Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02529203.2022.2166288
Hu Zhan, Peng Xizhe, Wu Yushao
Abstract The course of population ageing in China has unique features, and the country’s fundamental national conditions, development path and governance model impose special requirements on the country’s response. A path with Chinese characteristics that actively addresses this issue is urgently needed. The Chinese strategy is built on solid foundations, comprising the governance paradigm advantage of “one core and multiple components”; the structural advantage of “state-family-society” governance arrangements; the national endowment of being a major country with a rich culture; and the late-mover advantage conferred by the scientific and technological innovations of our changing times. It is necessary to clarify the relationship between the national strategy of actively responding to an population ageing and the population development strategy; on this basis, a positive view of ageing need to be cultivated to provide a better environment for the implementation of the national strategy; and to establish a holistic governance framework in which individuals, families, communities, the state, and the world are interconnected by integrating Chinese advantages in the governance of an ageing society. Thus, a systemic Chinese strategy for actively responding to population ageing can be continuously refined.
{"title":"The Chinese Strategy for Actively Responding to Population Ageing","authors":"Hu Zhan, Peng Xizhe, Wu Yushao","doi":"10.1080/02529203.2022.2166288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02529203.2022.2166288","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The course of population ageing in China has unique features, and the country’s fundamental national conditions, development path and governance model impose special requirements on the country’s response. A path with Chinese characteristics that actively addresses this issue is urgently needed. The Chinese strategy is built on solid foundations, comprising the governance paradigm advantage of “one core and multiple components”; the structural advantage of “state-family-society” governance arrangements; the national endowment of being a major country with a rich culture; and the late-mover advantage conferred by the scientific and technological innovations of our changing times. It is necessary to clarify the relationship between the national strategy of actively responding to an population ageing and the population development strategy; on this basis, a positive view of ageing need to be cultivated to provide a better environment for the implementation of the national strategy; and to establish a holistic governance framework in which individuals, families, communities, the state, and the world are interconnected by integrating Chinese advantages in the governance of an ageing society. Thus, a systemic Chinese strategy for actively responding to population ageing can be continuously refined.","PeriodicalId":51743,"journal":{"name":"中国社会科学","volume":"43 1","pages":"57 - 76"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42575724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02529203.2022.2166289
Zhao Tingyang
Abstract Philosophy based on epistemology is a philosophy of nouns which is restricted by the horizon of the knower, and cannot explain creation by human beings within its subjectobject frame. Therefore, we propose a philosophy of verbs that establishes itself on creational ontology and re-understands existence and origin from the horizon of the creator, so as to make that “I do” (facio) the starting point for the understanding of all order, ideas, and history that require consideration.
{"title":"The Ontology of Verbs and the Horizon of Creators","authors":"Zhao Tingyang","doi":"10.1080/02529203.2022.2166289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02529203.2022.2166289","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Philosophy based on epistemology is a philosophy of nouns which is restricted by the horizon of the knower, and cannot explain creation by human beings within its subjectobject frame. Therefore, we propose a philosophy of verbs that establishes itself on creational ontology and re-understands existence and origin from the horizon of the creator, so as to make that “I do” (facio) the starting point for the understanding of all order, ideas, and history that require consideration.","PeriodicalId":51743,"journal":{"name":"中国社会科学","volume":"43 1","pages":"24 - 40"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43362934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02529203.2022.2166294
Shu Yueyu, Gao Shenchun
Abstract In the historical interaction of science and philosophy, empirical science has used cumulative research to shed new light on how the science of philosophy understands fundamental scientific issues. As an effort of self-renewal, the initial impetus for the birth of cognitive science was dialogue among disciplines, with a view to making it possible to unlock the mysteries of cognition. In other words, cognitive science was to pave the way for fundamentally updating the philosophical premises of the science of mind or even making possible a new scientific worldview. As a branch of cognitive science, psychology was to have contributed to the renovation of the ontological, methodological and scientific worldview of cognitive science through its unique interpretation of human nature. However, in the course of the development of cognitive science and psychology, psychology has failed to employ its disciplinary endeavors to renew the ontology, methodology and values of the philosophical foundations of cognitive science, and has also failed to contribute to the promotion of cognitive science. On the contrary, cognitive science’s mechanistic worldview and positivist methodology are the sole determinants of the background of cognitive science that shapes psychology’s model of development—that is, cognitive psychology (if one sees cognitive psychology as a concrete manifestation of the interaction of cognitive science and psychology). This study examines cognitive psychology’s ontological, methodological and value presuppositions and scientific worldview and reflects on the blind and passive nature of the discipline’s development. Moreover, from a history of science perspective, it considers how the development of this discipline can contribute to the renewal of scientific concepts in the philosophy of science through the interaction of the mature natural sciences and philosophy and thence provide possibilities for handling the relationship between psychology and philosophy in psychology’s future development.
{"title":"A Critique of the Philosophical Presuppositions of Cognitive Psychology","authors":"Shu Yueyu, Gao Shenchun","doi":"10.1080/02529203.2022.2166294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02529203.2022.2166294","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the historical interaction of science and philosophy, empirical science has used cumulative research to shed new light on how the science of philosophy understands fundamental scientific issues. As an effort of self-renewal, the initial impetus for the birth of cognitive science was dialogue among disciplines, with a view to making it possible to unlock the mysteries of cognition. In other words, cognitive science was to pave the way for fundamentally updating the philosophical premises of the science of mind or even making possible a new scientific worldview. As a branch of cognitive science, psychology was to have contributed to the renovation of the ontological, methodological and scientific worldview of cognitive science through its unique interpretation of human nature. However, in the course of the development of cognitive science and psychology, psychology has failed to employ its disciplinary endeavors to renew the ontology, methodology and values of the philosophical foundations of cognitive science, and has also failed to contribute to the promotion of cognitive science. On the contrary, cognitive science’s mechanistic worldview and positivist methodology are the sole determinants of the background of cognitive science that shapes psychology’s model of development—that is, cognitive psychology (if one sees cognitive psychology as a concrete manifestation of the interaction of cognitive science and psychology). This study examines cognitive psychology’s ontological, methodological and value presuppositions and scientific worldview and reflects on the blind and passive nature of the discipline’s development. Moreover, from a history of science perspective, it considers how the development of this discipline can contribute to the renewal of scientific concepts in the philosophy of science through the interaction of the mature natural sciences and philosophy and thence provide possibilities for handling the relationship between psychology and philosophy in psychology’s future development.","PeriodicalId":51743,"journal":{"name":"中国社会科学","volume":"43 1","pages":"119 - 136"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49503755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02529203.2022.2166299
Su Jiajia, Ye Haosheng
Abstract In the civilizations of the axial age, Chinese and Western cultures gave birth to different scientific traditions—the image sciences and the natural sciences—within the knowledge frameworks of the union of man and nature and of the subject–object dichotomy respectively. Therefore, there are inevitably insurmountable barriers to explaining the differences between Chinese and Western cultures in terms of a natural science concerned with “things.” However, human nature is universal, and it is possible to make direct comparisons and interpretations of the differences between Chinese and Western cultures in terms of the cognitive sciences dealing with the mind. One important way to compare and interpret Chinese culture and cognitive science is the mutual interpretation of Chinese and Western cultures. In view of this, we have integrated enactive cognition (the frontier of cognitive science) and the free energy principle to propose the predictive mind model of enactive cognition and have used this mutual interpretation to study the two cultures using this model of cognitive science as a truly unified cross-cultural paradigm for cognitive science. First, the theory of enaction embedded in Chinese culture is actually closely related to enactive cognition, the frontier of Western cognitive science. Laozi’s theory of universal enaction (cosmology) shows that Chinese culture has an ancient theory of enaction. He firmly planted in the minds of Chinese people a way of thinking dealing with union of man and nature. Western enactive cognition, as a modern theory, advocates continuity of life and mind and emphasizes that life is both autopoietic and cognitive, which is actually a scientific cognitive expression of the Chinese cultural idea of the harmony of man and nature. This is actually a scientific cognitive expression of Chinese culture’s idea of the harmony of man and nature. Second, the qi in Chinese culture is similar to the free energy in Western cognitive science. In terms of concept definition, qi is a mixture of matter, function and principles (information), while free energy is the synthesis of energy and information. From the point of view of the mode of operation, qi is the contradictory harmony between yin and yang, while free energy is the unity of top-down and bottom-up approaches. In terms of kinetic purpose, the kinetic purpose of qi is the doctrine of benevolence, while the kinetic purpose of free energy has gradually changed from representation of nature to construction of meaning. Through comparison and interpretation, we find that enactive cognition is closely related to Chinese culture on the cognitive science route, in what will be a practical path for the rejuvenation of Chinese culture. In addition, through the association of qi in Chinese culture and free energy in Western cognitive science, Chinese and Western cultures can be expected to be truly connected through cognitive science.
{"title":"Chinese Culture and Cognitive Science","authors":"Su Jiajia, Ye Haosheng","doi":"10.1080/02529203.2022.2166299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02529203.2022.2166299","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the civilizations of the axial age, Chinese and Western cultures gave birth to different scientific traditions—the image sciences and the natural sciences—within the knowledge frameworks of the union of man and nature and of the subject–object dichotomy respectively. Therefore, there are inevitably insurmountable barriers to explaining the differences between Chinese and Western cultures in terms of a natural science concerned with “things.” However, human nature is universal, and it is possible to make direct comparisons and interpretations of the differences between Chinese and Western cultures in terms of the cognitive sciences dealing with the mind. One important way to compare and interpret Chinese culture and cognitive science is the mutual interpretation of Chinese and Western cultures. In view of this, we have integrated enactive cognition (the frontier of cognitive science) and the free energy principle to propose the predictive mind model of enactive cognition and have used this mutual interpretation to study the two cultures using this model of cognitive science as a truly unified cross-cultural paradigm for cognitive science. First, the theory of enaction embedded in Chinese culture is actually closely related to enactive cognition, the frontier of Western cognitive science. Laozi’s theory of universal enaction (cosmology) shows that Chinese culture has an ancient theory of enaction. He firmly planted in the minds of Chinese people a way of thinking dealing with union of man and nature. Western enactive cognition, as a modern theory, advocates continuity of life and mind and emphasizes that life is both autopoietic and cognitive, which is actually a scientific cognitive expression of the Chinese cultural idea of the harmony of man and nature. This is actually a scientific cognitive expression of Chinese culture’s idea of the harmony of man and nature. Second, the qi in Chinese culture is similar to the free energy in Western cognitive science. In terms of concept definition, qi is a mixture of matter, function and principles (information), while free energy is the synthesis of energy and information. From the point of view of the mode of operation, qi is the contradictory harmony between yin and yang, while free energy is the unity of top-down and bottom-up approaches. In terms of kinetic purpose, the kinetic purpose of qi is the doctrine of benevolence, while the kinetic purpose of free energy has gradually changed from representation of nature to construction of meaning. Through comparison and interpretation, we find that enactive cognition is closely related to Chinese culture on the cognitive science route, in what will be a practical path for the rejuvenation of Chinese culture. In addition, through the association of qi in Chinese culture and free energy in Western cognitive science, Chinese and Western cultures can be expected to be truly connected through cognitive science.","PeriodicalId":51743,"journal":{"name":"中国社会科学","volume":"43 1","pages":"184 - 202"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42163908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02529203.2022.2166290
Nan Fan
Abstract The theoretical dichotomy of the elegant (ya) and the popular or common (su) has a long history and many branches, provoking Babel-like confusion of tongues. Both have their own aesthetic origins, and each is interpreted in relation to sociological categories such as social class and social strata. No abstract and absolute definition of the two concepts exists. The yayue (formal ceremonial music) of ancient China is an important early example of the elegant or refined, whereas the popular usually prevails at the lower levels of mass society. In the course of history, the accumulation of professional knowledge, selected classics, avant garde “art for art’s sake,” and leisure class activities have often been considered “elegant,” while the experience of the masses, folk revelry, and the content of mass media have been considered “popular.” In modern literary history, the concepts of enlightenment and class were drawn into the dichotomy of the elegant and the popular in different ways. In Chinese culture in the second half of the twentieth century, this dichotomy began to be reorganized around the notions of “art” and “commodity.” The reconceptualization of elegance and popularity at each stage of history has often indicated a reconnection between aesthetic tastes and history. In this sense, the differentiation of elegance and popularity has always testified to culture’s participation in history.
{"title":"On the Dichotomy of the Elegant and the Popular","authors":"Nan Fan","doi":"10.1080/02529203.2022.2166290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02529203.2022.2166290","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The theoretical dichotomy of the elegant (ya) and the popular or common (su) has a long history and many branches, provoking Babel-like confusion of tongues. Both have their own aesthetic origins, and each is interpreted in relation to sociological categories such as social class and social strata. No abstract and absolute definition of the two concepts exists. The yayue (formal ceremonial music) of ancient China is an important early example of the elegant or refined, whereas the popular usually prevails at the lower levels of mass society. In the course of history, the accumulation of professional knowledge, selected classics, avant garde “art for art’s sake,” and leisure class activities have often been considered “elegant,” while the experience of the masses, folk revelry, and the content of mass media have been considered “popular.” In modern literary history, the concepts of enlightenment and class were drawn into the dichotomy of the elegant and the popular in different ways. In Chinese culture in the second half of the twentieth century, this dichotomy began to be reorganized around the notions of “art” and “commodity.” The reconceptualization of elegance and popularity at each stage of history has often indicated a reconnection between aesthetic tastes and history. In this sense, the differentiation of elegance and popularity has always testified to culture’s participation in history.","PeriodicalId":51743,"journal":{"name":"中国社会科学","volume":"43 1","pages":"41 - 56"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44017842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02529203.2022.2166295
Wang Bo, Qiongpeng Luo
Abstract In the traditional debate centered on the nature of language, the question of “the psychological reality of language” occupies a pivotal position. The key lies in the recognition of language (competence) as a natural entity that exists in the brain in some physical way. The empirical research perspectives supporting the psychological reality of language fall into four main categories: (a) linguistic perspectives based on introspective linguistic intuitions; (b) developmental psychology perspectives; (c) psycholinguistic perspectives; (d) neurolinguistic perspectives. In analyzing the four areas of research, it is clear that psychological realism does indeed reveal the physiological basis of language ability, but it does not fully explain how “reality” is expressed, i.e., at what level the operation and representation of language can be linked to human neurobiological mechanisms, and how the psychological reality of language is related to the semantic “material” reality of language. In essence, the ontological foundation of psychological realism is the logocentric tradition of “In the beginning was the Word,” while Chinese thought, which espouses “In the beginning was the Deed,” provides a transcendental framework for solving the dilemma of psychological realism by virtue of its self-cultivation theory of “heaven, in its motion, shows strength.” The focus is not on how language precisely maps reality, but how to mobilize the energy of language through the cultivation of the body and mind. This implies that human language and even its physiological basis develop according to how one learns to change the natural world, and that the most essential basis of language is the change in the world caused by its “doing” (self-cultivation), thus providing an adequate explanation for the problem of the psychological reality of language.
{"title":"The Integration of Psychology and Linguistics from the Perspective of Cognitive Science—The Example of the Psychological Reality of Language","authors":"Wang Bo, Qiongpeng Luo","doi":"10.1080/02529203.2022.2166295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02529203.2022.2166295","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the traditional debate centered on the nature of language, the question of “the psychological reality of language” occupies a pivotal position. The key lies in the recognition of language (competence) as a natural entity that exists in the brain in some physical way. The empirical research perspectives supporting the psychological reality of language fall into four main categories: (a) linguistic perspectives based on introspective linguistic intuitions; (b) developmental psychology perspectives; (c) psycholinguistic perspectives; (d) neurolinguistic perspectives. In analyzing the four areas of research, it is clear that psychological realism does indeed reveal the physiological basis of language ability, but it does not fully explain how “reality” is expressed, i.e., at what level the operation and representation of language can be linked to human neurobiological mechanisms, and how the psychological reality of language is related to the semantic “material” reality of language. In essence, the ontological foundation of psychological realism is the logocentric tradition of “In the beginning was the Word,” while Chinese thought, which espouses “In the beginning was the Deed,” provides a transcendental framework for solving the dilemma of psychological realism by virtue of its self-cultivation theory of “heaven, in its motion, shows strength.” The focus is not on how language precisely maps reality, but how to mobilize the energy of language through the cultivation of the body and mind. This implies that human language and even its physiological basis develop according to how one learns to change the natural world, and that the most essential basis of language is the change in the world caused by its “doing” (self-cultivation), thus providing an adequate explanation for the problem of the psychological reality of language.","PeriodicalId":51743,"journal":{"name":"中国社会科学","volume":"43 1","pages":"137 - 151"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47320529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02529203.2022.2166298
Jiang Ke, Liao Qiwei
Abstract Starting from the tension and integration between cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psychology, this paper analyzes the waxing and waning of physicalism versus mentalism over the last century and defends an anti-reductionist ontology of the mind. It first argues that “function logically precedes structure” and then refutes two classic arguments about the mind-brain problem. The paper shows that if structure is treated as the logical premise of function, discussions of the mind-brain problem will inevitably lead to dualism or reductionism. Structure cannot explain its own occurrence; instead, if function, which logically precedes structure, is taken as the starting point of the explanation, then the principle of the “ladder of explanation” will be satisfied. A higher-level theory can explain lower-level observed facts, and lower-level observed facts are the cognitive starting point leading to a theory through induction. We conclude that function logically precedes structure; therefore, logically, “the mind shapes the brain.” The logical sequence from function to structure represents a reverse strategy for solving the mind-brain problem.
{"title":"From Function to Structure: A Reverse Solution to the Mind-Brain Problem","authors":"Jiang Ke, Liao Qiwei","doi":"10.1080/02529203.2022.2166298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02529203.2022.2166298","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Starting from the tension and integration between cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psychology, this paper analyzes the waxing and waning of physicalism versus mentalism over the last century and defends an anti-reductionist ontology of the mind. It first argues that “function logically precedes structure” and then refutes two classic arguments about the mind-brain problem. The paper shows that if structure is treated as the logical premise of function, discussions of the mind-brain problem will inevitably lead to dualism or reductionism. Structure cannot explain its own occurrence; instead, if function, which logically precedes structure, is taken as the starting point of the explanation, then the principle of the “ladder of explanation” will be satisfied. A higher-level theory can explain lower-level observed facts, and lower-level observed facts are the cognitive starting point leading to a theory through induction. We conclude that function logically precedes structure; therefore, logically, “the mind shapes the brain.” The logical sequence from function to structure represents a reverse strategy for solving the mind-brain problem.","PeriodicalId":51743,"journal":{"name":"中国社会科学","volume":"43 1","pages":"168 - 183"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44968409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02529203.2022.2166286
Tianzhi Ye
Abstract Geopolitics, technology and international institutions are three major areas of great power competition. In the analysis of great power relations, both the balance of power theory and the hegemony theory rely on the assumption of diminishing returns and ignore the possibility of increasing returns. Increasing returns play an extensive role in geographical location, technological evolution and institutional change; accordingly, the increasing returns mechanism in great power relations is reflected in the geopolitical competition, technological competition and international institutional competition of great powers. The rational expectation that initial advantages will be transformed into long-term advantages through the mechanism of increasing returns drives great powers into competition whether they are rivals or allies. As specific mechanisms leading to increasing returns, coordination effects operate in geopolitical competition, technological competition and international institution competition; learning effects are found in technological competition and international institution competition; and adaptive expectations play a part in international institution competition. Various cases, ranging from the Anglo-Dutch rivalry over maritime hegemony in the 17th century to the current US-European competition over international investment arbitration regimes, show that great power competition derives from the logic of increasing returns.
{"title":"The Roots of Great Power Competition: An Analysis Based on the Increasing Returns Mechanism","authors":"Tianzhi Ye","doi":"10.1080/02529203.2022.2166286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02529203.2022.2166286","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Geopolitics, technology and international institutions are three major areas of great power competition. In the analysis of great power relations, both the balance of power theory and the hegemony theory rely on the assumption of diminishing returns and ignore the possibility of increasing returns. Increasing returns play an extensive role in geographical location, technological evolution and institutional change; accordingly, the increasing returns mechanism in great power relations is reflected in the geopolitical competition, technological competition and international institutional competition of great powers. The rational expectation that initial advantages will be transformed into long-term advantages through the mechanism of increasing returns drives great powers into competition whether they are rivals or allies. As specific mechanisms leading to increasing returns, coordination effects operate in geopolitical competition, technological competition and international institution competition; learning effects are found in technological competition and international institution competition; and adaptive expectations play a part in international institution competition. Various cases, ranging from the Anglo-Dutch rivalry over maritime hegemony in the 17th century to the current US-European competition over international investment arbitration regimes, show that great power competition derives from the logic of increasing returns.","PeriodicalId":51743,"journal":{"name":"中国社会科学","volume":"43 1","pages":"77 - 97"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41913962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/02529203.2022.2122215
Wang Mingming
Abstract Why should human beings be divided into “us” or “them”? This question underlies the basic proposition of anthropology. In fact, it has never received a decisive answer. In the dialogue between Marshall Sahlins and Wang Mingming, the two agree that “we are part of the other,” because it is to the other that we owe the constitution of our full selves. The modernity of diversity and plurality supports the validity of this judgment.
{"title":"We Are One of “The Others”","authors":"Wang Mingming","doi":"10.1080/02529203.2022.2122215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02529203.2022.2122215","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why should human beings be divided into “us” or “them”? This question underlies the basic proposition of anthropology. In fact, it has never received a decisive answer. In the dialogue between Marshall Sahlins and Wang Mingming, the two agree that “we are part of the other,” because it is to the other that we owe the constitution of our full selves. The modernity of diversity and plurality supports the validity of this judgment.","PeriodicalId":51743,"journal":{"name":"中国社会科学","volume":"43 1","pages":"162 - 179"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49027784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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