Development Policy Review最新文献

Motivation

Promoting coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) is a key means of implementation for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, yet it has been overlooked as policy discussions have focused predominantly on the financing of the agenda. The literature and policy debates about PCSD largely focus on processes and on OECD countries, and they neglect their political and normative dimensions. This article complements recent literature on PCSD by elaborating and testing a relational perspective on the concept.

Purpose

To address these issues, this article elaborates a relational perspective that responds to the misrepresentation of third countries as passive recipients of (in)coherent OECD policy preferences.

Methods and approach

The analysis presented summarizes the literature on the related concepts of PCSD and Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). On this basis, the article articulates a relational perspective on policy coherence that complements other critical perspectives in the literature. Subsequently, it explores the potential and relevance of this relational perspective by analysing how the fisheries policy preferences of the European Union interact with those of Ghana.

Findings

Overall, the analysis shows that a commitment to sustainable fisheries cannot be assumed for either the EU or Ghana. Furthermore, assessing the responsibilities of the EU and Ghana around sustainability and degrees of adherence is difficult due to the presence of other fishing nations and influences. In the context of the EU's ambitious policy framework, the continued overfishing in Ghanaian waters negatively affects the credibility and justification of its continued involvement. Policy dialogue between the EU and the Ghanaian government and accompanying EU technical assistance have supported changes to Ghanaian fisheries policies, but overfishing continues.

Policy implications

Discussions on promoting PCSD should be supported by more empirical research into the extent and manner that policy preferences consider by policy-makers to be coherent with the 2030 Agenda contribute to advancing the agenda in different country and regional contexts.

Motivation

The Jordan Compact was signed in 2016 by the Government of Jordan and the European Union (EU) to allow 200,000 Syrian refugees to work in Jordan in exchange for better access to the EU market for Jordan's exports. This marked a transition for Jordan's humanitarian sector. However, while services did indeed expand and elements of labour transitions and livelihood support were included, these benefits were exclusively for Syrian refugees and Jordanians, with little consideration given to other vulnerable refugees and migrant workers.

Purpose

We examine how the Jordan Compact affected refugee aid and inclusion for Syrians, and its effects on other refugees and migrant workers in Jordan.

Methods and approach

We draw on media and news articles, reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations, Jordanian law and policy, and prior academic research. We analyse the content of key informant interviews with representatives of government, international organizations, and NGOs conducted in August 2019. We use observations from the author's experience as a development worker in Jordan from 2016 to 2020.

Policy implications

Situated in an increasingly complex debate on the differential reception of refugees, we show differential treatment of refugees beyond reception and border policy. The selective, temporary, nationality-based legalization of refugee labour is intrinsically linked to the nature of refugeehood, whereby governments cannot maintain strict short-term limits on residency as they can with migrant labour.

Motivation

Although women continue to bear an unequal burden when it comes to unpaid housework and care work regardless of the level of economic progress, a systematic analysis of the gender gap in terms of the time allocated to these responsibilities has not been carried out in the context of India so far, primarily due to the lack of national-level data.

Purpose

This article measures how the burden of unpaid housework and care work is shared between men and women and investigates the factors associated with the allocation of time.

Methods and approach

We use the first nationally representative Time Use Survey (2019) data of India and employ Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition analysis to explain the gender gap in unpaid housework and care work.

Findings

After accounting for individual characteristics and household factors, the regression analysis shows that women spend a little over three hours more per day on unpaid housework and 20 minutes more on unpaid care work than men. The decomposition analysis reveals that the differences in socioeconomic and demographic factors between men and women only contribute a small part of the average gender gap in unpaid housework and care work. In other words, most of the gap in unpaid work at home between men and women in India can be attributed to structural factors, including inadequate infrastructural support and social programmes to alleviate the burden of housework and childcare, as well as the prevalence of unobserved gender norms and practices that pin the responsibility of unpaid housework and care work on women.

Policy implications

To achieve equitable distribution of unpaid work between women and men, there is a need to provide more opportunities for women to participate in remunerative paid employment. Infrastructural support and policies that can reduce the burden of time spent by women in day-to-day unpaid housework and care activities are crucial to reduce the gender gap.

Motivation

With rising unemployment in South Africa, new forms of digital work transcend legal conceptions and discourses on work. Uber's digital labour platform (DLP) has the potential to reduce unemployment and improve the livelihoods of South African households.

Purpose

We examine the nature of employment through digital platforms to assess how such employment conforms to labour law and regulation in South Africa, the responsibility of the Department of Employment and Labour (DEL).

Methods and approach

We review the literature on the gig economy, decent work, and labour relations. We examine Uber DLP in South Africa to assess its potential to create decent work given DEL's current labour regulations. We analyse factors that harm the relationship between Uber DLP and DEL.

Findings

Despite numerous constitutional provisions governing DLP and DEL, Uber DLP workers in South Africa are considered independent contractors not entitled to employee benefits. Uber DLP employees in South Africa make less than the national minimum wage after the platform deducts its fees. Few professional drivers own the cars they drive; they rent them from owners, known as “partners,” and split the earnings, meaning that the drivers earn very little.

Policy implications

DEL needs to establish a balance between flexibility and labour standards. DEL should preserve workers' rights and ensure financial stability in the digital age. Labour laws should be updated based on reliable data while considering the effects of digitally enabled employment on society and the economy. Platform workers need the same protection at work as other workers.

Motivation

Elaborated in their current form in Busan in 2011, and reiterated in Geneva in 2022, the four Principles of Effective Development Co-operation comprise country ownership, focus on results, inclusive partnerships, and transparency and mutual accountability. Framed to guide more effective development assistance, their measurement and impact has not been systematically studied.

Purpose

We ask, what do we know about adherence to the principles and better development outcomes? What can we learn about this relationship using the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation's (GPEDC) monitoring framework?

Methods and approach

We define and measure adherence to the four principles using the GPEDC framework and indicators. We then explore the association between these indicators and development outcomes (for example, economic growth and poverty) using correlation, descriptive analysis, and analysis of data quality.

Findings

Across countries, the empirical relationship between the currently available GPEDC data and the development outcomes is tenuous at best. Shortcomings in the data explain much of the lack of evidence. Some shortcomings could be easily fixed with adjustments to the indicators and data collection, but many relate to inherent challenges in measuring the four principles.

Policy implications

A more precise definition of indicators of adherence to the principles, with a wider coverage of countries and with annual measurement, would help—not necessarily for their instrumental value, but as much, if not more, to raise the profile of the principles themselves. The universally agreed objectives of strengthening international partnerships and co-operation, as well as of building inclusive, effective, accountable, and transparent institutions as declared in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, are goals well worth pursuing.

Motivation

The colonial legacies of aid and development in the Pacific continue to be at the centre of policy debate. The ideal is to decolonize and localize the practice of aid and development. However, decolonization and localization have become highly contested in their definition and proposed practical approaches. We call decolonization and localization “decolocalization.”

Purpose

This article aims to explore perspectives and proposals for decolocalization in the Pacific Islands.

Methods and approach

We talked to five key informants, all local to their islands, all with considerable development experience; we held a focus group; and we combined these insights and learnings with our own experience as Pacific Islanders engaged with development. Our analysis is reflexive.

Findings

Development practice in the Pacific Islands typically overvalues external Euro-centric knowledge and undervalues local knowledge. Most aid and development discourse has stressed financial figures, charts, and statistical assertions overwhelmingly from a donor perspective; Pacific non-statistical, human, and embodied contextual realities are overlooked or discounted. Hierarchies are created that privilege outsiders and discriminate against islanders.

A practical operationalization of decolocalization can begin with the recognition and practice of outsiders yielding and insiders wielding power.

Policy implications

We recommend decolocalization as a framework for studying and analysing colonial vestiges in Pacific aid and development. Decolocalization can be practised by outsiders yielding and insiders wielding power in aid and development.

Decolocalization is not an ultimate solution to a highly complex issue, but it offers a conceptual position; one that allows Pacific Islander scholars, thought leaders, and aid and development practitioners to further unpack the nuances and issues around aid and development from a Pacific Islander perspective.

Motivation

Formal social protection systems, such as health insurance and representation, are often biased in favour of formal workers, thereby excluding most of the world's working population who make a living in the informal economy.

Purpose

The article extends existing critiques of formality bias by investigating the reality of work for people in the informal economy in Kenya and Tanzania and analysing related social protection challenges. Specifically, we look at: (1) the governance of work; (2) the organization of work relations; and (3) collective agency. In terms of social protection, we focus on formal and informal forms of social insurance and representation.

Methods and approach

We draw on interview and survey data from people working in micro trading, transport, and construction in Nairobi and Kisumu in Kenya, and Dar es Salaam and Dodoma in Tanzania. A total of 1,462 workers were surveyed and 24 focus group discussions were held with such workers. Interviews were conducted with 120 key informants: leaders and members of informal workers' associations in the three sectors, as well as representatives of authorities, trade unions, and business associations. Data were collected from June 2018 to December 2019.

Findings

Formal social insurance and representation do not fit the real experience of most people working in the informal economy. They have been modelled on and designed to support workers in formal standard employment relations. At the same time, informal workers' associations play important roles in meeting—albeit inadequately—the social insurance and representational needs of their members.

Policy implications

Meaningful engagement with the reality of work and collective agency in the informal economy is necessary to inform more appropriate policies and measures to provide informal workers with appropriate social protection measures, particularly social insurance and representation. Their reality should not have to conform to an inadequate model; rather, the model should fit their reality.

Motivation

Despite global rhetoric to increase climate finance to civil society organizations and faith-based organizations (CSOs-FBOs), little is known about how accessible climate funds are for these organizations in the Pacific Islands.

Purpose

We posed three broad questions: (1) what types of climate finance did CSOs and FBOs obtain? (2) what barriers did CSOs and FBOs face to obtain climate finance? and (3) what innovative approaches or solutions did CSOs and FBOs use to obtain climate finance?

Methods and approach

In 2022, key informant interviews and focus group discussions were held in Fiji, led by House of Sarah; in Samoa, led by the Samoa Women's Association of Growers; and in Solomon Islands, led by the Coalition of Youths for Environmental Sustainability. Most CSOs and FBOs had fewer than 10 employees, with many relying on volunteers.

Findings

CSOs and FBOs generally pursued funding aligned to their values, priorities, and needs. None of the organizations had obtained funds from the large multilaterals, such as Green Climate Funds and Adaptation Fund. Their funds were seen as poorly suited to local organizations. The main barriers to obtaining climate finance were: (1) poor dissemination of information on the availability and suitability of funding sources for CSOs and FBOs; (2) overly complex donor processes and requirements; (3) insufficient capacity to write grant proposals and to manage funds; (4) poor recognition by donors of the role of CSOs and FBOs in development; and (5) difficult relationships with national governments and donors marked by differences in power. To overcome some barriers, some CSOs and FBOs partnered with regional or global organizations with the capacity to absorb the administrative burden of writing proposals and managing grants. In other cases, CSOs and FBOs made use of professionals with experience of donors who volunteered their time to craft or edit proposals.

Policy implications

Donors can create or inhibit equitable access to climate funding. If donors are genuinely committed to helping CSOs-FBOs obtain climate finance, they should reduce the complexity of grant-making and tailor it to local contexts and priorities. They should also work through regional or national intermediaries to reach grassroots organizations.

Motivation

Amid the highly polarized discourse on development aid in Pacific Islands, few studies explore the perspectives of local people. Missing from the literature is how the subjective experiences of Pacific Islands people responding and adapting to a sudden global disruption influence their perceptions of foreign aid. Faced by the sudden shutdown of export markets, tourism, and labour migration, the COVID-19 pandemic offered an opportunity to investigate how disruptions from international events affect Pacific Island peoples' perception of foreign aid.

Purpose

We investigated how the lived experiences of people in the Cook Islands and Tonga during COVID-19 may have influenced their perceptions of foreign aid.

Methods and approach

Semi-structured interviews guided by open-ended questions were conducted with 25 individuals in the Cook Islands and 24 in Tonga. Interviewees were purposively selected from staff in government ministries and environmental non-governmental organizations; from people working in tourism and private enterprise; from members of youth empowerment groups; and from among traditional leaders, faith leaders, high school teachers, fisherfolk, and farmers. The interviews explored their subjective experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic and the meanings they attributed to them.

Findings

The pandemic closed down tourism and interrupted labour emigration in both countries. In response, people switched to farming and fishing and found ways to redeploy their skills. The pandemic saw increased local innovation, strengthened traditional practices, increased local agricultural output, and enhanced collaboration between foreign donor partners and recipient countries in the development of local human capacity.

Policy implications

Rather than repeating history by integrating Pacific Island societies into the globalized economy, or providing bail-outs through economic restructuring, donors should strive to support the agency and self-determination of Pacific Islands people. They should start by recognizing the resourcefulness and capacity to adapt shown by participants during the pandemic.

Motivation

Across the world, illiberal democracy is on the rise. These majoritarian polities limit individual rights and undermine protections for minorities. Civil society organizations (CSOs) that support human rights and freedom of speech and association in these settings can be repressed.

Purpose

How does illiberal democracy impact CSOs that lobby for economic and human development? We examine how illiberal democracy affects organizations advocating for nutrition. Ostensibly, improved nutrition is a valence issue that does not threaten a government's hold on power. But nutrition advocacy may mean criticizing a government's policies and programmes, and hence be seen by governments as hostile.

Methods and approach

We focus on India, where illiberal democracy has become more pronounced over the last decade. Structured interviews were conducted in 2021 with three dozen advocacy organizations, donors, and government stakeholders who work on nutrition policy in India. We analyse how the financing of nutrition organizations, access to policy-making, and advocacy have been affected under the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

We divide CSOs into organizations that focus on the design of nutrition programmes, those that prioritize evidence-based nutrition policies, and those that advocate for the food and nutrition rights of certain communities, including those who are often marginalized.

Findings

Nutrition advocacy organizations' access to finance has been hampered by amendments to the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA). Partisan ideology and low tolerance of policy accountability affects nutrition CSOs' access to policy debates and decision-making. Fears about freedom of expression and its impacts on renewal of organizational registrations make the CSOs more timid in their advocacy.

These changes disproportionately affect CSOs that focus on evidence and, above all, those that stand up for rights.

Policy implications

Assessments of enabling environments for nutrition policy need to consider better how partisan ideologies and political settlements exclude some groups in society. Moreover, given that illiberal democracy further weakens the value of evidence in policy-making, donors need to consider how they present evidence and policy feedback when governments see criticism as hostile and politically motiva