Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity最新文献

Thailand has continuously established biosafety and security laws since 1932. The present law, the Pathogens and Animal Toxins Act 2015, was established for the controlled production, possession, sales, import, export, and transit of pathogens and animal toxins. The law is in accordance with the current world situation—that is, outbreaks of emerging and re-emerging diseases and the development of modern biotechnology, such as genetic modification of pathogens with the potential for beneficial or harmful use. The principles of the pathogen control measures of Thai law are similar to those of foreign laws in countries such as Canada, the United States, Singapore, and the People’s Republic of China. Control measures are based on the risk levels of pathogens to humans, animals, and the environment. This review briefly presents details of the law’s development in Thailand. Details are given in comparison with those of other countries; the export and import of pathogens and animal toxins according to EU export controls are also discussed. The practice and experience of applying the law in Thailand are also presented. Dissemination of enforcement details will ensure effective legal biosafety and biosecurity control measures in Thailand. This may be useful for establishing a law involving regulatory controls for biosafety and biosecurity.

Molecular testing sensitivity, which allows for early diagnosis of the 2019 coronavirus disease (COVID-19), could be affected by sample quality, storage, and transportation timeframe to the laboratory, along with bias related to the pre-analytic phase. The present study reports the selection and decontamination of nasopharyngeal samples during COVID-19 management at the Institut Pasteur Côte d’Ivoire. The objective of this work was to organize sample reception management and report a complete picture of sample selection and decontamination in the context of diagnosis activity decentralization.

An administrative note creating the selection and decontamination unit of nasopharyngeal samples initiated activities in May 2020. The required human resources and necessary materials were identified and put in place. Daily activity consisted of receiving, sorting, decontaminating, and sending nasopharyngeal samples to different diagnostic laboratories. Nonconformities were recorded monthly.

After a six-month period of activities, from a total amount of 11,401 containers received and decontaminated, 174,085 samples were selected. A proportion of 92.0% of these specimens met the diagnostic standards, while 7.0% that were found acceptable showed minor irregularities. Nevertheless, a rate of 1.0% of samples with major abnormalities could not be used for COVID-19 testing and, therefore, were rejected. Additionally, the non-conformity rate was reduced by 2.4% after the first term activity.

Sorting and decontamination of nasopharyngeal samples are crucial steps in biosafety optimization for the technical staff and quality improvement of sample care.

The increasing threat posed by state and nonstate actors seeking to misuse scientific and technological developments means it is more important than ever to ensure the responsible conduct of life sciences research, biosecurity research, and dual-use research of concern (DURC). Pakistan has a rapidly growing research environment and, being a signatory to the Biological Toxins and Weapons Convention, is committed to raising DURC awareness among its researchers. To this end, a series of five workshops were conducted in Pakistan between July 2018 and January 2020 with the support of the United States organization Health Security Partners. The workshops targeted universities offering postgraduate programs in life and medical sciences. The purpose of the workshops was to enable participants to understand the concept of DURC, review their own research, determine if any of their experiments may be DURC, identify potential risks while conducting the research, and develop protocols to mitigate DURC threats. A pre-and post-workshop questionnaire evaluated the knowledge of the participants. Evaluations of both the course and facilitators were obtained at each workshop.

The recent global COVID-19 pandemic has had profound economic and social impacts on the world. It has highlighted an urgent need to strengthen existing international biosecurity governance mechanisms to prevent the misuse and malicious abuse of life science research and maintain international biological arms control norms. Biologists are at the front line of biotechnology development and are key to maintaining biosecurity awareness and moral self-discipline. As an important first step, biologists need to actively participate in the formulation and implementation of relevant biosecurity policies and measures to ensure their effectiveness and sustainability. Furthermore, efforts should be made to advocate for and promote the establishment of an ethical code of conduct for biologists to share safety responsibilities for global biosecurity. To maximize the impact of this ethical code of conduct, an effective approach to implementing codes of conduct for biologists at both national and international levels should be established under the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

COVID-19 is the most severe pandemic globally since the 1918 influenza pandemic. Effectively responding to this once-in-a-century global pandemic is a worldwide challenge that the international community needs to jointly face and solve. This study reviews and discusses the key measures taken by major countries in 2020 to fight against COVID-19, such as lockdowns, social distancing, wearing masks, hand hygiene, using Fangcang shelter hospitals, large-scale nucleic acid testing, close-contacts tracking, and pandemic information monitoring, as well as their prevention and control effects. We hope it can help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of pandemic prevention and control in future.

China is one of the countries with the richest wildlife population. The large variety of widely distributed species act as natural or susceptible hosts for numerous infectious diseases. It is estimated that there are more than 1.2 million unknown virus species in China, and there might be 10,000–30,000 unknown bacteria in wild mammals on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau alone. There are no less than 600,000 species of animal-borne parasites and approximately 2 million species of fungi worldwide. With rapid economic growth and globalization, humans and wildlife interact more frequently, which enhances the probability of wildlife-borne pathogens infecting humans. The occurrence of animal-borne infectious diseases will become the “new normal” we have to face in the future. Therefore, research should be carried out on wildlife-borne microorganisms and the prevention and control of emerging infectious diseases to establish an analytical framework and an evaluation technology system for risk assessment and early warning of potential animal-borne emerging infectious diseases. This will not only improve our understanding of wildlife-borne microbial communities but also enable in-depth analysis, discovery, early warning, and even prediction of major animal-borne emerging infectious diseases that might occur in the future. Furthermore, this research will reduce response times, minimize the social and economic impact and losses, enable interventions related to the emergence or spread of the disease as early as possible, and comprehensively improve our management of infectious disease outbreaks.

Introduction

The cyclical process of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk mitigation, and review is a key step in developing a biorisk management (BRM) system. This paper describes how this process was initiated in two laboratories in Pakistan using a unique model of blended learning.

Methods

A training needs analysis showed that the staff had very little knowledge of BRM systems. A workshop using a unique blended model was conducted in which virtual and in-presence learning occurred simultaneously. This workshop aimed to train the participants by applying two key concepts from the World Health Organization Laboratory Biosafety Manual 4th edition: 1) the cyclical process of risk assessment and 2) mapping the core biorisk and establishing heightened control measures in the laboratories of the participants based on the risk assessment. All scenarios and examples used in the training were from the participants’ laboratory work processes.

Results

Prior to this project, no risk assessment was conducted in these laboratories. After the workshop, a risk assessment was performed for six work processes. In addition, seven core requirements and three heightened control measures were mapped, a biorisk officer was appointed, and a biosafety committee was convened. Furthermore, a biorisk manual, a biological waste management plan, an occupational health center, and a system for audits and inspections are being developed.

Discussion and conclusion

BRM training is not a one-time effort; it has to be strengthened to ensure the development and implementation of a comprehensive and sustainable BRM system. Training must be applicable to local settings and incremental, in a way that participants are not overloaded with information.

Background

Anopheles gambiae (An. gambiae) is considered the most effective malaria vector worldwide and is widely distributed in Africa. The purpose of this study is to determine the potential impact of climate change on An. gambiae and predict the present and future potential suitable habitat globally.

Methods

In this study, environmental variables, global occurrence data of An. gambiae, and the maximum entropy model (MaxEnt) were used to evaluate the contribution of environmental factors and predict the habitat suitability of An. gambiae under the current and future scenarios.

Results

Among all environmental variables, isothermality (Bio3, 34.5%) contributed the most to An. gambiae distribution. Under current climate conditions, the potential suitable areas for An. gambiae are mainly located near the equator (approximately 30°N-30°S), with a total area of 16.58 million km², including central and northern South America, a fraction of areas near the equator of North America, central and southern Africa, some tropical regions of southern Asia, and small areas of Oceania. The areas of potential suitable habitats would be reduced to varying degrees in future climate scenarios.

Conclusions

Potential suitable habitats for An. gambiae may not be limited to Africa. Necessary surveillance and preventive measures should be undertaken in high-risk regions, including those outside Africa, to monitor and control the spread of An. gambiae.

Formulated and endorsed by the international scientific community, the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines are a set of ten guiding principles and standards of conduct designed to promote responsible sciences and strengthen biosecurity governance at national and institutional levels. It may be used to develop new or enhance, supplement, and update the existing codes of conduct adaptive to a specific context and responsive to the bio-risks arising from the rapid advances in biological sciences.