Pub Date : 2023-01-26DOI: 10.1177/07388942221149669
L. Carlson, R. Dacey
The empirical results on the influence of inexperience and experience in decision making are inconclusive. This paper offers a resolution to the puzzle of how empirical studies that advance contradictory risk-related claims can all command empirical support. The paper employs a paradigmatic model of decision making that examines two variables: (1) the decision maker's personality, of which inexperience and experience is one component; and (2) the particulars of the decision problem. These two variables permit us to resolve the puzzle of inconclusive empirical results by identifying the separating conditions under which each risk-related claim holds.
{"title":"Explaining the conflicting behavior of inexperienced and experienced political elites","authors":"L. Carlson, R. Dacey","doi":"10.1177/07388942221149669","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221149669","url":null,"abstract":"The empirical results on the influence of inexperience and experience in decision making are inconclusive. This paper offers a resolution to the puzzle of how empirical studies that advance contradictory risk-related claims can all command empirical support. The paper employs a paradigmatic model of decision making that examines two variables: (1) the decision maker's personality, of which inexperience and experience is one component; and (2) the particulars of the decision problem. These two variables permit us to resolve the puzzle of inconclusive empirical results by identifying the separating conditions under which each risk-related claim holds.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42932991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-18DOI: 10.1177/07388942221147862
Molly M. Melin, Jacob D Kathman
What explains UN member-state personnel withdrawals from peacekeeping operations? Withdrawals can occur at the behest of contributor states, as contributions are voluntary. We argue that withdrawal is motivated by violence in the peacekeeping operation host state. Research shows that well-resourced missions improve the prospects of success. Personnel withdrawals are dangerous, as they are more likely when continued deployments are needed. We thus need to understand why some states resist withdrawing in the face of instability. We argue that democracies are more stalwart than their counterparts given their constituency interests, the democratic benefits of peacekeeping and the political cover offered to democratic policymakers.
{"title":"Sticking it out: Instability, regime type, and personnel withdrawals from UN peacekeeping operations","authors":"Molly M. Melin, Jacob D Kathman","doi":"10.1177/07388942221147862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221147862","url":null,"abstract":"What explains UN member-state personnel withdrawals from peacekeeping operations? Withdrawals can occur at the behest of contributor states, as contributions are voluntary. We argue that withdrawal is motivated by violence in the peacekeeping operation host state. Research shows that well-resourced missions improve the prospects of success. Personnel withdrawals are dangerous, as they are more likely when continued deployments are needed. We thus need to understand why some states resist withdrawing in the face of instability. We argue that democracies are more stalwart than their counterparts given their constituency interests, the democratic benefits of peacekeeping and the political cover offered to democratic policymakers.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42687854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-03DOI: 10.1177/07388942221147508
Karen Albert
Civil wars are difficult to resolve through negotiated settlements. Rebel institutions are thought to make negotiations more successful. I show, however, that this positive association does not hold. Rather, rebel service provision is negatively correlated with successful negotiated settlements. The well-established literature on commitment problems suggests that negotiated settlements are not reached because governments end negotiations amidst fears of rebel growth from civilian support derived from service provision. I offer an alternative explanation—strategic stalling—based on rebel incentives to realize the full long-term benefits of service provision. Qualitative evidence shows that observable implications of strategic stalling are observed in the cases surveyed.
{"title":"Rebel institutions and negotiated peace","authors":"Karen Albert","doi":"10.1177/07388942221147508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221147508","url":null,"abstract":"Civil wars are difficult to resolve through negotiated settlements. Rebel institutions are thought to make negotiations more successful. I show, however, that this positive association does not hold. Rather, rebel service provision is negatively correlated with successful negotiated settlements. The well-established literature on commitment problems suggests that negotiated settlements are not reached because governments end negotiations amidst fears of rebel growth from civilian support derived from service provision. I offer an alternative explanation—strategic stalling—based on rebel incentives to realize the full long-term benefits of service provision. Qualitative evidence shows that observable implications of strategic stalling are observed in the cases surveyed.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46879513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1177/07388942221081099
T. Passmore, Megan Shannon, Morgan Nadeau
Despite evidence that United Nations peacekeeping is a cost-effective tool for addressing civil and interstate conflict, it has consistently experienced financial shortfalls as member states neglect to pay their dues. To enable investigation into the dynamics of peacekeeping support, we present newly collected data on all member-state financial contributions to all UN peacekeeping operations from 1990 to 2010. The data also include dues assessed by the UN to gauge the extent to which states fall short of what they owe. We show that financial shortfalls are widespread and vary across both missions and contributors. The data offer opportunities to understand patterns of financial support for peacekeeping across states, missions, and time, and can ultimately provide insight into the factors that lead states to support international institutions and public goods. We illustrate how scholars can use the data with an analysis of the factors that drive states to meet their financial commitments. We find that wealthier states, those more engaged in global trade, democracies, and those that also contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations are the most likely to pay their dues. Conversely, the United States and countries in the Americas, Africa, and Asia are more likely to shirk part or all of their financial obligations in a given year.
{"title":"Financial contributions to United Nations peacekeeping, 1990–2010: A new dataset","authors":"T. Passmore, Megan Shannon, Morgan Nadeau","doi":"10.1177/07388942221081099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221081099","url":null,"abstract":"Despite evidence that United Nations peacekeeping is a cost-effective tool for addressing civil and interstate conflict, it has consistently experienced financial shortfalls as member states neglect to pay their dues. To enable investigation into the dynamics of peacekeeping support, we present newly collected data on all member-state financial contributions to all UN peacekeeping operations from 1990 to 2010. The data also include dues assessed by the UN to gauge the extent to which states fall short of what they owe. We show that financial shortfalls are widespread and vary across both missions and contributors. The data offer opportunities to understand patterns of financial support for peacekeeping across states, missions, and time, and can ultimately provide insight into the factors that lead states to support international institutions and public goods. We illustrate how scholars can use the data with an analysis of the factors that drive states to meet their financial commitments. We find that wealthier states, those more engaged in global trade, democracies, and those that also contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations are the most likely to pay their dues. Conversely, the United States and countries in the Americas, Africa, and Asia are more likely to shirk part or all of their financial obligations in a given year.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43758836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-29DOI: 10.1177/07388942221145352
Ali Fisunoglu, Kyungkook Kang, T. Kugler, Marina Arbetman-Rabinowitz
Measuring the ability of governments to implement policy remains one of the most significant questions of political science. This paper presents the latest iteration of the Relative Political Capacity (RPC) dataset and introduces the Absolute Political Capacity measure. It then investigates the trends in political performance measures across time and space, and different political and economic characteristics. Covering 168 countries from 1960 to 2018, the RPC offers a comprehensive measure of state capacity that allows direct comparisons to be made across countries from all levels of development and will help researchers explore different dimensions of capacity and power.
{"title":"Relative political capacity: A dataset to evaluate the performance of nations, 1960–2018","authors":"Ali Fisunoglu, Kyungkook Kang, T. Kugler, Marina Arbetman-Rabinowitz","doi":"10.1177/07388942221145352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221145352","url":null,"abstract":"Measuring the ability of governments to implement policy remains one of the most significant questions of political science. This paper presents the latest iteration of the Relative Political Capacity (RPC) dataset and introduces the Absolute Political Capacity measure. It then investigates the trends in political performance measures across time and space, and different political and economic characteristics. Covering 168 countries from 1960 to 2018, the RPC offers a comprehensive measure of state capacity that allows direct comparisons to be made across countries from all levels of development and will help researchers explore different dimensions of capacity and power.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48099279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-12DOI: 10.1177/07388942221140872
T. Rodon
Do violence during a civil war and its aftermath leave a mark on political behaviour? In this article I study how violence perpetrated by the left and repression by the right during and after the Spanish Civil War shaped vote choice and turnout in 1977, in the first legislative election after a 40 year dictatorship. I argue that the effect of repression travels over time when actions are perpetrated by clearly identifiable antagonistic actors. By using a dataset that captures the intensity and the type of violence, results indicate that repression perpetrated by the Francoist dictatorship during and after the conflict had a positive and significant effect on left-wing support in 1977. Results are consistent across different indicators, such as religious violence, distance to mass graves or sanctions to teachers, confirming that violence triggered greater support for the political left. In contrast, results show no relationship between repression and turnout.
{"title":"The scars of violence and repression on founding elections: Evidence from Spain","authors":"T. Rodon","doi":"10.1177/07388942221140872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221140872","url":null,"abstract":"Do violence during a civil war and its aftermath leave a mark on political behaviour? In this article I study how violence perpetrated by the left and repression by the right during and after the Spanish Civil War shaped vote choice and turnout in 1977, in the first legislative election after a 40 year dictatorship. I argue that the effect of repression travels over time when actions are perpetrated by clearly identifiable antagonistic actors. By using a dataset that captures the intensity and the type of violence, results indicate that repression perpetrated by the Francoist dictatorship during and after the conflict had a positive and significant effect on left-wing support in 1977. Results are consistent across different indicators, such as religious violence, distance to mass graves or sanctions to teachers, confirming that violence triggered greater support for the political left. In contrast, results show no relationship between repression and turnout.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46379925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-03DOI: 10.1177/07388942221129050
Hans-Inge Langø
Why do some civil wars turn into interstate wars? I analyze an asymmetric information model of civil war onset, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation with endogenous stakes. Interstate war occurs when rebels believe that the threat of intervention will compel the government to acquiesce, the third party believes that the government will tolerate an intervention, but they both underestimate the government's resolve. The model also has implications for civil wars. Retaliation can deter intervention and rebellion, but intervention can compel the government to give up power, so predicting civil war requires accounting for this triadic interaction.
{"title":"Intervention, war expansion, and the international sources of civil war","authors":"Hans-Inge Langø","doi":"10.1177/07388942221129050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221129050","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some civil wars turn into interstate wars? I analyze an asymmetric information model of civil war onset, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation with endogenous stakes. Interstate war occurs when rebels believe that the threat of intervention will compel the government to acquiesce, the third party believes that the government will tolerate an intervention, but they both underestimate the government's resolve. The model also has implications for civil wars. Retaliation can deter intervention and rebellion, but intervention can compel the government to give up power, so predicting civil war requires accounting for this triadic interaction.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42548352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-03DOI: 10.1177/07388942221129047
Wakako Maekawa
During a civil war, does external intelligence assistance reduce violence perpetrated by the recipient government against civilians? I contend that intelligence assistance reduces violence against civilians by facilitating identification problems and adopting a “winning-hearts-and-minds strategy,” which enhances the recipient government's legitimacy and intelligence potential. Enhanced intelligence capability solves the recipient government's identification problems. I examined this logic using a dataset on external support and one-sided violence between 1990 and 2008. The empirical findings show that external intelligence assistance reduces the recipient government's violence against civilians.
{"title":"External intelligence assistance and the recipient government’s violence against civilians","authors":"Wakako Maekawa","doi":"10.1177/07388942221129047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221129047","url":null,"abstract":"During a civil war, does external intelligence assistance reduce violence perpetrated by the recipient government against civilians? I contend that intelligence assistance reduces violence against civilians by facilitating identification problems and adopting a “winning-hearts-and-minds strategy,” which enhances the recipient government's legitimacy and intelligence potential. Enhanced intelligence capability solves the recipient government's identification problems. I examined this logic using a dataset on external support and one-sided violence between 1990 and 2008. The empirical findings show that external intelligence assistance reduces the recipient government's violence against civilians.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41651744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-05DOI: 10.1177/07388942221124515
Michal Smetana, M. Vranka, Ondřej Rosendorf
We present findings of a survey experiment on a sample of 2350 American and British citizens, in which we examined attitudes towards nuclear and chemical strikes. Our findings demonstrate that even though the public accurately judges nuclear weapons as more destructive and indiscriminate, it is still more averse to the use of chemical than nuclear weapons. Our follow up study has shown that individuals are significantly more likely to associate chemical weapons with “rogue states” and terrorists, and associate nuclear weapons with modern powers. The findings contribute to scholarship on the “taboos” surrounding the (non-)use of WMDs in world politics.
{"title":"The lesser evil? Experimental evidence on the strength of nuclear and chemical weapon “taboos”","authors":"Michal Smetana, M. Vranka, Ondřej Rosendorf","doi":"10.1177/07388942221124515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221124515","url":null,"abstract":"We present findings of a survey experiment on a sample of 2350 American and British citizens, in which we examined attitudes towards nuclear and chemical strikes. Our findings demonstrate that even though the public accurately judges nuclear weapons as more destructive and indiscriminate, it is still more averse to the use of chemical than nuclear weapons. Our follow up study has shown that individuals are significantly more likely to associate chemical weapons with “rogue states” and terrorists, and associate nuclear weapons with modern powers. The findings contribute to scholarship on the “taboos” surrounding the (non-)use of WMDs in world politics.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42494233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-15DOI: 10.1177/07388942221120382
T. Flores, Irfan Nooruddin
Civil conflict increases incumbents’ vulnerability, expands their coercive capacity, enervates public good provision, and stifles public opposition. Consequently, we expect that elections held during civil conflict will feature more incumbent-perpetrated election violence. We test our argument with disaggregated data on election violence, generating two principal findings. First, elections held during civil conflict are more likely to feature violent coercion by incumbents. Second, this effect does not depend on the conflict's intensity or political salience, but is endemic to conflict-affected societies as a class. This raises questions about the nature of elections in conflict-affected societies and the relationship between forms of political violence.
{"title":"Why incumbents perpetrate election violence during civil war","authors":"T. Flores, Irfan Nooruddin","doi":"10.1177/07388942221120382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221120382","url":null,"abstract":"Civil conflict increases incumbents’ vulnerability, expands their coercive capacity, enervates public good provision, and stifles public opposition. Consequently, we expect that elections held during civil conflict will feature more incumbent-perpetrated election violence. We test our argument with disaggregated data on election violence, generating two principal findings. First, elections held during civil conflict are more likely to feature violent coercion by incumbents. Second, this effect does not depend on the conflict's intensity or political salience, but is endemic to conflict-affected societies as a class. This raises questions about the nature of elections in conflict-affected societies and the relationship between forms of political violence.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44947105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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