Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity最新文献

Biological weapons are used in wars to wound or kill people or animals and destroy crops with pathogenic microorganisms such as bacteria and viruses, as well as toxins and other biologically active substances. These are highly infectious, easily communicable, widely destructive, long-acting, and difficult to prevent and treat. Thus, a major challenge for the international community is preventing the spread of biological weapons throughout the world. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is a multilateral treaty that clearly prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and preservation of biological and toxic weapons, as well as the design and delivery of biological warfare agents, except for the purpose of prevention, protection and other peaceful uses. The BWC is, to a certain extent, binding on countries capable of manufacturing biological weapons, and has become a powerful tool enabling the international community to jointly deal with the threats posed by biological weapons. However, its effectiveness has been reduced by the lack of a corresponding verification mechanism. With the rapid development of biotechnology, global biosecurity is faced with new and highly uncertain challenges and threats, which requires the member countries of the BWC to cooperate with, promote, and supervise each other in making constant improvements to the BWC in an effort to maintain global peace and stable development.

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is as an emerging infectious disease (EID) that has caused the worst public health catastrophe of the 21st century thus far. In terms of impact, the COVID-19 pandemic is second only to the Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918 in modern world history. As of 7 September 2021, there have been 220 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 and more than 4.5 million deaths. EIDs pose serious public health and socio-economic risks, and 70% of EIDs originate from wildlife. Preventing development of EIDs such as COVID-19 is a pressing concern. Here, taking the COVID-19 pandemic as an example, we illustrate the disastrous effects of EIDs and assess their emergence and evolution from a One Health perspective. We propose a One Health strategy, centered on ‘moving the gates forward’, for EID prevention and control at the human–animal–environment interface. This strategy may be instructive and provide early warnings of EIDs in the future.

We summarized the basic practices and characteristics of epidemic reporting during the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. Based on the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of epidemic data reporting, we put forward some suggestions that should be used for reference and thus improve the epidemic data reports of infectious diseases.

Public engagement in the development, promotion, and utilization of innovation is an important part of any biosafety decision-making process. Under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the public is expected to be involved in the development and handling of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and the implementation of a national biosafety framework (NBF), which governs and regulates the operations of modern biotechnology and GMOs. In this study, we explore the state of public knowledge and awareness regarding GMOs and attitudes toward the NBF in Ghana using a survey conducted in three elite communities in Accra, the capital of Ghana. We interviewed 130 people and found that while most of the respondents obtained information on GMOs through the media, academic papers, and agriculture awareness workshops, access to information on the technology and the NBF was often limited. Our results showed that despite the existence of GMOs and an NBF in Ghana for many years, awareness, understanding, and knowledge of GMOs and the NBF remain inadequate. We found that young, better-educated males are more likely to accept GMOs and be aware of the NBF. This suggests the need for more widespread public education, engagement, and awareness development regarding GMOs, the NBF, and governing institutions as a way of resolving the problems created by misinformation, distrust, and fear, and increasing public confidence in GMOs.

Thailand has continuously established biosafety and security laws since 1932. The present law, the Pathogens and Animal Toxins Act 2015, was established for the controlled production, possession, sales, import, export, and transit of pathogens and animal toxins. The law is in accordance with the current world situation—that is, outbreaks of emerging and re-emerging diseases and the development of modern biotechnology, such as genetic modification of pathogens with the potential for beneficial or harmful use. The principles of the pathogen control measures of Thai law are similar to those of foreign laws in countries such as Canada, the United States, Singapore, and the People’s Republic of China. Control measures are based on the risk levels of pathogens to humans, animals, and the environment. This review briefly presents details of the law’s development in Thailand. Details are given in comparison with those of other countries; the export and import of pathogens and animal toxins according to EU export controls are also discussed. The practice and experience of applying the law in Thailand are also presented. Dissemination of enforcement details will ensure effective legal biosafety and biosecurity control measures in Thailand. This may be useful for establishing a law involving regulatory controls for biosafety and biosecurity.

Molecular testing sensitivity, which allows for early diagnosis of the 2019 coronavirus disease (COVID-19), could be affected by sample quality, storage, and transportation timeframe to the laboratory, along with bias related to the pre-analytic phase. The present study reports the selection and decontamination of nasopharyngeal samples during COVID-19 management at the Institut Pasteur Côte d’Ivoire. The objective of this work was to organize sample reception management and report a complete picture of sample selection and decontamination in the context of diagnosis activity decentralization.

An administrative note creating the selection and decontamination unit of nasopharyngeal samples initiated activities in May 2020. The required human resources and necessary materials were identified and put in place. Daily activity consisted of receiving, sorting, decontaminating, and sending nasopharyngeal samples to different diagnostic laboratories. Nonconformities were recorded monthly.

After a six-month period of activities, from a total amount of 11,401 containers received and decontaminated, 174,085 samples were selected. A proportion of 92.0% of these specimens met the diagnostic standards, while 7.0% that were found acceptable showed minor irregularities. Nevertheless, a rate of 1.0% of samples with major abnormalities could not be used for COVID-19 testing and, therefore, were rejected. Additionally, the non-conformity rate was reduced by 2.4% after the first term activity.

Sorting and decontamination of nasopharyngeal samples are crucial steps in biosafety optimization for the technical staff and quality improvement of sample care.

The increasing threat posed by state and nonstate actors seeking to misuse scientific and technological developments means it is more important than ever to ensure the responsible conduct of life sciences research, biosecurity research, and dual-use research of concern (DURC). Pakistan has a rapidly growing research environment and, being a signatory to the Biological Toxins and Weapons Convention, is committed to raising DURC awareness among its researchers. To this end, a series of five workshops were conducted in Pakistan between July 2018 and January 2020 with the support of the United States organization Health Security Partners. The workshops targeted universities offering postgraduate programs in life and medical sciences. The purpose of the workshops was to enable participants to understand the concept of DURC, review their own research, determine if any of their experiments may be DURC, identify potential risks while conducting the research, and develop protocols to mitigate DURC threats. A pre-and post-workshop questionnaire evaluated the knowledge of the participants. Evaluations of both the course and facilitators were obtained at each workshop.

The recent global COVID-19 pandemic has had profound economic and social impacts on the world. It has highlighted an urgent need to strengthen existing international biosecurity governance mechanisms to prevent the misuse and malicious abuse of life science research and maintain international biological arms control norms. Biologists are at the front line of biotechnology development and are key to maintaining biosecurity awareness and moral self-discipline. As an important first step, biologists need to actively participate in the formulation and implementation of relevant biosecurity policies and measures to ensure their effectiveness and sustainability. Furthermore, efforts should be made to advocate for and promote the establishment of an ethical code of conduct for biologists to share safety responsibilities for global biosecurity. To maximize the impact of this ethical code of conduct, an effective approach to implementing codes of conduct for biologists at both national and international levels should be established under the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).