Pub Date : 2023-10-08DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2265849
Morgan Brigg, Mary Graham
{"title":"Approaching First Nations diplomacy from the Australian continent","authors":"Morgan Brigg, Mary Graham","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2265849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2265849","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135198796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2264238
Lai-Ha Chan, Pak K. Lee
ABSTRACTWhen the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) was resuscitated in November 2017, it was framed as a minilateral grouping of liberal democratic countries to build a free and open Indo-Pacific in the shadow of China’s growing assertiveness. However, this Quad 2.0 had not taken collective action until 2021. The four states neither held leaders’ summit meetings nor issued joint statements after lower-level meetings. They took no joint quadrilateral actions to deter China either. From a constructivist perspective, this paper addresses this puzzle by critically revisiting the alleged common identity of the four states. It argues that India’s national identity has not been built on the ontological difference between liberal democracy and autocracy but on a complex amalgamation of non-alignment, post-imperial ideology, Hindu nationalism and Indian exceptionalism. India, having held a vision of establishing an India–China partnership in Asia, did not regard China as its significant Other until the deadly border clashes between them in June 2020. China’s expansionism has challenged India’s identity as the pre-eminent power in South Asia and its vision of an equal China–India partnership. Despite India’s increased cooperation with its Quad partners since then, the Quad is built more on geopolitical pragmatism than on shared liberal norms and values.KEYWORDS: Indiathe Quadnational identitysignificant otherHindu nationalismChina AcknowledgementsThe authors are very grateful to Cecilia Ducci, Ian Hall, Bec Strating and Jasmine-Kim Westendorf for their incisive and helpful comments on early versions of this article. The paper was presented to the Australian Political Science Association 2022 annual conference and the Oceanic Conference on International Studies 2023 conference. We thank the participants in the two conferences for their questions and comments on the paper. Thanks also go to two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on the manuscript.The research conducted in this publication was supported by a grant from the Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) at the University of Technology Sydney, Australia. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the ACRI.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Quad 1.0 was initiated by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and supported by his Australian and Indian counterparts, John Howard and Manmohan Singh, respectively, and US Vice President Dick Cheney (Buchan and Rimland Citation2020). As discussed below, China has long held that the Quad is an Asian version of NATO, aimed to contain China.2 The standoff had lasted 73 days in June-August 2017. Both sides announced in late August 2017 that they pulled back their forces from the disputed territory (Gettleman and Hernández Citation2017).3 As said below, the first summit was not held until March 2021. See: https://www.dfa
{"title":"Quad 2.0 in flux, how possible? A study of India’s changing ‘significant other’","authors":"Lai-Ha Chan, Pak K. Lee","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2264238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2264238","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTWhen the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) was resuscitated in November 2017, it was framed as a minilateral grouping of liberal democratic countries to build a free and open Indo-Pacific in the shadow of China’s growing assertiveness. However, this Quad 2.0 had not taken collective action until 2021. The four states neither held leaders’ summit meetings nor issued joint statements after lower-level meetings. They took no joint quadrilateral actions to deter China either. From a constructivist perspective, this paper addresses this puzzle by critically revisiting the alleged common identity of the four states. It argues that India’s national identity has not been built on the ontological difference between liberal democracy and autocracy but on a complex amalgamation of non-alignment, post-imperial ideology, Hindu nationalism and Indian exceptionalism. India, having held a vision of establishing an India–China partnership in Asia, did not regard China as its significant Other until the deadly border clashes between them in June 2020. China’s expansionism has challenged India’s identity as the pre-eminent power in South Asia and its vision of an equal China–India partnership. Despite India’s increased cooperation with its Quad partners since then, the Quad is built more on geopolitical pragmatism than on shared liberal norms and values.KEYWORDS: Indiathe Quadnational identitysignificant otherHindu nationalismChina AcknowledgementsThe authors are very grateful to Cecilia Ducci, Ian Hall, Bec Strating and Jasmine-Kim Westendorf for their incisive and helpful comments on early versions of this article. The paper was presented to the Australian Political Science Association 2022 annual conference and the Oceanic Conference on International Studies 2023 conference. We thank the participants in the two conferences for their questions and comments on the paper. Thanks also go to two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on the manuscript.The research conducted in this publication was supported by a grant from the Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) at the University of Technology Sydney, Australia. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the ACRI.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Quad 1.0 was initiated by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and supported by his Australian and Indian counterparts, John Howard and Manmohan Singh, respectively, and US Vice President Dick Cheney (Buchan and Rimland Citation2020). As discussed below, China has long held that the Quad is an Asian version of NATO, aimed to contain China.2 The standoff had lasted 73 days in June-August 2017. Both sides announced in late August 2017 that they pulled back their forces from the disputed territory (Gettleman and Hernández Citation2017).3 As said below, the first summit was not held until March 2021. See: https://www.dfa","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135590818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-19DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2259353
Chenjun Wang
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size AcknowledgementsThe author would like to express her sincere thanks to Professor HwaJung Kim and Emeritus Professor Naren Chitty for their invaluable feedback on the draft.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsChenjun WangChenjun Wang is pursuing doctoral research on Australia’s domestic public diplomacy approach in communicating its foreign policies with migrant communities. She is currently a researcher at the Soft Power Analysis and Resource Centre (SPARC) at Macquarie University. She has worked as a research assistant for the Lowy Institute (2019), as well as been a visiting research fellow at the Australian Centre on China in the World, ANU (2023). As a PhD candidate, she has contributed chapters in The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power 2nd Edition (2023) and Soft Power and The Future of US Foreign Policy (2023).
{"title":"When political apology becomes a source of soft power: a case of South Korea and its Vietnam War experience","authors":"Chenjun Wang","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2259353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2259353","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size AcknowledgementsThe author would like to express her sincere thanks to Professor HwaJung Kim and Emeritus Professor Naren Chitty for their invaluable feedback on the draft.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsChenjun WangChenjun Wang is pursuing doctoral research on Australia’s domestic public diplomacy approach in communicating its foreign policies with migrant communities. She is currently a researcher at the Soft Power Analysis and Resource Centre (SPARC) at Macquarie University. She has worked as a research assistant for the Lowy Institute (2019), as well as been a visiting research fellow at the Australian Centre on China in the World, ANU (2023). As a PhD candidate, she has contributed chapters in The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power 2nd Edition (2023) and Soft Power and The Future of US Foreign Policy (2023).","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135061289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-04DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2251901
Hiroaki Mori
{"title":"Intermediary structure of paradiplomacy: examining sister-city links in Japan","authors":"Hiroaki Mori","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2251901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2251901","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44259756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-03DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2275113
Heather Smith, Bryce Wakefield
{"title":"Farewell to Allan Gyngell AO FAIIA","authors":"Heather Smith, Bryce Wakefield","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2275113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2275113","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"11 1","pages":"443 - 445"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139343064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-04DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2248915
Ausma Bernot, Marcus Smith
ABSTRACT In the global interconnected economy, China-made information-collecting technologies such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance cameras have become popular products for routine video-based surveillance. Hikvision and Dahua are the two largest global suppliers of CCTV cameras, with both companies supplying their products to over 200 countries. Despite their popularity, national security concerns are commonly cited when adopting these cameras, citing manufacturer links with the Communist Party of China (CPC), cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and sales recorded in the Xinjiang region, that has records of human rights violations. This paper is structured in three parts: first, we explore the predominance of China-made information-gathering technologies in Australia; second, we summarise common national security concerns usually associated with China-based technology manufacturers; and third, we propose regulatory measures to regulating China-made CCTV cameras in Australia. The paper suggests that while state and Federal decision-makers are free to remove Chinese CCTV surveillance cameras, they should avoid overt politisation. Overall, a stronger focus should be placed on evaluating cybersecurity risks of Internet of Things (IoT) information-collecting technologies and considering their timely and effective regulation from the perspective of individual and national interests.
{"title":"Understanding the risks of China-made CCTV surveillance cameras in Australia","authors":"Ausma Bernot, Marcus Smith","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2248915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2248915","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the global interconnected economy, China-made information-collecting technologies such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance cameras have become popular products for routine video-based surveillance. Hikvision and Dahua are the two largest global suppliers of CCTV cameras, with both companies supplying their products to over 200 countries. Despite their popularity, national security concerns are commonly cited when adopting these cameras, citing manufacturer links with the Communist Party of China (CPC), cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and sales recorded in the Xinjiang region, that has records of human rights violations. This paper is structured in three parts: first, we explore the predominance of China-made information-gathering technologies in Australia; second, we summarise common national security concerns usually associated with China-based technology manufacturers; and third, we propose regulatory measures to regulating China-made CCTV cameras in Australia. The paper suggests that while state and Federal decision-makers are free to remove Chinese CCTV surveillance cameras, they should avoid overt politisation. Overall, a stronger focus should be placed on evaluating cybersecurity risks of Internet of Things (IoT) information-collecting technologies and considering their timely and effective regulation from the perspective of individual and national interests.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"380 - 398"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45269828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-04DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2241835
R. Barber
ABSTRACT This commentary reflects on the 3-pillar strategy for the implementation of the R2P, put forward by the UN Secretary-General in 2009. It outlines three problems with the 3-pillar strategy. First, fear of pillar 3 undermines support for R2P in its entirety; second, the 3-pillar strategy puts the emphasis on what the international community can do to States if they fail, rather than what all States should do all the time; and third, the 3-pillar approach assumes for the most part that where atrocities are being committed, either the territorial State or non-State actors are to blame. This commentary describes an alternate framing, adopted in the R2P ‘Framework for Action’, produced by the Asia Pacific Centre and the Global Centre for R2P last month. That framework describes what States should do to better protect populations from atrocity crimes across four spheres of action: (1) domestic laws, policies and institutions; (2) bilateral cooperation and influencing; (3) regional cooperation and influencing; and (4) multilateral cooperation. The approach taken in the framework aims to shift perceptions about R2P from a responsibility that is owned and actioned (or not) by the international community at large, to a responsibility that is owned and actioned by individual States.
{"title":"Reflections on the three pillars of the responsibility to protect, and a possible alternative approach","authors":"R. Barber","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2241835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2241835","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This commentary reflects on the 3-pillar strategy for the implementation of the R2P, put forward by the UN Secretary-General in 2009. It outlines three problems with the 3-pillar strategy. First, fear of pillar 3 undermines support for R2P in its entirety; second, the 3-pillar strategy puts the emphasis on what the international community can do to States if they fail, rather than what all States should do all the time; and third, the 3-pillar approach assumes for the most part that where atrocities are being committed, either the territorial State or non-State actors are to blame. This commentary describes an alternate framing, adopted in the R2P ‘Framework for Action’, produced by the Asia Pacific Centre and the Global Centre for R2P last month. That framework describes what States should do to better protect populations from atrocity crimes across four spheres of action: (1) domestic laws, policies and institutions; (2) bilateral cooperation and influencing; (3) regional cooperation and influencing; and (4) multilateral cooperation. The approach taken in the framework aims to shift perceptions about R2P from a responsibility that is owned and actioned (or not) by the international community at large, to a responsibility that is owned and actioned by individual States.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"415 - 422"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44321023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-04DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2248900
H. Boon
ABSTRACT Since early 2023, China has sought to play a more active crisis resolution role in the Russia-Ukraine war, marking a shift in Chinese behaviour on the conflict. What explains China’s pursuit of this role, an agenda that has been described as a ‘fool’s errand,’ not least because of the seeming difficulties of real peace between Kyiv and Moscow without one side capitulating to the other? One interpretation is that China’s behaviour is part of a broader trend of ambitions to play a bigger role in addressing global hotspots and project itself as a responsible power. It parallels Beijing’s involvement in brokering the Saudi-Iran rapprochement as well as attempts to mediate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet, such ambitions are only part of the story. There are more contingent considerations behind the subtle but distinct change in Chinese positioning on the war. Far from being a ‘fool’s errand,’ Beijing’s peacemaker posturing is borne out of calculations taken to minimise risks to Chinese interests as a consequence of the war. Taking into account documentary sources and views from China, this article unpacks those calculations to provide a fuller explanation behind the shift in Chinese behaviour.
{"title":"Making sense of China’s crisis resolution role in Ukraine","authors":"H. Boon","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2248900","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2248900","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Since early 2023, China has sought to play a more active crisis resolution role in the Russia-Ukraine war, marking a shift in Chinese behaviour on the conflict. What explains China’s pursuit of this role, an agenda that has been described as a ‘fool’s errand,’ not least because of the seeming difficulties of real peace between Kyiv and Moscow without one side capitulating to the other? One interpretation is that China’s behaviour is part of a broader trend of ambitions to play a bigger role in addressing global hotspots and project itself as a responsible power. It parallels Beijing’s involvement in brokering the Saudi-Iran rapprochement as well as attempts to mediate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet, such ambitions are only part of the story. There are more contingent considerations behind the subtle but distinct change in Chinese positioning on the war. Far from being a ‘fool’s errand,’ Beijing’s peacemaker posturing is borne out of calculations taken to minimise risks to Chinese interests as a consequence of the war. Taking into account documentary sources and views from China, this article unpacks those calculations to provide a fuller explanation behind the shift in Chinese behaviour.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"423 - 429"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46494165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-04DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2241842
Luke Gosling
ABSTRACT One of the most successful defence pacts in history, Australia’s alliance with America is becoming ever more central to our strategic policy. This is a bipartisan trend that has been supported by previous governments, including in the Morrison government’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update, and is being implemented by the Albanese government, as confirmed in its 2023 Defence Strategic Review. At the same time, successive U.S. administrations have refocussed on the Indo-Pacific despite competing strategic priorities in other regions, including the Ukraine war. This has led to Australia and America pursuing a policy of deeper integration of their armed forces at the operational and strategic levels. This is most visible in northern Australia, whose value to Australian and allied defence planning is increasing for geopolitical reasons. Building on the Marine rotational force in Darwin announced in President Obama’s pivot to Asia, U.S. force posture initiatives are upgrading northern Australian defence infrastructure and deploying additional forces for exercises and contingency planning at a time when Australia is also investing in its northern bases. While cutting-edge capabilities such as SSN-AUKUS submarines will boost Australia’s strategic contribution to the alliance, its strength lies in the solid public support it enjoys.
{"title":"The future of the U.S. alliance","authors":"Luke Gosling","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2241842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2241842","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT One of the most successful defence pacts in history, Australia’s alliance with America is becoming ever more central to our strategic policy. This is a bipartisan trend that has been supported by previous governments, including in the Morrison government’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update, and is being implemented by the Albanese government, as confirmed in its 2023 Defence Strategic Review. At the same time, successive U.S. administrations have refocussed on the Indo-Pacific despite competing strategic priorities in other regions, including the Ukraine war. This has led to Australia and America pursuing a policy of deeper integration of their armed forces at the operational and strategic levels. This is most visible in northern Australia, whose value to Australian and allied defence planning is increasing for geopolitical reasons. Building on the Marine rotational force in Darwin announced in President Obama’s pivot to Asia, U.S. force posture initiatives are upgrading northern Australian defence infrastructure and deploying additional forces for exercises and contingency planning at a time when Australia is also investing in its northern bases. While cutting-edge capabilities such as SSN-AUKUS submarines will boost Australia’s strategic contribution to the alliance, its strength lies in the solid public support it enjoys.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"399 - 406"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44749246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-02DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2228709
I. Ardhani, R. Nandyatama, Rizky Alif Alvian
ABSTRACT This article examines how middle powers develop their strategies for influencing other members of international society. This research is important as the literature on middle powers assumes that they possess significant persuasive power, yet does not explain how such persuasive capabilities are developed. This research applies the legitimation strategies framework to the case of Indonesia’s promotion of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). It argues that Indonesia sought to convince ASEAN countries, China, and the United States of the value of its preferred vision of the Indo-Pacific by articulating multiple rhetorics that appealed to the pre-existing interests and beliefs of the target audience. Before the ASEAN audience, Indonesia claimed that its vision was compatible with the principles of non-interference and regional economic development. To influence the United States, Indonesia held that its regional vision would support a rule-based order. To convince China, Indonesia maintained that its vision would create an inclusive regional order. This article, therefore, shows that middle powers seek to develop their persuasive capabilities through enunciations that appeal to the beliefs and interests of multiple audiences simultaneously.
{"title":"Middle power legitimation strategies: the case of Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific","authors":"I. Ardhani, R. Nandyatama, Rizky Alif Alvian","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2228709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2228709","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines how middle powers develop their strategies for influencing other members of international society. This research is important as the literature on middle powers assumes that they possess significant persuasive power, yet does not explain how such persuasive capabilities are developed. This research applies the legitimation strategies framework to the case of Indonesia’s promotion of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). It argues that Indonesia sought to convince ASEAN countries, China, and the United States of the value of its preferred vision of the Indo-Pacific by articulating multiple rhetorics that appealed to the pre-existing interests and beliefs of the target audience. Before the ASEAN audience, Indonesia claimed that its vision was compatible with the principles of non-interference and regional economic development. To influence the United States, Indonesia held that its regional vision would support a rule-based order. To convince China, Indonesia maintained that its vision would create an inclusive regional order. This article, therefore, shows that middle powers seek to develop their persuasive capabilities through enunciations that appeal to the beliefs and interests of multiple audiences simultaneously.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"359 - 379"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43705029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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