Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5771/0947-9511-2019-1-23
Hitoshi Suzuki, I. Makihara
Negotiations on a Japan-EEC trade agreement faced a deadlock only three years after the launch of the common foreign trade policy in 1970. The European Commission adopted a step-by-step approach to change the climate. European business people were sent to Japan under the ETP-Japan. The Commission welcomed Japanese investments so that Japanese exports could be reduced. Japanese plants were launched in Britain. After the cold war ended, Japanese manufacturers headed towards the newly liberalised countries. Japan’s policy of commitment - via both aid and investments - was an extension of her relations with the Central and Eastern European countries during the cold war, namely towards the GDR. However, after 1991, Japan’s priority was not limited to her market share in Europe and gained a longer perspective to stabilise the region. Joint efforts made Japan and the EU claim themselves as global actors. Both shared fears on global warming and agreed upon the Kyoto Protocol of 1997.
{"title":"Japan-EEC/EU Relations, 1970-2005: Re-Emergence as Strategic Partners in Trade and Environment","authors":"Hitoshi Suzuki, I. Makihara","doi":"10.5771/0947-9511-2019-1-23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2019-1-23","url":null,"abstract":"Negotiations on a Japan-EEC trade agreement faced a deadlock only three years after the launch of the common foreign trade policy in 1970. The European Commission adopted a step-by-step approach to change the climate. European business people were sent to Japan under the ETP-Japan. The Commission welcomed Japanese investments so that Japanese exports could be reduced. Japanese plants were launched in Britain. After the cold war ended, Japanese manufacturers headed towards the newly liberalised countries. Japan’s policy of commitment - via both aid and investments - was an extension of her relations with the Central and Eastern European countries during the cold war, namely towards the GDR. However, after 1991, Japan’s priority was not limited to her market share in Europe and gained a longer perspective to stabilise the region. Joint efforts made Japan and the EU claim themselves as global actors. Both shared fears on global warming and agreed upon the Kyoto Protocol of 1997.","PeriodicalId":53497,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Integration History","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79404539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5771/0947-9511-2019-1-9
Anjo G. Harryvan
Japanese competition has been a prime factor in overcoming European economic fragmentation. In the course of the 1980s Japanese technology - especially in consumer electronics - as well as Japanese business practices were key incentives for the establishment of Europe’s Common Market. The confluence of two distinct but mutually supportive non-state actors, the Philips/RTE lobby and the Action Committee for Europe (ACE) played a decisive role in setting the agenda for what is now known as the ‘EU Common Market’. The former campaigned for a pan-European single market, the latter for institutional changes needed to bring about its realization. The two lobbies were in close contact with each other. For Philips, the Japanese challenge was much more than a storm in a teacup. ‘Japan incorporated’ threatened its very existence, or so it was perceived. Seen in this light, fighting Japanese protectionism and campaigning for overcoming Europe’s economic fragmentation, were two sides of the same coin. It is a testimony to the quality of the company’s lobbying efforts on how successfully it managed to frame its private interests on both issues as Europe-wide continental interests.
{"title":"Japan, Philips and the Making of Europe’s Single Market, 1984-1994","authors":"Anjo G. Harryvan","doi":"10.5771/0947-9511-2019-1-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2019-1-9","url":null,"abstract":"Japanese competition has been a prime factor in overcoming European economic fragmentation. In the course of the 1980s Japanese technology - especially in consumer electronics - as well as Japanese business practices were key incentives for the establishment of Europe’s Common Market. The confluence of two distinct but mutually supportive non-state actors, the Philips/RTE lobby and the Action Committee for Europe (ACE) played a decisive role in setting the agenda for what is now known as the ‘EU Common Market’. The former campaigned for a pan-European single market, the latter for institutional changes needed to bring about its realization. The two lobbies were in close contact with each other. For Philips, the Japanese challenge was much more than a storm in a teacup. ‘Japan incorporated’ threatened its very existence, or so it was perceived. Seen in this light, fighting Japanese protectionism and campaigning for overcoming Europe’s economic fragmentation, were two sides of the same coin. It is a testimony to the quality of the company’s lobbying efforts on how successfully it managed to frame its private interests on both issues as Europe-wide continental interests.","PeriodicalId":53497,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Integration History","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73390862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5771/0947-9511-2019-2-243
Olivier Van den Bossche
In 1975, the Lomé Convention, which manages relations between the EEC and the countries of the ACP (Africa Caribbean Pacific) group, introduces a chapter on "industrial cooperation". This new policy aims to develop production sectors (industry, agriculture, mining and tourism) in the ACP countries, and embodies the egalitarian partnership discourse specific to the New International Economic Order. Using unpublished archives from the European Commission, the ACP Secretariat, the Centre for Industrial Development and interviews with the administrators in charge in the 1970s, we study the complexity of the networks of internal and external actors at DG- VIII responsible for setting up EEC-ACP industrial cooperation in Brussels. In doing so, we show that industrial cooperation is created out of the political will to rethink relations between European countries and previous African colonies in the framework of the NIEO; we also show the persistence of interests from private European economic circles, which remain close to the European Commission.
{"title":"Lomé et la coopération industrielle CEE-ACP en 1975: entre Nouvel ordre économique international et poursuite des intérêts industriels européens","authors":"Olivier Van den Bossche","doi":"10.5771/0947-9511-2019-2-243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2019-2-243","url":null,"abstract":"In 1975, the Lomé Convention, which manages relations between the EEC and the countries of the ACP (Africa Caribbean Pacific) group, introduces a chapter on \"industrial cooperation\". This new policy aims to develop production sectors (industry, agriculture, mining and tourism) in the ACP countries, and embodies the egalitarian partnership discourse specific to the New International Economic Order. Using unpublished archives from the European Commission, the ACP Secretariat, the Centre for Industrial Development and interviews with the administrators in charge in the 1970s, we study the complexity of the networks of internal and external actors at DG- VIII responsible for setting up EEC-ACP industrial cooperation in Brussels. In doing so, we show that industrial cooperation is created out of the political will to rethink relations between European countries and previous African colonies in the framework of the NIEO; we also show the persistence of interests from private European economic circles, which remain close to the European Commission.","PeriodicalId":53497,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Integration History","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79044907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5771/0947-9511-2019-1-37
Takeshi Yamamoto
It is perhaps a little known fact that Henry Kissinger mentioned Japan several times in his [in]famous “Year of Europe” speech of 1973. He intended to include Japan in the “New Atlantic Charter”, making it a US-EC-Japan triangular framework in the hope of preventing Japan drifting in an undesirable direction during the era of détente. Europe, and France in particular, however, disliked Kissinger’s initiative because they perceived it to be a US attempt to dominate its allies. Instead, the EC proposed direct negotiations with the Japanese government leading to a bilateral Japan-EC declaration in order to avoid America being at the top of the triangle. Japan faced with a dilemma. In the end, the idea of bilateral Japan-EC and US-EC declarations along with a trilateral US-EC-Japan declaration proved impossible due to a deterioration in US-EC relations. The Japanese government had to retreat not only from the Kissinger exercise but also from the idea of a bilateral declaration with the EC because pursuing the latter without a US-EC declaration would, it was feared, be perceived as anti-American behaviour.
{"title":"Bilateral or Trilateral? Japan, the EC and the United States in the “Year of Europe”","authors":"Takeshi Yamamoto","doi":"10.5771/0947-9511-2019-1-37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2019-1-37","url":null,"abstract":"It is perhaps a little known fact that Henry Kissinger mentioned Japan several times in his [in]famous “Year of Europe” speech of 1973. He intended to include Japan in the “New Atlantic Charter”, making it a US-EC-Japan triangular framework in the hope of preventing Japan drifting in an undesirable direction during the era of détente. Europe, and France in particular, however, disliked Kissinger’s initiative because they perceived it to be a US attempt to dominate its allies. Instead, the EC proposed direct negotiations with the Japanese government leading to a bilateral Japan-EC declaration in order to avoid America being at the top of the triangle. Japan faced with a dilemma. In the end, the idea of bilateral Japan-EC and US-EC declarations along with a trilateral US-EC-Japan declaration proved impossible due to a deterioration in US-EC relations. The Japanese government had to retreat not only from the Kissinger exercise but also from the idea of a bilateral declaration with the EC because pursuing the latter without a US-EC declaration would, it was feared, be perceived as anti-American behaviour.","PeriodicalId":53497,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Integration History","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73617276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.5771/0947-9511-2019-2-225
E. Durlinger
On 1st June 2005, Dutch citizens rejected the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (ECT) in a referendum. Reasons for this rejection have been explored in previous studies on media framing. In these studies, scholars contend that the media influence citizens’ voting behaviour through the manner in which the news is depicted. This article aims at uncovering qualitatively what frames two Dutch newspapers, NRC Handelsblad and de Volkskrant, used to report on the referendum and why. In this manner, it adds to the existing understanding of the influence of the media coverage on the Dutch electorate. The results show that the responsibility frame is the most salient frame in the news coverage on the referendum on the ECT, indicating that newspapers discussed the referendum on the ECT in terms of the invisibility of debate on Europe in general and the incumbent government’s failure to provide sufficient and reliable information on the ECT. This is striking with regard to the fact that most authors attribute the rejection to a rise in Euroscepticism or discontent with the speed and direction of the integration process.
{"title":"Understanding Dutch Attitudes to European Integration in the Early 2000s Through the Referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty","authors":"E. Durlinger","doi":"10.5771/0947-9511-2019-2-225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2019-2-225","url":null,"abstract":"On 1st June 2005, Dutch citizens rejected the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (ECT) in a referendum. Reasons for this rejection have been explored in previous studies on media framing. In these studies, scholars contend that the media influence citizens’ voting behaviour through the manner in which the news is depicted. This article aims at uncovering qualitatively what frames two Dutch newspapers, NRC Handelsblad and de Volkskrant, used to report on the referendum and why. In this manner, it adds to the existing understanding of the influence of the media coverage on the Dutch electorate. The results show that the responsibility frame is the most salient frame in the news coverage on the referendum on the ECT, indicating that newspapers discussed the referendum on the ECT in terms of the invisibility of debate on Europe in general and the incumbent government’s failure to provide sufficient and reliable information on the ECT. This is striking with regard to the fact that most authors attribute the rejection to a rise in Euroscepticism or discontent with the speed and direction of the integration process.","PeriodicalId":53497,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Integration History","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83497524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5771/0947-9511-2023-1-35
Andrew Glencross
This article examines Brexit from the perspective of the role played by multiple historical narratives about the UK and its place in Europe, as well as the wider world. Existing accounts associate the 2016 referendum result with the rise of populism and the spread of particular anti-EU narratives grounded in Englishness, the Anglosphere and, more problematically, nostalgia about former national glories. The analysis shows that these different historical narratives served to delegitimise European integration as inimical to UK democracy and sovereignty. Equally importantly, narratives of delegitimation in turn depended on a highly selective reading of British history and convenient acts of forgetting or misremembering the role of economic or political borders. It was precisely this combination of selective historical memory and a narrative of EU oppression that created a revolutionary moment. Brexit was thus founded on multiple acts of forgetting.
{"title":"A Revolutionary Moment Founded on Forgetting: How Narratives of the UK’s Place in Europe and the World made Brexit Possible","authors":"Andrew Glencross","doi":"10.5771/0947-9511-2023-1-35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/0947-9511-2023-1-35","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines Brexit from the perspective of the role played by multiple historical narratives about the UK and its place in Europe, as well as the wider world. Existing accounts associate the 2016 referendum result with the rise of populism and the spread of particular anti-EU narratives grounded in Englishness, the Anglosphere and, more problematically, nostalgia about former national glories. The analysis shows that these different historical narratives served to delegitimise European integration as inimical to UK democracy and sovereignty. Equally importantly, narratives of delegitimation in turn depended on a highly selective reading of British history and convenient acts of forgetting or misremembering the role of economic or political borders. It was precisely this combination of selective historical memory and a narrative of EU oppression that created a revolutionary moment. Brexit was thus founded on multiple acts of forgetting.","PeriodicalId":53497,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Integration History","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82214069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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