Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2021.1891680
M. Bankovsky, D. Petherbridge
Can a theory of recognition provide not only a form of social critique but also a productive form of philosophical practice? This issue explores Axel Honneth’s approach to philosophy as an open, self-reflexive, and outwardly oriented discipline. One of the hallmarks of Honneth’s work has been his preparedness to engage cooperatively with a range of alternative positions in contemporary French philosophy, including the work of Derrida, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Castoriadis, Foucault, Rancière and Levinas, in developing a theory of recognition. In this respect, in contrast to Habermas’s much more critical and dismissive treatment of this line of thinkers and the limited reception of their work in terms of his own philosophy of language and theory of rationalisation, Honneth’s work has proven important for opening new lines of engagement with a range of traditions. This is especially the case in terms of emphasising the more phenomenological and existential aspects of the French tradition, for example, in Sartre’s work, with its focus on forms of existential denigration and affectivity; the preand extra-linguistic dimensions of sociality and non-deliberative aspects of social interaction; the importance of the asymmetricality of ethical relations highlighted by Derrida and Levinas, as well as a productive engagement with Foucault’s analysis of power and conflictual notion of the social understood as a field of strategic struggle. In this respect, Honneth has been particularly attuned to the existential experiences of social suffering and shame, and to feelings of disrespect as explanatory factors for social conflict and change. He acknowledges the important contribution of both Sartre and Foucault in identifying the more conflictual and negative dimensions of intersubjective and social relations; credits Sartre for drawing attention to the existential or emotional rather than merely epistemic stance to others and the world; and takes up Derrida’s and Levinas’s insights in regard to the unconditional responsibility to the other (which he applies to the sphere of intimate relations in his theory of recognition). These impulses have become guiding motifs in Honneth’s work: his theory of recognition is predicated on the lived experiences of disrespect that provide immanent resources within social life for the basis of social critique and transformation. In this
{"title":"Recognition Beyond French-German Divides: Engaging Axel Honneth","authors":"M. Bankovsky, D. Petherbridge","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2021.1891680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2021.1891680","url":null,"abstract":"Can a theory of recognition provide not only a form of social critique but also a productive form of philosophical practice? This issue explores Axel Honneth’s approach to philosophy as an open, self-reflexive, and outwardly oriented discipline. One of the hallmarks of Honneth’s work has been his preparedness to engage cooperatively with a range of alternative positions in contemporary French philosophy, including the work of Derrida, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Castoriadis, Foucault, Rancière and Levinas, in developing a theory of recognition. In this respect, in contrast to Habermas’s much more critical and dismissive treatment of this line of thinkers and the limited reception of their work in terms of his own philosophy of language and theory of rationalisation, Honneth’s work has proven important for opening new lines of engagement with a range of traditions. This is especially the case in terms of emphasising the more phenomenological and existential aspects of the French tradition, for example, in Sartre’s work, with its focus on forms of existential denigration and affectivity; the preand extra-linguistic dimensions of sociality and non-deliberative aspects of social interaction; the importance of the asymmetricality of ethical relations highlighted by Derrida and Levinas, as well as a productive engagement with Foucault’s analysis of power and conflictual notion of the social understood as a field of strategic struggle. In this respect, Honneth has been particularly attuned to the existential experiences of social suffering and shame, and to feelings of disrespect as explanatory factors for social conflict and change. He acknowledges the important contribution of both Sartre and Foucault in identifying the more conflictual and negative dimensions of intersubjective and social relations; credits Sartre for drawing attention to the existential or emotional rather than merely epistemic stance to others and the world; and takes up Derrida’s and Levinas’s insights in regard to the unconditional responsibility to the other (which he applies to the sphere of intimate relations in his theory of recognition). These impulses have become guiding motifs in Honneth’s work: his theory of recognition is predicated on the lived experiences of disrespect that provide immanent resources within social life for the basis of social critique and transformation. In this","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"22 1","pages":"1 - 4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14409917.2021.1891680","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46694618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2021.1886669
M. Bankovsky
ABSTRACT What does it mean to practice a theory of recognition within the discipline of philosophy? Across an initially acrimonious French-German divide, Axel Honneth’s effort to recognise the value of contemporary French philosophy and social theory suggests that philosophy is a self-critical, outwardly oriented, and cooperative discipline. First, mobilising the idea of recognition in his own philosophical practise has permitted Honneth to notice non-deliberative aspects of social interaction that Habermas had overlooked, including the need for self-confidence (drawn from a “deconstructive” ethics of care) and the need for self-esteem (informed by Sartre’s and Foucault’s attention to the existential damage caused by denigration, and the nefarious effects of reproductive power). Second, although Honneth’s ascription of value to contemporary French theory also involves mis-recognition, his practice of recognition has nonetheless prompted philosophical cooperation among theorists who would not otherwise have engaged, encouraging French-influenced critical theorists to extend Honneth’s theory in ways that he had not anticipated. What emerges is an interpretation of philosophy as an ongoing intersubjective pursuit that attempts to respond to its own limitations through cooperative critique.
{"title":"Recognition as a Philosophical Practice: From “Warring” Attitudes to Cooperative Projects","authors":"M. Bankovsky","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2021.1886669","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2021.1886669","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What does it mean to practice a theory of recognition within the discipline of philosophy? Across an initially acrimonious French-German divide, Axel Honneth’s effort to recognise the value of contemporary French philosophy and social theory suggests that philosophy is a self-critical, outwardly oriented, and cooperative discipline. First, mobilising the idea of recognition in his own philosophical practise has permitted Honneth to notice non-deliberative aspects of social interaction that Habermas had overlooked, including the need for self-confidence (drawn from a “deconstructive” ethics of care) and the need for self-esteem (informed by Sartre’s and Foucault’s attention to the existential damage caused by denigration, and the nefarious effects of reproductive power). Second, although Honneth’s ascription of value to contemporary French theory also involves mis-recognition, his practice of recognition has nonetheless prompted philosophical cooperation among theorists who would not otherwise have engaged, encouraging French-influenced critical theorists to extend Honneth’s theory in ways that he had not anticipated. What emerges is an interpretation of philosophy as an ongoing intersubjective pursuit that attempts to respond to its own limitations through cooperative critique.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"22 1","pages":"29 - 55"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14409917.2021.1886669","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43048809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2021.1886670
Steffen Herrmann
ABSTRACT According to Max Horkheimer, a critical theory of society has to fulfil two tasks: the elimination of social injustice and the critical reflection of its own conceptual means. Based on this definition, I argue that Axel Honneth’s critical theory of recognition is at risk of losing sight of the ambivalence of recognition which limits the scope of his analysis of social pathologies. By drawing on the concept of misrecognising recognition it can be shown that recognition itself is an ambivalent concept which can not only serve the purpose of self-realisation but also the purpose of self-subjection. Following the lead of Jean-Paul Sartre in this article I will unfold the concept of misrecognising recognition and put it at work to show how a variety of social pathologies of self-subjection can only be addressed if the ambivalence of recognition is taken into account.
{"title":"Misrecognising Recognition. Foundations of a Critical Theory of Recognition","authors":"Steffen Herrmann","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2021.1886670","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2021.1886670","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT According to Max Horkheimer, a critical theory of society has to fulfil two tasks: the elimination of social injustice and the critical reflection of its own conceptual means. Based on this definition, I argue that Axel Honneth’s critical theory of recognition is at risk of losing sight of the ambivalence of recognition which limits the scope of his analysis of social pathologies. By drawing on the concept of misrecognising recognition it can be shown that recognition itself is an ambivalent concept which can not only serve the purpose of self-realisation but also the purpose of self-subjection. Following the lead of Jean-Paul Sartre in this article I will unfold the concept of misrecognising recognition and put it at work to show how a variety of social pathologies of self-subjection can only be addressed if the ambivalence of recognition is taken into account.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"22 1","pages":"56 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14409917.2021.1886670","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41400961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2020.1835043
John F. Rundell
It has sometimes been said that Critical Theory is Atlantic-centric – pre-occupied with European and American problems – from war and concentration camps in Europe, the post-national status of the ...
{"title":"Underdevelopment and Critical Theorizing: Empowerment and Cosmopolitan Democracy","authors":"John F. Rundell","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2020.1835043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2020.1835043","url":null,"abstract":"It has sometimes been said that Critical Theory is Atlantic-centric – pre-occupied with European and American problems – from war and concentration camps in Europe, the post-national status of the ...","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"21 1","pages":"367 - 377"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14409917.2020.1835043","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45292516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2020.1835044
J. Grumley
ABSTRACT In this paper I take a closer look at Agnes Heller’s late public lectures and her theoretical methods, scope and their contemporaneity. My relationship to Agnes Heller was a thirty-five year long friendship. She was one of my early mentors. Into her nineties, Agnes was characterized by great vitality, all-consuming interests, from all domains of higher culture to the everyday and current politics. I also meet her periodically during that time in Sydney, Budapest and New York and have some early striking memories of Agnes as a striking personality. Finally, the paper will consider her contemporaneity as a thinker and public figure but also her many great strengths and her only too human weaknesses.
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Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2020.1835042
Sam McAuliffe
ABSTRACT While there is a sense in which technological advancements enhance our experience of the world, there is also a sense in which technology obscures the world. One such instance of technology’s ability to (potentially) obscure the world is the way in which makes works of art (I focus on music) so readily accessible. While in many ways the accessibility and democratisation of music offered by digital streaming, for example, is seen to be convenient, we may also notice how this accessibility can efface the significance of the musical work – works that were once only encountered in the concert hall as “works of art” now also function as background music while we drive our cars, or do the dishes, for instance. In this paper, I argue that improvisation, such as that which is demonstrated by improvising musicians, offers us a “way in” to (re)experience music as works of art, qua art, in the age of technology.
{"title":"The Significance of Improvisation in the Age of Technology","authors":"Sam McAuliffe","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2020.1835042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2020.1835042","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT While there is a sense in which technological advancements enhance our experience of the world, there is also a sense in which technology obscures the world. One such instance of technology’s ability to (potentially) obscure the world is the way in which makes works of art (I focus on music) so readily accessible. While in many ways the accessibility and democratisation of music offered by digital streaming, for example, is seen to be convenient, we may also notice how this accessibility can efface the significance of the musical work – works that were once only encountered in the concert hall as “works of art” now also function as background music while we drive our cars, or do the dishes, for instance. In this paper, I argue that improvisation, such as that which is demonstrated by improvising musicians, offers us a “way in” to (re)experience music as works of art, qua art, in the age of technology.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"21 1","pages":"352 - 366"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14409917.2020.1835042","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45894813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2020.1835041
G. Petropoulos
ABSTRACT This paper examines Heidegger’s remarks about the worldlessness of Judaism in his Black Notebooks. In the first part of the paper I examine Heidegger’s concept of the world in Being and Time and subsequent writings. In the second part, I analyze a distinction that Heidegger draws between mere human actuality and genuine human existence in a 1932 lecture course on The Beginning of Western Philosophy. This distinction, I suggest, relates to the development of Heidegger’s thoughts on nihilism and what he conceives as its gravest danger. In the third part, I argue that the above-mentioned distinction can help us to better understand Heidegger’s remarks on Judaism. In particular, I suggest that the Jewish figure comes to symbolize for Heidegger a kind of unessential human actuality that is irredeemably detached from the question of Being.
{"title":"Actuality Without Existence: The Jewish Figure in Heidegger’s Notebooks","authors":"G. Petropoulos","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2020.1835041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2020.1835041","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper examines Heidegger’s remarks about the worldlessness of Judaism in his Black Notebooks. In the first part of the paper I examine Heidegger’s concept of the world in Being and Time and subsequent writings. In the second part, I analyze a distinction that Heidegger draws between mere human actuality and genuine human existence in a 1932 lecture course on The Beginning of Western Philosophy. This distinction, I suggest, relates to the development of Heidegger’s thoughts on nihilism and what he conceives as its gravest danger. In the third part, I argue that the above-mentioned distinction can help us to better understand Heidegger’s remarks on Judaism. In particular, I suggest that the Jewish figure comes to symbolize for Heidegger a kind of unessential human actuality that is irredeemably detached from the question of Being.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"21 1","pages":"335 - 351"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14409917.2020.1835041","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42475887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2020.1835040
Benjamin Ask Popp-Madsen
ABSTRACT Cornelius Castoriadis is one of the most important democratic thinkers in the second half of the twentieth century, and his theory of autonomy and the self-instituted character of society are fundamental to many post-Marxist theories of democracy. The role of the council system in Castoriadis' work, though, has rarely been investigated, and his analysis of the twentieth century workers' councils of has seldom been connected to his important concepts of autonomy and the instituting power. The article remedies this lack of engagement with Castoriadis' analysis of the council system and argues that the emergence of workers' councils in Castoriadis' own lifetime, during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, provided a crucial impetus for his formulation of a theory of autonomy. Moreover, the article argues that the role of the council system in Castoriadis' work provides a privileged vantage point in order to nuance the critique – voiced by for example Jürgen Habermas and Claude Lefort – that Castoriadis exclusively valorise constituent politics without properly appreciating the importance of ordinary politics. Contrary to this interpretation, the article demonstrates how Castoriadis look to the councils to understand how democratic politics entails both freedom to act anew and the need for institutional structure.
{"title":"From Workers’ Councils to Democratic Autonomy: Rediscovering Cornelius Castoriadis' Theory of Council Democracy","authors":"Benjamin Ask Popp-Madsen","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2020.1835040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2020.1835040","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Cornelius Castoriadis is one of the most important democratic thinkers in the second half of the twentieth century, and his theory of autonomy and the self-instituted character of society are fundamental to many post-Marxist theories of democracy. The role of the council system in Castoriadis' work, though, has rarely been investigated, and his analysis of the twentieth century workers' councils of has seldom been connected to his important concepts of autonomy and the instituting power. The article remedies this lack of engagement with Castoriadis' analysis of the council system and argues that the emergence of workers' councils in Castoriadis' own lifetime, during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, provided a crucial impetus for his formulation of a theory of autonomy. Moreover, the article argues that the role of the council system in Castoriadis' work provides a privileged vantage point in order to nuance the critique – voiced by for example Jürgen Habermas and Claude Lefort – that Castoriadis exclusively valorise constituent politics without properly appreciating the importance of ordinary politics. Contrary to this interpretation, the article demonstrates how Castoriadis look to the councils to understand how democratic politics entails both freedom to act anew and the need for institutional structure.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"21 1","pages":"318 - 334"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14409917.2020.1835040","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45860528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2020.1835039
J. F. Dorahy
ABSTRACT On 19 July 2019, Agnes Heller died whilst swimming in Lake Balaton outside Budapest. With her passing, the culture of humanity lost one of its most remarkable representatives. So too, contemporary critique lost a philosophical sensibility that is, today, within the neoliberal university, increasingly rare. It is this philosophical sensibility with which this essay is concerned. Through a critical reconstruction of Heller’s reading of three key figures from the philosophical tradition (Marx, Pascal and Kierkegaard), this essay both charts the changes and continuities in Heller’s philosophy of concrete subjectivity and makes a case for its continuing relevance to the cultural project of philosophy.
{"title":"Agnes Heller: A Philosopher for Today","authors":"J. F. Dorahy","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2020.1835039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2020.1835039","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT On 19 July 2019, Agnes Heller died whilst swimming in Lake Balaton outside Budapest. With her passing, the culture of humanity lost one of its most remarkable representatives. So too, contemporary critique lost a philosophical sensibility that is, today, within the neoliberal university, increasingly rare. It is this philosophical sensibility with which this essay is concerned. Through a critical reconstruction of Heller’s reading of three key figures from the philosophical tradition (Marx, Pascal and Kierkegaard), this essay both charts the changes and continuities in Heller’s philosophy of concrete subjectivity and makes a case for its continuing relevance to the cultural project of philosophy.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"21 1","pages":"303 - 317"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14409917.2020.1835039","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44258953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2020.1835038
Katie Terezakis
ABSTRACT I link the fundamentalist zeal of Trumpism to its romantic anti-capitalist ideology, and I argue that Trumpism and its European counterparts have appropriated the imaginative plot of romantic anti-capitalism from its place in the Leftist lexicon. The creed-makers of Trumpism now announce that the machinery of capital, which was supposed to belong to the common person, is managed by career politicians and over-educated apologists on behalf of a class that will do anything to keep others from its ranks. I make the case that the ideological successes of Trumpism attest to the continued draw of romantic anti-capitalism and to the Left’s mistake of leaving the romantic imagination unfortified by enfranchising political initiatives. I cite a number of recent speeches by right-wing pundits and politicians, and I analyse them as inheritors of an expanding nationalism tied to romantic anti-capitalist ideologies. I turn to Agnes Heller’s approach to assessing populism and romanticism, both as part as her seminal evaluations of modernity and justice, and in the popular opinion pieces, essays, and lectures delivered during the last years of her life.
{"title":"The Revival of Romantic Anti-Capitalism on the Right: A Synopsis Informed by Agnes Heller’s Philosophy","authors":"Katie Terezakis","doi":"10.1080/14409917.2020.1835038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2020.1835038","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I link the fundamentalist zeal of Trumpism to its romantic anti-capitalist ideology, and I argue that Trumpism and its European counterparts have appropriated the imaginative plot of romantic anti-capitalism from its place in the Leftist lexicon. The creed-makers of Trumpism now announce that the machinery of capital, which was supposed to belong to the common person, is managed by career politicians and over-educated apologists on behalf of a class that will do anything to keep others from its ranks. I make the case that the ideological successes of Trumpism attest to the continued draw of romantic anti-capitalism and to the Left’s mistake of leaving the romantic imagination unfortified by enfranchising political initiatives. I cite a number of recent speeches by right-wing pundits and politicians, and I analyse them as inheritors of an expanding nationalism tied to romantic anti-capitalist ideologies. I turn to Agnes Heller’s approach to assessing populism and romanticism, both as part as her seminal evaluations of modernity and justice, and in the popular opinion pieces, essays, and lectures delivered during the last years of her life.","PeriodicalId":51905,"journal":{"name":"Critical Horizons","volume":"21 1","pages":"291 - 302"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14409917.2020.1835038","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46866619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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