Pub Date : 2023-12-07DOI: 10.1177/1532673x231220638
Amy D. Meli
Blame attribution research suggests partisans acknowledge evidence that portrays copartisans negatively but blame externalities for negative events. This study identifies another blame attribution pattern. When people observe unfair/dishonest behavior by a copartisan, instead of shifting blame entirely to others, they engage in blame-spreading. I conduct two tests: a survey of undergraduate students who watched part of a 2020 Presidential debate and a survey experiment of a random sample of adults that randomizes the party affiliation of the debate participant engaging in unfair/dishonest behavior. When the unfair actor is a copartisan, people blame both participants equally. When the unfair actor is in the out-party, people blame the out-party actor. These findings suggest individuals acknowledge undesirable behavior among copartisans, but seek to justify it by identifying blame-worthy behavior by others, thus providing an additional mechanism in motivated reasoning whereby individuals acknowledge events while finding a way to justify such behavior.
{"title":"Who is To Blame? Partisans’ Use of Blame Spreading in Reaction to Unfair or Dishonest Behavior","authors":"Amy D. Meli","doi":"10.1177/1532673x231220638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x231220638","url":null,"abstract":"Blame attribution research suggests partisans acknowledge evidence that portrays copartisans negatively but blame externalities for negative events. This study identifies another blame attribution pattern. When people observe unfair/dishonest behavior by a copartisan, instead of shifting blame entirely to others, they engage in blame-spreading. I conduct two tests: a survey of undergraduate students who watched part of a 2020 Presidential debate and a survey experiment of a random sample of adults that randomizes the party affiliation of the debate participant engaging in unfair/dishonest behavior. When the unfair actor is a copartisan, people blame both participants equally. When the unfair actor is in the out-party, people blame the out-party actor. These findings suggest individuals acknowledge undesirable behavior among copartisans, but seek to justify it by identifying blame-worthy behavior by others, thus providing an additional mechanism in motivated reasoning whereby individuals acknowledge events while finding a way to justify such behavior.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138593825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-06DOI: 10.1177/1532673x231220647
Michael Heseltine
Times of national and international crisis are often unifying events which lower levels of division within the public and between political elites. Yet, COVID-19 pandemic responses in the United States have been viewed as markedly polarized. Using a comprehensive dataset of over four million social media posts sent by local, state, and federal level political officials between January 2020 and September 2022, this paper explores the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic was a rhetorically unifying or divisive event, and whether rhetorical responses differed across levels of government. The results show that federal level officials were less likely to message about COVID-19 and were more likely to do so in a polarizing fashion compared to state and local officials. Temporally, in the early stages of the pandemic there was indeed a collective rhetorical de-polarization across all levels of government. However, as the pandemic progressed, COVID-related messaging became more polarizing, especially among Republicans. Evidence also emerges of dynamic responsiveness from elected officials, with relativeness attentiveness to COVID increasing and polarizing rhetoric decreasing during time periods when local case counts were relatively high. These findings suggest that rhetorical unity is still possible, even in times of high political polarization, but that this unity is also short-lived and tempered by political and electoral considerations.
{"title":"Polarizing Online Elite Rhetoric at the Federal, State, and Local Level During the COVID-19 Pandemic","authors":"Michael Heseltine","doi":"10.1177/1532673x231220647","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x231220647","url":null,"abstract":"Times of national and international crisis are often unifying events which lower levels of division within the public and between political elites. Yet, COVID-19 pandemic responses in the United States have been viewed as markedly polarized. Using a comprehensive dataset of over four million social media posts sent by local, state, and federal level political officials between January 2020 and September 2022, this paper explores the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic was a rhetorically unifying or divisive event, and whether rhetorical responses differed across levels of government. The results show that federal level officials were less likely to message about COVID-19 and were more likely to do so in a polarizing fashion compared to state and local officials. Temporally, in the early stages of the pandemic there was indeed a collective rhetorical de-polarization across all levels of government. However, as the pandemic progressed, COVID-related messaging became more polarizing, especially among Republicans. Evidence also emerges of dynamic responsiveness from elected officials, with relativeness attentiveness to COVID increasing and polarizing rhetoric decreasing during time periods when local case counts were relatively high. These findings suggest that rhetorical unity is still possible, even in times of high political polarization, but that this unity is also short-lived and tempered by political and electoral considerations.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138594746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-05DOI: 10.1177/1532673x231220643
Keith L. Dougherty, Aaron A. Hitefield
The success of any constitutional convention can depend on its provisions for power sharing. We test three claims about the effects of the Great Compromise, a power sharing agreement, on the Constitutional Convention of 1787. First, we find that the convention was not more likely to pass proposals to strengthen the national government after the compromise than before, contrary to claims made by historians. Two small states increased their support, but other states did not. Second, Southern states (and large states) were more likely to support weakening the national government after the compromise. Third, large states were more likely to support proposals to strengthen the power of the House relative to the Senate after the compromise, and small states were more likely to resist. However, the opposite was not true for strengthening the Senate. Our results suggest a new narrative about the effects of Great Compromise on the Constitutional Convention.
{"title":"The Effects of the Great Compromise on the Constitutional Convention of 1787","authors":"Keith L. Dougherty, Aaron A. Hitefield","doi":"10.1177/1532673x231220643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x231220643","url":null,"abstract":"The success of any constitutional convention can depend on its provisions for power sharing. We test three claims about the effects of the Great Compromise, a power sharing agreement, on the Constitutional Convention of 1787. First, we find that the convention was not more likely to pass proposals to strengthen the national government after the compromise than before, contrary to claims made by historians. Two small states increased their support, but other states did not. Second, Southern states (and large states) were more likely to support weakening the national government after the compromise. Third, large states were more likely to support proposals to strengthen the power of the House relative to the Senate after the compromise, and small states were more likely to resist. However, the opposite was not true for strengthening the Senate. Our results suggest a new narrative about the effects of Great Compromise on the Constitutional Convention.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138600877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-05DOI: 10.1177/1532673x231220651
Benjamin T. Toll, Courtney Corona
Most Americans have little knowledge about why we elect the president through the Electoral College. This complex system that requires understanding the impact of 51 different elections on the outcome of the presidential election leads many Americans to desire the simple effectiveness of the popular vote method. Previous scholarship highlights a majority of Americans wanting to replace our current system with the popular vote. Political science research lacks a clear understanding of the impact of partisan self-interest on views of changing the presidential election method. In this paper we look at public opinion surveys over the last 45 years and find there was no clear partisan difference in views of changing the system before the electoral inversion of 2000. We argue that partisan self-interest was activated because of this electoral inversion. The inversion of 2016 led to a hardening of opinions on replacing the Electoral College with the popular vote.
{"title":"Partisan Self-Interest and Views on the Electoral College: How Electoral Inversions Activate Differences in Support for the System","authors":"Benjamin T. Toll, Courtney Corona","doi":"10.1177/1532673x231220651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x231220651","url":null,"abstract":"Most Americans have little knowledge about why we elect the president through the Electoral College. This complex system that requires understanding the impact of 51 different elections on the outcome of the presidential election leads many Americans to desire the simple effectiveness of the popular vote method. Previous scholarship highlights a majority of Americans wanting to replace our current system with the popular vote. Political science research lacks a clear understanding of the impact of partisan self-interest on views of changing the presidential election method. In this paper we look at public opinion surveys over the last 45 years and find there was no clear partisan difference in views of changing the system before the electoral inversion of 2000. We argue that partisan self-interest was activated because of this electoral inversion. The inversion of 2016 led to a hardening of opinions on replacing the Electoral College with the popular vote.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138598489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1177/1532673x231206138
Benjamin Highton, Walter J. Stone
We offer a candidate-centered amendment to incumbent-referendum models of presidential election outcomes that dominate the literature on post-WWII presidential elections. Our argument is that incumbent-challenger differences in character qualifications and issue concerns of the electorate should be included. These differentials, which recognize the advantage or disadvantage of the incumbent relative to the challenger party candidate have strong effects on election outcomes independent of the state of the economy, the number of years the incumbent party has held the White House, and presidential approval. Properly understood, in addition to the state of national affairs, presidential election outcomes are about the choice presented to the mass public. This added element means that candidates matter for election outcomes and electoral change in ways that have not been properly appreciated in existing scholarship.
{"title":"“Extending the Referendum Model of Presidential Election Outcomes: Both Candidates Matter”","authors":"Benjamin Highton, Walter J. Stone","doi":"10.1177/1532673x231206138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x231206138","url":null,"abstract":"We offer a candidate-centered amendment to incumbent-referendum models of presidential election outcomes that dominate the literature on post-WWII presidential elections. Our argument is that incumbent-challenger differences in character qualifications and issue concerns of the electorate should be included. These differentials, which recognize the advantage or disadvantage of the incumbent relative to the challenger party candidate have strong effects on election outcomes independent of the state of the economy, the number of years the incumbent party has held the White House, and presidential approval. Properly understood, in addition to the state of national affairs, presidential election outcomes are about the choice presented to the mass public. This added element means that candidates matter for election outcomes and electoral change in ways that have not been properly appreciated in existing scholarship.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135271736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221135550
Jakob Wiedekind
To what extent and under which conditions do presidents challenge foreign policy legislation through Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs)? While the presidents’ use of executive orders and signing statements has been studied extensively, this paper argues that SAPs are a subtler and less politically costly tool that is more important than scholars realized. Delivered at a crucial intervention point along the legislative process, these communications provide a key gateway for assertive presidential challenges. Relying on a novel assertiveness-score, this paper finds that SAPs target legislative content more aggressively over time and that the composition of government predicts executive assertiveness particularly well. Next to that, I show that presidents are more assertive when their term comes to an end. These insights contribute to our understanding of spiking interbranch tensions in American Politics.
{"title":"Preemptive Action: Measuring Presidential Assertiveness in Foreign Policy Lawmaking","authors":"Jakob Wiedekind","doi":"10.1177/1532673X221135550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221135550","url":null,"abstract":"To what extent and under which conditions do presidents challenge foreign policy legislation through Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs)? While the presidents’ use of executive orders and signing statements has been studied extensively, this paper argues that SAPs are a subtler and less politically costly tool that is more important than scholars realized. Delivered at a crucial intervention point along the legislative process, these communications provide a key gateway for assertive presidential challenges. Relying on a novel assertiveness-score, this paper finds that SAPs target legislative content more aggressively over time and that the composition of government predicts executive assertiveness particularly well. Next to that, I show that presidents are more assertive when their term comes to an end. These insights contribute to our understanding of spiking interbranch tensions in American Politics.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139293833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-23DOI: 10.1177/1532673x231206139
Daniel R. Biggers, David J. Hendry, Gregory A. Huber
The decision-theoretic Downsian model and other related accounts predict that increasing perceptions of election closeness will increase turnout. Does this prediction hold? Past observational and experimental tests raise generalizability and credible inference issues. Prior field experiments either (1) compare messages emphasizing election closeness to non-closeness messages, potentially conflating changes in closeness perceptions with framing effects of the voter encouragement message, or (2) deliver information about a particular race’s closeness, potentially altering beliefs about the features of that election apart from its closeness. We address the limitations of prior work in a large-scale field experiment conducted in seven states and find that a telephone message describing a class of contests as decided by fewer, as opposed to more, votes increases voter turnout. Furthermore, this effect exceeds that of a standard election reminder. The results imply expected electoral closeness affects turnout and that perceptions of closeness can be altered to increase participation.
{"title":"Messages Designed to Increase Perceived Electoral Closeness Increase Turnout","authors":"Daniel R. Biggers, David J. Hendry, Gregory A. Huber","doi":"10.1177/1532673x231206139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x231206139","url":null,"abstract":"The decision-theoretic Downsian model and other related accounts predict that increasing perceptions of election closeness will increase turnout. Does this prediction hold? Past observational and experimental tests raise generalizability and credible inference issues. Prior field experiments either (1) compare messages emphasizing election closeness to non-closeness messages, potentially conflating changes in closeness perceptions with framing effects of the voter encouragement message, or (2) deliver information about a particular race’s closeness, potentially altering beliefs about the features of that election apart from its closeness. We address the limitations of prior work in a large-scale field experiment conducted in seven states and find that a telephone message describing a class of contests as decided by fewer, as opposed to more, votes increases voter turnout. Furthermore, this effect exceeds that of a standard election reminder. The results imply expected electoral closeness affects turnout and that perceptions of closeness can be altered to increase participation.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135366525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-19DOI: 10.1177/1532673x231206136
Lauren Ratliff Santoro, Emily Sydnor
Public perceptions of science and scientific institutions have become more negative in recent years, especially among individuals who identify as ideologically conservative in the United States. While there is much work investigating the origins and implications of this decline, we focus instead on understanding the ways in which symbols of scientific expertise, like the university, convey information in a politicized environment. Universities are seen as trusted scientific experts or biased propagandists, depending on individuals’ ideological identification. Are individuals more likely to believe research coming out of universities that they perceive to reflect their own ideological biases? This project looks at the effect of the academic source cue – the university label – on individual assessments of the research that these universities produce. Drawing on results from two survey experiments focused on climate change and racial wealth disparity research, we find that while liberals are more likely to believe research that confirms their previously held beliefs, they are also more likely to believe incongruent information when it comes from a university that they believe shares their bias. Conservatives, on the other hand, remain skeptical of academic research despite the message or its’ source. The findings point toward both “blind trust” and “blind skepticism” in academic institutions.
{"title":"Blind Trust, Blind Skepticism: Liberals’ & Conservatives’ Response to Academic Research","authors":"Lauren Ratliff Santoro, Emily Sydnor","doi":"10.1177/1532673x231206136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x231206136","url":null,"abstract":"Public perceptions of science and scientific institutions have become more negative in recent years, especially among individuals who identify as ideologically conservative in the United States. While there is much work investigating the origins and implications of this decline, we focus instead on understanding the ways in which symbols of scientific expertise, like the university, convey information in a politicized environment. Universities are seen as trusted scientific experts or biased propagandists, depending on individuals’ ideological identification. Are individuals more likely to believe research coming out of universities that they perceive to reflect their own ideological biases? This project looks at the effect of the academic source cue – the university label – on individual assessments of the research that these universities produce. Drawing on results from two survey experiments focused on climate change and racial wealth disparity research, we find that while liberals are more likely to believe research that confirms their previously held beliefs, they are also more likely to believe incongruent information when it comes from a university that they believe shares their bias. Conservatives, on the other hand, remain skeptical of academic research despite the message or its’ source. The findings point toward both “blind trust” and “blind skepticism” in academic institutions.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135779253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-19DOI: 10.1177/1532673x231206151
Hang Qi, Jake Haselswerdt
Research shows that Americans have a generally poor understanding of welfare programs. Providing information about such programs has the potential to shape public preferences, but we argue that such effects may differ based on the content of the information and its correspondence with existing ideological beliefs. Using original survey experiments embedded in the Cooperative Congressional Election Study and through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, we analyze how the relationship of ideology with welfare programs varies in response to different types of negative information about the program, and different descriptions of policy design. We find that information about inadequate benefits has a larger negative impact on welfare support for liberals than for conservatives but that both liberals and conservatives may be equally concerned about fraud and inefficiency. Other information about policy design has the expected conditional effect: state (as opposed to federal) funding and short time limits for benefits are more appealing to conservatives than liberals.
{"title":"Ideology, Information, and Social Welfare Preferences","authors":"Hang Qi, Jake Haselswerdt","doi":"10.1177/1532673x231206151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x231206151","url":null,"abstract":"Research shows that Americans have a generally poor understanding of welfare programs. Providing information about such programs has the potential to shape public preferences, but we argue that such effects may differ based on the content of the information and its correspondence with existing ideological beliefs. Using original survey experiments embedded in the Cooperative Congressional Election Study and through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, we analyze how the relationship of ideology with welfare programs varies in response to different types of negative information about the program, and different descriptions of policy design. We find that information about inadequate benefits has a larger negative impact on welfare support for liberals than for conservatives but that both liberals and conservatives may be equally concerned about fraud and inefficiency. Other information about policy design has the expected conditional effect: state (as opposed to federal) funding and short time limits for benefits are more appealing to conservatives than liberals.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135729683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-16DOI: 10.1177/1532673x231206140
Christopher A. Cooper, Scott H. Huffmon, H. Gibbs Knotts, Seth C. McKee
Party factions are central to our understanding of American politics, but what role do party factions play within the electorate? With an August 2022 survey of the American South, we investigate factions within the modern GOP. We find evidence that faction identities overlap, as most Republicans hold some degree of identification with multiple factions. We also employ multivariate analyses to show that, despite evidence of overlap, Make America Great Again (MAGA) identifiers hold distinguishable opinions on President Trump and a variety of election issues. This research demonstrates the importance of factions within the southern Republican electorate and argues that factions can be an identity, representing a new way to conceive of intraparty factions in American politics.
{"title":"Intraparty Republican Factionalism as Identity in the Modern American South","authors":"Christopher A. Cooper, Scott H. Huffmon, H. Gibbs Knotts, Seth C. McKee","doi":"10.1177/1532673x231206140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x231206140","url":null,"abstract":"Party factions are central to our understanding of American politics, but what role do party factions play within the electorate? With an August 2022 survey of the American South, we investigate factions within the modern GOP. We find evidence that faction identities overlap, as most Republicans hold some degree of identification with multiple factions. We also employ multivariate analyses to show that, despite evidence of overlap, Make America Great Again (MAGA) identifiers hold distinguishable opinions on President Trump and a variety of election issues. This research demonstrates the importance of factions within the southern Republican electorate and argues that factions can be an identity, representing a new way to conceive of intraparty factions in American politics.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136142837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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