Gender is a central concept and a buzzword in the development aid discourse. Like many buzzwords, its meaning is malleable. If aid efforts really are to “leave no one behind,” as the Sustainable Development Goals proclaim, we must critically interrogate how the discursive articulation of buzzwords such as gender can both make visible and hide from view vulnerabilities that should be salient for aid programming. In this article, we focus on the extent to which the mobilization of “gender” by Norwegian development aid non-governmental organizations' is able to bring vulnerabilities related to sexual orientation, gender identity, and expression (SOGIE) to the fore.
The purpose of this study is to examine a corpus of Norwegian NGO development aid policy and planning documents to analyse whether and how gender is articulated differently across different types of documents, and what this means in terms of which gendered vulnerabilities become visible.
We draw on methods from corpus-assisted discourse studies (CADS) to examine a purpose-built corpus of 88 files pulled from framework funding applications submitted by four Norwegian aid NGOs to the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). We analyse the results drawing on Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory to examine how conceptual translation between policy and programme-level documents opens up space for the concept to be assigned changing meanings.
While the NGOs at policy level articulate a broad notion of gendered vulnerabilities that include recognition of SOGIE vulnerabilities, this is not translated into practical programme plans. At the programme plan level, gender is articulated as a subject field overwhelmingly concerned with women and firmly attached to a traditional binary sex-gender construct.
Although SOGIE gendered vulnerabilities are increasingly acknowledged in NGO articulations of their priorities and values, this is not reflected in actual programme plans. We argue that this can lead to a misplaced expectation that these concerns are being addressed in the NGOs' activities, obscuring the neglect of SOGIE vulnerabilities in many development aid gender programmes.
As a leading programme aimed at promoting “connectivity” and “exchanges of people,” BRI is providing a new avenue to expand China's presence and influence in Latin America and contribute to its rise at the systemic (global) level. Research shows that China's BRI in Latin America is not merely an economic initiative, but offers a combination of economic, political, and strategic objectives and consequences.
The purpose of the research is to examine China's BRI in Latin America from geopolitical perspectives, as well as its motivations, focuses, and consequences. It contributes to the scholarly discussion by analysing China's BRI in the greater picture of China's rise at the systemic (global) level and examining it through a political economy lens.
The research examines China's BRI in Latin America with a special focus on large-scale infrastructure projects that may have geopolitical implications and transform the built landscape in the region. The research is based on a critical review of the literature, and especially the Chinese academic literature, government documents, and corporate documents provided by some Chinese companies involved in large-scale BRI projects.
The research finds that BRI helps China increase its economic and political co-operation with the states of Latin America. China is increasingly capable of reaping not only economic but also geopolitical benefits from BRI by intensifying economic and, by extension, political relations with Latin America.
China's BRI in Latin America looks to obtain not merely economic, but also political and strategic benefits from China's “soft” power. Chinese policy-makers should be aware that China's “soft power” and interest could be strengthened if BRI could be implemented in accordance with the principles of advancing democratization, “good governance,” and environmental protection.
Policy-makers dealing with conflicting development goals and constrained budgets must comprehend the relative cost effectiveness of agricultural and rural development initiatives.
We assess the impact of alternative interventions on development outcomes—economic growth, job creation, poverty reduction, and diet quality—to inform decision-making and resource allocation in Tanzania's agriculture. We analyse trade-offs among development objectives and explore budget reallocation to enhance the efficiency of public spending.
We used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model linked top-down with microsimulation modules to simulate the impact of public investment options.
No single option emerges as the most effective across all development objectives. Investments in improved inputs and extension for horticulture and cash crops stand out for diet quality and employment creation. Livestock services show consistently high rankings across multiple objectives. Investments to boost cereals and root crops promote growth and reduce poverty but do little to increase employment and diet quality.
Budget reallocation towards more cost-effective interventions can significantly enhance the development effectiveness of Tanzania's agricultural expenditures and would substantially increase cumulative gross domestic product growth between 2019 and 2028.
Policy-makers can use the findings to design and prioritize agricultural interventions that better align with broader development objectives. Tanzania can achieve higher benefits and contribute to overall development goals by reallocating resources towards more cost-effective expenditure options.
Localization is increasingly invoked in debates about how to reform international aid: to improve aid effectiveness and address ethical concerns by turning hierarchical aid relations on their head. This has proved to be easier said than done. The COVID-19 pandemic produced logistical impediments to aid practitioners, which translated into a renewed, if temporary, interest in localization.
The initial scope of the research engaged with the notion of partnership during COVID-19, but almost all informants drew attention to the concept of localization. The article maps and analyses the challenges and advantages of localization, as seen from the practitioners' perspective.
The article draws on 24 interviews conducted in Oslo with representatives of various Norwegian development and humanitarian non-governmental organizations and government agencies, in addition to policy and grey literature review.
The article shows that the re-emergence of the localization debate during COVID-19 occurred not because of any ambition to reform aid, but as a pragmatic and temporary response to the logistical impediments caused by the pandemic. Reflections from the interviewees on the pros and cons offer more substantial insights into why localization fails to change practice, while at the same time localization enables a form of indirect governance related to accountability regimes. This is analysed as developmentality, reflecting the logic that localization takes place when recipients do as donors want, but they do so voluntarily, which suggests that localization counterintuitively may reinforce existing power structures.
Localization is poorly conceptualized. While a definition could be helpful in practice, one that is too rigid could undermine the diversity of actors and knowledge that localization aims to advance. At the operational level, localization requires greater flexibility and slack throughout the aid chain, especially in the audit and accountability regimes of donor and funding authorities, which permeate and uphold lopsided aid relations.
This study examines the intricate relationship between governance, institutions, and human development in the context of Ghana's flagship projects and initiatives; One Village, One Dam (1V1D) and Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ). The aim is to provide a better understanding of how government interventions based on development state theory can achieve sustainable economic growth and the well-being of the people of Ghana.
The study seeks to understand the feasibility, challenges, and effectiveness of these projects in promoting food security, job creation, and skills development.
A qualitative approach using a multiple case study design was used for the research. In-depth interviews and focus group discussions with 64 purposively selected participants provided the data, which was subsequently subjected to content analysis.
The study finds that while certain aspects of the projects, such as well-defined objectives and scope, worked well, problems relating to risk management and stakeholder engagement proved a hindrance. Additionally, although the projects were facilitated by a network of well-organized governance structures and institutions, ineffective co-ordination often led to delays and miscommunication. Nevertheless, the PFJ project was successful in promoting food security, job creation, and skills development for farmers.
The study underscores the need for Ghana's policy-makers to improve risk management and stakeholder engagement within such initiatives. The One Village, One Dam initiative needs to be reinvigorated through the adoption by policy-makers of a culture of open dialogue, inclusivity, and adaptive governance.
The need to diversify their economies is an enduring challenge for fossil fuel-dependent countries, one which will become ever more important as the world seeks to decarbonize. But the conditions under which major oil-producing countries (petrostates) seek to diversify their exports—and those under which their attempts succeed—are poorly understood.
This article tests competing explanations for the successes and failures of petrostates' export diversification.
We employ a comparative case study approach using qualitative evidence from two comparatively successful diversification cases—Egypt and Malaysia—and one less successful case—Kazakhstan—selected using a Theil index of export concentration.
The evidence indicates that Egypt and Malaysia's more successful outcomes stemmed more from necessity and policy design than from differences in domestic institutions and interests. All three countries were motivated to diversify by price volatility and declining revenues at various points from the 1980s to the 2000s and beyond, but reserve depletion was a greater threat in Egypt and Malaysia. As such, they adopted a more balanced approached to diversification, one that combined liberalization with state intervention.
These cases suggest that petrostates may be willing and able to diversify as the global shift toward renewables raises the prospect of unburnable oil reserves. Petrostates can diversify efficiently by using a basket of policies that includes a mix of economic liberalization and government intervention to create investment and incentives in non-oil tradeable sectors and nurture infant industries. Opposition to reforms in petrostates can be addressed by selectively compensating vested interests.
Local government can develop democracy and community participation if institutions support it. But when a military regime takes over following a coup d'état, it may use familiar methods of patronage, corruption, and exploitation of kinship ties to render decentralization a spectacle—that is, done for show, but without substantial change. Local elites may then capture local administration and extract public resources.
Does decentralization as spectacle bring positive change — when the military hold power and the state is laden with corruption, patronage, and kinship ties?
We analyse how respondents experienced two periods of local government, including post-election public interactions between representatives and their constituents.
Data comes from responses to qualitative interviews with 70 key informants from the Qambar Shahdadkot and Larkana districts of Sindh, Pakistan. We analysed the themes generated by responses to questions.
Some 40% of respondents reported those who came into local government power aimed first and foremost to promote the interests of their own class. Some 29% of respondents reported local government made empty promises to provide services with public participation.
Pakistan's decentralization has been a spectacle, to serve powerful elites. Local government has been captured by local elites.
Decentralization, muzzled by the military, is mere spectacle, and predatory to boot. Donor agencies should explore possibilities for change at the local level; for example, where local networks and informal governmentality can build up trust amongst hyper-local communities.
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