European Journal of Political Economy最新文献

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Local labour market conditions and electoral behaviour: An instrumental variable approach from Italy 当地劳动力市场状况和选举行为：来自意大利的工具变量方法

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-10-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102769

Daniel Mele , Alessandro Pietropaoli

What is the causal impact of local employment dynamics on electoral behaviour? We combine Italian labour market area-level data for four national elections (2008, 2013, 2018 and 2022) with a shift-share IV estimation design to identify how local labour market conditions, captured by changes in the employment rate, affect voter participation and incumbent support. Our baseline estimates show that a 1 p.p. drop in the employment rate yields a significant 0.76 p.p. increase in turnout and a 0.80 p.p. decline in incumbent vote share. Further analyses reveal crucial nuances. First, exploring mediation, we find that higher turnout in response to worsening labour market conditions accounts for roughly one-quarter of the total negative impact on incumbent support via a participation channel. Second, the effects appear driven entirely by adverse conditions: we find strong electoral reactions in areas actually experiencing employment declines, but no significant response where conditions improve, consistent with a protest voting framework. Third, while regional-national partisan alignment slightly moderates effect magnitudes, national accountability for economic performance largely dominates the local electoral reaction.

本地就业动态对选举行为有何因果影响？我们将意大利四次全国选举（2008年、2013年、2018年和2022年）的劳动力市场区域数据与变动份额IV估计设计相结合，以确定就业率变化所反映的当地劳动力市场状况如何影响选民参与和现任支持率。我们的基线估计显示，就业率每下降1个百分点，投票率就会显著提高0.76个百分点，在职选民的得票率就会下降0.80个百分点。进一步的分析揭示了关键的细微差别。首先，探索调解，我们发现，应对劳动力市场状况恶化的更高投票率约占通过参与渠道对现任支持率的总负面影响的四分之一。其次，这种影响似乎完全是由不利条件驱动的：我们发现，在就业实际下降的地区，选民反应强烈，但在条件改善的地区，选民反应不明显，这与抗议投票框架一致。第三，虽然地区-国家党派结盟略微缓和了影响程度，但国家对经济表现的问责制在很大程度上主导了地方选举的反应。

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引用次数: 0

Corrupt reserve prices 储备价格腐败

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-10-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102767

Sümeyra Atmaca , Koen Schoors , Elena Podkolzina

We develop a methodology to identify favoritism in public procurement auctions with reserve prices and apply it to procurement of gasoline in Russia. As reserve prices are set prior to the auction, they should be independent of the winning seller’s identity in a fair and competitive auction. A procurer-seller pair with consistently higher unit reserve prices than the procurer’s average indicates potentially corrupt favoritism. In auctions involving such favoritist pairs, procurers limit entry, so that their favored sellers face less competition, are more likely to win, and enjoy higher price markups. Electronic open-bid auctions with sufficient competition offset these effects.

我们开发了一种方法来识别保留价格的公共采购拍卖中的偏袒，并将其应用于俄罗斯的汽油采购。由于底价是在拍卖前设定的，因此在公平和竞争的拍卖中，底价应独立于中标者的身份。如果买方和卖方的单位底价始终高于买方的平均底价，则表明存在潜在的腐败偏袒。在涉及这类偏好组合的拍卖中，买家限制进入，这样他们偏爱的卖家面临的竞争就更少，更有可能获胜，并获得更高的加价。具有充分竞争的电子公开拍卖抵消了这些影响。

引用次数: 0

Female politicians and corruption in rural India 印度农村的女政客和腐败

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-10-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102764

Somdeep Chatterjee , Shiv Hastawala , Elisa Taveras

This paper leverages random assignment of female quotas for leadership positions on Indian village councils to assess its causal effect on corruption. Since the mid-1990s, India has mandated that at least one third of village council chief positions be randomly reserved for women. Using data from the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS) 2006, we find that an additional term reserved for a female head as opposed to just a single one reduces both the occurrence and bribe amounts paid to the local government by households. This reduction is also observed in bribes paid to other local officials suggesting downstream effects of electing female officials on corruption. As a potential mechanism, we provide speculative evidence that it takes time for women political leaders to establish and settle, and when they are able to do so, they appear more efficient and transparent, especially in terms of selecting households as beneficiaries for government programs.

本文利用印度村委会女性领导职位的随机分配来评估其对腐败的因果影响。自上世纪90年代中期以来，印度规定至少三分之一的村委会主任职位随机保留给女性。利用2006年农村经济和人口调查（REDS）的数据，我们发现，为女性户主预留一个额外的任期，而不是一个任期，既减少了家庭向地方政府支付的贿赂金额，也减少了家庭向地方政府支付的贿赂金额。在向其他地方官员行贿方面也观察到这种减少，这表明选举女性官员对腐败产生了下游效应。作为一种潜在的机制，我们提供了推测性证据，证明女性政治领导人的建立和稳定需要时间，当她们能够这样做时，她们显得更有效率和透明，特别是在选择家庭作为政府项目的受益者方面。

引用次数: 0

Female political representation and budget forecast errors 女性政治代表性与预算预测误差

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-10-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102766

Marco Alberto De Benedetto , Pasquale Giacobbe , Andrea Mosca

This paper examines how female representation in municipal executive boards — the primary budgetary decision-making bodies in Italian local governments — affects both the accuracy and bias of budget forecasts. We exploit Law 56/2014, which mandated gender quotas in municipalities with more than 3000 residents, to identify causal effects. Using an instrumental variable approach, we find that a one–percentage-point increase in the share of female aldermen reduces expenditure and revenue forecast errors by 0.5 and 0.4 percent, respectively, and systematically mitigates the prevailing optimistic bias in projections, particularly in pre-election years. Mechanism analyses highlight two main channels: (i) higher levels of technical competence and (ii) lower scope for political manipulation, with the strongest effects observed in social spending and in regions with weaker accountability.

本文考察了意大利地方政府的主要预算决策机构——市执行委员会中的女性代表如何影响预算预测的准确性和偏差。我们利用第56/2014号法律来确定因果关系，该法律规定在居民超过3000人的城市实行性别配额。使用工具变量方法，我们发现女性议员比例每增加1个百分点，支出和收入预测误差分别减少0.5%和0.4%，并系统地减轻了预测中普遍存在的乐观偏见，特别是在选举前的年份。机制分析强调了两个主要渠道：(i)更高水平的技术能力和（ii）更小的政治操纵范围，在社会支出和问责制较弱的地区观察到最强烈的影响。

引用次数: 0

Labor market institutions and preferences for redistribution 劳动力市场制度和再分配偏好

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102765

Clàudia Serra-Sala , Pilar Sorribas-Navarro

In highly segmented labor markets uneven distributions of risk across worker groups can lead to varying demands for redistribution. We study the impact of economic insecurity, associated with temporary contracts, on individual preferences for income redistribution. The Spanish labor market, where one-third of workers are employed under temporary contracts, provides a good context for this study. We use data from the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2018 and apply an exact matching methodology to isolate the effect of the contract type from other individual characteristics. Our results reveal that temporary contracts lead to an 11 percent increase in the likelihood of strongly supporting redistribution, irrespective of individuals’ education level or sex. In terms of age, the effect is concentrated among individuals aged 40 and above, indicating an increase in risk perception when this contractual figure is perceived as a dead end. During periods of macroeconomic uncertainty, when insecurity extends beyond the contract type, redistribution preferences of workers with temporary and permanent contracts equalize due to a substantial increase in the preferences of those with an ex-ante more secure labor market position. Our results provide evidence that economic insecurity caused by the design of labor market institutions is a strong determinant of redistribution preferences.

在高度分割的劳动力市场中，工人群体之间风险的不均衡分布可能导致对再分配的不同需求。我们研究了与临时合同相关的经济不安全感对个人收入再分配偏好的影响。西班牙劳动力市场有三分之一的工人是临时合同雇佣的，这为这项研究提供了一个很好的背景。我们使用2002年至2018年欧洲社会调查的数据，并采用精确匹配方法，将合同类型的影响与其他个人特征隔离开来。我们的研究结果显示，无论个人的教育水平或性别如何，临时合同导致强烈支持再分配的可能性增加了11%。就年龄而言，这种影响主要集中在40岁及以上的个人身上，这表明当这个合同数字被视为死胡同时，风险认知会增加。在宏观经济不确定时期，当不安全感超出合同类型时，临时合同和永久合同工人的再分配偏好相等，因为那些事先拥有更安全的劳动力市场地位的工人的偏好大幅增加。我们的研究结果证明，由劳动力市场制度设计引起的经济不安全感是再分配偏好的重要决定因素。

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引用次数: 0

Aid, Reform, and Interest groups 援助、改革和利益集团

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102750

Jac C. Heckelman, Bonnie Wilson

Employing a political economy perspective, we seek to understand the seeming failure of aid to promote institutional reform. À la Stigler’s theory of regulatory capture, we suppose that institutions are determined via a process of exchange and that special interest groups may capture institutions. We interpret grants of aid as a shock to the market for institutions and hypothesize that the impact of aid on institutional reform is conditional on the influence of groups. Based on a panel of 92 aid-receiving nations, we find evidence consistent with a political economy perspective and our hypothesis. In particular, we find that aid has had a positive impact on reform in countries with especially low levels of market-orientation in institutions and middling to large numbers of groups, and that aid has been associated with back-sliding on reform in many countries with high levels of market-orientation in institutions.

运用政治经济学的观点，我们试图理解援助在促进制度改革方面看似失败的原因。À在斯蒂格勒的监管捕获理论中，我们假设制度是通过交换过程决定的，特殊利益集团可能会捕获制度。我们将援助赠款解释为对机构市场的冲击，并假设援助对机构改革的影响取决于团体的影响。基于对92个受援国的调查，我们发现了与政治经济学观点和我们的假设相一致的证据。特别是，我们发现援助对制度市场化程度特别低的国家和中等到大量群体的改革产生了积极影响，而援助与许多制度市场化程度很高的国家的改革倒退有关。

引用次数: 0

Threshold of shadows: Unveiling organised crime in Italian municipal public procurement 阴影的门槛：揭露意大利市政公共采购中的有组织犯罪

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102752

Stefania Fontana , Giorgio d’Agostino

This paper investigates the complicity of local public buyers in enabling the diversion of resources to organised crime through the manipulation of contract values in public works and services. Exploiting a discontinuity in anti-mafia screening procedures, we analyse a comprehensive dataset of public procurement contracts issued by Italian municipalities spanning from 2007 to 2019. Bunching estimators reveal a distinct pattern of contract value manipulation occurring just below the anti-mafia screening threshold of €150,000, with a heightened concentration observed in public works projects and provinces characterised by a higher prevalence of mafia influence. Our empirical analysis further shows that bunching is significantly more pronounced in municipalities that are later dissolved for mafia infiltration. Contracts below the threshold are also more likely to involve limited competition and to be awarded to firms with financial traits consistent with the hypothesis of mafia infiltration. By following the full procurement chain – from the design of the contract, to how competition is shaped, to who ultimately wins – we provide new evidence of collusion risks in local procurement, and highlight the importance of enhanced safeguards to counter corruption and organised crime within public procurement processes.

本文调查本地公共买家串谋操纵公共工程和服务的合约价值，使资源转用于有组织犯罪。利用反黑手党筛选程序的不连续性，我们分析了2007年至2019年意大利市政当局发布的公共采购合同的综合数据集。群集估算揭示了一种明显的合同价值操纵模式，发生在反黑手党筛选门槛15万欧元以下，在公共工程项目和黑手党影响较为普遍的省份中观察到这种情况更加集中。我们的实证分析进一步表明，在后来因黑手党渗透而解散的城市中，聚集现象更为明显。低于门槛的合同也更有可能涉及有限的竞争，并被授予具有与黑手党渗透假设一致的财务特征的公司。通过跟踪整个采购链——从合同的设计到竞争的形成，再到谁最终胜出——我们提供了本地采购存在串通风险的新证据，并强调了在公共采购过程中加强打击腐败和有组织犯罪的保障措施的重要性。

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引用次数: 0

Stock returns of federal reserve officials 美联储官员的股票回报

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102739

Cody Couture , Abhiprerna Smit

This paper examines the trading behavior of members of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). First, we calculate the financial market returns of FOMC members relative to the overall market and examine if there is any evidence of abnormal returns. Second, we test whether FOMC members exhibit evidence of market timing around monetary policy announcements. We do not find any evidence that FOMC officials select securities that earn abnormal returns. However, our results regarding market timing are mixed. Though we do not find any evidence of security selection or portfolio rebalancing with respect to monetary policy decisions, we do find that stock sales by FOMC officials are typically succeeded by negative returns in the overall stock market.

本文考察了美联储联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）成员的交易行为。首先，我们计算了FOMC成员相对于整体市场的金融市场回报，并检查是否有任何异常回报的证据。其次，我们测试联邦公开市场委员会成员是否在货币政策宣布前后表现出市场时机的证据。我们没有发现任何证据表明联邦公开市场委员会官员选择获得异常回报的证券。然而，我们关于市场时机的结果喜忧参半。虽然我们没有发现任何与货币政策决策相关的证券选择或投资组合再平衡的证据，但我们确实发现，联邦公开市场委员会官员出售股票后，整体股市通常会出现负回报。

引用次数: 0

Physical vs. institutional public goods provision: Evidence from China 物质与制度的公共产品供给：来自中国的证据

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102737

Linghui Han

This paper argues that political and market concentration levels explain why developing economies often underinvest in institutional infrastructure and legal capacity. Economic growth challenges this equilibrium, incentivizing rulers to invest in institutional infrastructure complementary to physical infrastructure. Rulers jointly invest to expand market entry and size only if they can secure higher rents and preserve institutions favoring concentration. The theoretical model predicts that physical infrastructure investment grows faster than institutional investment as market concentration rises. Using provincial coal reserve shares as an instrument for market concentration, a difference-in-differences analysis of Chinese data from 1997 to 2006 shows that the fiscal expenditure ratio of physical to institutional infrastructure increased 78% faster in provinces within the top market concentration quartile in 2000—the year before China joined the WTO.

本文认为，政治和市场集中度水平解释了为什么发展中经济体经常在制度基础设施和法律能力方面投资不足。经济增长挑战了这种平衡，激励统治者投资于与实体基础设施互补的制度基础设施。统治者只有在能够获得更高的租金并保留有利于集中的机构的情况下，才会共同投资以扩大市场准入和规模。理论模型预测，随着市场集中度的提高，实物基础设施投资的增长速度要快于机构投资。利用省级煤炭储量份额作为市场集中度的衡量指标，对1997年至2006年中国数据进行的一项异中异分析显示，2000年（即中国加入WTO的前一年），市场集中度最高的四分之一省份的财政支出中，有形基础设施与制度性基础设施之比增长速度快了78%。

引用次数: 0

The impact of income inequality on public environmental expenditure with green consumers 收入不平等对绿色消费者公共环境支出的影响

IF 2.4 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy

Pub Date : 2025-09-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102746

Lesly Cassin , Paolo Melindi-Ghidi , Fabien Prieur

This article analyzes the impact of income inequality on environmental policy in the presence of green consumers. We first perform an empirical analysis using a panel of European countries over the period 1995–2021. The results show a negative relationship between inequality and public environmental expenditure, which is weaker with higher inequality. We also find a negative correlation between environmental expenditure and green consumption, that highlights the substitutable nature of the relationship between the two variables. We next develop a model with two main ingredients: citizens with different income capacities have access to two commodities that differ in terms of environmental impact, and they vote on the environmental policy. In equilibrium, the population is divided into two groups, conventional vs green consumers. An increase in inequality raises the marginal cost of policy through size and composition effects. The higher the equilibrium tax, the larger the overall effect. This provides us with an explanation of the main empirical result.

本文分析了在绿色消费者存在的情况下，收入不平等对环境政策的影响。我们首先使用1995-2021年期间的欧洲国家面板进行实证分析。结果表明，不平等与公共环境支出呈负相关关系，且不平等程度越高，这种负相关关系越弱。我们还发现环境支出与绿色消费之间存在负相关关系，这凸显了两个变量之间关系的可替代性。接下来，我们开发了一个包含两个主要成分的模型：不同收入能力的公民可以获得两种环境影响不同的商品，他们对环境政策进行投票。在均衡中，人口被分为两组，传统消费者和绿色消费者。不平等的加剧通过规模和构成效应提高了政策的边际成本。均衡税越高，整体效果就越大。这为我们提供了对主要实证结果的解释。

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全部 ACS Publications Elsevier ieeexplore Springer The Royal Society of Chemistry Wiley

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European Journal of Political Economy

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