{"title":"Local Labor Markets and Party Elite: Crafting Trade Policy in the United States House of Representatives","authors":"Adrienne Hosek, Lauren J. Peritz","doi":"10.1561/100.00020048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020048","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67073043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Past research suggests that increasing citizen political knowledge and coordination can improve government performance via “bottom-up accountability,” where mobilized local communities exert pressure on elected officials through democratic processes. A randomized field experiment in Peru demonstrates that interventions to promote bottom-up accountability can sometimes have unintended effects on government performance, among other outcomes. I find that accountability workshops reduce participation in the district’s “participatory budgeting” process and increase support for civil unrest as a tool for sanctioning politicians. Although the intervention increases the initiation of recalls for poor-performing mayors, these mayors respond to the recall threat by further reducing their effort. Taken together the evidence suggests that improved information and coordination of local elites is not sufficient to improve government performance where it has previously lagged and can in fact be counterproductive. ∗Postdoctoral Fellow, Niehaus Center, Princeton University; email: rsexton@princeton.edu. The intervention was designed and implemented in collaboration with Innovations for Poverty Action (Lima) and the Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA), a member of the Propuesta Ciudadana network. I thank Maria Luisa Zeta, Gonzalo Manrique and Juan Manuel Hernandez-Agramonte of IPA for their research assistance, as well as Epifanio Baca and Gustavo Avila of Propuesta Ciudadana, and gratefully acknowledge financial support for this research from the Governance Initiative of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at MIT. Thanks for helpful comments from Matthew Bird, Graeme Blair, Darin Christensen, Mike Findley, Mike Gilligan, Kosuke Imai, Livio di Lonardo, Mai Nguyen, Tom Pepinsky, Cyrus Samii, Jake Shapiro, and seminar participants at APSA, PELA and Polmeth. This research comes under IPA IRB Protocol no. 13696.
过去的研究表明，增加公民的政治知识和协调可以通过“自下而上的问责制”改善政府绩效，即动员起来的地方社区通过民主程序向民选官员施加压力。秘鲁的一项随机实地试验表明，促进自下而上问责制的干预措施有时会对政府绩效产生意想不到的影响。我发现问责工作坊减少了对地区“参与式预算”程序的参与，并增加了对内乱作为制裁政客工具的支持。虽然干预增加了表现不佳的市长的召回启动，但这些市长通过进一步减少他们的努力来应对召回威胁。综上所述，证据表明，改善信息和地方精英的协调不足以改善政府绩效，而政府绩效此前一直落后，实际上可能适得其反。*普林斯顿大学Niehaus中心博士后研究员;电子邮件:rsexton@princeton.edu。该干预措施的设计和实施是与创新促进贫困行动(利马)和城市发展计划网络成员之一Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado中心(CIPCA)合作进行的。我感谢IPA的Maria Luisa Zeta、Gonzalo Manrique和Juan Manuel Hernandez-Agramonte的研究协助，以及Propuesta Ciudadana的Epifanio Baca和Gustavo Avila，并感谢麻省理工学院Abdul Latif Jameel贫困行动实验室的治理倡议为本研究提供的资金支持。感谢Matthew Bird、Graeme Blair、Darin Christensen、Mike Findley、Mike Gilligan、Kosuke Imai、Livio di ronardo、Mai Nguyen、Tom Pepinsky、Cyrus Samii、Jake Shapiro以及APSA、PELA和Polmeth研讨会参与者的宝贵意见。本研究遵循国际出版协会IRB协议。13696.
{"title":"The Unintended Effects of Bottom-Up Accountability: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Peru","authors":"Renard Sexton","doi":"10.1561/100.00020079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020079","url":null,"abstract":"Past research suggests that increasing citizen political knowledge and coordination can improve government performance via “bottom-up accountability,” where mobilized local communities exert pressure on elected officials through democratic processes. A randomized field experiment in Peru demonstrates that interventions to promote bottom-up accountability can sometimes have unintended effects on government performance, among other outcomes. I find that accountability workshops reduce participation in the district’s “participatory budgeting” process and increase support for civil unrest as a tool for sanctioning politicians. Although the intervention increases the initiation of recalls for poor-performing mayors, these mayors respond to the recall threat by further reducing their effort. Taken together the evidence suggests that improved information and coordination of local elites is not sufficient to improve government performance where it has previously lagged and can in fact be counterproductive. ∗Postdoctoral Fellow, Niehaus Center, Princeton University; email: rsexton@princeton.edu. The intervention was designed and implemented in collaboration with Innovations for Poverty Action (Lima) and the Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA), a member of the Propuesta Ciudadana network. I thank Maria Luisa Zeta, Gonzalo Manrique and Juan Manuel Hernandez-Agramonte of IPA for their research assistance, as well as Epifanio Baca and Gustavo Avila of Propuesta Ciudadana, and gratefully acknowledge financial support for this research from the Governance Initiative of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at MIT. Thanks for helpful comments from Matthew Bird, Graeme Blair, Darin Christensen, Mike Findley, Mike Gilligan, Kosuke Imai, Livio di Lonardo, Mai Nguyen, Tom Pepinsky, Cyrus Samii, Jake Shapiro, and seminar participants at APSA, PELA and Polmeth. This research comes under IPA IRB Protocol no. 13696.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Prem, Andrés F. Rivera, Dario A. Romero, Juan F. Vargas
Peace agreements may inadvertently increase selective violence against civilians when they are incomplete in two key dimensions. First, only a fraction of the existing armed groups participates of the agreement. Second, the legitimate government fails to establish institutional presence in the areas previously controlled by those who do participate. Under these two conditions, the resulting vacuum of power may attract active armed groups who engage in selective civilian victimization to obtain control. Studying the recent Colombian experience, we find that the permanent ceasefire declared by the FARC insurgency in 2014 led to a surge in the targeting of community leaders in former FARC strongholds, perpetrated by armed groups excluded from the peace process, with the goal of consolidating their dominance in those areas. Critically, selective victimization is attenuated by some dimensions of state capacity and exacerbated in places which are more valuable as proxied by the existence of recent land conflicts.
{"title":"Selective Civilian Targeting: The Unintended Consequences of Partial Peace","authors":"M. Prem, Andrés F. Rivera, Dario A. Romero, Juan F. Vargas","doi":"10.31235/osf.io/st96r","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/st96r","url":null,"abstract":"Peace agreements may inadvertently increase selective violence against civilians when they are incomplete in two key dimensions. First, only a fraction of the existing armed groups participates of the agreement. Second, the legitimate government fails to establish institutional presence in the areas previously controlled by those who do participate. Under these two conditions, the resulting vacuum of power may attract active armed groups who engage in selective civilian victimization to obtain control. Studying the recent Colombian experience, we find that the permanent ceasefire declared by the FARC insurgency in 2014 led to a surge in the targeting of community leaders in former FARC strongholds, perpetrated by armed groups excluded from the peace process, with the goal of consolidating their dominance in those areas. Critically, selective victimization is attenuated by some dimensions of state capacity and exacerbated in places which are more valuable as proxied by the existence of recent land conflicts.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69652660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mehdi Shadmehr, Sepehr Shahshahani, Charles Cameron
{"title":"Coordination and Innovation in Judiciaries: Correct Law versus Consistent Law","authors":"Mehdi Shadmehr, Sepehr Shahshahani, Charles Cameron","doi":"10.1561/100.00019216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019216","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Rank Effect in Multimember District Elections","authors":"B. Song","doi":"10.1561/100.00021045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021045","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent research suggests that the penalty congressional candidates pay for ideological extremism declined abruptly in 1994, when the House majority became competitive for the first time in decades. We reexamine congressional accountability in light of this evidence, first evaluating the centrality of 1994 as a turning point and then allowing that voters may not weigh incumbents’ and challengers’ positions equally. Several findings emerge. Even when the penalty for extremism is constrained to be equal for challengers and incumbents, accountability does not abruptly decline in 1994 but instead decreases gradually from 1980 through recent elections. Furthermore, once incumbent and challenger ideology are examined separately, the results on incumbents do not match those for challengers. Depending on the specification and ideology measure, incumbent accountability may stay similar, decrease, or even increase over time. By comparison, the relationship between challenger ideology and vote share consistently declines across electoral cycles. These results suggest that analyses treating incumbents and challengers identically will be prone to find decreased congressional accountability, even when the evidence on incumbents does not merit such a conclusion. ∗We are grateful to seminar participants at Columbia, Princeton, and Stanford GSB for helpful feedback. In addition, we thank David Brady, Adam Bonica, Gabriel Borelli, John Cogan, Gary Cox, Bob Erikson, John Kastellec, Eric Manning, Adam Meirowitz, and Nolan McCarty for valuable comments and Gary Jacobson for graciously providing his data on challenger quality and congressional elections. †Brandice Canes-Wrone is Donald E. Stokes Professor of Public and International Affairs, and Professor of Politics, Princeton University. bcwrone@princeton.edu. Ph: 609-258-9047. ‡Michael Kistner is a joint Ph.D. candidate in Politics and Social Policy, Princeton University. mkistner@princeton.edu. Ph: 309-531-0494. An enduring question in political science is the extent to which the ideological positions of congressional incumbents and challengers affect electoral outcomes. Among theories that predict some level of policy accountability, various hypotheses exist regarding whether and how candidates’ positions matter. Most empirical analysis has lacked measures of challengers’ ideological positions and accordingly, analyzed the roll call or announced positions of incumbents (e.g. Erikson and Wright 1993; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Nyhan et al. 2012). This body of work offers considerable evidence that incumbent accountability exists, with those who are sufficiently “out of step” for their district faring worse at the voting booth. Recently, the development of candidate ideology estimates based on campaign contributors’ behavior has revolutionized the capacity to analyze the relationship between challengers’ ideological positions and electoral outcomes. The most widely used are the Bonica (2014) CFscores, which
最近的研究表明，国会候选人为意识形态极端主义付出的代价在1994年突然下降，当时众议院多数席位几十年来首次出现竞争。根据这些证据，我们重新审视了国会的问责制，首先评估了1994年作为转折点的中心地位，然后允许选民可能不会平等地权衡现任者和挑战者的立场。一些发现浮出水面。即使对极端主义的惩罚被限制为对挑战者和现任者一视同仁，问责制也没有在1994年突然下降，而是从1980年开始通过最近的选举逐渐减少。此外，如果将在任者和挑战者的意识形态分开考察，在任者的结果与挑战者的结果并不一致。根据规范和意识形态的度量，义务责任可能会随着时间的推移保持相似、减少甚至增加。相比之下，在整个选举周期中，挑战者意识形态与选票份额之间的关系一直在下降。这些结果表明，将现任者和挑战者等同对待的分析很容易发现国会问责减少，即使有关现任者的证据并不值得得出这样的结论。*我们感谢哥伦比亚大学、普林斯顿大学和斯坦福大学GSB的研讨会参与者提供的有益反馈。此外，我们感谢大卫·布雷迪、亚当·博尼卡、加布里埃尔·博雷利、约翰·科根、加里·考克斯、鲍勃·埃里克森、约翰·卡斯特莱克、埃里克·曼宁、亚当·梅洛维茨和诺兰·麦卡蒂的宝贵意见，感谢加里·雅各布森慷慨地提供了他关于挑战者质量和国会选举的数据。†布兰迪斯·坎尼斯-沃内，普林斯顿大学唐纳德·e·斯托克斯公共和国际事务教授、政治学教授。bcwrone@princeton.edu。Ph值:609-258-9047。‡Michael Kistner，普林斯顿大学政治与社会政策联合博士候选人。mkistner@princeton.edu。Ph值:309-531-0494。政治科学中一个经久不衰的问题是，国会现任议员和挑战者的意识形态立场在多大程度上影响选举结果。在预测一定程度的政策问责的理论中，存在着关于候选人的立场是否重要以及如何重要的各种假设。大多数实证分析缺乏对挑战者意识形态立场的衡量，因此，分析了现任者的点名或宣布的立场(如埃里克森和赖特1993;Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002;Nyhan et al. 2012)。这项工作提供了相当多的证据，证明在任者的责任是存在的，那些与他们所在地区完全“脱节”的人在投票站的表现更糟。最近，基于竞选捐款人行为的候选人意识形态估计的发展彻底改变了分析挑战者意识形态立场与选举结果之间关系的能力。最广泛使用的是Bonica(2014)的cfscore，它描述了候选人和贡献者的意识形态位置。虽然这不是对挑战者意识形态的第一次估计，但这些分数特别有吸引力，因为它们涵盖了30多年来绝大多数大选挑战者。相比之下，基于候选人调查的替代措施(Erikson and Wright 1989;Klinger, Hollingbaugh, and Ramey 2019)， Twitter关注者(barber， 2015)或专家调查(例如Joesten and Stone, 2014)在候选人和/或选举方面的范围要有限得多。利用cfscore的优势，许多著名的研究调查了候选人的问责是否随着时间的推移而发生了变化，并发现它已经急剧下降，甚至不再以一种显著的方式存在。例如，Bonica和Cox(2018)分析了国会。关于选举的文献使用“候选人问责制”一词，不仅指现任职位，也指挑战者职位(例如Bonica和Cox 2018)。我们认识到挑战者的职位可能是廉价的言论，特别是如果挑战者缺乏任何政治职位的经验。尽管如此，我们仍然遵循传统，使用“问责制”一词来指代这两种类型的候选人。
{"title":"Out of Step and Still in Congress? Electoral Consequences of Incumbent and Challenger Positioning Across Time","authors":"Brandice Canes-Wrone, Michael R. Kistner","doi":"10.1561/100.00019222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019222","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research suggests that the penalty congressional candidates pay for ideological extremism declined abruptly in 1994, when the House majority became competitive for the first time in decades. We reexamine congressional accountability in light of this evidence, first evaluating the centrality of 1994 as a turning point and then allowing that voters may not weigh incumbents’ and challengers’ positions equally. Several findings emerge. Even when the penalty for extremism is constrained to be equal for challengers and incumbents, accountability does not abruptly decline in 1994 but instead decreases gradually from 1980 through recent elections. Furthermore, once incumbent and challenger ideology are examined separately, the results on incumbents do not match those for challengers. Depending on the specification and ideology measure, incumbent accountability may stay similar, decrease, or even increase over time. By comparison, the relationship between challenger ideology and vote share consistently declines across electoral cycles. These results suggest that analyses treating incumbents and challengers identically will be prone to find decreased congressional accountability, even when the evidence on incumbents does not merit such a conclusion. ∗We are grateful to seminar participants at Columbia, Princeton, and Stanford GSB for helpful feedback. In addition, we thank David Brady, Adam Bonica, Gabriel Borelli, John Cogan, Gary Cox, Bob Erikson, John Kastellec, Eric Manning, Adam Meirowitz, and Nolan McCarty for valuable comments and Gary Jacobson for graciously providing his data on challenger quality and congressional elections. †Brandice Canes-Wrone is Donald E. Stokes Professor of Public and International Affairs, and Professor of Politics, Princeton University. bcwrone@princeton.edu. Ph: 609-258-9047. ‡Michael Kistner is a joint Ph.D. candidate in Politics and Social Policy, Princeton University. mkistner@princeton.edu. Ph: 309-531-0494. An enduring question in political science is the extent to which the ideological positions of congressional incumbents and challengers affect electoral outcomes. Among theories that predict some level of policy accountability, various hypotheses exist regarding whether and how candidates’ positions matter. Most empirical analysis has lacked measures of challengers’ ideological positions and accordingly, analyzed the roll call or announced positions of incumbents (e.g. Erikson and Wright 1993; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Nyhan et al. 2012). This body of work offers considerable evidence that incumbent accountability exists, with those who are sufficiently “out of step” for their district faring worse at the voting booth. Recently, the development of candidate ideology estimates based on campaign contributors’ behavior has revolutionized the capacity to analyze the relationship between challengers’ ideological positions and electoral outcomes. The most widely used are the Bonica (2014) CFscores, which","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Policing Ethnicity: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence on Discrimination, Cooperation, and Ethnic Balancing in the Liberian National Police","authors":"R. Blair, S. Karim, M. Gilligan, K. Beardsley","doi":"10.1561/100.00019226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019226","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Accountability and Inclusion in Customary Institutions: Evidence from a Village-Level Experiment in Zimbabwe","authors":"Kate Baldwin, Shylock Muyengwa, Eric Mvukiyehe","doi":"10.1561/100.00020110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020110","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic Civil War Aims and the Resource Curse","authors":"Jack Paine","doi":"10.1561/100.00020065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020065","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67073053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From the Editors in Chief: A Farewell Message","authors":"Scott Ashworth, Joshua D. Clinton","doi":"10.1561/100.00022126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00022126","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67073074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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