth distribution that rationalizes this pattern. We show that uniform fines are optimal when harm from crime is low, non-monetary sanctions when it is high, and day fines in the intermediate region. The introduction of day fines reduces the (optimal) use of non-monetary sanctions and restores deterrence for the rich, as compared to uniform fines. The scope for day fines increases with wealth inequality and decreases with the cost of wealth verification.
{"title":"Fines for unequal societies","authors":"Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci , Giovanni Immordino , Francesco F. Russo","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102621","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102621","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>One fourth of the 196 countries we surveyed adopts some form of day fines — that is, fines that increase with the wealth of the offender — and does so for moderate, non-monetary violations. We offer a model of optimal deterrence with decreasing marginal utility of wealth and unequal wealth distribution that rationalizes this pattern. We show that uniform fines are optimal when harm from crime is low, non-monetary sanctions when it is high, and day fines in the intermediate region. The introduction of day fines reduces the (optimal) use of non-monetary sanctions and restores deterrence for the rich, as compared to uniform fines. The scope for day fines increases with wealth inequality and decreases with the cost of wealth verification.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102621"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Geopolitical Risks, Political Tensions and the European Economy","authors":"Jamel Saadaoui, Amélie Barbier-Gauchard, Jan-Egbert Sturm","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102644","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102644","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102644"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102619
Mihai Mutascu , Cristina Strango , Camelia Turcu
We investigate the impact of social media (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and LinkedIn) on left-wing and right-wing populist voting patterns within the European Union 27 (EU-27). Our empirical analysis is based on an Ordered Probit model, over 2014–2020. We differentiate between politically oriented communication and general communication, through social media. We find that politically oriented communication on platforms like Facebook and LinkedIn contributes to the electoral success of right-wing parties. In contrast, active engagement of left-wing parties on social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn appears not to enhance their electoral success. This suggests that right-wing parties effectively leverage platforms like Facebook and LinkedIn to disseminate populist ideologies, while left-wing parties face challenges with their engagement strategies on these platforms.
{"title":"Online social media and populism in Europe","authors":"Mihai Mutascu , Cristina Strango , Camelia Turcu","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102619","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102619","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the impact of social media (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and LinkedIn) on left-wing and right-wing populist voting patterns within the European Union 27 (EU-27). Our empirical analysis is based on an Ordered Probit model, over 2014–2020. We differentiate between politically oriented communication and general communication, through social media. We find that politically oriented communication on platforms like Facebook and LinkedIn contributes to the electoral success of right-wing parties. In contrast, active engagement of left-wing parties on social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn appears not to enhance their electoral success. This suggests that right-wing parties effectively leverage platforms like Facebook and LinkedIn to disseminate populist ideologies, while left-wing parties face challenges with their engagement strategies on these platforms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102619"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143171619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102642
Marco A. Marini, Samuel Nocito
We investigate whether climate activism favors pro-environmental consumption by examining the impact of Fridays for Future (FFF) protests in Italy on second-hand automobile sales in rally-affected areas. Leveraging data on 10 million automobile transactions occurring before and after FFF mobilizations, we exploit rainfall on the day of the event as an exogenous source of attendance variation. Our findings reveal a reduction in both the total number of cars purchased and their average CO2 emissions, with an uptick in the market share of low-emission vehicles and a corresponding decrease in the market share of high-emission counterparts. We test for two potential mechanisms at work: one mediated by an increase in environmental awareness, the other induced by a rational anticipation of future stricter regulations. Empirical evidence suggests that the latter mechanism is generally more pronounced than the former. However, the first channel seems likely to be at work among individuals aged 18–25, a group that is potentially more involved in the FFF movement.
{"title":"Climate activism favors pro-environmental consumption","authors":"Marco A. Marini, Samuel Nocito","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102642","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102642","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate whether climate activism favors pro-environmental consumption by examining the impact of Fridays for Future (FFF) protests in Italy on second-hand automobile sales in rally-affected areas. Leveraging data on 10 million automobile transactions occurring before and after FFF mobilizations, we exploit rainfall on the day of the event as an exogenous source of attendance variation. Our findings reveal a reduction in both the total number of cars purchased and their average CO2 emissions, with an uptick in the market share of low-emission vehicles and a corresponding decrease in the market share of high-emission counterparts. We test for two potential mechanisms at work: one mediated by an increase in environmental awareness, the other induced by a rational anticipation of future stricter regulations. Empirical evidence suggests that the latter mechanism is generally more pronounced than the former. However, the first channel seems likely to be at work among individuals aged 18–25, a group that is potentially more involved in the FFF movement.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102642"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Resource wealth induces predation incentives but also conflict-deterring third-party involvement. As a result, the relation between resource value and conflict probability is a priori unclear. This paper studies such relation with a theoretical framework involving a potential aggressor and a powerful third party. First, we show that, if the third party’s incentives to intervene are sufficiently strong, conflict probability is hump-shaped in the resource value. Second, we theoretically establish that resource value increases the third party’s incentive to side with the resource-rich defendant in case of intervention, providing another mechanism for stabilization when the resource value is high. Third, we explain how our theory relates to policy-relevant case studies involving conflict-ridden areas (including inter-state or civil conflicts) and powerful third parties.
{"title":"Third-party interest, resource value, and the likelihood of conflict","authors":"Giacomo Battiston , Matteo Bizzarri , Riccardo Franceschin","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102635","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102635","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Resource wealth induces predation incentives but also conflict-deterring third-party involvement. As a result, the relation between resource value and conflict probability is a priori unclear. This paper studies such relation with a theoretical framework involving a potential aggressor and a powerful third party. First, we show that, if the third party’s incentives to intervene are sufficiently strong, conflict probability is hump-shaped in the resource value. Second, we theoretically establish that resource value increases the third party’s incentive to side with the resource-rich defendant in case of intervention, providing another mechanism for stabilization when the resource value is high. Third, we explain how our theory relates to policy-relevant case studies involving conflict-ridden areas (including inter-state or civil conflicts) and powerful third parties.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102635"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143170602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-15DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102618
Thomas Däubler , Lukáš Linek
Do party selectors or voters choose more productive politicians? Selectors may promote quality candidates and have an informational advantage over voters, but quality need not be the key criterion for nominations, and voters may be sufficiently informed to correct inferior decisions. We empirically examine whether the type of principal responsible for the selection affects individual parliamentary work (attendance, bills, amendments, questions, speeches). Flexible-list proportional representation systems are both interesting and analytically useful in this context, since seats within parties are first allocated to candidates reaching a certain number of personal votes, while any remaining seats are awarded based on the pre-electoral list rank. This allows us to compare three types of elected candidates: selector-chosen, voter-chosen, and doubly-chosen representatives. Analysing data from the Czech Republic in the period between 2002 and 2021, we find that voters have a stronger preference for candidates with high formal education than selectors. We do not find differences in parliamentary behaviour between selector-chosen and voter-chosen types. The results speak against a potential trade-off between giving voters more influence on within-party seat allocation and the quality of chosen representatives.
{"title":"Party selectors, voters, and the choice of productive representatives under different types of list proportional representation","authors":"Thomas Däubler , Lukáš Linek","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102618","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102618","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do party selectors or voters choose more productive politicians? Selectors may promote quality candidates and have an informational advantage over voters, but quality need not be the key criterion for nominations, and voters may be sufficiently informed to correct inferior decisions. We empirically examine whether the type of principal responsible for the selection affects individual parliamentary work (attendance, bills, amendments, questions, speeches). Flexible-list proportional representation systems are both interesting and analytically useful in this context, since seats within parties are first allocated to candidates reaching a certain number of personal votes, while any remaining seats are awarded based on the pre-electoral list rank. This allows us to compare three types of elected candidates: selector-chosen, voter-chosen, and doubly-chosen representatives. Analysing data from the Czech Republic in the period between 2002 and 2021, we find that voters have a stronger preference for candidates with high formal education than selectors. We do not find differences in parliamentary behaviour between selector-chosen and voter-chosen types. The results speak against a potential trade-off between giving voters more influence on within-party seat allocation and the quality of chosen representatives.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102618"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142701407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-03DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102615
Denis Ivanov , Gaygysyz Ashyrov
Wealth inequality, both within and between countries, is on the rise, prompting various interventions to address this issue. In this context, some governments could perceive hosting mega events as an opportunity to generate economic and social benefits through directed long-lasting investments and to converge with other countries in the region. However, the impact of these costly events on wealth inequality could be detrimental, depending on the quality of existing distribution channels. This paper aims to understand the potential role of mega events in addressing wealth inequality. We empirically test the impact of sports mega events on wealth inequality across more than 120 countries. Utilizing panel data analysis on a comprehensive dataset dating back to 1900, we find that hosting mega events such as the Olympic Games, FIFA World Cups, and Universal Expositions is associated with an increase in the wealth shares of the top 1% and 10%, often at the expense of the bottom 50%. This effect is double in magnitude in non-democracies and non-OECD countries, as well as higher during the organization of FIFA World Cups. We propose two possible explanations for this phenomenon: episodes of extreme growth during the organization of mega events that disproportionately benefit the wealthiest individuals, and vested interests associated with the organization of such events. Our results remain statistically significant under various model specifications.
{"title":"Wealth inequality and mega events","authors":"Denis Ivanov , Gaygysyz Ashyrov","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102615","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102615","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Wealth inequality, both within and between countries, is on the rise, prompting various interventions to address this issue. In this context, some governments could perceive hosting mega events as an opportunity to generate economic and social benefits through directed long-lasting investments and to converge with other countries in the region. However, the impact of these costly events on wealth inequality could be detrimental, depending on the quality of existing distribution channels. This paper aims to understand the potential role of mega events in addressing wealth inequality. We empirically test the impact of sports mega events on wealth inequality across more than 120 countries. Utilizing panel data analysis on a comprehensive dataset dating back to 1900, we find that hosting mega events such as the Olympic Games, FIFA World Cups, and Universal Expositions is associated with an increase in the wealth shares of the top 1% and 10%, often at the expense of the bottom 50%. This effect is double in magnitude in non-democracies and non-OECD countries, as well as higher during the organization of FIFA World Cups. We propose two possible explanations for this phenomenon: episodes of extreme growth during the organization of mega events that disproportionately benefit the wealthiest individuals, and vested interests associated with the organization of such events. Our results remain statistically significant under various model specifications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102615"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142425746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-27DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102614
Bilal El Rafhi, Thibault Darcillon
This paper explores the changing attitudes of the most affluent individuals towards state intervention in redistribution in Germany in the context of growing inequality. Contrary to the predictions from traditional political economy models, a growing body of research suggests that the most affluent individuals could support more redistributive policies in reaction to higher income inequality due to altruism, fear of externalities (such as rising crime rates), and potential economic and social costs associated with downward mobility. Using survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002 to 2020, our results provide robust evidence of our main prediction: we find a significant relative increase in support for redistribution among the top 30% of earners (compared to the bottom 70% of earners). Our heterogeneous analysis then reveals that the substantial increase in support for redistribution among the affluent has increased among supporters of the political left. This trend seems, however, to be comparatively less pronounced in East Germany.
{"title":"The evolution of affluent support for redistribution in Germany in the context of rising inequalities","authors":"Bilal El Rafhi, Thibault Darcillon","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102614","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102614","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper explores the changing attitudes of the most affluent individuals towards state intervention in redistribution in Germany in the context of growing inequality. Contrary to the predictions from traditional political economy models, a growing body of research suggests that the most affluent individuals could support more redistributive policies in reaction to higher income inequality due to altruism, fear of externalities (such as rising crime rates), and potential economic and social costs associated with downward mobility. Using survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002 to 2020, our results provide robust evidence of our main prediction: we find a significant relative increase in support for redistribution among the top 30% of earners (compared to the bottom 70% of earners). Our heterogeneous analysis then reveals that the substantial increase in support for redistribution among the affluent has increased among supporters of the political left. This trend seems, however, to be comparatively less pronounced in East Germany.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102614"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142425745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-25DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102612
Karen Jackson , Oleksandr Shepotylo
This study investigates how political alliances influence trade and welfare in Europe and major global economies amidst escalating geopolitical tensions. Utilizing a panel data approach, we assess the impact of military alliances on trade through structural gravity and staggered difference-in-difference methodologies. We further simulate the potential trade and welfare effects of the strengthening and disintegration of political alliances within blocs. Results reveal significant trade and welfare consequences stemming from the expansion or disintegration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the establishment of a military alliance under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). From a European point of view, our results suggest that the accession of new NATO members will bring economic benefits, while the US leaving NATO, or the deepening of the SCO, will bring negative trade and welfare effects. If a US exit from NATO triggers a disintegration of the alliance and the SCO creates a military alliance, this would lead to severe negative consequences for the EU. Notably, the study finds that the benefits of collective security provided by NATO substantially outweigh the costs associated with its 2% defence spending requirement.
{"title":"Political alliances and trade: Europe in a polarized world","authors":"Karen Jackson , Oleksandr Shepotylo","doi":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102612","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102612","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates how political alliances influence trade and welfare in Europe and major global economies amidst escalating geopolitical tensions. Utilizing a panel data approach, we assess the impact of military alliances on trade through structural gravity and staggered difference-in-difference methodologies. We further simulate the potential trade and welfare effects of the strengthening and disintegration of political alliances within blocs. Results reveal significant trade and welfare consequences stemming from the expansion or disintegration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the establishment of a military alliance under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). From a European point of view, our results suggest that the accession of new NATO members will bring economic benefits, while the US leaving NATO, or the deepening of the SCO, will bring negative trade and welfare effects. If a US exit from NATO triggers a disintegration of the alliance and the SCO creates a military alliance, this would lead to severe negative consequences for the EU. Notably, the study finds that the benefits of collective security provided by NATO substantially outweigh the costs associated with its 2% defence spending requirement.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51439,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Economy","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 102612"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142320317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}