Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity最新文献

The devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have acutely shown the need for maintaining robust international and national systems for biological security and ensuring that life sciences are used only for peaceful purposes. Life science stakeholders can play an important role in safeguarding scientific and technological advances in biology and related fields against accidental or deliberate misuse, not least because they are on the frontlines of driving innovation. In this paper, we argue that enhancing awareness and understanding of the risk of deliberate disease is essential for effective biological security. We first discuss the issue of ‘dual use’ in science and technology as it relates to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Second, we review how scientist engagement with dual-use risks has been addressed in the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Third, we report on the development of an innovative awareness-raising tool, a cartoon series, that can be used for engaging life science stakeholders with BTWC issues. Finally, we outline a set of practical considerations for promoting sustainable life science engagement with the BTWC.

Considerable progress has been achieved in basic research and the biotechnological application of biological sciences in recent years. Synthetic biology integrates systems biology, engineering, computer science, and other disciplines to achieve the “modification of life” or even the “creation of life” via the redesign of existing natural systems or the development of new biological components and devices. However, the research and application of synthetic biology can create potential risks, such as aggravation of species with complex gene modifications, threats to species diversity, abuse of biological weapons, laboratory leaks, and man-made mutations. Without a suitable governance system, such research activities could result in harm to humans, plants, and animals, as well as to natural ecological systems. In this article, we first briefly summarize technical progress in synthetic biology in recent years and the potential bioethical and biosecurity risks, and then describe current international treaties, guidance documents, and national regulatory measures designed to address potential harm caused by the dual-use property of synthetic biology, including the Biological Weapons Convention, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Model Code of Conduct for Biological Scientists (Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists). In addition, we also present some recommendations for better governance of synthetic biology research and applications in China, including strengthening the biosecurity capacity, improving the biosecurity regulatory system, and promoting multilevel international cooperation to effectively address the potential biosecurity risks of synthetic biology.

Experimental research with animals can help the prevention, cure, and alleviation of human ailments. Animal research facilities are critical for scientific advancement, but they can also pose a higher risk than other biomedical laboratories. Zoonosis, allergic reactions, bites, cuts, and scratches by animals are all substantial concerns that can occur in animal facilities. Furthermore, human error and unexpected animal behavior pose a risk not just to humans, but also to the environment and the animals themselves. The majority of biosafety and biosecurity training programs focus on clinical and biomedical laboratories dealing with human safety factors, with little emphasis on animal biosafety. The current virtual training was designed to improve biosafety and biosecurity capabilities of animal laboratory personnel, researchers, and veterinarians from different regions of Pakistan. The results revealed that understanding was improved regarding triggers for risk assessment in addition to annual and regular reviews (56% to 69%), biosecurity (21% to 50%), decontamination (17% to 35%), safe handling of sharps (21% to 35%), Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) (17% to 40%), Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) usage by waste handlers (60.9% to 75%), waste management (56% to 85%), animal biosafety levels (40.57% to 45%), and good microbiological practices and procedures (17% to 35%). To bring human and animal laboratories up to the same level in terms of biosafety and biosecurity, it is critical to focus on areas that have been overlooked in the past. Training programs focusing on animal biosafety should be conducted more frequently to strengthen bio risk management systems in animal research facilities.

Laboratory diagnostic capacity is crucial for an optimal national response to a public health emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Preventing laboratory-acquired infections and the loss of critical human resources, especially during a public health emergency, requires laboratories to have a good biorisk management system in place. In this study, we aimed to evaluate laboratory biosafety and biosecurity in Pakistan during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this cross-sectional study, a self-rated anonymous questionnaire was distributed to laboratory professionals (LPs) working in clinical diagnostic laboratories, including laboratories performing polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-based COVID-19 diagnostic testing in Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Gilgit-Baltistan provinces as well as Islamabad during March 2020 to April 2020. The questionnaire assessed knowledge and perceptions of LPs, resource availability, and commitment by top management in these laboratories. In total, 58.6% of LPs performing COVID-19 testing reported that their laboratory did not conduct a biorisk assessment before starting COVID-19 testing in their facility. Only 31% of LPs were aware that COVID-19 testing could be performed at a biosafety level 2 laboratory, as per the World Health Organization interim biosafety guidelines. A sufficiently high percentage of LPs did not feel confident in their ability to handle COVID-19 samples (32.8%), spills (43.1%), or other accidents (32.8%). These findings demonstrate the need for effective biosafety program implementation, proper training, and establishing competency assessment methods. These findings also suggested that identifying and addressing gaps in existing biorisk management systems through sustainable interventions and preparing LPs for surge capacity is crucial to better address public health emergencies.

Nucleic acid detection, widely used in clinical diagnosis, biological analysis, and environmental monitoring, is of great significance for disease diagnosis and basic research. With the outbreak of COVID-19, the demand for fast and high-throughput nucleic acid detection from large numbers of samples has increased sharply. Automated nucleic acid detection systems can meet these needs, and also play important roles in disease screening and infectious disease prevention and control. In this review, we introduce and compare the current mainstream nucleic acid automatic detection instruments and equipment, then discuss the future demands of nucleic acid detection.

Coronavirus causes significant damage to human health and the global economy. In this paper, we undertake patent analysis and data mining to systematically analyze the trend in patent applications for coronavirus detection, prevention, and treatment technologies. Our goals are to determine the correlation between typical coronavirus outbreaks and changes in patent technology applications, and to compare the research and development (R&D) progress, patent layout, and characteristics of major institutions in various countries experiencing coronavirus outbreaks. We find that the United States commenced coronavirus detection and vaccine technology R&D earlier than other countries, as it attached importance to the R&D for treatment technologies from the time of the SARS outbreak and initiated the trend of multi-party R&D, with full technology chain coverage by the government, enterprises, universities, and research institutions. China’s patent applications have grown rapidly in recent years, mainly based on the R&D of research institutions and universities, although it has formed full technology chain coverage. However, the patent quality and technology global layout still need to be improved. This paper reviews the patent development trends of important coronavirus technologies, and proposes that policymakers should establish a long-term mechanism for R&D, pay attention to intellectual property protection, and deepen international technical cooperation to provide a reference for the development and application of coronavirus detection technology, vaccine technology, and treatment technology.

Countries must have strong early warning, detection, and response capabilities in the face of the risks and challenges posed by major infectious diseases and bioterrorism threats. Vaccination is one of the most effective means for countries to maintain biosecurity and respond to bioterrorism attacks. Microneedles are emerging as a potential vaccine delivery method with minimal pain, no bleeding, and the ability to be self-administered, doing away with the need for professional health care workers. This last advantage, particularly if combined with room temperature preservation, could have an important role in improving national biosecurity through large-scale, rapid deployment of a biological vaccine. In this review, we summarized the research status of microneedles, including the types, materials, and production technologies of microneedles. Recent progress regarding microneedles in the field of biosecurity is introduced and challenges in its future application are discussed.

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has evolved rapidly into new variants throughout the pandemic. The Omicron variant has more than 50 mutations when compared with the original wild-type strain and has been identified globally in numerous countries. In this report, we analyzed the mutational profiles of several variants, including the per-site mutation rate, to determine evolutionary relationships. The Omicron variant was found to have a unique mutation profile when compared with that of other SARS-CoV-2 variants, containing mutations that are rare in clinical samples. Moreover, the presence of five mouse-adapted mutation sites suggests that Omicron may have evolved in a mouse host. Mutations in the Omicron receptor-binding domain (RBD) region, in particular, have potential implications for the ongoing pandemic.

Biological threats, whether naturally occurring or accidentally or deliberately released, have the potential to endanger lives and disrupt economies worldwide. Thus, high-containment protective measures should be implemented when handling bio-agents that can cause serious, highly contagious diseases, otherwise devastating pandemics can occur. In the fields of scientific investigation, healthcare, and product development, high-containment facilities play a critical role in preventing, detecting, and responding promptly and effectively to threats to global health security. In this paper, we present a summary of the main types of high-containment facilities, as well as their applications, challenges, and suggestions for the future.