Pub Date : 2022-07-30DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2107172
Farkhondeh Akbari, J. True
ABSTRACT One year on from the Taliban’s takeover, what has changed in Afghanistan? Why has re-instituting a gender apartheid regime been so central to the Taliban 2.0’s (Taliban 2.0 refers to the second version of the Taliban that came to power in August 2021. The first Taliban rule were from 1996 to 2001.) consolidation of power in Afghanistan since August 2021? We address these questions by explaining how gender has become a salient feature of multi-level power struggles in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. First, we examine the changes experienced by women and girls over the past year under the second Taliban regime. Second, we consider four types of power struggles—in international relations, in transnational politics, within the Taliban organisation, and between Afghan men and women—that constrain the realisation of women’s rights and security. Finally, we suggest politically necessary actions for Australian Government to support the women and girls of Afghanistan in line with its value-based foreign policy and multilateral commitments.
{"title":"One year on from the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan: re-instituting gender apartheid","authors":"Farkhondeh Akbari, J. True","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2107172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2107172","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT One year on from the Taliban’s takeover, what has changed in Afghanistan? Why has re-instituting a gender apartheid regime been so central to the Taliban 2.0’s (Taliban 2.0 refers to the second version of the Taliban that came to power in August 2021. The first Taliban rule were from 1996 to 2001.) consolidation of power in Afghanistan since August 2021? We address these questions by explaining how gender has become a salient feature of multi-level power struggles in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. First, we examine the changes experienced by women and girls over the past year under the second Taliban regime. Second, we consider four types of power struggles—in international relations, in transnational politics, within the Taliban organisation, and between Afghan men and women—that constrain the realisation of women’s rights and security. Finally, we suggest politically necessary actions for Australian Government to support the women and girls of Afghanistan in line with its value-based foreign policy and multilateral commitments.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"624 - 633"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47455489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-30DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2107173
R. MacNeil, G. Edwards
Abstract After nearly a decade of policy inaction by the Abbott/Turnbull/Morrison Coalition governments, the election of Anthony Albanese’s Labor government has ushered in expectations of a sea-change in Australian climate policy, one that might allow the country to finally emerge as a global leader on the issue. Yet while years of inaction have left some relatively easy victories for the new government to rack up, the change of leadership and rhetoric obscures some key continuities in the Albanese government’s approach that need to be foregrounded and critiqued by domestic and international audiences alike. In this brief commentary, we consider what the new Labor government might mean for Australian climate action over the coming years. We focus, in particular, on the role that fossil fuel exports will continue to play in overwhelming any emissions cuts achieved domestically, and underscore the need for a much broader and more ambitious national climate strategy designed to wean the country off its reliance on coal and gas revenues.
{"title":"The promise and peril of Australian climate leadership under Albanese","authors":"R. MacNeil, G. Edwards","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2107173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2107173","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract After nearly a decade of policy inaction by the Abbott/Turnbull/Morrison Coalition governments, the election of Anthony Albanese’s Labor government has ushered in expectations of a sea-change in Australian climate policy, one that might allow the country to finally emerge as a global leader on the issue. Yet while years of inaction have left some relatively easy victories for the new government to rack up, the change of leadership and rhetoric obscures some key continuities in the Albanese government’s approach that need to be foregrounded and critiqued by domestic and international audiences alike. In this brief commentary, we consider what the new Labor government might mean for Australian climate action over the coming years. We focus, in particular, on the role that fossil fuel exports will continue to play in overwhelming any emissions cuts achieved domestically, and underscore the need for a much broader and more ambitious national climate strategy designed to wean the country off its reliance on coal and gas revenues.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"19 - 25"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43044326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2095615
Sian Troath
ABSTRACT Robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) are amongst a plethora of new and emerging technologies states are seeking to develop and use to gain military advantage in an environment of intensifying strategic competition. Australia is a key player when it comes to autonomous systems, with trusted autonomous systems (TAS) being earmarked as a priority area. RAS have taken an increasingly prevalent place in Australian research, discourse, military thinking, and defence industry. How Australia thinks about these technologies reveals important insights into their broader defence and strategic outlook, including their understanding of how the character of warfare is changing, and their approach to alliances and partnerships. In this article, I will trace how TAS became a priority area for defence in Australia, and provide a stocktake of the key developments in RAS which have taken place since 2016. This will include key actors, funding, discourses, and technologies. Taking stock of RAS in Australia reveals several key themes which stand out: the centrality of the concept of control, trust, ethics, interoperability, keeping ahead of adversaries, reducing danger to defence personnel, and developing systems which are cheap, small, and single-use.
{"title":"The development of robotics and autonomous systems in Australia: key issues, actors, and discourses","authors":"Sian Troath","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2095615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2095615","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) are amongst a plethora of new and emerging technologies states are seeking to develop and use to gain military advantage in an environment of intensifying strategic competition. Australia is a key player when it comes to autonomous systems, with trusted autonomous systems (TAS) being earmarked as a priority area. RAS have taken an increasingly prevalent place in Australian research, discourse, military thinking, and defence industry. How Australia thinks about these technologies reveals important insights into their broader defence and strategic outlook, including their understanding of how the character of warfare is changing, and their approach to alliances and partnerships. In this article, I will trace how TAS became a priority area for defence in Australia, and provide a stocktake of the key developments in RAS which have taken place since 2016. This will include key actors, funding, discourses, and technologies. Taking stock of RAS in Australia reveals several key themes which stand out: the centrality of the concept of control, trust, ethics, interoperability, keeping ahead of adversaries, reducing danger to defence personnel, and developing systems which are cheap, small, and single-use.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"65 - 84"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46040777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-23DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2091514
Jae-ho Chung, H. Kim
ABSTRACT Relatively few systematic and categorical studies have been conducted on the variant responses by East Asian states to the rise of China, and even fewer dealt with reasons for such intra-regional variations. This study seeks to fill the void by examining the strategic responses by 15 East Asian states for the period of 2011–2016. This period merits close scrutiny because China became more explicitly assertive. The research proceeds in two phases. First, by way of reading into the expert assessments in academic journals, the strategic responses of the 15 states are categorised into balancing, hedging, or bandwagoning. Second, statistical analyses are conducted to see how the intra-regional variations are related to unit-level factors. Of the seven variables analyzed, three – geographical proximity, democracy, and identity – turn out to be crucial in determining the East Asian states’ strategic responses.
{"title":"East Asia’s strategic positioning toward China: identifying and accounting for intra-regional variations","authors":"Jae-ho Chung, H. Kim","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2091514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2091514","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Relatively few systematic and categorical studies have been conducted on the variant responses by East Asian states to the rise of China, and even fewer dealt with reasons for such intra-regional variations. This study seeks to fill the void by examining the strategic responses by 15 East Asian states for the period of 2011–2016. This period merits close scrutiny because China became more explicitly assertive. The research proceeds in two phases. First, by way of reading into the expert assessments in academic journals, the strategic responses of the 15 states are categorised into balancing, hedging, or bandwagoning. Second, statistical analyses are conducted to see how the intra-regional variations are related to unit-level factors. Of the seven variables analyzed, three – geographical proximity, democracy, and identity – turn out to be crucial in determining the East Asian states’ strategic responses.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"107 - 128"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42911263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-14DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2084179
Erika Feller AO, John Langmore AM
In flagrant violation of international law, Russia has invaded Ukraine. It invokes a right to intervene on humanitarian and security grounds despite the necessary pre-conditions, including UN Security Council endorsement, being absent. In Myanmar, the February 2021 military coup has ushered in a new era of serious repression of citizens, violent conflict and human rights violations. ASEAN’s 2021 five-point consensus to end the violence and promote conciliation has been largely ignored. These are but two of a number of current global threats which defy unilateral resolution and demand multilateral responses. Others are the looming disasters provoked by climate change; the ongoing Covid pandemic; conflict and the threat of conflict from Syria and Yemen to the South China Sea; the return of repressive Taliban rule in Afghanistan; ferocious civil war in Ethiopia; historically high refugee displacement; and mass migratory movements. At a time when ‘the only certainty is more uncertainty’, countries must unite to forge a new, more hopeful and equal path, UN Secretary-General António Guterres (SG) told the General Assembly on 21 January 2022. In laying out his priorities for 2022, he observed, “We face a five-alarm global fire that requires the full mobilisation of all countries”, – the raging COVID-19 pandemic, a morally bankrupt global financial system, the climate crisis, lawlessness in cyberspace, and diminished peace and security. He stressed that countries must go into emergency mode. Leadership to guide such adaptation to these complex challenges is found in an uncharacteristically hard-hitting report, Our Common Agenda, released in September 2021 by the SG and adopted by consensus in the UN General Assembly, on 16 November 2021. It rests on a belief in the absolute criticality, now, of improving the way countries cooperate to manage the world’s common resources (oceans, land masses and space) and public goods like global health and peaceful security to safeguard the planet and its resources for future generations. Our Common Agenda aims to spur a renewed multilateral system built on a ‘UN 2.0’ able to offer ‘system-wide solutions to 21st century challenges’. The Agenda contains recommendations which address a multiplicity of issues, from the high-profile like climate change and loss of biodiversity, peace and disarmament, to the more micro-issues like coordination to reduce international tax evasion. New pathways to reaching the sustainable development goals adopted by the UN are a
{"title":"Implications of the UN Common Agenda for Australia: Renewing Multilateralism","authors":"Erika Feller AO, John Langmore AM","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2084179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2084179","url":null,"abstract":"In flagrant violation of international law, Russia has invaded Ukraine. It invokes a right to intervene on humanitarian and security grounds despite the necessary pre-conditions, including UN Security Council endorsement, being absent. In Myanmar, the February 2021 military coup has ushered in a new era of serious repression of citizens, violent conflict and human rights violations. ASEAN’s 2021 five-point consensus to end the violence and promote conciliation has been largely ignored. These are but two of a number of current global threats which defy unilateral resolution and demand multilateral responses. Others are the looming disasters provoked by climate change; the ongoing Covid pandemic; conflict and the threat of conflict from Syria and Yemen to the South China Sea; the return of repressive Taliban rule in Afghanistan; ferocious civil war in Ethiopia; historically high refugee displacement; and mass migratory movements. At a time when ‘the only certainty is more uncertainty’, countries must unite to forge a new, more hopeful and equal path, UN Secretary-General António Guterres (SG) told the General Assembly on 21 January 2022. In laying out his priorities for 2022, he observed, “We face a five-alarm global fire that requires the full mobilisation of all countries”, – the raging COVID-19 pandemic, a morally bankrupt global financial system, the climate crisis, lawlessness in cyberspace, and diminished peace and security. He stressed that countries must go into emergency mode. Leadership to guide such adaptation to these complex challenges is found in an uncharacteristically hard-hitting report, Our Common Agenda, released in September 2021 by the SG and adopted by consensus in the UN General Assembly, on 16 November 2021. It rests on a belief in the absolute criticality, now, of improving the way countries cooperate to manage the world’s common resources (oceans, land masses and space) and public goods like global health and peaceful security to safeguard the planet and its resources for future generations. Our Common Agenda aims to spur a renewed multilateral system built on a ‘UN 2.0’ able to offer ‘system-wide solutions to 21st century challenges’. The Agenda contains recommendations which address a multiplicity of issues, from the high-profile like climate change and loss of biodiversity, peace and disarmament, to the more micro-issues like coordination to reduce international tax evasion. New pathways to reaching the sustainable development goals adopted by the UN are a","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"1 - 10"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42887888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-10DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2085242
Xiangning Wu, J. C. Velasco
ABSTRACT When great powers such as the United States and China grow especially hawkish with more uncertainties, how does a smaller state react to such a complex and dangerous territorial conflict? Given the competing frames of influence between China and the United States, what are the underlying reasons for the shift in the Philippines’ foreign policy? This paper focuses on the Philippines’ changing foreign policy on the South China Sea dispute and examines the main rationale for its shift in strategy towards China. We use the perspective of neoclassical realism to unpack the constraining factors that underlie the Philippines’ domestic politics and ongoing global exigencies. With changes in its domestic politics and the security challenges posed by the evolving geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region, the Philippines is in a difficult situation, having to choose between a territorially hostile trading partner and its historical security guarantor.
{"title":"Examining the Philippines’ China policy: great powers and domestic politics","authors":"Xiangning Wu, J. C. Velasco","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2085242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2085242","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT When great powers such as the United States and China grow especially hawkish with more uncertainties, how does a smaller state react to such a complex and dangerous territorial conflict? Given the competing frames of influence between China and the United States, what are the underlying reasons for the shift in the Philippines’ foreign policy? This paper focuses on the Philippines’ changing foreign policy on the South China Sea dispute and examines the main rationale for its shift in strategy towards China. We use the perspective of neoclassical realism to unpack the constraining factors that underlie the Philippines’ domestic politics and ongoing global exigencies. With changes in its domestic politics and the security challenges posed by the evolving geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region, the Philippines is in a difficult situation, having to choose between a territorially hostile trading partner and its historical security guarantor.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"672 - 693"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43840364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-07DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2085243
Jon Fraenkel, Graeme Smith
ABSTRACT A security deal struck between the Solomon Islands and China in April 2022 has been depicted as the precursor to the establishment of a Chinese naval base in the Pacific. Fed by the proximity of an Australian federal election, these fears have stimulated lurid images in the Australian press of Beijing's aircraft carriers being stationed off Brisbane's coast creating a Pacific version of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In this paper, we examine the provisions of the ‘framework agreement’, explore its rationale and consider the likelihood that the predicted naval base eventuates. We also investigate Chinese extraterritoriality on the global stage and Chinese commercial activity in the Solomons since the switch in diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 2019. We argue that Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare signed the deal primarily in response to domestic pressures, in particular the danger of a repeat of major riots that took place in the capital in November 2021. The most pressing risk is not Chinese warships or nuclear missiles stationed in Honiara, but repression to handle urban unrest without the restraint required of Australian, Papua New Guinean, Fijian or New Zealand police officers.
{"title":"The Solomons-China 2022 security deal: extraterritoriality and the perils of militarisation in the Pacific Islands","authors":"Jon Fraenkel, Graeme Smith","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2085243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2085243","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A security deal struck between the Solomon Islands and China in April 2022 has been depicted as the precursor to the establishment of a Chinese naval base in the Pacific. Fed by the proximity of an Australian federal election, these fears have stimulated lurid images in the Australian press of Beijing's aircraft carriers being stationed off Brisbane's coast creating a Pacific version of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In this paper, we examine the provisions of the ‘framework agreement’, explore its rationale and consider the likelihood that the predicted naval base eventuates. We also investigate Chinese extraterritoriality on the global stage and Chinese commercial activity in the Solomons since the switch in diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 2019. We argue that Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare signed the deal primarily in response to domestic pressures, in particular the danger of a repeat of major riots that took place in the capital in November 2021. The most pressing risk is not Chinese warships or nuclear missiles stationed in Honiara, but repression to handle urban unrest without the restraint required of Australian, Papua New Guinean, Fijian or New Zealand police officers.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"473 - 485"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43385369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-06DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2084708
Veysel Tekdal
ABSTRACT It is widely agreed that recent decades have witnessed a power shift towards the emerging economies. Yet the magnitude of the power shift and its implications for the global economic order are much contested. For some, the diffusion of power has been changing the power relations between the global North and global South as well as within the global South. For others, the emerging economies do not pose a significant challenge to the global North’s dominance in the global political economy as the latter continues to hold structural power advantages in technology, finance, and institutional capacity. This paper contributes to this debate by analysing the changing power relations in the field of development cooperation. As shown by recent work, Chinese development finance, combining a massive scale, global reach, and distinctive modalities, has reshaped the global landscape of development finance. This paper offers an interpretation of this transformation with a focus on power relations. It argues that Chinese development finance has not only decreased the ability of Western development finance institutions to influence policy agendas and preferences in the developing world, but also eroded the latter’s power to shape the governance, norms, and modalities of development cooperation.
{"title":"Taking the power shift seriously: China and the transformation of power relations in development cooperation","authors":"Veysel Tekdal","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2084708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2084708","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It is widely agreed that recent decades have witnessed a power shift towards the emerging economies. Yet the magnitude of the power shift and its implications for the global economic order are much contested. For some, the diffusion of power has been changing the power relations between the global North and global South as well as within the global South. For others, the emerging economies do not pose a significant challenge to the global North’s dominance in the global political economy as the latter continues to hold structural power advantages in technology, finance, and institutional capacity. This paper contributes to this debate by analysing the changing power relations in the field of development cooperation. As shown by recent work, Chinese development finance, combining a massive scale, global reach, and distinctive modalities, has reshaped the global landscape of development finance. This paper offers an interpretation of this transformation with a focus on power relations. It argues that Chinese development finance has not only decreased the ability of Western development finance institutions to influence policy agendas and preferences in the developing world, but also eroded the latter’s power to shape the governance, norms, and modalities of development cooperation.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"596 - 616"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47827799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-18DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2077302
N. Tung
ABSTRACT This paper investigates the COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy of the United States and China in Vietnam and conceptualises Hanoi’s practical responses. The deployment of vaccine diplomacy is closely associated with US-China strategic rivalry and is thus labelled as proxy competition in this paper. This paper found that both Washington and Beijing leveraged vaccine diplomacy to achieve general strategic objectives and specific foreign policy objectives in relations with Vietnam. For the USA, vaccine donation consolidated Hanoi’s strategic trust in Washington during tough times. Meanwhile, despite widespread mistrust and suspicion regarding the quality and efficacy of Chinese-made vaccines amongst Vietnamese people, China’s vaccine donation to Vietnam could still prevent Hanoi from further spiraling into the US-led anti-China coalition. Nevertheless, Vietnam has constantly been at a crossroads, for it not only strives to respond reasonably to the USA and China at the international level but also has to accommodate the Vietnamese public’s policy preferences at the domestic level.
{"title":"US-China COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy competition in Vietnam: where vaccines go, influence may follow","authors":"N. Tung","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2077302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2077302","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper investigates the COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy of the United States and China in Vietnam and conceptualises Hanoi’s practical responses. The deployment of vaccine diplomacy is closely associated with US-China strategic rivalry and is thus labelled as proxy competition in this paper. This paper found that both Washington and Beijing leveraged vaccine diplomacy to achieve general strategic objectives and specific foreign policy objectives in relations with Vietnam. For the USA, vaccine donation consolidated Hanoi’s strategic trust in Washington during tough times. Meanwhile, despite widespread mistrust and suspicion regarding the quality and efficacy of Chinese-made vaccines amongst Vietnamese people, China’s vaccine donation to Vietnam could still prevent Hanoi from further spiraling into the US-led anti-China coalition. Nevertheless, Vietnam has constantly been at a crossroads, for it not only strives to respond reasonably to the USA and China at the international level but also has to accommodate the Vietnamese public’s policy preferences at the domestic level.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"653 - 671"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46494510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-18DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2076805
Murat Güneylioğlu
ABSTRACT This article examines how the rise of geoeconomics vis-à-vis geopolitics has influenced the Turkish-Chinese rapprochement. It focuses on the impacts of the rise of geoeconomics on the long-term military alliances established in the Cold War and the strategic autonomy of smaller states that were once primarily dependent on their great power allies for their economic and regime security. Besides, it deals with the case-specific factors pushing Turkey towards China such as the rising authoritarian tendencies in Turkey and Ankara's disagreements on regional security issues with its traditional Western allies. Those factors have had negative repercussions on Turkey's economy, while the government has been facing a strong domestic imperative to continue infrastructure and construction projects which had contributed to the rapid economic growth in the 2000s. This situation has facilitated China's geoeconomic power projections seeking to create asymmetrical interdependence with Turkey and to influence Ankara's significant political and economic decisions. This article also underlines the limits of Turkish-Chinese rapprochement like Turkey's long-standing interdependence with the West and the relatively small role played by China in the Turkish economy. It concludes that Sino-Turkish ‘geoeconomic rapprochement' would neither ensure Turkey’s economic recovery nor increase its strategic autonomy unless Turkish-Western relations are ameliorated.
{"title":"The Turkey-China rapprochement in the context of the BRI: a geoeconomic perspective","authors":"Murat Güneylioğlu","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2076805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2076805","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines how the rise of geoeconomics vis-à-vis geopolitics has influenced the Turkish-Chinese rapprochement. It focuses on the impacts of the rise of geoeconomics on the long-term military alliances established in the Cold War and the strategic autonomy of smaller states that were once primarily dependent on their great power allies for their economic and regime security. Besides, it deals with the case-specific factors pushing Turkey towards China such as the rising authoritarian tendencies in Turkey and Ankara's disagreements on regional security issues with its traditional Western allies. Those factors have had negative repercussions on Turkey's economy, while the government has been facing a strong domestic imperative to continue infrastructure and construction projects which had contributed to the rapid economic growth in the 2000s. This situation has facilitated China's geoeconomic power projections seeking to create asymmetrical interdependence with Turkey and to influence Ankara's significant political and economic decisions. This article also underlines the limits of Turkish-Chinese rapprochement like Turkey's long-standing interdependence with the West and the relatively small role played by China in the Turkish economy. It concludes that Sino-Turkish ‘geoeconomic rapprochement' would neither ensure Turkey’s economic recovery nor increase its strategic autonomy unless Turkish-Western relations are ameliorated.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"546 - 574"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43334236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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