Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory最新文献_第2页

Democratic Respect: Populism, Resentment and the Struggle for Recognition 民主尊重：民粹主义、怨恨和争取承认的斗争

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-05-27 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12814

Gabriela Rodrigues da Guia Rosa

引用次数: 0

Thinking Poetically and Thinking Politically—Arendt, Benjamin, Heidegger, and Arendt's Benjamin 诗性思考与政治思考——阿伦特、本雅明、海德格尔与阿伦特的本雅明

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-05-27 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12820

Jacob Abolafia

Hannah Arendt's 1968 remembrance “Walter Benjamin: 1892–1940” is a famous artifact of a famous friendship. Not only was Arendt Benjamin's friend, a witness to his final weeks, and a conduit for the survival of some of his most famous writings, but scholars of Arendt now frequently position her as a leading epigone of Benjamin's. Seyla Benhabib hails what she calls the “Benjaminian Arendt” and identifies Walter Benjamin as the “prime example” for Arendt's political methodology (Benhabib 2003, x–xi). Dana Villa writes that “it is the spirit of Benjamin … that informs [Arendt's] search for hidden treasures,” and that what she writes of Benjamin's “‘poetic’ thinking … applies equally well to her own thought” (Villa 1996, 9). The literature is rife with similar examples.1Rather than a general introduction to Benjamin's life and thought, or evidence for Arendt's own Benjaminian tendencies, however, Arendt's essay is a polemical intervention in debates over Benjamin's political and intellectual orientation. The central thesis of the Benjamin essay is that Walter Benjamin “thought poetically.” Poetic thinking refers not only to Benjamin's literary style or use of metaphor, but to what Arendt argues is his fundamentally anti-political orientation to his role as an intellectual—an orientation Arendt thought he shared with another German philosopher, Martin Heidegger. According to Arendt, both Benjamin and Heidegger privilege withdrawal into poetic writing and philosophical thinking about the essence of being over the error-prone world of human action. But Arendt's depiction of Benjamin as a “poetic thinker,” while influential, does not do justice to his self-perception as a political thinker. This essay hopes to enable a recovery of the political Benjamin. Benjamin, in contrast to Heidegger, never retreated from his early belief that the task of the scholar is to redeem the world of things (phenomena). His commitment to “thinking politically” is a useful contrast to the Arendtian category of political judgement as a practical rather than a theoretical matter. For Benjamin, the task of the thinker is a political task.The paper begins by reconstructing Arendt's assertion that Benjamin, like Heidegger, “thought poetically.” The paper argues that Arendt's comparison of Benjamin and Heidegger is part of a broader late-career attempt to redefine and rehabilitate Heidegger as a poetic rather than political thinker. If Arendt's presentation of Benjamin reflects her ideas about Heidegger, then we must reconsider the prevalent dual genealogy of a Benjaminian and a Heideggerian influence on Arendt.2 The final section of the paper makes the argument for the significance of this repositioning of Arendt and Benjamin in relation to one another. Stripped of Arendt's influential “Heideggerian” interpretation, the insistently political nature of Benjamin's philosophical method emerges.The idea that Hannah Arendt's wid

汉娜·阿伦特1968年的纪念作品《沃尔特·本雅明：1892-1940》是一段著名友谊的著名作品。她不仅是阿伦特·本雅明的朋友，是他最后几周的见证者，是他一些最著名作品得以流传的渠道，而且阿伦特的学者现在经常把她定位为本雅明的主要追随者。塞拉·本哈比布称赞她所谓的“本杰明主义的阿伦特”，并认为瓦尔特·本雅明是阿伦特政治方法论的“主要范例”（Benhabib 2003, x-xi）。达纳·维拉写道，“正是本雅明的精神……启发了[阿伦特]寻找隐藏的宝藏，”她对本雅明的“‘诗意’思维……同样适用于她自己的思想”（维拉1996,9）。文献中充斥着类似的例子。然而，阿伦特的文章并不是对本雅明的生活和思想的一般性介绍，也不是对阿伦特自己的本雅明倾向的证据，而是对本雅明的政治和思想取向的辩论进行了辩论性的干预。本雅明论文的中心论点是沃尔特·本雅明“诗意地思考”。诗意思维不仅指本雅明的文学风格或隐喻的使用，而且指阿伦特认为的他作为知识分子角色的根本反政治取向——阿伦特认为他与另一位德国哲学家马丁·海德格尔（Martin Heidegger）有共同的取向。根据阿伦特的观点，本雅明和海德格尔都把退入诗歌写作和对存在本质的哲学思考置于容易出错的人类行为世界之上。但是，阿伦特将本雅明描述为一个“诗意的思想家”，虽然有影响力，但并没有公正地对待他作为一个政治思想家的自我认知。本文希望能使政治上的本雅明得以复苏。与海德格尔相反，本雅明从未放弃他早期的信念，即学者的任务是拯救事物（现象）的世界。他对“政治思考”的承诺与阿伦特的政治判断范畴形成了有益的对比，阿伦特认为政治判断是一种实践问题，而不是理论问题。对本雅明来说，思想家的任务是一项政治任务。本文首先重构了阿伦特的论断，即本雅明像海德格尔一样“诗意地思考”。本文认为，阿伦特对本雅明和海德格尔的比较是其职业生涯后期更广泛尝试的一部分，目的是重新定义和恢复海德格尔作为诗歌思想家而非政治思想家的地位。如果阿伦特对本雅明的介绍反映了她对海德格尔的看法，那么我们必须重新考虑普遍存在的本雅明主义者和海德格尔对阿伦特的影响的双重谱系。2论文的最后一部分论证了阿伦特和本雅明相互关系的重新定位的重要性。剥去了阿伦特有影响力的“海德格尔式”解释，便雅明哲学方法的坚持政治本质显现出来。汉娜·阿伦特对瓦尔特·本雅明思想的广泛阅读的介绍被与海德格尔的争论性比较所掩盖，这种想法是违反直觉的。毕竟，这篇1968年以德语和英语出版的文章坚持认为，“本杰明写的一切……都是自成一体的。”根据阿伦特的说法，本雅明独创性的本质是“他以诗意的方式思考，但他既不是诗人，也不是哲学家”（第4章）。在文章的结尾，阿伦特再次赞扬了本雅明的“诗意思考的天赋”。但是，尽管她承认这是“极其罕见的”，阿伦特坚持认为，这种天赋“不是……独一无二的”；换句话说，本雅明并不是唯一一个发现思想的诗意本质的人（见第50页，阿伦特的斜体）。阿伦特在她关于思考能力的长篇著作《心灵的生活》中讨论了另一个“罕见的”诗意思考的例子。在那里，她明确地将诗歌与思维之间的联系与马丁·海德格尔联系起来，特别是海德格尔对隐喻的分析在本雅明的文章中，“诗意的思想”也与隐喻联系在一起隐喻是本雅明动态而直接的写作方式的一个关键方面，这是一种语言工具，使他能够在社会上具体化，而不会陷入阿伦特所认为的辩证（马克思主义）哲学的陷阱（第13章）。因此，我们有充分的理由怀疑，“诗意地思考”应该带着海德格尔式的泛音来听（见第14页）。在阿伦特的文章中，“诗意思维”的概念并不是连接本雅明和海德格尔的唯一线索。这篇文章还包含了一篇关于本雅明的长篇传记，以及他的德国犹太同龄人的世代困境。她用海德格尔在《存在与时间》（来自对“他们”的分析）中的一句话总结了本雅明对犹太人在德国公共生活中的角色的不安，即“公共之光使一切都变暗”（第35章）。阿伦特通过这段引语强调了本雅明，像海德格尔一样，以怀疑的态度看待公共领域，反对“真实”——诚然，这是一个反映魏玛犹太人政治煽动的奇怪选择，他们中的许多人将自己的生命献给了德国的“宣传”。阿伦特声称，对于本雅明和其他德裔犹太理论家来说，这个“犹太问题”只是一个更普遍的问题的一个特殊例子，“西方传统作为一个整体的相关性”（Ill. 37）对于这些德国犹太人中的许多人来说，海德格尔是解决这个问题的最具洞察力的思想家，因此阿伦特比较这两位传统批评家是有意义的本雅明，像海德格尔一样，理解传统衰落的“决定性”本质，并警告说，与僵化的过去相比，现在可能会导致全球性的灾难（《最后的审判》，第37、38页）。根据阿伦特的说法，本雅明通过引用、引用和拼贴的文学超现实主义来处理过去与现在之间不可弥补的断裂。通过将段落从原始语境的权威中解放出来，从“无用的苦工”中解放出来（《伊利诺伊州》42章，引用本雅明的话），本雅明既规避了作者的意图，又通过将材料挪用于他的私人目的而“从公众中退出”（《伊利诺伊州》43章）。在这里，阿伦特回到了她早先对海德格尔的引用，暗示本雅明的收集和整理方法本身就是对当前公共世界空虚的一种替代。她的解释充满了海德格尔式的口号，如真实性、起源和决定性：引用可以是“真实的”，它出现在“起源”的标志下（Ursprung），收集者“用纯粹的原创性或真实性取代内容”（Ill. 44）。事实上，在他与“事物本身”的相遇中，本雅明是一个“坚定地面对现在”的人（伊利诺伊州第45章）。对于阿伦特来说，这两位伟大的非正统传统读者之间的相似性在语言和真理方面尤为明显。她写道，对本雅明来说，语言是“‘世界的本质……话语由此产生’……这恰好与海德格尔的立场非常接近，即‘人只有在他是说话者的情况下才能说话’”（第49-50页）。阿伦特的最终决定是，本雅明的片段应该被理解为“一种‘世界本质’的无意图和非交流的话语”（见第50页）。因此，“诗性思维”的内容在本质上就是海德格尔式地把语言和思维定性为存在的痕迹。阿伦特写作的历史背景大大加强了本雅明文章中海德格尔式偏见的文本证据。在出版的前一年，阿伦特在弗赖堡大学发表了这篇文章。海德格尔在观众席上，阿伦特在台上向他致意阿伦特选择将注意力吸引到海德格尔身上，这是一个有意的选择，当时海德格尔仍然是一个有争议的人物；阿伦特在一次书信交流中告诉海德格尔，她“预见到”弗莱堡听众的不安反应，所以她在关于本雅明的讲座上“有点戏剧性”地向海德格尔打招呼（阿伦特和海德格尔2002,157）。海德格尔本人对这次演讲深表赞赏，随后两人就语言和辩证法进行了对话。海德格尔甚至在阿伦特的文章结尾引用了mallarm<s:1>引文，她用它来总结本雅明的“诗意思考”（157,cf. Ill. 50）。在选择公开发表关于本雅明的声明时，阿伦特克服了先前的担忧，即她对本雅明的了解过于狭隘而不完整，过于亲密而不客观（阿伦特和肖勒姆2017,72）。写一个概括性的介绍需要她熟悉本杰明的生活和工作，比她以前所知道的更广泛。正如她写给卡尔·雅斯贝尔斯（Karl Jaspers）的信中所说，“我必须做一份详细的工作，因为[本杰明]在这里完全不为人知，他的工作相当复杂”（Arendt and Jaspers 1993,667）。矛盾的是，阿伦特最终承担起了为英语读者

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引用次数: 0

Hegel's World Revolutions 黑格尔的《世界革命

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-05-27 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12816

Jörg Schaub

引用次数: 0

Freedom From or Freedom in Work? Post-Work Proposals and Hannah Arendt's Conception of Political Freedom 自由还是工作中的自由？后工作提议与汉娜·阿伦特的政治自由观

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-05-27 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12818

Thijs Keulen

Universal basic income and collective working-time reductions are familiar features of a ‘post-work’ politics that seeks to reduce the unfreedom associated with the workplace. Proponents appeal to an image of freedom where citizens are liberated from the compulsive aspects of wage-labor and free to engage in self-determined projects and activities. In this article, I critically evaluate these ideas of freedom in relation to work and offer an alternative interpretation of this relationship by turning to Hannah Arendt's thought. I argue that Arendt's conception of political freedom and concern with the ‘worldly’ dimension of the economic demonstrate the normative priority of establishing institutions for the exercise of democratic power at work and in the economy compared to post-work ideals of freedom from work as the basis for human flourishing. Rather than staking the meaning of freedom on liberation from work, Arendt's understanding of freedom compels us to transform it.

普遍基本收入和集体减少工作时间是“后工作”政治的常见特征，旨在减少与工作场所相关的不自由。支持者呼吁一种自由的形象，即公民从强制性的雇佣劳动中解放出来，自由地参与自主的项目和活动。在这篇文章中，我批判性地评价了这些自由与工作的关系，并通过转向汉娜·阿伦特的思想，提供了这种关系的另一种解释。我认为，阿伦特的政治自由概念和对经济的“世俗”维度的关注，证明了建立在工作和经济中行使民主权力的制度的规范性优先权，而不是将工作自由的后工作理想作为人类繁荣的基础。阿伦特对自由的理解迫使我们对自由进行改造，而不是将自由的意义押注于从工作中解放出来。

引用次数: 0

Immanent Critiques: The Frankfurt School Under Pressure 内在批判：压力下的法兰克福学派

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12815

Espen Hammer

引用次数: 0

Toward a Theory of Myth Critique: Ideology, Learned Ignorance, and the Conditions of Imaginative Success 走向神话批判理论：意识形态、习得的无知和想象成功的条件

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-05-12 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12813

Carmen Lea Dege, Tae-Yeoun Keum

Sweeping accounts of the history of the human species—from Rousseau (1997 [1755]) to Toynbee (1934–1961) to Diamond (1997) to Harari (2014)—are no novelty in popular culture, just as they are no strangers to controversy. But the debate that ensued around David Graeber and David Wengrow's The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity (2021), perhaps the most significant recent addition to this genre, was different. One especially striking instance of its peculiar reception unfolded in the pages of the New York Review of Books letters section between Wengrow and the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah, who had written a lengthy review.Appiah was clearly taken with Graeber and Wengrow's project. Expressing admiration for its vision of freedom and political possibility, he rounded off his review with the verdict that, “whatever its empirical shortcomings, the book must be counted an imaginative success” (Appiah 2021). But this conclusion also came, almost like an afterthought, at the heels of a detailed report on those very empirical shortcomings, which took up the greater part of his review. In their book, Graeber and Wengrow had positioned themselves as debunkers of a pervasive “myth” about human history: a Rousseauian narrative about the birth of political society from out of an original, prepolitical state, whereby the privatization of property and domination by centralized governments were the necessary price humans had to pay for the complexity of civilization. But among the preponderance of archaeological counterexamples the authors marshaled as a corrective to this myth, not a single one, Appiah judged, held up to strict scrutiny. “Two half-truths, alas, do not make a truth,” he concluded, “and neither do a thousand” (Appiah 2021).If Appiah had meant to praise the book as an imaginative success, this certainly got lost in the ensuing conversation, which quickly hardened into a debate over facts. In a fiery response, Wengrow defended their empirical foundations, accusing Appiah of being too beholden to the old myth to face the archaeological evidence challenging it. Appiah responded, for his part, by once again highlighting the ambiguities surrounding the evidence, and reaffirming his regard for the authors’ imaginative vision (Wengrow and Appiah 2022).In this paper, we suggest something crucial is at stake in the crossfire of this conversation. All the parties to the debate agree that disrupting our sense of what is possible in politics is valuable, and that social criticism to this end is ultimately aimed at bringing about conceptual shifts in its audience that are, in essence, imaginative. Such shifts require their subjects to rework their attachments to tacit, subconscious values in the background of their worldviews. As such, successful social critique involves engaging the affective, aesthetic, an

从卢梭（1997[1755]）到汤因比（1934-1961），从戴蒙德（1997）到赫拉利（2014），对人类历史的全面描述在流行文化中并不新鲜，就像他们对争议并不陌生一样。但围绕大卫·格雷伯和大卫·温格罗的《万物的黎明：人类的新历史》（2021年出版）展开的争论却有所不同，这本书可能是这一流派最近最重要的新作。在《纽约书评》（New York Review of Books）上，温格罗与哲学家夸梅·安东尼·阿皮亚（Kwame Anthony Appiah）之间的书信部分，出现了一个特别引人注目的例子，后者写了一篇长篇评论。阿皮亚显然被格雷伯和温格罗的项目所吸引。他对其对自由和政治可能性的愿景表示钦佩，并在评论中总结道：“无论它在经验上有什么缺点，这本书必须被视为想象力上的成功”（Appiah 2021）。但是，这个结论几乎是在一份详细的报告之后才得出的，这份报告占据了他的评论的大部分篇幅。在他们的书中，格雷伯和温格罗将自己定位为一个关于人类历史的普遍“神话”的拆解者：一个卢梭式的关于政治社会诞生于原始的、前政治国家的叙述，在这个国家中，财产私有化和中央政府的统治是人类必须为文明的复杂性付出的必要代价。但阿皮亚认为，在作者列举的众多考古学反例中，没有一个能经得起严格审查。“唉，两个半真半假的事实不能构成一个事实，”他总结道，“一千个也不能”（Appiah 2021）。如果阿皮亚是想称赞这本书是一个富有想象力的成功，那么在随后的谈话中，这一点肯定被忽略了，谈话很快就变成了对事实的争论。在激烈的回应中，温格罗为他们的经验基础辩护，指责阿皮亚过于依赖古老的神话，而不去面对挑战它的考古证据。Appiah对此的回应是，他再次强调了证据的模糊性，并重申了他对作者想象力的尊重（Wengrow and Appiah 2022）。在本文中，我们认为在这场对话的交火中，一些至关重要的东西处于危险之中。辩论的各方都同意，破坏我们对政治可能性的认识是有价值的，为此目的的社会批评的最终目的是在其受众中带来概念上的转变，这种转变本质上是富有想象力的。这种转变要求他们的主体在他们的世界观背景下重新处理他们对隐性的、潜意识的价值观的依恋。因此，成功的社会批判涉及到超越经验事实领域的情感、美学，甚至是我们思维的神话维度。阿皮亚（Appiah, 2017）在其他地方为并非事实的哲学虚构的价值辩护，他将是第一个支持这一观点的人。但是，尽管有这些共同点，格雷伯和温格罗的书以及随后的讨论显然都未能避免对事实的呼吁和争论——这些争论无法帮助淹没了更广泛项目的想象力雄心。我们认为，一方面，这本书的目的是产生这样一种富有想象力的转变，另一方面，它遇到的困难是在不严格的经验主义的条件下进行这种努力，这表明了一个更广泛的问题。也就是说，缺乏一个更强大的理论框架来理解对神话的批判的条件——格雷伯和温格罗在《万物的黎明》中所宣称的那种——可以算作是想象上的成功。批评我们继承的根深蒂固的故事意味着什么？这些故事构成了我们对自己是谁、我们来自哪里、我们将走向何方的看法。我们是否只能从事实的角度来批评这些故事——事实是正确的还是错误的？或者从价值观的角度来批评这些故事，道德上是可以接受的还是有问题的？在接下来的内容中，我们试图概述一种不同的批评神话的方法，这种方法为事实揭穿和更传统的意识形态批评形式提供了另一种选择。学者们有充分的证据表明，我们讲述的关于我们的世界及其可能性的更大范围的故事与客观事实有着复杂的关系。事实上，再现危机是跨越哲学的所谓“叙事”和“美学转向”的基石(例如，Cavell 1976；拉图1993;Ranciere 1999;Taylor 1989)，社会学(Berger and Luckmann 1966；戈夫曼（Goffman, 1981）、心理学（Gergen, 1999）、文学研究（Scarry, 1994）和历史（White, 2014[1973]）。近年来，随着人们对事实的政治有效性以及它们与文化和社会价值之间的不确定关系日益感到焦虑，这两种转变的核心关注点——对知识是否可以建立在安全和确定的基础上的深刻怀疑——变得令人担忧，而事实与文化和社会价值之间的不确定关系现在通常被称为意识形态形式或“伪科学”（McIntyre 2019）。这些发展还伴随着对神话在政治中的作用的重新关注，通常以消极的方式，作为操纵、煤气灯或故意扭曲和歪曲的做法(Brennan 2016；黄油和骑士2019；Cassam 2019)。与此同时，在一个独立的传统中，越来越多的人认识到社会批评家需要回归到某些意识形态批评的种类(Cooke等人；Hall 1986, Haslanger 2017；拉丰2023)。然而，对更恰当的“内在”意识形态批判的推动，同时也揭示了其对社会批评的自我反思要求理性核心这一假设的承诺所构成的约束（Winter, 2025）。因此，意识形态批判如果不能为区分好神话和坏神话提供明确的理性标准，就有可能沦为非理性的相对主义，最终助长威权主义和民粹主义政治的病态。意识形态批判传统今天所处的十字路口，突出了对其持久承诺——无论多么必要——在社会批判中理性至上——所承担的未理论化成本的进一步批判反思的必要性。首先，存在这样一个问题，即这种承诺是否能够在不同时产生对某些形式的知识的偏见或将知识作为认识论立场的特权的情况下得以维持。这些倾向只能强化众所周知的事实与价值的二分法，鼓励我们将客观性理想化，同时将主观性相对化。接受这些后果，反过来，也迫使我们重新考虑社会批评在两极分化的政治景观中的价值和效力，在那里，太多的个人，不太可能被事实的权威所左右，将经历这样的批评，专横的，道德主义的，或精英主义的。相反，尚不清楚的是，经验主义和语境主义——有些人可能认为是相对主义——对知识的理解从美学和叙事的转折中产生，从而使什么样的社会批评成为可能。研究神话的学者们，他们长期以来精确地根据神话对事实和论证的抵抗来定义神话(Cassirer 1965, 29-31；Habermas 1987 [1981], 52-53；Sorel 1999,29)一直承认有必要重新设计我们政治想象的主导叙事，并指出，反过来，这些项目增加了确定我们可能评估和批评神话的标准的额外困难（例如，Bottici 2007,16）。如果社会批判的最终目的是发起各种富有想象力的突破，将我们从我们对世界的习惯故事中解放出来，那么无论是正确的事实还是正确的意识形态都不足以完成这项任务。我们自己思考这个挑战的努力，集中在发展一种专门针对神话的社会批判。为了达到我们的目的，我们将神话定义为在我们的社会世界中根深蒂固的继承和隐性叙事，它解决了对个人和社区存在意义的大规模问题，而不一定给出解释性的答案。在我们看来，神话批判要求批评家创造性地重新创作这些神话，同时对它们所涉及的问题保持一种明显的反身性承认。我们首先回到格雷伯和温格罗将卢梭的推测史概念化为“神话”。指出他们利用考古事实和规范价值陈述来挑战它的方式，我们认为格雷伯和温格罗采取了一种最终不适合神话的意识形态批判形式：一种具有独特态度功能的媒介，它构建了我们与不透明的关系，并且需要一种相应的批评形式来保持这种功能。在我们论证的第二

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引用次数: 0

Structural Domination and Contradictory Socialization1 结构支配与矛盾社会化

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-05-09 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12810

Antoine Louette

In order to “illuminate” structural domination in ways that provide social movements and dominated groups with “a basis for resistance” (Haslanger 2022, 1; see also Horkheimer [1937] 1972, Geuss 1981), an important tradition in critical theory argues—without minimizing the role of repressive violence or collective action problems—that the reproduction of structural domination is partly due to actors’ socialization into the social practices and institutions that are responsible for it (Haslanger 2017a; Celikates 2016; Einspahr 2010; Sewell 1992; see also Giddens 1984; Bourdieu 1977).Much should be said in favor of this approach: aware of the recent sociological and anthropological literature on socialization's “internal contradiction” (Sewell 2005, 53; see also Lemieux 2018; Graeber 2005), it is now rid of the totalizing tendencies common to the “more nightmarish visions” of the Frankfurt School (Leopold 2018, sec. 4.3). As such, it promises to help solve one of the central problems of critical theory without compromising on actors’ agency.Yet I argue in this paper that this approach needs refining. Specifically, I show that its very emphasis on agency means that the analysis of socialization on which it is based needs to be sharpened before it can be a successful (albeit partial) explanation of the reproduction of structural domination: I argue that further detail must be given as to why socialization's internal contradictions should fail to prompt critical thinking and draw on neglected Marxist insights to suggest that seeing structural domination as an explanans, and not just the explanandum, can help here (Geuss 1981; Balibar 2014; MacKinnon 1982; Althusser [1970] 2014).2 I make this argument in five steps.First, I offer a brief account of structural domination as the disempowerment of social groups by social practices and institutions. I illustrate this account by taking three examples, to which I then return throughout the paper: racially biased hiring practices (Haslanger 2017a), capitalist exploitation (Young 1990), and the law of male sex right that can be found behind much sexual violence (Rich 1986, 2004; Pateman 1988).Second, I present in more detail the account of socialization put forward by the proponents of the socialization view. On this account, socialization refers to the material-symbolic feedback loop whereby actors learn the schemas of social practices and institutions from the social milieux in which these practices and institutions are enacted (Sewell 1992; Einspahr 2010; Celikates 2016; Haslanger 2017a).Third, I argue that, in its welcome attempt to do justice to act

为了“阐明”结构性统治，为社会运动和被统治群体提供“抵抗的基础”(Haslanger 2022, 1；另见hokheimer [1937] 1972， Geuss 1981)，批判理论的一个重要传统认为——没有最小化镇压性暴力或集体行动问题的作用——结构性统治的再生产部分是由于演员社会化进入了对其负责的社会实践和制度（Haslanger 2017a; Celikates 2016; Einspahr 2010; Sewell 1992；另见Giddens 1984； Bourdieu 1977）。应该说很多支持这种方法的话：意识到最近关于社会化“内部矛盾”的社会学和人类学文献（Sewell 2005,53；另见Lemieux 2018； Graeber 2005），它现在摆脱了法兰克福学派“更噩梦般的愿景”所共有的总体倾向（Leopold 2018，第4.3节）。因此，它有望帮助解决批评理论的一个核心问题，而不损害演员的能动性。然而，我在本文中认为，这种方法需要改进。具体来说，我指出，它对代理的强调意味着，在它能够成功地（尽管是部分地）解释结构性统治的再生产之前，它所基于的对社会化的分析需要更加尖锐：我认为，必须给出进一步的细节，为什么社会化的内部矛盾不能促使批判性思维，并利用被忽视的马克思主义见解，表明将结构性支配视为一种解释，而不仅仅是解释，可以在这里有所帮助（Geuss 1981; Balibar 2014; MacKinnon 1982; Althusser [1970] 2014）我的论点分为五个步骤。首先，我简要介绍了结构性支配，即社会实践和制度对社会群体的剥夺。我通过三个例子来说明这个说法，然后我在整篇论文中都回到了这三个例子：种族偏见的雇佣行为（Haslanger 2017a），资本主义剥削（Young 1990），以及在许多性暴力背后可以找到的男性性权利法（Rich 1986, 2004; Pateman 1988）。其次，我更详细地介绍了社会化观点的支持者提出的社会化的解释。就此而言，社会化是指物质-符号反馈循环，行动者从制定这些实践和制度的社会环境中学习社会实践和制度的图式（Sewell 1992; Einspahr 2010; Celikates 2016; Haslanger 2017a）。第三，我认为，通过坚持认为社会化“被内部矛盾所困扰”（Sewell 2005,53；另见Haslanger 2017a, 11; Celikates 2016），这种方法试图公正地对待行动者的代理，但它忽视了这种矛盾可能允许足够的批判意识在很大程度上混淆了我们对社会化有助于结构统治再生产的方式的理解。第四，我考虑并拒绝对这一反对意见的三种可能的回应：如果社会化构成了对结构统治再生产的成功解释（尽管是部分的），我认为，这既不是因为矛盾通常太少（马尔库塞[1964]2002），也不是因为它们提出的挑战通常被忽视（Young 1990），也不是因为这些挑战很少促使批判性思维（Valian 1998）——或者至少不是，在每种情况下，与结构统治隔离开来，我认为它本身应该被理解为一种解释。而不仅仅是对“一般社会化”的“正常”操作的抽象理解的解释。事实上，第五，也是最后，我暗示了另一个更令人满意的解决方案，它试图做到这一点：社会化为结构性统治的再生产提供了部分解释，我认为，当结构性统治本身对社会化有一定的影响时。借鉴马克思主义观点理论的见解（hooks 1992; Mills 2005; cf. Balibar 2014），最近对商品拜物教的描述（greaeber 2005; Louette 2023; cf. MacKinnon 1982），以及对性暴力的女权主义分析(Kelly 1987; Miriam 2007；参见Althusser[1970] 2014)，所有这些都在某种程度上被社会化观点所忽视，我强调了三种这样的影响：一种是导致无知的隔离影响，一种是消除矛盾的标准化影响，一种是阻止批判性吸收的压制性影响。在这样做的过程中，我的主要目标是表明，如果要为批判理论的核心问题——结构支配的意识形态再生产——提供一个成功的（如果是部分的）答案，就必须给社会化方法，特别是它对社会化内部矛盾的解释提供进一步的细节。因为这将有助于我们注意到，当涉及到社会化对结构性支配的再生产时，结构性支配不仅仅是需要解释的那一边：它本身也有一些解释作用，或者至少比社会化观点所强调的要多，在某种程度上，它对社会化过程施加了各种类型的影响。让我暗示其中的三个：隔离的影响，标准化的影响和压制性的影响。首先，从激进女权主义者（Harding 2004年，Wylie 2003年），特别是激进黑人女权主义者（hooks 1992年）的立场理论中汲取马克思主义的见解，我们可以在所谓的结构性统治对社会化的隔离影响中找到第一条前进的道路。对于结构性统治来说，作为一个以劳动分工（Balibar 2014）和种族隔离（Mills 2005）为例的历史过程，它不仅剥夺了一些参与者相对于其他人的权力：正如大卫·格雷伯（David Graeber）所建议的（2015），它还以这样一种方式将两个群体分开，即主导群体往往不会频繁出现在主导群体的环境中，这可以帮助他们纠正自己的意识形态。更准确地说，权力动态是这样的，除非有必要，否则两个群体都不倾向于频繁出现在另一个群体的环境中，但被统治的群体往往需要，因为他们依赖于统治群体的关键资源。相比之下，如果没有这种依赖，主导群体往往会发现自己或多或少地被锁定在我在讨论上面第一个据称的解决方案时提到的那种“特定于群体的局部总体”中（见Graeber 2015, 69）。这种对结构支配的中心权力动态的分析的根源可以一直追溯到马克思，正如Étienne Balibar所强调的那样，马克思的意识形态理论是一种“意识的阶级特征理论”，它帮助我们注意到不同阶级成员的态度如何反映了他们的“实践世界”的限制，这些限制是“由社会划分为阶级所强加的”（2014,95-96；我的翻译）。但随后的概括，从“照顾婴儿和身体与不这样做之间的区别”（Young 1994, 730）到美国法律上的隔离和“从那时起以更微妙的形式持续的白人统治”（Mills 2005, 175），都清楚地表明，只要社会实践构成了一些主体占主导地位，而另一些主体占主导地位，我们就应该期待这种现象的出现。事实上，上面提到的白人专业人士就是一个很好的例子。黑人员工需要找到工作时,他们从他们的员工,过不同的生活,与我们之前预期的相反,事实上他们不经历这种障碍解释后者明显不可靠:实际上他们并不依赖于公共交通工具,例如,或不如黑色的员工,这就解释了为什么他们不正确的错误的看法(见安德森2010)。我们真的应该像我所做的那样，将这种隔离效应纳入结构性支配的概念吗？如上所述，这种影响只倾向于影响优势群体，而不是劣势群体。然而，我们看到意识形态社会化的某些形式，如商品图式，对两者都是共同的，这意味着隔离效应不可能与所有意识形态社会化的情况有关。但这是否意味着，决定隔离效应是否与意识形态社会化有关的不是结构性支配，而是其他一些有待经验确定的变量？如果是这样的话，这种隔

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引用次数: 0

Does Adorno Have a Theory of Fascist Thinking? 阿多诺有法西斯思想理论吗？

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-05-06 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12802

Stefan Bird-Pollan

引用次数: 0

Immanent Critique in Political Education: Indoctrination or Emancipation? 政治教育的内在批判：灌输还是解放？

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-05-02 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12794

Antti Moilanen

This article assesses whether critical political education, which immanently criticizes society, is able to avoid the challenge of indoctrination. For this purpose, the article reconstructs premises of critical political education, contemporary theories of immanent critique, and criteria of indoctrination. Moreover, the article constructs a didactic approach of immanent critique of capitalism in political education and examines it using Habermasian criteria of indoctrination. According to the study, immanent critique in political education can be both indoctrinative and critical of indoctrination depending on how successful teachers are in applying the didactic principles of self-reflectivity, controversy, and dialogic teaching. Therefore, the challenge can be avoided.

批判政治教育本质上是批判社会的，它是否能够避免思想灌输的挑战，本文对此进行了评估。为此，本文重构了批判政治教育的前提、当代内在批判理论和灌输标准。此外，本文还构建了一种在政治教育中对资本主义进行内在批判的教学方法，并运用哈贝马斯的灌输标准对其进行了考察。根据这项研究，政治教育中的内在批判既可以是教条化的，也可以是对教条化的批判，这取决于教师在应用自我反思、争议和对话教学的教学原则方面有多成功。因此，挑战是可以避免的。

引用次数: 0

The Rise of Unreasonableness: Beyond Binaries for Containment 不合理的崛起：超越二进制的遏制

IF 1.2 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-05-02 DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12804

Michelle Chun

引用次数: 0