Alexander Agadjanian, John Carey, Yusaku Horiuchi, Timothy J. Ryan
{"title":"Disfavor or Favor? Assessing the Valence of White Americans' Racial Attitudes","authors":"Alexander Agadjanian, John Carey, Yusaku Horiuchi, Timothy J. Ryan","doi":"10.1561/100.00021119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021119","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134954758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Gap in Our Understanding? Reconsidering the Evidence for Partisan Knowledge Gaps","authors":"Carolyn E. Roush, G. Sood","doi":"10.1561/100.00020178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020178","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Locally Controlled Minimum Wages Leapfrog Public Preferences","authors":"Gábor Simonovits, Julia Payson","doi":"10.1561/100.00021133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021133","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01Epub Date: 2023-07-10DOI: 10.1561/100.00021091
Claire L Adida, Amanda Lea Robinson
Scholarship shows that Black immigrants to the US resist assimilation to reduce exposure to racial discrimination faced by native-born African Americans. But, not all Black immigrants are equally likely to be (mis)perceived as African American. We argue that immigrants who are likely to be misidentified as African American have incentives to reify ethnic boundaries as a form of protection against racial discrimination. We develop this argument from interviews and focus groups with African immigrants. We then use a lab experiment to measure rates of miscategorization and identify its correlates among African immigrants. Finally, we test our argument with a novel survey of Somalis, an immigrant population with two ethnic subgroups who differ in their likelihood of being miscategorized as African Americans. We show that this difference shapes the degree of resistance to assimilation. These findings improve our understanding of the relationship between racial discrimination and incentives for Black immigrants to resist assimilation.
{"title":"Why (some) immigrants resist assimilation: US racism and the African immigrant experience.","authors":"Claire L Adida, Amanda Lea Robinson","doi":"10.1561/100.00021091","DOIUrl":"10.1561/100.00021091","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Scholarship shows that Black immigrants to the US resist assimilation to reduce exposure to racial discrimination faced by native-born African Americans. But, not all Black immigrants are equally likely to be (mis)perceived as African American. We argue that immigrants who are likely to be misidentified as African American have incentives to reify ethnic boundaries as a form of protection against racial discrimination. We develop this argument from interviews and focus groups with African immigrants. We then use a lab experiment to measure rates of miscategorization and identify its correlates among African immigrants. Finally, we test our argument with a novel survey of Somalis, an immigrant population with two ethnic subgroups who differ in their likelihood of being miscategorized as African Americans. We show that this difference shapes the degree of resistance to assimilation. These findings improve our understanding of the relationship between racial discrimination and incentives for Black immigrants to resist assimilation.</p>","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10706603/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
William G. Howell, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Stephane Wolton
{"title":"Executive Absolutism: The Dynamics of Authority Acquisition in a System of Separated Powers","authors":"William G. Howell, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Stephane Wolton","doi":"10.1561/100.00021219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021219","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135470423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Overreacting and Posturing: How Accountability and Ideology Shape Executive Policies","authors":"P. Bils","doi":"10.1561/100.00020177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020177","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Polarization and Group Cooperation","authors":"Andrea Robbett, Peter Hans Matthews","doi":"10.1561/100.00021036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021036","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135470424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"Banning the Box"refers to a policy campaign aimed at prohibiting employers from soliciting applicant information that could be used to statistically discriminate against categories of applicants (in particular, those with criminal records). In this article, we examine how the concealing or revealing of informative features about an applicant's identity affects hiring both directly and, in equilibrium, by possibly changing applicants' incentives to invest in human capital. We show that there exist situations in which an employer and an applicant are in agreement about whether to ban the box. Specifically, depending on the structure of the labor market, banning the box can be (1) Pareto dominant, (2) Pareto dominated, (3) benefit the applicant while harming the employer, or (4) benefit the employer while harming the applicant. Our results have policy implications spanning beyond employment decisions, including the use of credit checks by landlords and standardized tests in college admissions.
{"title":"Ban the Box? Information, Incentives, and Statistical Discrimination","authors":"John W. Patty, E. M. Penn","doi":"10.1561/100.00022021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00022021","url":null,"abstract":"\"Banning the Box\"refers to a policy campaign aimed at prohibiting employers from soliciting applicant information that could be used to statistically discriminate against categories of applicants (in particular, those with criminal records). In this article, we examine how the concealing or revealing of informative features about an applicant's identity affects hiring both directly and, in equilibrium, by possibly changing applicants' incentives to invest in human capital. We show that there exist situations in which an employer and an applicant are in agreement about whether to ban the box. Specifically, depending on the structure of the labor market, banning the box can be (1) Pareto dominant, (2) Pareto dominated, (3) benefit the applicant while harming the employer, or (4) benefit the employer while harming the applicant. Our results have policy implications spanning beyond employment decisions, including the use of credit checks by landlords and standardized tests in college admissions.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46666655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite evidence that infants affect families’ economic and social behaviors, little is known about how young children influence their parents’ political engagement. I show that U.S. women with an infant during an election year are 3.5 percentage points less likely to vote than women without children; men with an infant are 2.2 percentage points less likely to vote. Suggesting that this effect may be causal, I find no significant decreases in turnout the year before parents have an infant. Using a triple-difference approach, I then show that universal vote-by-mail systems mitigate the negative association between infants and mothers’ turnout.
{"title":"Parents, Infants, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from the United States","authors":"Angela Cools","doi":"10.1561/100.00020072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020072","url":null,"abstract":"Despite evidence that infants affect families’ economic and social behaviors, little is known about how young children influence their parents’ political engagement. I show that U.S. women with an infant during an election year are 3.5 percentage points less likely to vote than women without children; men with an infant are 2.2 percentage points less likely to vote. Suggesting that this effect may be causal, I find no significant decreases in turnout the year before parents have an infant. Using a triple-difference approach, I then show that universal vote-by-mail systems mitigate the negative association between infants and mothers’ turnout.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46733657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Past research suggests that increasing citizen political knowledge and coordination can improve government performance via “bottom-up accountability,” where mobilized local communities exert pressure on elected officials through democratic processes. A randomized field experiment in Peru demonstrates that interventions to promote bottom-up accountability can sometimes have unintended effects on government performance, among other outcomes. I find that accountability workshops reduce participation in the district’s “participatory budgeting” process and increase support for civil unrest as a tool for sanctioning politicians. Although the intervention increases the initiation of recalls for poor-performing mayors, these mayors respond to the recall threat by further reducing their effort. Taken together the evidence suggests that improved information and coordination of local elites is not sufficient to improve government performance where it has previously lagged and can in fact be counterproductive. ∗Postdoctoral Fellow, Niehaus Center, Princeton University; email: rsexton@princeton.edu. The intervention was designed and implemented in collaboration with Innovations for Poverty Action (Lima) and the Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA), a member of the Propuesta Ciudadana network. I thank Maria Luisa Zeta, Gonzalo Manrique and Juan Manuel Hernandez-Agramonte of IPA for their research assistance, as well as Epifanio Baca and Gustavo Avila of Propuesta Ciudadana, and gratefully acknowledge financial support for this research from the Governance Initiative of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at MIT. Thanks for helpful comments from Matthew Bird, Graeme Blair, Darin Christensen, Mike Findley, Mike Gilligan, Kosuke Imai, Livio di Lonardo, Mai Nguyen, Tom Pepinsky, Cyrus Samii, Jake Shapiro, and seminar participants at APSA, PELA and Polmeth. This research comes under IPA IRB Protocol no. 13696.
过去的研究表明，增加公民的政治知识和协调可以通过“自下而上的问责制”改善政府绩效，即动员起来的地方社区通过民主程序向民选官员施加压力。秘鲁的一项随机实地试验表明，促进自下而上问责制的干预措施有时会对政府绩效产生意想不到的影响。我发现问责工作坊减少了对地区“参与式预算”程序的参与，并增加了对内乱作为制裁政客工具的支持。虽然干预增加了表现不佳的市长的召回启动，但这些市长通过进一步减少他们的努力来应对召回威胁。综上所述，证据表明，改善信息和地方精英的协调不足以改善政府绩效，而政府绩效此前一直落后，实际上可能适得其反。*普林斯顿大学Niehaus中心博士后研究员;电子邮件:rsexton@princeton.edu。该干预措施的设计和实施是与创新促进贫困行动(利马)和城市发展计划网络成员之一Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado中心(CIPCA)合作进行的。我感谢IPA的Maria Luisa Zeta、Gonzalo Manrique和Juan Manuel Hernandez-Agramonte的研究协助，以及Propuesta Ciudadana的Epifanio Baca和Gustavo Avila，并感谢麻省理工学院Abdul Latif Jameel贫困行动实验室的治理倡议为本研究提供的资金支持。感谢Matthew Bird、Graeme Blair、Darin Christensen、Mike Findley、Mike Gilligan、Kosuke Imai、Livio di ronardo、Mai Nguyen、Tom Pepinsky、Cyrus Samii、Jake Shapiro以及APSA、PELA和Polmeth研讨会参与者的宝贵意见。本研究遵循国际出版协会IRB协议。13696.
{"title":"The Unintended Effects of Bottom-Up Accountability: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Peru","authors":"Renard Sexton","doi":"10.1561/100.00020079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020079","url":null,"abstract":"Past research suggests that increasing citizen political knowledge and coordination can improve government performance via “bottom-up accountability,” where mobilized local communities exert pressure on elected officials through democratic processes. A randomized field experiment in Peru demonstrates that interventions to promote bottom-up accountability can sometimes have unintended effects on government performance, among other outcomes. I find that accountability workshops reduce participation in the district’s “participatory budgeting” process and increase support for civil unrest as a tool for sanctioning politicians. Although the intervention increases the initiation of recalls for poor-performing mayors, these mayors respond to the recall threat by further reducing their effort. Taken together the evidence suggests that improved information and coordination of local elites is not sufficient to improve government performance where it has previously lagged and can in fact be counterproductive. ∗Postdoctoral Fellow, Niehaus Center, Princeton University; email: rsexton@princeton.edu. The intervention was designed and implemented in collaboration with Innovations for Poverty Action (Lima) and the Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA), a member of the Propuesta Ciudadana network. I thank Maria Luisa Zeta, Gonzalo Manrique and Juan Manuel Hernandez-Agramonte of IPA for their research assistance, as well as Epifanio Baca and Gustavo Avila of Propuesta Ciudadana, and gratefully acknowledge financial support for this research from the Governance Initiative of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at MIT. Thanks for helpful comments from Matthew Bird, Graeme Blair, Darin Christensen, Mike Findley, Mike Gilligan, Kosuke Imai, Livio di Lonardo, Mai Nguyen, Tom Pepinsky, Cyrus Samii, Jake Shapiro, and seminar participants at APSA, PELA and Polmeth. This research comes under IPA IRB Protocol no. 13696.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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