Pub Date : 2023-06-28DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2229755
J. Corbett
{"title":"Helpem Fren: Australia and the regional assistance mission to Solomon Islands","authors":"J. Corbett","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2229755","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2229755","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"430 - 431"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47307326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-16DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2223550
Danielle Chubb, I. McAllister
ABSTRACT This article examines Australian attitudes towards foreign aid and the intersection of these attitudes with broader debates around the purpose and level of the aid program. Drawing on surveys conducted over six decades, we show that the public broadly supports the principle of foreign aid, but are much less supportive of aid expenditure, especially judged against other areas of government spending. Using the 2022 Lowy Poll, we test four hypotheses to explain public support for foreign aid. The results show that both values and interests shape the public’s views of foreign aid spending. The challenge for policymakers is to craft messages about foreign aid which present aid expenditure as being relevant to both the values and interests relevant to the lives of everyday Australians.
{"title":"Global values or national interest? Public opinion towards foreign aid in Australia","authors":"Danielle Chubb, I. McAllister","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2223550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2223550","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines Australian attitudes towards foreign aid and the intersection of these attitudes with broader debates around the purpose and level of the aid program. Drawing on surveys conducted over six decades, we show that the public broadly supports the principle of foreign aid, but are much less supportive of aid expenditure, especially judged against other areas of government spending. Using the 2022 Lowy Poll, we test four hypotheses to explain public support for foreign aid. The results show that both values and interests shape the public’s views of foreign aid spending. The challenge for policymakers is to craft messages about foreign aid which present aid expenditure as being relevant to both the values and interests relevant to the lives of everyday Australians.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"345 - 358"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44274162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2219628
W. Maley
Russia’s 2014 seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine highlighted the limitations of a ‘rules-based’ international order in protecting a state’s territorial integrity in the face of threats to international peace and security resulting from the actions of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. With the capacity to veto any Security Council resolution authorising ‘enforcement action’ under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, Russian leaders only had to fear the exercise under Article 51 of Ukraine’s inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. But Ukraine was in no position to drive Russian forces from Crimea unless supported by a great power such as the United States, and as Lawrence Freedman put it, ‘President Obama made it clear that he saw no circumstances in which the United States would use armed force in connection with this crisis’ (Freedman 2019, 106). The focus of the international response would instead be on extended deterrence of future Russian aggression. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 (Birnbaum et al. 2022), it became abundantly clear that Russia had not been successfully deterred from invading its western neighbour. Debate thereafter tended to focus on two points: the extent to which moves to admit Ukraine to NATO membership, anticipated by US President George W. Bush at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, might or might not have inflamed Russian elite opinion; and the importance of building a coalition of Western states to support the Ukrainian government of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, an exercise for which US President Biden on the whole received high marks. Somewhat lost in these discussions was any serious analysis of the deterrence failure that the invasion of Ukraine exposed. Yet an exploration of what deterrence means in the 21st century, and how it came to fail in the Ukrainian case, remains distinctly pertinent when one looks at other potential flashpoints such as the Middle East and East Asia. For this reason, it is worth unpacking some key elements of the idea of deterrence, and looking at what contributed to its failing in the case of Ukraine.
2014年俄罗斯对乌克兰克里米亚半岛的占领凸显了“基于规则”的国际秩序在面对联合国安理会常任理事国的行动对国际和平与安全造成的威胁时保护国家领土完整的局限性。根据《联合国宪章》(United Nations Charter)第42条，俄罗斯领导人有权否决安理会授权采取“强制行动”的任何决议，他们只需要担心乌克兰根据第51条行使其固有的单独或集体自卫权。但除非得到美国等大国的支持，否则乌克兰无法将俄罗斯军队赶出克里米亚。正如劳伦斯·弗里德曼(Lawrence Freedman)所说，“奥巴马总统明确表示，他认为美国在任何情况下都不会在这场危机中使用武力”(Freedman 2019, 106)。相反，国际社会反应的重点将是扩大对俄罗斯未来侵略的威慑。随着俄罗斯在2022年2月24日入侵乌克兰(Birnbaum et al. 2022)，很明显，俄罗斯并没有成功地阻止其入侵其西部邻国。此后的辩论往往集中在两点上:美国总统乔治•w•布什(George W. Bush)在2008年布加勒斯特北约(NATO)峰会上所预期的接纳乌克兰加入北约(NATO)的举措，在多大程度上是否会激起俄罗斯精英的意见;以及建立西方国家联盟支持乌克兰总统政府的重要性，美国总统拜登在这方面总体上得到了很高的评价。这些讨论多少忽略了对入侵乌克兰所暴露出的威慑失败的认真分析。然而，当我们审视中东和东亚等其他潜在的爆发点时，探索威慑在21世纪意味着什么，以及它是如何在乌克兰事件中失败的，仍然具有明显的相关性。出于这个原因，有必要对威慑理念的一些关键要素进行分析，并研究是什么导致了它在乌克兰问题上的失败。
{"title":"Ukraine, Afghanistan and the failure of deterrence","authors":"W. Maley","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2219628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2219628","url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s 2014 seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine highlighted the limitations of a ‘rules-based’ international order in protecting a state’s territorial integrity in the face of threats to international peace and security resulting from the actions of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. With the capacity to veto any Security Council resolution authorising ‘enforcement action’ under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, Russian leaders only had to fear the exercise under Article 51 of Ukraine’s inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. But Ukraine was in no position to drive Russian forces from Crimea unless supported by a great power such as the United States, and as Lawrence Freedman put it, ‘President Obama made it clear that he saw no circumstances in which the United States would use armed force in connection with this crisis’ (Freedman 2019, 106). The focus of the international response would instead be on extended deterrence of future Russian aggression. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 (Birnbaum et al. 2022), it became abundantly clear that Russia had not been successfully deterred from invading its western neighbour. Debate thereafter tended to focus on two points: the extent to which moves to admit Ukraine to NATO membership, anticipated by US President George W. Bush at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, might or might not have inflamed Russian elite opinion; and the importance of building a coalition of Western states to support the Ukrainian government of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, an exercise for which US President Biden on the whole received high marks. Somewhat lost in these discussions was any serious analysis of the deterrence failure that the invasion of Ukraine exposed. Yet an exploration of what deterrence means in the 21st century, and how it came to fail in the Ukrainian case, remains distinctly pertinent when one looks at other potential flashpoints such as the Middle East and East Asia. For this reason, it is worth unpacking some key elements of the idea of deterrence, and looking at what contributed to its failing in the case of Ukraine.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"407 - 414"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41826353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2216139
Isabelle Bond, James Mortensen
ABSTRACT Antarctica is a crucial regulator of the world’s climate, and as environmental security permeates global security, using Antarctic science to better understand climate is becoming increasingly pressing. Although the Australian Government has recognised that climate change poses ‘a current and existential national security’ threat and has acknowledged Antarctica’s importance regarding the earth’s global climate system, the focus of Australia’s intelligence community pertaining to Antarctica currently remains restricted to upholding the military-security and diplomatic goals of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). This current focus aims to hedge against the possibility of conflict on, or over, the frozen continent via ‘working the ATS’, however, this paper argues that Antarctic climate science holds a greater capacity to deliver security outcomes for Australia. Antarctic climate science offers opportunities regarding intelligence for Antarctica, that is, securing Australia’s Antarctic interests, as well as regarding intelligence from Antarctica; by enhancing natural disaster preparedness, bolstering broader strategic planning, as well as furthering diplomacy and the legitimisation of Australia’s leadership on, and over, the frozen continent. It is recommended that the Commonwealth Government establish a climate intelligence working group to ensure the utility of climate science to security and intelligence is realised.
{"title":"The changing value of Antarctica to Australia’s security policy","authors":"Isabelle Bond, James Mortensen","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2216139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2216139","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Antarctica is a crucial regulator of the world’s climate, and as environmental security permeates global security, using Antarctic science to better understand climate is becoming increasingly pressing. Although the Australian Government has recognised that climate change poses ‘a current and existential national security’ threat and has acknowledged Antarctica’s importance regarding the earth’s global climate system, the focus of Australia’s intelligence community pertaining to Antarctica currently remains restricted to upholding the military-security and diplomatic goals of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). This current focus aims to hedge against the possibility of conflict on, or over, the frozen continent via ‘working the ATS’, however, this paper argues that Antarctic climate science holds a greater capacity to deliver security outcomes for Australia. Antarctic climate science offers opportunities regarding intelligence for Antarctica, that is, securing Australia’s Antarctic interests, as well as regarding intelligence from Antarctica; by enhancing natural disaster preparedness, bolstering broader strategic planning, as well as furthering diplomacy and the legitimisation of Australia’s leadership on, and over, the frozen continent. It is recommended that the Commonwealth Government establish a climate intelligence working group to ensure the utility of climate science to security and intelligence is realised.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"299 - 316"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42933810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2212612
J. Laurenceson, S. Armstrong
ABSTRACT Perceived threats to sovereignty stemming from trade exposure to China have led to calls for the Australian government to embrace the concept of ‘trusted trade’. This involves using policy levers to drive trade towards markets that have capitals more geopolitically aligned with Canberra and finds practical expression in forms such as ‘friend-shored’ supply chains. A theme of ‘trusted trade’ advocacy is the conscription of existing security-oriented partnerships, including the ANZUS alliance, the Quad grouping and the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement, to take on economic dimensions. While holding superficial appeal, this paper details why pursuing this policy path would be to learn the wrong lessons from Beijing’s campaign of trade disruption that began in May 2020, and make Australia both poorer and less secure. Three key data points are highlighted that collectively support an assessment that the Australian government’s traditional trade policy approach, emphasising open regionalism, remains overwhelmingly fit for purpose.
{"title":"Learning the right policy lessons from Beijing’s campaign of trade disruption against Australia","authors":"J. Laurenceson, S. Armstrong","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2212612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2212612","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 Perceived threats to sovereignty stemming from trade exposure to China have led to calls for the Australian government to embrace the concept of ‘trusted trade’. This involves using policy levers to drive trade towards markets that have capitals more geopolitically aligned with Canberra and finds practical expression in forms such as ‘friend-shored’ supply chains. A theme of ‘trusted trade’ advocacy is the conscription of existing security-oriented partnerships, including the ANZUS alliance, the Quad grouping and the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement, to take on economic dimensions. While holding superficial appeal, this paper details why pursuing this policy path would be to learn the wrong lessons from Beijing’s campaign of trade disruption that began in May 2020, and make Australia both poorer and less secure. Three key data points are highlighted that collectively support an assessment that the Australian government’s traditional trade policy approach, emphasising open regionalism, remains overwhelmingly fit for purpose.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"258 - 275"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49103572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2216642
Yukyung Yeo
ABSTRACT In the context of economic interdependence, South Korea, like other countries with asymmetrical trade relations with China, is often seen by its citizens as vulnerable to China’s use of economic power to gain political influence. However, South Korea’s deployment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) offers the opposite perspective on South Korea’s vulnerability. Despite China’s coercive policies against South Korean businesses and great leverage over Korea’s economy, China failed to generate a concession regarding Korea’s decision to deploy the THAAD. The question is why? Drawing on the 2016–17 THAAD crisis between South Korea and China, I argue that influence of coercive power will depend on the coercive state’s willingness to pay a cost, the target state’s level of stateness, and the relative intensity of interests related to the policy. This case study helps us understand the circumstances under which China’s use of economic coercion against target countries may be successful.
{"title":"The limits of pressure: China’s bounded economic coercion in response to South Korea’s THAAD","authors":"Yukyung Yeo","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2216642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2216642","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the context of economic interdependence, South Korea, like other countries with asymmetrical trade relations with China, is often seen by its citizens as vulnerable to China’s use of economic power to gain political influence. However, South Korea’s deployment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) offers the opposite perspective on South Korea’s vulnerability. Despite China’s coercive policies against South Korean businesses and great leverage over Korea’s economy, China failed to generate a concession regarding Korea’s decision to deploy the THAAD. The question is why? Drawing on the 2016–17 THAAD crisis between South Korea and China, I argue that influence of coercive power will depend on the coercive state’s willingness to pay a cost, the target state’s level of stateness, and the relative intensity of interests related to the policy. This case study helps us understand the circumstances under which China’s use of economic coercion against target countries may be successful.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"276 - 298"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46376191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2210278
R. Dunley
ABSTRACT The Australian debate over AUKUS, and its strategic policy more generally, has been notable for its disjointed and incoherent nature. This article seeks to explain why, arguing that Australia has been the beneficiary of a remarkably benign strategic situation for nearly 80 years, something that has distorted our understanding of the underlying landscape.
{"title":"The end of the ‘lucky country’? Understanding the failure of the AUKUS policy debate","authors":"R. Dunley","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2210278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2210278","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Australian debate over AUKUS, and its strategic policy more generally, has been notable for its disjointed and incoherent nature. This article seeks to explain why, arguing that Australia has been the beneficiary of a remarkably benign strategic situation for nearly 80 years, something that has distorted our understanding of the underlying landscape.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"317 - 324"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44648310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-23DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2197283
R. Barber
ABSTRACT Two years following Myanmar’s attempted military coup, the situation is at a stalemate. Little progress has been achieved against ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus, hailed as a major breakthrough in April 2021. Egregious human rights violations continue, and the military is reportedly losing ground but showing little inclination to negotiate. Facing internal political constraints, ASEAN has requested support from the UN. The Security Council has responded by ‘encouraging the international community’ to support ASEAN to resolve the crisis. The UN’s Special Envoy on Myanmar has for her part declared there is no room for ‘talks about talks’, and that she will focus on alleviating suffering. This commentary argues that the UN should do more. It recalls the Secretary-General’s prioritisation in 2017 of ‘diplomacy for peace’, and his ambitions for the UN’s mediation capacity. It reviews situations elsewhere in which the Secretary-General has exercised his ‘good offices’, through his Special Envoys and Representatives, and observes that the exercise of the Secretary-General’s good offices is typically enabled by a request from the Security Council. This commentary thus explores the possibility of ASEAN initiating such a request, with a view to prompting stronger UN support for ASEAN-led negotiations towards a political settlement in Myanmar.
{"title":"The case for UN-supported, ASEAN-led negotiations on Myanmar","authors":"R. Barber","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2197283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2197283","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 Two years following Myanmar’s attempted military coup, the situation is at a stalemate. Little progress has been achieved against ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus, hailed as a major breakthrough in April 2021. Egregious human rights violations continue, and the military is reportedly losing ground but showing little inclination to negotiate. Facing internal political constraints, ASEAN has requested support from the UN. The Security Council has responded by ‘encouraging the international community’ to support ASEAN to resolve the crisis. The UN’s Special Envoy on Myanmar has for her part declared there is no room for ‘talks about talks’, and that she will focus on alleviating suffering. This commentary argues that the UN should do more. It recalls the Secretary-General’s prioritisation in 2017 of ‘diplomacy for peace’, and his ambitions for the UN’s mediation capacity. It reviews situations elsewhere in which the Secretary-General has exercised his ‘good offices’, through his Special Envoys and Representatives, and observes that the exercise of the Secretary-General’s good offices is typically enabled by a request from the Security Council. This commentary thus explores the possibility of ASEAN initiating such a request, with a view to prompting stronger UN support for ASEAN-led negotiations towards a political settlement in Myanmar.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"325 - 332"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46449569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-11DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2189219
John Blaxland
Abstract This is a review of Professor Craig Stockings' fiery official history of the East Timor crisis and the Australian led intervention. It spans the diplomatic, historical, cultural, geographic and political background to the Indonesian occupation in 1975, the 1999 ballot and the part played by the UN Assistance Mission East Timor (UNAMET) as well as the subsequent Australian led intervention in September 1999. This no-punches-pulled account exposes significant shortcomings in Australia's departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and beyond.
{"title":"Craig stockings’ fiery official history of the East Timor crisis","authors":"John Blaxland","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2189219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2189219","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This is a review of Professor Craig Stockings' fiery official history of the East Timor crisis and the Australian led intervention. It spans the diplomatic, historical, cultural, geographic and political background to the Indonesian occupation in 1975, the 1999 ballot and the part played by the UN Assistance Mission East Timor (UNAMET) as well as the subsequent Australian led intervention in September 1999. This no-punches-pulled account exposes significant shortcomings in Australia's departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and beyond.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"333 - 344"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42102970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2023.2191925
Charalampos Efstathopoulos
ABSTRACT The premise of Global IR for greater pluralism and inclusivity allows for reconsidering the relevance of established concepts in the IR discipline. This article discusses how Global IR can contribute to rethinking the question of agency in the middle power concept. While the concept has been used in a Western and non-Western context, there is a tendency to adopt a binary distinction between Western middle powers that are conformist in their approach to the liberal international order and Southern middle powers that adopt a reformist stance. The article argues that a Global IR approach can help overcome this dichotomy and open up the study of Western and Southern middle powers to new agential possibilities. To demonstrate this, the article discusses how the cases of Australia and Brazil are not limited to conformist and reformist middle power agencies respectively. The discussion shows how the two states have undergone periods of ambivalence to gradually project new forms of middle power agency that alter and redefine their roles within the liberal international order.
{"title":"Global IR and the middle power concept: exploring different paths to agency","authors":"Charalampos Efstathopoulos","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2191925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2191925","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The premise of Global IR for greater pluralism and inclusivity allows for reconsidering the relevance of established concepts in the IR discipline. This article discusses how Global IR can contribute to rethinking the question of agency in the middle power concept. While the concept has been used in a Western and non-Western context, there is a tendency to adopt a binary distinction between Western middle powers that are conformist in their approach to the liberal international order and Southern middle powers that adopt a reformist stance. The article argues that a Global IR approach can help overcome this dichotomy and open up the study of Western and Southern middle powers to new agential possibilities. To demonstrate this, the article discusses how the cases of Australia and Brazil are not limited to conformist and reformist middle power agencies respectively. The discussion shows how the two states have undergone periods of ambivalence to gradually project new forms of middle power agency that alter and redefine their roles within the liberal international order.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"213 - 232"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45562888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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