Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity最新文献

It’s urgently needed to assess the COVID-19 epidemic under the “dynamic zero-COVID policy” in China, which provides a scientific basis for evaluating the effectiveness of this strategy in COVID-19 control. Here, we developed a time-dependent susceptible-exposed-asymptomatic-infected-quarantined-removed (SEAIQR) model with stage-specific interventions based on recent Shanghai epidemic data, considering a large number of asymptomatic infectious, the changing parameters, and control procedures. The data collected from March 1st, 2022 to April 15th, 2022 were used to fit the model, and the data of subsequent 7 days and 14 days were used to evaluate the model performance of forecasting. We then calculated the effective regeneration number (R_t) and analyzed the sensitivity of different measures scenarios. Asymptomatic infectious accounts for the vast majority of the outbreaks in Shanghai, and Pudong is the district with the most positive cases. The peak of newly confirmed cases and newly asymptomatic infectious predicted by the SEAIQR model would appear on April 13th, 2022, with 1963 and 28,502 cases, respectively, and zero community transmission may be achieved in early to mid-May. The prediction errors for newly confirmed cases were considered to be reasonable, and newly asymptomatic infectious were considered to be good between April 16th to 22nd and reasonable between April 16th to 29th. The final ranges of cumulative confirmed cases and cumulative asymptomatic infectious predicted in this round of the epidemic were 26,477 ∼ 47,749 and 402,254 ∼ 730,176, respectively. At the beginning of the outbreak, R_t was 6.69. Since the implementation of comprehensive control, R_t showed a gradual downward trend, dropping to below 1.0 on April 15th, 2022. With the early implementation of control measures and the improvement of quarantine rate, recovery rate, and immunity threshold, the peak number of infections will continue to decrease, whereas the earlier the control is implemented, the earlier the turning point of the epidemic will arrive. The proposed time-dependent SEAIQR dynamic model fits and forecasts the epidemic well, which can provide a reference for decision making of the “dynamic zero-COVID policy”.

With the rapid development of intelligent technology, the smart heightened-containment biological laboratory (sHCBL) has moved from concept to reality. Experimental activities and laboratory construction, operation, and management will undoubtedly lead to disruptive changes. Conventional laboratories are increasingly being replaced by smart laboratories; however, the key technologies involved in this transition remain at an exploratory stage. It is necessary for HCBLs to absorb the advanced ideas of smart laboratories to guarantee the establishment of biosafety and biosecurity in a more automated way. This study examines in detail sHCBL module structures, the functions of each module, laboratory operation processes, and the advanced nature of smart laboratories. It may provide a theoretical foundation for the future transformation and smart construction of sHCBLs.

Biosafety issues have become a major threat to the health of humans, animals, and ecosystems worldwide. As problems with food production and the food supply chain have become of greater concern to consumers, issues involving biosafety and food safety from a developmental perspective need to be urgently addressed. The term, food biosafety, is the combination of the core concepts of biosafety and food safety. It refers to the effective prevention of biological threats to food production and the food supply chain by controlling foodborne diseases arising from the consumption of edible plants and animal products, by preventing the establishment of invasive species, by strictly controlling the use of antibiotics, agricultural chemicals and veterinary drugs in the food supply chain, and by initiating food defense and anti-terrorism measures to protect the health of humans, animals, and ecosystems, thereby maintaining sustainable development in China. This article provides theoretical support for the extension of food biosafety to propose an innovative plan for the international co-governance of food safety.

Microbiology Research Laboratory (MRL) is a biosafety level-2 (BSL-2) research laboratory located at the main campus of Faculty of Medicine, Ain Shams University (ASU) in Cairo. With the objective of strengthening the departmental capacities of biosafety, a series of activities were carried out between October 2019, and January 2020 to raise awareness, along with instilling standard biosafety practices and procedures among laboratory staff including non-health professions. MRL staff were categorized according to their biosafety knowledge into three tiers: tier (1): with zero to minimal knowledge, tier (2): with basic knowledge, tier (3): with satisfactory knowledge. Tier based activities were designed to align with their job responsibilities. Results: 44 selected laboratory staff were trained on biosafety practices: 12 from tier (1), 19 from tier (2) and 13 constituted tier (3). Through regular follow-ups, the impact of the implemnted training plan was reflected on the practices and knowledge of all laboratory staff. Knowledge among health professions has increased by 60%. Furthermore, 6 staff members have granted a biosafety certification by International Federation of Biosafety Association (IFBSA). Conclusion: establishing a culture of biosafety within microbiology research laboratories is integral to safe research practices. Together with developing local and national biosafety regulations and policies will ensure research advancement without compromising public health or environmental safety.

The devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have acutely shown the need for maintaining robust international and national systems for biological security and ensuring that life sciences are used only for peaceful purposes. Life science stakeholders can play an important role in safeguarding scientific and technological advances in biology and related fields against accidental or deliberate misuse, not least because they are on the frontlines of driving innovation. In this paper, we argue that enhancing awareness and understanding of the risk of deliberate disease is essential for effective biological security. We first discuss the issue of ‘dual use’ in science and technology as it relates to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Second, we review how scientist engagement with dual-use risks has been addressed in the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Third, we report on the development of an innovative awareness-raising tool, a cartoon series, that can be used for engaging life science stakeholders with BTWC issues. Finally, we outline a set of practical considerations for promoting sustainable life science engagement with the BTWC.

Considerable progress has been achieved in basic research and the biotechnological application of biological sciences in recent years. Synthetic biology integrates systems biology, engineering, computer science, and other disciplines to achieve the “modification of life” or even the “creation of life” via the redesign of existing natural systems or the development of new biological components and devices. However, the research and application of synthetic biology can create potential risks, such as aggravation of species with complex gene modifications, threats to species diversity, abuse of biological weapons, laboratory leaks, and man-made mutations. Without a suitable governance system, such research activities could result in harm to humans, plants, and animals, as well as to natural ecological systems. In this article, we first briefly summarize technical progress in synthetic biology in recent years and the potential bioethical and biosecurity risks, and then describe current international treaties, guidance documents, and national regulatory measures designed to address potential harm caused by the dual-use property of synthetic biology, including the Biological Weapons Convention, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Model Code of Conduct for Biological Scientists (Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists). In addition, we also present some recommendations for better governance of synthetic biology research and applications in China, including strengthening the biosecurity capacity, improving the biosecurity regulatory system, and promoting multilevel international cooperation to effectively address the potential biosecurity risks of synthetic biology.

Experimental research with animals can help the prevention, cure, and alleviation of human ailments. Animal research facilities are critical for scientific advancement, but they can also pose a higher risk than other biomedical laboratories. Zoonosis, allergic reactions, bites, cuts, and scratches by animals are all substantial concerns that can occur in animal facilities. Furthermore, human error and unexpected animal behavior pose a risk not just to humans, but also to the environment and the animals themselves. The majority of biosafety and biosecurity training programs focus on clinical and biomedical laboratories dealing with human safety factors, with little emphasis on animal biosafety. The current virtual training was designed to improve biosafety and biosecurity capabilities of animal laboratory personnel, researchers, and veterinarians from different regions of Pakistan. The results revealed that understanding was improved regarding triggers for risk assessment in addition to annual and regular reviews (56% to 69%), biosecurity (21% to 50%), decontamination (17% to 35%), safe handling of sharps (21% to 35%), Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) (17% to 40%), Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) usage by waste handlers (60.9% to 75%), waste management (56% to 85%), animal biosafety levels (40.57% to 45%), and good microbiological practices and procedures (17% to 35%). To bring human and animal laboratories up to the same level in terms of biosafety and biosecurity, it is critical to focus on areas that have been overlooked in the past. Training programs focusing on animal biosafety should be conducted more frequently to strengthen bio risk management systems in animal research facilities.

Laboratory diagnostic capacity is crucial for an optimal national response to a public health emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Preventing laboratory-acquired infections and the loss of critical human resources, especially during a public health emergency, requires laboratories to have a good biorisk management system in place. In this study, we aimed to evaluate laboratory biosafety and biosecurity in Pakistan during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this cross-sectional study, a self-rated anonymous questionnaire was distributed to laboratory professionals (LPs) working in clinical diagnostic laboratories, including laboratories performing polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-based COVID-19 diagnostic testing in Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Gilgit-Baltistan provinces as well as Islamabad during March 2020 to April 2020. The questionnaire assessed knowledge and perceptions of LPs, resource availability, and commitment by top management in these laboratories. In total, 58.6% of LPs performing COVID-19 testing reported that their laboratory did not conduct a biorisk assessment before starting COVID-19 testing in their facility. Only 31% of LPs were aware that COVID-19 testing could be performed at a biosafety level 2 laboratory, as per the World Health Organization interim biosafety guidelines. A sufficiently high percentage of LPs did not feel confident in their ability to handle COVID-19 samples (32.8%), spills (43.1%), or other accidents (32.8%). These findings demonstrate the need for effective biosafety program implementation, proper training, and establishing competency assessment methods. These findings also suggested that identifying and addressing gaps in existing biorisk management systems through sustainable interventions and preparing LPs for surge capacity is crucial to better address public health emergencies.

Nucleic acid detection, widely used in clinical diagnosis, biological analysis, and environmental monitoring, is of great significance for disease diagnosis and basic research. With the outbreak of COVID-19, the demand for fast and high-throughput nucleic acid detection from large numbers of samples has increased sharply. Automated nucleic acid detection systems can meet these needs, and also play important roles in disease screening and infectious disease prevention and control. In this review, we introduce and compare the current mainstream nucleic acid automatic detection instruments and equipment, then discuss the future demands of nucleic acid detection.