Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2179016
Jeffrey Robertson
ABSTRACT During the South Korean president’s state visit to Australia in December 2021, the Australian Government and in turn the Australian media sustained a narrative that the two countries held ‘common strategic interests’. Over the past ten years, the notion of common strategic interests became a ‘naturalized narrative’ in Australia – a narrative, which through entrenched repetition becomes both natural and inevitable to such an extent that counter-narratives are seen as counterintuitive and open to ridicule. This study investigates the common strategic interests narrative. It first explores the bilateral relationship and the narrative gap that occurred during the president’s visit. It then turns to the use of language and narrative in bilateral relationships. It looks at how the constituent components supporting the common strategic interests narrative are contextualized and how this impacts the political action of Australia and Korea. The study finds that the common strategic interests narrative does not cross the linguistic-cultural divide in the Australia-Korea bilateral relationship. The article concludes with policy recommendations. Australia needs to pay more attention to building policy relevance and education links in South Korea.
{"title":"Australia, Korea and the entangled language of common strategic interests","authors":"Jeffrey Robertson","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2179016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2179016","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT During the South Korean president’s state visit to Australia in December 2021, the Australian Government and in turn the Australian media sustained a narrative that the two countries held ‘common strategic interests’. Over the past ten years, the notion of common strategic interests became a ‘naturalized narrative’ in Australia – a narrative, which through entrenched repetition becomes both natural and inevitable to such an extent that counter-narratives are seen as counterintuitive and open to ridicule. This study investigates the common strategic interests narrative. It first explores the bilateral relationship and the narrative gap that occurred during the president’s visit. It then turns to the use of language and narrative in bilateral relationships. It looks at how the constituent components supporting the common strategic interests narrative are contextualized and how this impacts the political action of Australia and Korea. The study finds that the common strategic interests narrative does not cross the linguistic-cultural divide in the Australia-Korea bilateral relationship. The article concludes with policy recommendations. Australia needs to pay more attention to building policy relevance and education links in South Korea.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"188 - 212"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49324816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2095614
M. Davies, C. Hobson
ABSTRACT The COVID-19 pandemic poses fundamental challenges to the ways that the discipline of International Relations makes sense of our world. Framing the pandemic as both a social disaster and as part of an ongoing polycrisis, this work argues that existing responses to COVID-19 are, whatever their insights, partial and limited, predicated on assumptions about how we know the world now shown to be problematic. This situation calls less for some defined incremental change and more for a period of uncomfortable disciplinary reflection on the boundaries, purposes and value structures that shape IR.
{"title":"An embarrassment of changes: International Relations and the COVID-19 pandemic","authors":"M. Davies, C. Hobson","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2095614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2095614","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The COVID-19 pandemic poses fundamental challenges to the ways that the discipline of International Relations makes sense of our world. Framing the pandemic as both a social disaster and as part of an ongoing polycrisis, this work argues that existing responses to COVID-19 are, whatever their insights, partial and limited, predicated on assumptions about how we know the world now shown to be problematic. This situation calls less for some defined incremental change and more for a period of uncomfortable disciplinary reflection on the boundaries, purposes and value structures that shape IR.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"150 - 168"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45954915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2177253
R. Ayson
ABSTRACT Amidst concerns that Australia may end up in a military confrontation with China, this article evaluates New Zealand’s formal and informal alliance obligations in such an event. In keeping with Wellington’s current declaratory policy, New Zealand’s obligations would be most pressing if the attack occurred on or near Australia, although these would be less clear if China favoured coercion over violence. New Zealand is also likely to have strong alliance obligations if Australian forces were attacked in the South Pacific, the leading area for Australia-New Zealand security cooperation. If Australian forces were attacked in East Asia, New Zealand may have some obligations under the trilateral ANZUS Treaty despite the suspension of Washington’s commitments to Wellington under the same agreement. While New Zealand’s military capacity to assist Australia in maritime East Asia is limited, this is where a serious clash involving Australian and Chinese forces seems most likely. Enlarging the geographical focus of the trans-Tasman alliance may be logical in this new setting, but it could also be hazardous.
{"title":"New Zealand’s alliance obligations in a China-Australia war","authors":"R. Ayson","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2177253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2177253","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 Amidst concerns that Australia may end up in a military confrontation with China, this article evaluates New Zealand’s formal and informal alliance obligations in such an event. In keeping with Wellington’s current declaratory policy, New Zealand’s obligations would be most pressing if the attack occurred on or near Australia, although these would be less clear if China favoured coercion over violence. New Zealand is also likely to have strong alliance obligations if Australian forces were attacked in the South Pacific, the leading area for Australia-New Zealand security cooperation. If Australian forces were attacked in East Asia, New Zealand may have some obligations under the trilateral ANZUS Treaty despite the suspension of Washington’s commitments to Wellington under the same agreement. While New Zealand’s military capacity to assist Australia in maritime East Asia is limited, this is where a serious clash involving Australian and Chinese forces seems most likely. Enlarging the geographical focus of the trans-Tasman alliance may be logical in this new setting, but it could also be hazardous.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"233 - 257"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49503687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-31DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2172136
Thomazena Dixon
ABSTRACT Bioinformational diplomacy is a field of practice that emerges from the politics of biological information exchange during global public health emergencies. Cyberbiosecurity is a field of practice that emerges from the need to secure material at the interface of the digital and biological worlds from misuse and exploitation. Bioinformational diplomacy arises from the intersection of biologically-derived information becoming acutely valuable to national security actors, and the secrecy with which some valuable bioinformation is handled during global public health emergencies. This article analyses bioinformational diplomacy in relation to cyberbiosecurity and shows that both fields of practice are anchored by the concept of bioinformational secrecy. This paper explores the cooperative exchange and competitive exfiltration of bioinformation using the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study. During the COVID-19 pandemic, states sought to protect and covertly acquire certain types of bioinformation. This highlighted a potentially destabilising security dilemma that requires ongoing management via the practice of bioinformational diplomacy.
{"title":"The bioinformational dilemma: where bioinformational diplomacy meets cyberbiosecurity","authors":"Thomazena Dixon","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2172136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2172136","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 Bioinformational diplomacy is a field of practice that emerges from the politics of biological information exchange during global public health emergencies. Cyberbiosecurity is a field of practice that emerges from the need to secure material at the interface of the digital and biological worlds from misuse and exploitation. Bioinformational diplomacy arises from the intersection of biologically-derived information becoming acutely valuable to national security actors, and the secrecy with which some valuable bioinformation is handled during global public health emergencies. This article analyses bioinformational diplomacy in relation to cyberbiosecurity and shows that both fields of practice are anchored by the concept of bioinformational secrecy. This paper explores the cooperative exchange and competitive exfiltration of bioinformation using the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study. During the COVID-19 pandemic, states sought to protect and covertly acquire certain types of bioinformation. This highlighted a potentially destabilising security dilemma that requires ongoing management via the practice of bioinformational diplomacy.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"169 - 187"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48375183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2163977
B. O'connor, Lloyd Cox, Danny Cooper
ABSTRACT The AUKUS agreement to facilitate Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines has been described by its critics as a ‘bet' on the U.S. This bet entails serious risks for Australia. These risks include uncertainty around construction of the submarines; uncertainty around the U.S.'s long-term commitment to the region; and uncertainty about the future political trajectory of the U.S. These risks are compounded by the sovereignty-constraining implications of AUKUS. The reliance on U.S. technical expertise, and the demands of military interoperability, will bind Australian defence policy more closely to the U.S. than ever. Hence, AUKUS is a deal that demands close scrutiny. This article contributes to such scrutiny, exploring the risks associated with this bet on the U.S. In particular, it examines the ‘America’ that Australian governments expressly want – a liberal internationalist America with a strong commitment to democracy – and then contrasts this with the America that Australia does not want but may well get: an illiberal America that is increasingly anti-democratic at home and crudely transactional, protectionist and undiplomatic abroad. The obvious problem with this approach, we argue, is that Australia does not get to choose the presidential administration in the U.S. over the next twenty to forty years.
{"title":"Australia's AUKUS ‘bet’ on the United States: nuclear-powered submarines and the future of American democracy","authors":"B. O'connor, Lloyd Cox, Danny Cooper","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2163977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2163977","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The AUKUS agreement to facilitate Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines has been described by its critics as a ‘bet' on the U.S. This bet entails serious risks for Australia. These risks include uncertainty around construction of the submarines; uncertainty around the U.S.'s long-term commitment to the region; and uncertainty about the future political trajectory of the U.S. These risks are compounded by the sovereignty-constraining implications of AUKUS. The reliance on U.S. technical expertise, and the demands of military interoperability, will bind Australian defence policy more closely to the U.S. than ever. Hence, AUKUS is a deal that demands close scrutiny. This article contributes to such scrutiny, exploring the risks associated with this bet on the U.S. In particular, it examines the ‘America’ that Australian governments expressly want – a liberal internationalist America with a strong commitment to democracy – and then contrasts this with the America that Australia does not want but may well get: an illiberal America that is increasingly anti-democratic at home and crudely transactional, protectionist and undiplomatic abroad. The obvious problem with this approach, we argue, is that Australia does not get to choose the presidential administration in the U.S. over the next twenty to forty years.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"45 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45022484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2170978
T. Ide
ABSTRACT Climate change can undermine human, national and planetary security in various ways. While scholars harve explored the human security implications of climate change and climate security discourses in Australia, systematic scientific assessments of climate change and national security are scarce. I address this knowledge gap by analysing whether climate change impacts the national security of Australia before 2050, focussing particularly on climate-related threats within Australia and on countries of high strategic importance for Australia. The results indicate that climate change will very likely undermine Australia’s national security by disrupting critical infrastructure, by challenging the capacity of the defence force, by increasing the risk of domestic political instability in Australia’s immediate region, by reducing the capabilities of partner countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and by interrupting important supply chains. These impacts will matter most if several large-scale disasters co-occur or if Australia becomes involved in a major international conflict. By contrast, international wars, large-scale migration, and adverse impacts on key international partners are only minor climate-related risks.
{"title":"Climate change and Australia’s national security","authors":"T. Ide","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2170978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2170978","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Climate change can undermine human, national and planetary security in various ways. While scholars harve explored the human security implications of climate change and climate security discourses in Australia, systematic scientific assessments of climate change and national security are scarce. I address this knowledge gap by analysing whether climate change impacts the national security of Australia before 2050, focussing particularly on climate-related threats within Australia and on countries of high strategic importance for Australia. The results indicate that climate change will very likely undermine Australia’s national security by disrupting critical infrastructure, by challenging the capacity of the defence force, by increasing the risk of domestic political instability in Australia’s immediate region, by reducing the capabilities of partner countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and by interrupting important supply chains. These impacts will matter most if several large-scale disasters co-occur or if Australia becomes involved in a major international conflict. By contrast, international wars, large-scale migration, and adverse impacts on key international partners are only minor climate-related risks.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"26 - 44"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48055311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-13DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2152427
Rodney Tiffen
ABSTRACT Australia’s efforts to pursue public diplomacy through a government-funded international television service have been sporadic and ineffectual. The reasons for failure lie in the way such efforts have been pawns in other political conflicts and relationships – conflicts between Coalition governments and the ABC; conflicts between Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard that dominated the Labor government from 2010 onwards; and the wish of key players in both major parties to please Rupert Murdoch and News Corp. The Abbott Government’s 2014 axing of the ten-year contract with Australian Television slashed Australia’s international broadcasting capacity. Domestic agendas have repeatedly trumped what should be a tool of international policy.
{"title":"Transmission interrupted: Australia’s international television broadcasting","authors":"Rodney Tiffen","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2152427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2152427","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Australia’s efforts to pursue public diplomacy through a government-funded international television service have been sporadic and ineffectual. The reasons for failure lie in the way such efforts have been pawns in other political conflicts and relationships – conflicts between Coalition governments and the ABC; conflicts between Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard that dominated the Labor government from 2010 onwards; and the wish of key players in both major parties to please Rupert Murdoch and News Corp. The Abbott Government’s 2014 axing of the ten-year contract with Australian Television slashed Australia’s international broadcasting capacity. Domestic agendas have repeatedly trumped what should be a tool of international policy.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"85 - 106"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45260152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-11DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2112145
Denghua Zhang
ABSTRACT Traditional powers have growing concerns about China’s influence in the Global South derived from its fast-growing outreach in the past two decades. However, how stakeholders in developing countries perceive China’s engagement and influence remains largely unknown. Drawing upon a survey of 210 participants and 30 follow-up interviews in the Pacific region with a focus on Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga, this paper examines Pacific civil society stakeholders’ perceptions about China. It suggests that these perceptions are nuanced at best and reveals concerns about the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese foreign aid and China-Pacific relations. It argues that China’s influence on Pacific civil society is weak, but this may be different in the political, government and business sectors. More similar research is required to develop a comprehensive understanding.
{"title":"China’s influence and local perceptions: the case of Pacific island countries","authors":"Denghua Zhang","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2112145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2112145","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Traditional powers have growing concerns about China’s influence in the Global South derived from its fast-growing outreach in the past two decades. However, how stakeholders in developing countries perceive China’s engagement and influence remains largely unknown. Drawing upon a survey of 210 participants and 30 follow-up interviews in the Pacific region with a focus on Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga, this paper examines Pacific civil society stakeholders’ perceptions about China. It suggests that these perceptions are nuanced at best and reveals concerns about the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese foreign aid and China-Pacific relations. It argues that China’s influence on Pacific civil society is weak, but this may be different in the political, government and business sectors. More similar research is required to develop a comprehensive understanding.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"575 - 595"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42661970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-02DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2107171
R. D. de Castro
ABSTRACT This article examines how the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) between the U.S. and the Philippines became the cornerstone of the two countries’ alliance. When the American forces withdrew from their bases in 1992 after the Philippine Senate (by a vote of 12 to 11) rejected the extension of the bases’ stay, the MDT has since served as the fallback basis of the Philippine-U.S. security relationship. However, the MDT does not spell out the details of the U.S. commitment to the Philippine defense. The MDT has been the bone of contention during the first and second decades of the new millennium, especially when China started asserting its expansive claims over much of the South China Sea. Eventually, the two allies made the necessary adjustments to transform the MDT from a mere consultative agreement to the sole bedrock of security relations. In conclusion, the article argues that the Philippines and the U.S. were able to maximize the effectiveness and relevance of their alliance by applying the Goldilocks principle—neither too cold, neither too hot—with the U.S. concretizing its security commitments to the Philippines and the two parties committing themselves together in addressing China’s maritime expansionism cautiously, reliably, and responsibly.
{"title":"Exploring the factors behind the persistence of the Philippine-U.S. alliance: a focus on the changing gist of the 1951 Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT)","authors":"R. D. de Castro","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2107171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2107171","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines how the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) between the U.S. and the Philippines became the cornerstone of the two countries’ alliance. When the American forces withdrew from their bases in 1992 after the Philippine Senate (by a vote of 12 to 11) rejected the extension of the bases’ stay, the MDT has since served as the fallback basis of the Philippine-U.S. security relationship. However, the MDT does not spell out the details of the U.S. commitment to the Philippine defense. The MDT has been the bone of contention during the first and second decades of the new millennium, especially when China started asserting its expansive claims over much of the South China Sea. Eventually, the two allies made the necessary adjustments to transform the MDT from a mere consultative agreement to the sole bedrock of security relations. In conclusion, the article argues that the Philippines and the U.S. were able to maximize the effectiveness and relevance of their alliance by applying the Goldilocks principle—neither too cold, neither too hot—with the U.S. concretizing its security commitments to the Philippines and the two parties committing themselves together in addressing China’s maritime expansionism cautiously, reliably, and responsibly.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"694 - 711"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42829632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-02DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2022.2107170
N. McDonagh
ABSTRACT There is growing debate over whether China’s economic model can be managed within the rules of the multilateral trade system, a debate with major implications for international order. Critics argue that the China model is a systemic rival to the liberal trade order, a view that implies future decoupling. For those who reject the rivalry view, the default position is to propose more trade agreements with China, with the goal of driving liberal reforms in the country. This article engages the debate by contributing a conceptually informed and empirically supported analysis of China’s institutional development. Combining ‘second image’ insights with a comparative capitalism framework helps explain why nations evolve distinct varieties of market economy, which then shape their multilateral preferences. Applying these insights to China’s institutional development suggests two things: (1) the country is in transition to a socialist, rather than liberal, market economy, grounded in a fundamentally different legal and normative order; (2) the socialist market economy shapes Chinese preferences towards challenging the liberal trade order at a systemic level (i.e. over the rules of the game, rather than within them). Empirically, the article highlights two modes of systemic contestation by China that confirm the paper’s conceptual expectations.
{"title":"China’s socialist market economy and systemic rivalry in the multilateral trade order","authors":"N. McDonagh","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2022.2107170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2022.2107170","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 There is growing debate over whether China’s economic model can be managed within the rules of the multilateral trade system, a debate with major implications for international order. Critics argue that the China model is a systemic rival to the liberal trade order, a view that implies future decoupling. For those who reject the rivalry view, the default position is to propose more trade agreements with China, with the goal of driving liberal reforms in the country. This article engages the debate by contributing a conceptually informed and empirically supported analysis of China’s institutional development. Combining ‘second image’ insights with a comparative capitalism framework helps explain why nations evolve distinct varieties of market economy, which then shape their multilateral preferences. Applying these insights to China’s institutional development suggests two things: (1) the country is in transition to a socialist, rather than liberal, market economy, grounded in a fundamentally different legal and normative order; (2) the socialist market economy shapes Chinese preferences towards challenging the liberal trade order at a systemic level (i.e. over the rules of the game, rather than within them). Empirically, the article highlights two modes of systemic contestation by China that confirm the paper’s conceptual expectations.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"76 1","pages":"712 - 733"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42721378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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