The Soviet Union has disappeared from the maps of the world, leaving the EU a chance to participate in the political processes unfolding in Central Asia, even if the vast spaces between them limited Brussels’ involvement in regional policies. This explains the European Commission’s succinct definition: “a bridge to China, as well as to Afghanistan and the Middle East” and “a source of significant energy imports for the EU.” For the same reason, Central Asia remains outside the European neighborhood policy; in defiance of the Treaty of Lisbon, its members prefer to act independently on the international arena: their interest in Central Asia and, therefore, their contributions to the common EU policy in the region differ vastly. Following the signing of partnership and cooperation agreements with the Central Asian states, the EU became one of their important trade partners and key investors. As such, Brussels pays particular attention to democracy, human rights and civil society in all the regional countries and cooperates with them in the security sphere. Destabilization in Afghanistan has forced border security issues into the focus of corresponding programs and initiatives realized by the EU. Their growing dependence on external sources of energy and an absence of guaranteed supplies stir up concerns in the EU member-states and in Brussels and breed hopes that Central Asia, with its considerable hydrocarbon resources and advantageous geographic location, may play an important role in energy supplies. So far, EU policy in Central Asia leaves much to be desired, while the results of the projects it had initiated in the region are clearly contradictory. Brussels has achieved a lot in diplomatic relations with the local states, which allowed it to expand its trade and economic cooperation and develop political coordination. However, its achievements in many other spheres (human rights, counteracting corruption and economic diversification) are not particularly impressive. The worsening situation in Afghanistan will generate migration flows to the Central Asian countries and the European Union. Another migration crisis cannot be ruled out.
{"title":"THE EU IN CENTRAL ASIA: UNREALIZED AMBITIONS AND PROSPECTS","authors":"O. Timakova","doi":"10.37178/ca-c.21.4.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.4.01","url":null,"abstract":"The Soviet Union has disappeared from the maps of the world, leaving the EU a chance to participate in the political processes unfolding in Central Asia, even if the vast spaces between them limited Brussels’ involvement in regional policies. This explains the European Commission’s succinct definition: “a bridge to China, as well as to Afghanistan and the Middle East” and “a source of significant energy imports for the EU.” For the same reason, Central Asia remains outside the European neighborhood policy; in defiance of the Treaty of Lisbon, its members prefer to act independently on the international arena: their interest in Central Asia and, therefore, their contributions to the common EU policy in the region differ vastly. Following the signing of partnership and cooperation agreements with the Central Asian states, the EU became one of their important trade partners and key investors. As such, Brussels pays particular attention to democracy, human rights and civil society in all the regional countries and cooperates with them in the security sphere. Destabilization in Afghanistan has forced border security issues into the focus of corresponding programs and initiatives realized by the EU. Their growing dependence on external sources of energy and an absence of guaranteed supplies stir up concerns in the EU member-states and in Brussels and breed hopes that Central Asia, with its considerable hydrocarbon resources and advantageous geographic location, may play an important role in energy supplies. So far, EU policy in Central Asia leaves much to be desired, while the results of the projects it had initiated in the region are clearly contradictory. Brussels has achieved a lot in diplomatic relations with the local states, which allowed it to expand its trade and economic cooperation and develop political coordination. However, its achievements in many other spheres (human rights, counteracting corruption and economic diversification) are not particularly impressive. The worsening situation in Afghanistan will generate migration flows to the Central Asian countries and the European Union. Another migration crisis cannot be ruled out.","PeriodicalId":53489,"journal":{"name":"Central Asia and the Caucasus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47724064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the new Central Asian independent states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan replaced the Soviet republics of Central (Sredniaia) Asia and Kazakhstan. By the time they gained independence, these countries had already developed specific mechanisms of governance: The Communist Party and state structures had relied, to a great extent, on certain regional clan principles of decision-making inherited from their distant past. The new states immediately declared that they would strive to build Western-style political systems. They elected their presidents and parliaments, set up judicial systems, yet the political elites proved unable to realize the democratic standards of the West they supported in words. Over the course of three decades, heads of state, who dominated and still remain the dominant figures in their countries and are responsible for domestic and foreign policies have replaced each other without any real competition. None of the regional states can boast of competitive presidential elections. On the other hand, even though their political development may have external similarities, there are still numerous differences rooted in their very different past, cultures and mentalities. The regional clan division, swept under the carpet during the Soviet period, was revived as an important and highly influential feature. Kazakhstan was divided into zhuzes; Kyrgyzstan is in the midst of an ongoing regional confrontation between the South and the North; in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan regional clans have gradually gained a lot of political weight. This means that the leaders of all Central Asian countries had no choice but to take into account the interests of groups and clans and the ties between different tribes, which inevitably affected the principles of governance and choice of officials. The personal characteristics of leaders who came to power after the Soviet Union had left the stage and their interpretations of the ongoing processes played a huge role in regional developments, the relationships between the regional states, the regional balance of power and the political situation. Today, all the above-mentioned countries with the exception of Tajikistan, have elected new presidents either amid domestic political turmoil or through a power transit within the same group. This means that in all Central Asian countries presidential elections are not seen as an instrument of change of power but, rather, as an instrument of remaining in power. The complicated economic situation, the non-regional actors that put pressure on the local political elites and, recently, the COVID-19 pandemic, which intensified the social and economic problems, did nothing positive for the political and economic stability in Central Asia.
{"title":"CENTRAL ASIA: THE BUMPY ROAD TOWARDS POLITICAL MATURITY","authors":"O. Karpovich","doi":"10.37178/ca-c.21.4.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.4.04","url":null,"abstract":"Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the new Central Asian independent states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan replaced the Soviet republics of Central (Sredniaia) Asia and Kazakhstan. By the time they gained independence, these countries had already developed specific mechanisms of governance: The Communist Party and state structures had relied, to a great extent, on certain regional clan principles of decision-making inherited from their distant past. The new states immediately declared that they would strive to build Western-style political systems. They elected their presidents and parliaments, set up judicial systems, yet the political elites proved unable to realize the democratic standards of the West they supported in words. Over the course of three decades, heads of state, who dominated and still remain the dominant figures in their countries and are responsible for domestic and foreign policies have replaced each other without any real competition. None of the regional states can boast of competitive presidential elections. On the other hand, even though their political development may have external similarities, there are still numerous differences rooted in their very different past, cultures and mentalities. The regional clan division, swept under the carpet during the Soviet period, was revived as an important and highly influential feature. Kazakhstan was divided into zhuzes; Kyrgyzstan is in the midst of an ongoing regional confrontation between the South and the North; in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan regional clans have gradually gained a lot of political weight. This means that the leaders of all Central Asian countries had no choice but to take into account the interests of groups and clans and the ties between different tribes, which inevitably affected the principles of governance and choice of officials. The personal characteristics of leaders who came to power after the Soviet Union had left the stage and their interpretations of the ongoing processes played a huge role in regional developments, the relationships between the regional states, the regional balance of power and the political situation. Today, all the above-mentioned countries with the exception of Tajikistan, have elected new presidents either amid domestic political turmoil or through a power transit within the same group. This means that in all Central Asian countries presidential elections are not seen as an instrument of change of power but, rather, as an instrument of remaining in power. The complicated economic situation, the non-regional actors that put pressure on the local political elites and, recently, the COVID-19 pandemic, which intensified the social and economic problems, did nothing positive for the political and economic stability in Central Asia.","PeriodicalId":53489,"journal":{"name":"Central Asia and the Caucasus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42973626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nurettin Can, Ibrahim Koncak, Sanar Muhyaddin, I. Keles
This article studies the perception of great powers in the eyes of students in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan using data collected through an online survey. The research has compared the perceptions of China’s and other Great Powers’ economic, political, and military authority among the youth of Central Asian countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. To analyze these perceptions, young people from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (N = 262) took part in a survey in the spring of 2021. Responses were analyzed to reveal the differences in perception by applying descriptive and inferential statistical methods, i.e., one-sample t-test. An association of geodemographic factors with the perception towards global powers was discovered by applying the chi-square test statistical method. The early research revealed that the role of the other Great Powers was seen mainly in political terms, while China’s role was mostly economic, however, recent studies made it clear that China’s political influence is increasing in the region. Another finding from this research is that China’s position on human rights and environmental issues is more negatively perceived than that of the other Great powers.
{"title":"PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA AND OTHER GREAT POWERS AMONG KAZAKHSTAN AND KYRGYZSTAN YOUTH","authors":"Nurettin Can, Ibrahim Koncak, Sanar Muhyaddin, I. Keles","doi":"10.37178/ca-c.21.4.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.4.07","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies the perception of great powers in the eyes of students in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan using data collected through an online survey. The research has compared the perceptions of China’s and other Great Powers’ economic, political, and military authority among the youth of Central Asian countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. To analyze these perceptions, young people from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (N = 262) took part in a survey in the spring of 2021. Responses were analyzed to reveal the differences in perception by applying descriptive and inferential statistical methods, i.e., one-sample t-test. An association of geodemographic factors with the perception towards global powers was discovered by applying the chi-square test statistical method. The early research revealed that the role of the other Great Powers was seen mainly in political terms, while China’s role was mostly economic, however, recent studies made it clear that China’s political influence is increasing in the region. Another finding from this research is that China’s position on human rights and environmental issues is more negatively perceived than that of the other Great powers.","PeriodicalId":53489,"journal":{"name":"Central Asia and the Caucasus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46362420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
R. Kadyrzhanov, Zhannat Makasheva, Zhyldyz Amrebayeva, A. Amrebayev
The article examines the problem of sovereignty of the Republic of Kazakhstan through the prism of Kazakh-Russian interstate relations. The key conclusions made by the authors are that, first of all, Kazakh-Russian relations are based on the post-Soviet model and the concept of the sovereignty of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which retains significant elements of the Soviet constitutional model of relations between the Union center and the republics; secondly, as part of this sovereignty model, the Republic of Kazakhstan has to make concessions in the economic, financial and other forms of sovereignty. However, the Republic of Kazakhstan makes no concessions in matters of territorial integrity and other fundamental aspects of its sovereignty. Thirdly, it was easier for the Republic of Kazakhstan to maintain the image of the Russian Federation as a strategic partner between 1991 and the mid-2000s, but since that time, the Russian Federation has been pursuing an openly neo-imperial policy in the post-Soviet space, thus, the increasing securitization of the relations with the Russian Federation requires great efforts from the Republic of Kazakhstan to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
{"title":"KAZAKHSTAN’S SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CONTEXT OF KAZAKH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS","authors":"R. Kadyrzhanov, Zhannat Makasheva, Zhyldyz Amrebayeva, A. Amrebayev","doi":"10.37178/ca-c.21.4.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.4.09","url":null,"abstract":"The article examines the problem of sovereignty of the Republic of Kazakhstan through the prism of Kazakh-Russian interstate relations. The key conclusions made by the authors are that, first of all, Kazakh-Russian relations are based on the post-Soviet model and the concept of the sovereignty of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which retains significant elements of the Soviet constitutional model of relations between the Union center and the republics; secondly, as part of this sovereignty model, the Republic of Kazakhstan has to make concessions in the economic, financial and other forms of sovereignty. However, the Republic of Kazakhstan makes no concessions in matters of territorial integrity and other fundamental aspects of its sovereignty. Thirdly, it was easier for the Republic of Kazakhstan to maintain the image of the Russian Federation as a strategic partner between 1991 and the mid-2000s, but since that time, the Russian Federation has been pursuing an openly neo-imperial policy in the post-Soviet space, thus, the increasing securitization of the relations with the Russian Federation requires great efforts from the Republic of Kazakhstan to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.","PeriodicalId":53489,"journal":{"name":"Central Asia and the Caucasus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43126744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article contains an overview of the activities of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), a structure aimed at creating a comprehensive mechanism for developing and reconciling the positions of Asian countries on key security issues. The CICA is a forum that many regional states have joined as permanent participants. Eight countries and five international organizations, including the U.N., currently have an observer status at the CICA, which cooperates with existing regional organizations such as SCO, ASEAN, and OIC in a number of specific areas. The current concept of CICA’s work is aligned with five main spheres: military and political collaboration; the fight against new challenges and threats, including terrorism; drug trafficking; transnational crime and human trafficking; as well as the economic, environmental and human dimensions. Cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose members (including the observer countries) are all also members of the Conference, will be of great importance for the further development of CICA. The presence of both resource-producing countries and large oil and gas importers in the organization creates the preconditions for the formation of an energy block within its framework, which will increase the energy security of its member states. The authors note that the interaction between ASEAN and the CICA can be based on five points required for building a “community of common destiny,” which were set forth by President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping in Jakarta: (1) adhere to the principle of trust and strive for good neighborliness; (2) adhere to the principle of cooperation and mutual benefit; (3) constantly provide mutual assistance; (4) adhere to the principle of “living in perfect harmony”; (5) adhere to the principle of openness and tolerance. The authors note that the problem of Afghanistan can become a point of contact and development of joint approaches and strategies of the CICA and the OIC in the context of international and regional security. The author concludes that the transformation of the CICA into the Organization for Security and Development of Asia, proposed by Kazakhstan, would mean an expansion of the conference format and a turn towards solving new problems. In addition, the urgent task of the CICA at present is the transition to qualitatively new levels of cooperation—preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention.
{"title":"CICA AND ASIAN COOPERATION ORGANIZATIONS (SCO, ASEAN, OIC): COOPERATION POTENTIAL AND PROSPECTS","authors":"M. Laumulin, S. Kozhirova","doi":"10.37178/ca-c.21.4.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.4.02","url":null,"abstract":"The article contains an overview of the activities of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), a structure aimed at creating a comprehensive mechanism for developing and reconciling the positions of Asian countries on key security issues. The CICA is a forum that many regional states have joined as permanent participants. Eight countries and five international organizations, including the U.N., currently have an observer status at the CICA, which cooperates with existing regional organizations such as SCO, ASEAN, and OIC in a number of specific areas. The current concept of CICA’s work is aligned with five main spheres: military and political collaboration; the fight against new challenges and threats, including terrorism; drug trafficking; transnational crime and human trafficking; as well as the economic, environmental and human dimensions. Cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose members (including the observer countries) are all also members of the Conference, will be of great importance for the further development of CICA. The presence of both resource-producing countries and large oil and gas importers in the organization creates the preconditions for the formation of an energy block within its framework, which will increase the energy security of its member states. The authors note that the interaction between ASEAN and the CICA can be based on five points required for building a “community of common destiny,” which were set forth by President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping in Jakarta: (1) adhere to the principle of trust and strive for good neighborliness; (2) adhere to the principle of cooperation and mutual benefit; (3) constantly provide mutual assistance; (4) adhere to the principle of “living in perfect harmony”; (5) adhere to the principle of openness and tolerance. The authors note that the problem of Afghanistan can become a point of contact and development of joint approaches and strategies of the CICA and the OIC in the context of international and regional security. The author concludes that the transformation of the CICA into the Organization for Security and Development of Asia, proposed by Kazakhstan, would mean an expansion of the conference format and a turn towards solving new problems. In addition, the urgent task of the CICA at present is the transition to qualitatively new levels of cooperation—preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention.","PeriodicalId":53489,"journal":{"name":"Central Asia and the Caucasus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49019638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Armenian diaspora is one of the largest in Russia and in the world. The Armenians living in the Krasnodar Territory are a large and active group, thus, an investigation into the problem of their acculturation is of scientific and practical importance. Based on the theory of social identity, the theory of acculturation, and the regional socio-cultural context, the study focused on the role of ethnic, regional and Russian national (civic) identities and diaspora activity in the acculturation of the Armenians in the Krasnodar Territory. The study used the scales from the MIRIPS project questionnaire (Mutual Intercultural Relations in Plural Societies). The sample consisted of 181 respondents. Using structural equation modeling, the ethnic and Russian national identities of the Armenians living in the Krasnodar Territory were revealed as factors that contributed to their integration, and regional identity—as factors that fostered assimilation. Diaspora activity was determined by both ethnic and regional identity and predicted the Armenians’ attitudes towards integration and separation. Also, diaspora activity of the Armenians in the Kuban region facilitated the interconnection of ethnic and regional identities with the separation strategy. In general, the study revealed that all identities (ethnic, regional and Russian national) contribute to a certain degree to the acceptance of the host society culture by the Armenians in the Krasnodar Territory. At the same time, diaspora activity can be an effective mechanism for the adaptation of migrants or a source of problems associated with increased impenetrability of diaspora’s borders, the migrants’ exclusive focus on their ethnic group and their decreased desire for sociocultural integration into the host society. It is important to take this into account when shaping the regional interethnic relations policy.
{"title":"ACCULTURATION OF ARMENIANS IN RUSSIA: ROLE OF SOCIAL IDENTITIES AND DIASPORA ACTIVITY","authors":"V. Galyapina, O. Tuchina, I. Apollonov","doi":"10.37178/ca-c.21.4.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.4.10","url":null,"abstract":"The Armenian diaspora is one of the largest in Russia and in the world. The Armenians living in the Krasnodar Territory are a large and active group, thus, an investigation into the problem of their acculturation is of scientific and practical importance. Based on the theory of social identity, the theory of acculturation, and the regional socio-cultural context, the study focused on the role of ethnic, regional and Russian national (civic) identities and diaspora activity in the acculturation of the Armenians in the Krasnodar Territory. The study used the scales from the MIRIPS project questionnaire (Mutual Intercultural Relations in Plural Societies). The sample consisted of 181 respondents. Using structural equation modeling, the ethnic and Russian national identities of the Armenians living in the Krasnodar Territory were revealed as factors that contributed to their integration, and regional identity—as factors that fostered assimilation. Diaspora activity was determined by both ethnic and regional identity and predicted the Armenians’ attitudes towards integration and separation. Also, diaspora activity of the Armenians in the Kuban region facilitated the interconnection of ethnic and regional identities with the separation strategy. In general, the study revealed that all identities (ethnic, regional and Russian national) contribute to a certain degree to the acceptance of the host society culture by the Armenians in the Krasnodar Territory. At the same time, diaspora activity can be an effective mechanism for the adaptation of migrants or a source of problems associated with increased impenetrability of diaspora’s borders, the migrants’ exclusive focus on their ethnic group and their decreased desire for sociocultural integration into the host society. It is important to take this into account when shaping the regional interethnic relations policy.","PeriodicalId":53489,"journal":{"name":"Central Asia and the Caucasus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49576865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. Osadchaya, Egor Kireev, Evgenia E. Kiseleva, A. Chernikova
The significant numbers of migrants from Kyrgyzstan in Moscow and the difficulties in adapting to the new conditions recorded by our research highlight the need to explore the adaptive capacity of young Kyrgyz. The lack of scientific knowledge about the potential adaptive capacities of different groups of young Kyrgyz hinders the creation of optimal conditions that would allow them to internalize norms, values, and rules of behavior, increases the potential for conflict in the Moscow community, makes the life of migrants less comfortable, and complicates integration processes in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The purpose of this study is to characterize the adaptive capacity of young people from Kyrgyzstan in Moscow that helps them fit into the social environment, allows them to overcome the discomfort caused by the contradictory social context and unfamiliar living conditions, and influences their success in the host community and their attitudes to integration. The analysis presented in this article rests on empirical data obtained from a structured interview with 823 migrants, citizens of Kyrgyzstan aged 17 to 30 years, conducted in 2020. The novelty of the study lies in a systemic examination and comprehensive assessment of the social adaptation capacity of this social community, because up to now publications on this topic have considered only some aspects of the phenomenon. In this article, “adaptive capacity” refers to the set of individual characteristics of migrants that ensures their inclusion into the host society, a change in previous norms and models of behavior, and the socialization of new behavior models emerging in the process of interaction between the individual and the new socio-cultural conditions of life and work as the synergistic effect of the relationship and interaction between the adaptive capacity of the individual and that of the environment. Its analysis is based on a description of expectations, perceptions, and social attitudes; the level of empathy, openness and complementarity with regard to the host community; and the degree of tolerance for people of other nationalities and identities. The article shows how migrants evaluate the adaptive capacity of the environment as resulting from coordinated, concerted, and friendly action by all stakeholders: government, employers, and local population. It also analyzes the associations that arise in connection with Russia. The study reveals the impact of migrants’ adaptive capacity on their attitudes to integration processes in the EAEU. It was shown that notions about the nature of the interaction between Muscovites and migrants that is necessary to harmonize the individual and the environment (assimilation, bicultural adaptation or separation) determine the depth and direction of the activities of young migrants and their assessments of concrete social reality, while their strategic preferences with regard to the cultural norms and values of other peoples determine
{"title":"THE ADAPTIVE CAPACITY OF YOUNG MIGRANTS FROM KYRGYZSTAN IN MOSCOW","authors":"G. Osadchaya, Egor Kireev, Evgenia E. Kiseleva, A. Chernikova","doi":"10.37178/ca-c.21.4.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.4.11","url":null,"abstract":"The significant numbers of migrants from Kyrgyzstan in Moscow and the difficulties in adapting to the new conditions recorded by our research highlight the need to explore the adaptive capacity of young Kyrgyz. The lack of scientific knowledge about the potential adaptive capacities of different groups of young Kyrgyz hinders the creation of optimal conditions that would allow them to internalize norms, values, and rules of behavior, increases the potential for conflict in the Moscow community, makes the life of migrants less comfortable, and complicates integration processes in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The purpose of this study is to characterize the adaptive capacity of young people from Kyrgyzstan in Moscow that helps them fit into the social environment, allows them to overcome the discomfort caused by the contradictory social context and unfamiliar living conditions, and influences their success in the host community and their attitudes to integration. The analysis presented in this article rests on empirical data obtained from a structured interview with 823 migrants, citizens of Kyrgyzstan aged 17 to 30 years, conducted in 2020. The novelty of the study lies in a systemic examination and comprehensive assessment of the social adaptation capacity of this social community, because up to now publications on this topic have considered only some aspects of the phenomenon. In this article, “adaptive capacity” refers to the set of individual characteristics of migrants that ensures their inclusion into the host society, a change in previous norms and models of behavior, and the socialization of new behavior models emerging in the process of interaction between the individual and the new socio-cultural conditions of life and work as the synergistic effect of the relationship and interaction between the adaptive capacity of the individual and that of the environment. Its analysis is based on a description of expectations, perceptions, and social attitudes; the level of empathy, openness and complementarity with regard to the host community; and the degree of tolerance for people of other nationalities and identities. The article shows how migrants evaluate the adaptive capacity of the environment as resulting from coordinated, concerted, and friendly action by all stakeholders: government, employers, and local population. It also analyzes the associations that arise in connection with Russia. The study reveals the impact of migrants’ adaptive capacity on their attitudes to integration processes in the EAEU. It was shown that notions about the nature of the interaction between Muscovites and migrants that is necessary to harmonize the individual and the environment (assimilation, bicultural adaptation or separation) determine the depth and direction of the activities of young migrants and their assessments of concrete social reality, while their strategic preferences with regard to the cultural norms and values of other peoples determine ","PeriodicalId":53489,"journal":{"name":"Central Asia and the Caucasus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47563905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Turkey and Iran have maintained stable relations for decades and established cooperation by exploring their common interests despite many political disputes, ideological differences, or economic competition. But recently, many emerging disagreements of the two neighbors started to test the breaking point of this longtime balance. Today, Ankara and Tehran are trying to get a better hand against each other through diplomatic, military, and economic instruments. Starting by presenting an overview of Turkish-Iranian relations, this article focuses on the main points of friction between the two actors in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The region is going through a critical juncture with crucial events such as the Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 and the aftermaths of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. So far, Turkey has increased its regional influence by strengthening its economic and diplomatic presence and establishing military cooperation. This target is pursued through the Turkic identity, which provides the ideological basis for Ankara’s regional strategy. The Islamic Republic of Iran, on the other hand, is trying to defend the regional status quo to resist the containment strategy and international isolation that it has been facing since the revolution. The “axis of resistance” idea that Iran pursues, especially in the Middle East, is almost nonexistent in the Central Asian and Caucasian region due to the Russian factor, lack of sympathy to such an approach on the part of the regional actors, and the Regime’s reluctance to change the status quo in its Northern and Eastern borders. In addition to Ankara and Tehran’s competing regional desires, several bilateral problems to solve in energy, trade, security, and migration management put the actors on the opposing sides. The study claims that the incompatibility between the actors’ regional strategies increases to the point that their rivalry in the Middle East will expand to Central Asia and the Caucasian region. But in contrast to this slow process, there are imminent common issues that can only be solved by a joint effort by Turkey and Iran, and this necessity will restrain the damages of this incompatibility on bilateral relations.
{"title":"TURKISH-IRANIAN COMPETITION IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA","authors":"Başaran Ayar","doi":"10.37178/ca-c.21.4.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.4.08","url":null,"abstract":"Turkey and Iran have maintained stable relations for decades and established cooperation by exploring their common interests despite many political disputes, ideological differences, or economic competition. But recently, many emerging disagreements of the two neighbors started to test the breaking point of this longtime balance. Today, Ankara and Tehran are trying to get a better hand against each other through diplomatic, military, and economic instruments. Starting by presenting an overview of Turkish-Iranian relations, this article focuses on the main points of friction between the two actors in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The region is going through a critical juncture with crucial events such as the Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 and the aftermaths of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. So far, Turkey has increased its regional influence by strengthening its economic and diplomatic presence and establishing military cooperation. This target is pursued through the Turkic identity, which provides the ideological basis for Ankara’s regional strategy. The Islamic Republic of Iran, on the other hand, is trying to defend the regional status quo to resist the containment strategy and international isolation that it has been facing since the revolution. The “axis of resistance” idea that Iran pursues, especially in the Middle East, is almost nonexistent in the Central Asian and Caucasian region due to the Russian factor, lack of sympathy to such an approach on the part of the regional actors, and the Regime’s reluctance to change the status quo in its Northern and Eastern borders. In addition to Ankara and Tehran’s competing regional desires, several bilateral problems to solve in energy, trade, security, and migration management put the actors on the opposing sides. The study claims that the incompatibility between the actors’ regional strategies increases to the point that their rivalry in the Middle East will expand to Central Asia and the Caucasian region. But in contrast to this slow process, there are imminent common issues that can only be solved by a joint effort by Turkey and Iran, and this necessity will restrain the damages of this incompatibility on bilateral relations.","PeriodicalId":53489,"journal":{"name":"Central Asia and the Caucasus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48008265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tian Xie, R. Zharkynbayeva, G. Dadabayeva, L. Delovarova
The thirty years of Kazakhstan’s independence have been characterized by rapid growth of trade and economic cooperation with China, one of the world’s largest economies, which has steadily increased its presence in the region. Based on statistics published by the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China and the National Bank of Kazakhstan, legal and regulatory documents of the two countries and reports by international organizations, this article examines the specific features and further prospects of bilateral cooperation between China and Kazakhstan in the field of trade, investment, and energy, as well as in implementing integration projects. The authors have identified the main stages of interaction between the two countries, the problems they encounter, and the opportunities for trade and economic cooperation, which has developed rapidly since the turn of the century. Objectively, this process is mutually beneficial for both sides, especially in the sphere of energy, promotion of infrastructure projects, establishment of joint ventures, and other long-term plans. However, despite the positive dynamics of this process, the article identifies a number of negative phenomena in trade and economic relations. Overall, trade declined because of the drop in oil prices and the resultant weakening of Kazakhstan’s national currency tenge, since oil is the basis of the country’s exports. At the same time, when trade indicators began to improve after 2017, some negative phenomena were still in evidence. They were primarily due to the consequences of the pandemic, an increase in Sinophobia, and Kazakhstan’s participation in new regional projects, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In the authors’ opinion, investment specifics and trade asymmetry are the main areas where both parties should adjust their approaches in order to tap the full potential of cooperation in these sectors.
{"title":"TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND KAZAKHSTAN: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS","authors":"Tian Xie, R. Zharkynbayeva, G. Dadabayeva, L. Delovarova","doi":"10.37178/ca-c.21.3.010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.3.010","url":null,"abstract":"The thirty years of Kazakhstan’s independence have been characterized by rapid growth of trade and economic cooperation with China, one of the world’s largest economies, which has steadily increased its presence in the region. Based on statistics published by the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China and the National Bank of Kazakhstan, legal and regulatory documents of the two countries and reports by international organizations, this article examines the specific features and further prospects of bilateral cooperation between China and Kazakhstan in the field of trade, investment, and energy, as well as in implementing integration projects. The authors have identified the main stages of interaction between the two countries, the problems they encounter, and the opportunities for trade and economic cooperation, which has developed rapidly since the turn of the century. Objectively, this process is mutually beneficial for both sides, especially in the sphere of energy, promotion of infrastructure projects, establishment of joint ventures, and other long-term plans. However, despite the positive dynamics of this process, the article identifies a number of negative phenomena in trade and economic relations. Overall, trade declined because of the drop in oil prices and the resultant weakening of Kazakhstan’s national currency tenge, since oil is the basis of the country’s exports. At the same time, when trade indicators began to improve after 2017, some negative phenomena were still in evidence. They were primarily due to the consequences of the pandemic, an increase in Sinophobia, and Kazakhstan’s participation in new regional projects, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In the authors’ opinion, investment specifics and trade asymmetry are the main areas where both parties should adjust their approaches in order to tap the full potential of cooperation in these sectors.","PeriodicalId":53489,"journal":{"name":"Central Asia and the Caucasus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43457139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since gaining independence in 1991, the Central Asian countries have embarked on state building with regard for the experience of developed countries. During the political modernization process, the countries of Central Asia heeded great attention to the constitution. The political elites in power have enshrined the separation of powers between the government branches in the basic law. At the same time, the institution of the president retained a special status in the state power system. This fact reflected the specifics of the development of new states, where the legislative body was absent or played an insignificant role for a prolonged time period. The president plays a major role in the political systems of the regional states (with the exception of Kyrgyzstan), which was manifested in his special status. As a result, a patron-client model has developed in the regional states, where the president acquires and maintains the loyalty of political elites through material incentives. Meanwhile, the regional countries were undergoing continuous constitutional reforms. The amendments to the fundamental law have been and are being used by the presidents of the Central Asian countries to maintain and reinforce their legitimacy. The need to solve this problem has increased in the context of a decline in economic growth and accumulated internal socio-economic problems. In 2020-2021, the coronavirus pandemic produced a negative impact. These challenges posed the task of implementing a new democratic transformation strategy for the executive authorities of the regional states, in particular, the expansion of powers in the legislative branch of government. At the present stage, a new balance of forces has emerged in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which involves a higher responsibility of the parliament and government for the implementation of socio-economic reforms. This afforded greater stability to the political regimes in these countries. In Tajikistan, a power centralization tendency has developed, and the position of the incumbent is being solidified. Hopes for carrying out structural economic reforms are pinned on the president. Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated a desire to develop parliamentarianism in order to prevent the development of authoritarian tendencies. However, the introduction of a parliamentary form of government did not lead to the solution of the country’s internal problems, primarily due to the continued enormous influence of informal institutions on the authorities. Major socio-economic problems faced by the Kyrgyz authorities in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic triggered another round of political tension in the country and ultimately led to a change of power and a transition to a presidential form of government. The changes introduced to the constitutions of the regional states create the appearance of the implementation of democratic principles and the use of procedures to improve the efficiency of the government. At the sa
{"title":"ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES","authors":"E. Garbuzarova","doi":"10.37178/ca-c.21.3.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.3.03","url":null,"abstract":"Since gaining independence in 1991, the Central Asian countries have embarked on state building with regard for the experience of developed countries. During the political modernization process, the countries of Central Asia heeded great attention to the constitution. The political elites in power have enshrined the separation of powers between the government branches in the basic law. At the same time, the institution of the president retained a special status in the state power system. This fact reflected the specifics of the development of new states, where the legislative body was absent or played an insignificant role for a prolonged time period. The president plays a major role in the political systems of the regional states (with the exception of Kyrgyzstan), which was manifested in his special status. As a result, a patron-client model has developed in the regional states, where the president acquires and maintains the loyalty of political elites through material incentives. Meanwhile, the regional countries were undergoing continuous constitutional reforms. The amendments to the fundamental law have been and are being used by the presidents of the Central Asian countries to maintain and reinforce their legitimacy. The need to solve this problem has increased in the context of a decline in economic growth and accumulated internal socio-economic problems. In 2020-2021, the coronavirus pandemic produced a negative impact. These challenges posed the task of implementing a new democratic transformation strategy for the executive authorities of the regional states, in particular, the expansion of powers in the legislative branch of government. At the present stage, a new balance of forces has emerged in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which involves a higher responsibility of the parliament and government for the implementation of socio-economic reforms. This afforded greater stability to the political regimes in these countries. In Tajikistan, a power centralization tendency has developed, and the position of the incumbent is being solidified. Hopes for carrying out structural economic reforms are pinned on the president. Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated a desire to develop parliamentarianism in order to prevent the development of authoritarian tendencies. However, the introduction of a parliamentary form of government did not lead to the solution of the country’s internal problems, primarily due to the continued enormous influence of informal institutions on the authorities. Major socio-economic problems faced by the Kyrgyz authorities in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic triggered another round of political tension in the country and ultimately led to a change of power and a transition to a presidential form of government. The changes introduced to the constitutions of the regional states create the appearance of the implementation of democratic principles and the use of procedures to improve the efficiency of the government. At the sa","PeriodicalId":53489,"journal":{"name":"Central Asia and the Caucasus","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41317772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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