Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-1-87-98
Oleg A. Glebov
The article is devoted to the analysis of the key provisions of Rozanov’s early theoretical treatise “On Understanding”, which is a model of Russian philosophical idealism. It shows that Rozanov’s work, which anticipated some ideas of hermeneutics and phenomenology in the 20th century, remained unnoticed within the Russian philosophical tradition. The purpose of this article is to reveal the basis of Rozanov’s thesis that the first idea of reason potentially contains all knowledge in unity. The author analyzes the following aspects of Rozanov’s work related to the problem of understanding: the motive and purpose of writing a treatise, the theme of innate ideas, the concept of vivacity of ideas, the theory of potential knowledge and its subject, the cyclical process of understanding, the difference between mind and reason, understanding from knowledge. Rozanov’s interpretation of the idea of reason, the scheme of reason, and the doctrine of number are also reconstructed. The paper concludes: the fundamental thesis of Rozanov about the embeddedness of all knowledge in the unity of the first idea of reason is justified by the primacy of the position of the idea in the taxonomy of cognitive acts. And also, by the fact that the purpose of the cognitive process pushes reason to itself.
{"title":"The Concept of Understanding and its Idealistic Interpretation in the Theoretical Philosophy of V.V. Rozanov","authors":"Oleg A. Glebov","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-1-87-98","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-1-87-98","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the analysis of the key provisions of Rozanov’s early theoretical treatise “On Understanding”, which is a model of Russian philosophical idealism. It shows that Rozanov’s work, which anticipated some ideas of hermeneutics and phenomenology in the 20th century, remained unnoticed within the Russian philosophical tradition. The purpose of this article is to reveal the basis of Rozanov’s thesis that the first idea of reason potentially contains all knowledge in unity. The author analyzes the following aspects of Rozanov’s work related to the problem of understanding: the motive and purpose of writing a treatise, the theme of innate ideas, the concept of vivacity of ideas, the theory of potential knowledge and its subject, the cyclical process of understanding, the difference between mind and reason, understanding from knowledge. Rozanov’s interpretation of the idea of reason, the scheme of reason, and the doctrine of number are also reconstructed. The paper concludes: the fundamental thesis of Rozanov about the embeddedness of all knowledge in the unity of the first idea of reason is justified by the primacy of the position of the idea in the taxonomy of cognitive acts. And also, by the fact that the purpose of the cognitive process pushes reason to itself.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85078926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-57-68
S. Gashkov
The author of the article analyzes the subject, the structure and the content elements of Michel Foucault’s posthumous “Confessions of the Flesh” (2018, Russian translation 2021). Foucault there turns to the patristic tradition (which gives some researchers a reason to talk about a “new theology”), but also proclaims the need for the unity of philosophical and philological approaches, a “lexicalization” (in the words of Philippe Chevallier). The author examines fragments on Christian chastity and the ascetic model of Cassian to demonstrate the historical and philosophical significance of Foucault’s distinctions between the ancient and Christian concepts of chastity, as well as between the “prohibitional” and “transformational” forms of asceticism.
{"title":"The “Confessions of the Flesh” by M. Foucault: Towards Understanding of Methodology and Significance","authors":"S. Gashkov","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-57-68","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-57-68","url":null,"abstract":"The author of the article analyzes the subject, the structure and the content elements of Michel Foucault’s posthumous “Confessions of the Flesh” (2018, Russian translation 2021). Foucault there turns to the patristic tradition (which gives some researchers a reason to talk about a “new theology”), but also proclaims the need for the unity of philosophical and philological approaches, a “lexicalization” (in the words of Philippe Chevallier). The author examines fragments on Christian chastity and the ascetic model of Cassian to demonstrate the historical and philosophical significance of Foucault’s distinctions between the ancient and Christian concepts of chastity, as well as between the “prohibitional” and “transformational” forms of asceticism.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81650833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-102-113
V. Porus
The author outlines the views on social ideal of Russian thinkers from Vladimir Solovyov to Georgij Fedotov. Solovyov, advancing Fyodor Dostoevsky’s ideas, viewed the social ideal as a realization of the doctrine of universal solidarity and free development of a person under spiritual guidance of the Universal Church. This ecumenic and theocratic utopia had not received any recognition in Russian society, torn apart by unsolvable social and cultural conflicts. Pavel Novgorodtsev, generally sharing on the whole Solovyov’s views, thought that only the constitutional state could put these into effect. Konstantin Pobedonostsev pinned his hopes on monarchy, which would embrace popular religious and cultural traditions and oppose the “destructive” liberal reforms, while Nicolay Berdyaev believed in intelligentsia “transformed” by the idea of freedom. Georgij Fedotov called for the revival of the “need for freedom” and creation of the institutes executing spiritual development of society. The problem of the social ideal is relevant in modern Russia, though discredited by the neglect of cultural values, and above all, the devaluation of personal freedom. The prospect of a new cultural elite to overcome this remains vague.
{"title":"Sharp Edges of the Social Ideal (From Old Discussions to the Present)","authors":"V. Porus","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-102-113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-102-113","url":null,"abstract":"The author outlines the views on social ideal of Russian thinkers from Vladimir Solovyov to Georgij Fedotov. Solovyov, advancing Fyodor Dostoevsky’s ideas, viewed the social ideal as a realization of the doctrine of universal solidarity and free development of a person under spiritual guidance of the Universal Church. This ecumenic and theocratic utopia had not received any recognition in Russian society, torn apart by unsolvable social and cultural conflicts. Pavel Novgorodtsev, generally sharing on the whole Solovyov’s views, thought that only the constitutional state could put these into effect. Konstantin Pobedonostsev pinned his hopes on monarchy, which would embrace popular religious and cultural traditions and oppose the “destructive” liberal reforms, while Nicolay Berdyaev believed in intelligentsia “transformed” by the idea of freedom. Georgij Fedotov called for the revival of the “need for freedom” and creation of the institutes executing spiritual development of society. The problem of the social ideal is relevant in modern Russia, though discredited by the neglect of cultural values, and above all, the devaluation of personal freedom. The prospect of a new cultural elite to overcome this remains vague.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81582947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.38.1.03
R. Atkins
Commonsensism is a thesis about commonsense beliefs: our commonsense beliefs are items of knowledge (or should be so regarded) that have epistemic or methodological priority. This account of commonsensism risks making our commonsense beliefs impervious to philosophical argument. But in Santayana's commonsensism, what deserves our trust is not our commonsense beliefs but the development of common sense over successive generations. Our commonsense beliefs deserve only a secondary or subsidiary trust; we trust them only insofar as we trust the momentum of common sense. I examine Santayana's distinctive form of commonsensism and explain why he avoids putting trust primarily in commonsense beliefs.
{"title":"Santayana, Commonsensism, and the Problem of Impervious Belief","authors":"R. Atkins","doi":"10.5406/21521026.38.1.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.1.03","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Commonsensism is a thesis about commonsense beliefs: our commonsense beliefs are items of knowledge (or should be so regarded) that have epistemic or methodological priority. This account of commonsensism risks making our commonsense beliefs impervious to philosophical argument. But in Santayana's commonsensism, what deserves our trust is not our commonsense beliefs but the development of common sense over successive generations. Our commonsense beliefs deserve only a secondary or subsidiary trust; we trust them only insofar as we trust the momentum of common sense. I examine Santayana's distinctive form of commonsensism and explain why he avoids putting trust primarily in commonsense beliefs.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46124452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-13-24
Yu. E. Fedorova
The Persian didactic poem (mathnawī) served among the Sufis of the classical period as a popular form of presenting their doctrine. The article outlines and analyzes the Sufi poet Farīd al-Dīn ‘Aṭṭār’s four main poems belonging to the end of XII – beginning of XIII centuries: “Book of Mysteries” (Asrār-nāma), “Book of Sorrow” (Muṣ ībat-nāma), “Divine Book”(Ilāhī-nāma) and “The Language of the Birds”(Mantiq al-ṭayr). The author examines systematically the composition, the plot and the content of them, showing the principle of their construction, which is the combination the “explicit” (narrative) and “hidden” (Sufi) levels of meaning. Taking this into account the author offers an interpretation of the general Sufi theme, that is the search for and knowledge of God.
{"title":"Farīd al-Dīn ‘Aṭṭār’s Mathnawī as Representation of Sufi Doctrine","authors":"Yu. E. Fedorova","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-13-24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-13-24","url":null,"abstract":"The Persian didactic poem (mathnawī) served among the Sufis of the classical period as a popular form of presenting their doctrine. The article outlines and analyzes the Sufi poet Farīd al-Dīn ‘Aṭṭār’s four main poems belonging to the end of XII – beginning of XIII centuries: “Book of Mysteries” (Asrār-nāma), “Book of Sorrow” (Muṣ ībat-nāma), “Divine Book”(Ilāhī-nāma) and “The Language of the Birds”(Mantiq al-ṭayr). The author examines systematically the composition, the plot and the content of them, showing the principle of their construction, which is the combination the “explicit” (narrative) and “hidden” (Sufi) levels of meaning. Taking this into account the author offers an interpretation of the general Sufi theme, that is the search for and knowledge of God.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"66 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90722382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-127-141
Anastasia V. Ugleva
This author examines understanding of social ideal in the ethical and political theory of Ivan Aleksandrovich Ilyin, emigre and ideologist of the “white” movement. Ilyin thought that the best possible social structure would emerge as a probable outcome of the activity of so-called “aristocracy of the spirit”. The article doubts the possibility of creating the public ideal through the energies of an intellectual who lost touch with the people. The people charged with the duty of obedience and respect to authorities, and with a command to love each other, and believe in God, the Tsar and the Fatherland, all these considered the basis of national unity, are actually denied their dignity. Ilyin’s shady speeches, as well as his contacts with Nazis cast doubts on the appropriateness of his ideas to serve as a guiding light of present political reforms in Russia.
{"title":"Ivan A. Ilyin: The Social Ideal of “Aristocrat of the Spirit”","authors":"Anastasia V. Ugleva","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-127-141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-127-141","url":null,"abstract":"This author examines understanding of social ideal in the ethical and political theory of Ivan Aleksandrovich Ilyin, emigre and ideologist of the “white” movement. Ilyin thought that the best possible social structure would emerge as a probable outcome of the activity of so-called “aristocracy of the spirit”. The article doubts the possibility of creating the public ideal through the energies of an intellectual who lost touch with the people. The people charged with the duty of obedience and respect to authorities, and with a command to love each other, and believe in God, the Tsar and the Fatherland, all these considered the basis of national unity, are actually denied their dignity. Ilyin’s shady speeches, as well as his contacts with Nazis cast doubts on the appropriateness of his ideas to serve as a guiding light of present political reforms in Russia.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80807426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-5-12
N. Volkova
“Cratylus” is one of Plato’s twelve dialogues which Iamblichus had selected for the study of Platonic philosophy (Iamblichus’ canon). The author analyzes principles of curriculum on Plato’s dialogues, as set forth in “Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy”, among them: a) the unity of the topic, or purpose (σκοπός), b) the choice of dialogues, c) the order of reading, etc. Next, leaning on reconstruction by Leendert Westerink of “Prolegomena”, the author of the article shows why “Cratylus” was placed after “Phaedo”, but before “Theaetetus”. And then the purpose (σκοπός) of “Cratylus” is becoming clear owing to analysis of Proclus’ Commentary on the “Cratylus”.
《克拉提洛斯》是柏拉图的十二篇对话录之一，是Iamblichus为研究柏拉图哲学(Iamblichus的正典)而选择的。作者分析了《柏拉图哲学匿名导论》中柏拉图对话录课程的原则，其中包括:a)主题或目的的统一(σκοπ ο ς)， b)对话录的选择，c)阅读顺序等。接下来，文章的作者借助Leendert Westerink对《绪论》的重构，说明了为什么“克拉提罗斯”被放在“费多”之后，而在“泰阿提图”之前。然后通过对普罗克劳斯对“克拉提勒斯”的评注的分析，明确了“克拉提勒斯”的目的(σκοπός)。
{"title":"The Place of Plato’s Cratylus in the Curriculum of Neoplatonic Philosophy","authors":"N. Volkova","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-5-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-2-5-12","url":null,"abstract":"“Cratylus” is one of Plato’s twelve dialogues which Iamblichus had selected for the study of Platonic philosophy (Iamblichus’ canon). The author analyzes principles of curriculum on Plato’s dialogues, as set forth in “Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy”, among them: a) the unity of the topic, or purpose (σκοπός), b) the choice of dialogues, c) the order of reading, etc. Next, leaning on reconstruction by Leendert Westerink of “Prolegomena”, the author of the article shows why “Cratylus” was placed after “Phaedo”, but before “Theaetetus”. And then the purpose (σκοπός) of “Cratylus” is becoming clear owing to analysis of Proclus’ Commentary on the “Cratylus”.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"10 2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78332815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-1-62-75
D. G. Mironov
The article clarifies the reasons why A. Meinong expands the classification of mental phenomena proposed by F. Brentano and places the class of assumptions between the classes of presentations and judgments. Meinong understands acts of assumption as propositional acts, the specificity of which is that they lack the affirmative force or the moment of seriousness characteristic for acts of judgment. Meinong demonstrates the impossibility of reducing the acts of assumption to the acts of presentation on the example of negative assumptions: the negative characteristics of objects grasped in such assumptions are not captured by the presentations. It is demonstrated that the theory of modes of presentation put forward by Brentano and Marty in response to this argument of Meinong does not allow us to defend the thesis of the reducibility of assumptions to presentations: even with the help of a new notion of presentation, it is not possible to explain such phenomena as play, pretense and lies without artificial complications. The article goes on to discuss some of the details of Meinong’s semantic theory that are in need for resolving the issue of the difference between assumptions and judgments. The author points out the peculiarity of Meinong's understanding of words and sentences meanings, and gives a brief description of the theory of objectives. After the explanations made, an argument is discussed that allows Meinong to justify the difference between acts of assumption and acts of judgment. The argument is constructed as a sequential analysis of sentences, the task is to show that sentences of different types, both simple, and loaded with subordinate clauses, and composite, in different circumstances express a propositional attitude devoid of affirmative force.
{"title":"Meinong’s Theory of Assumptions","authors":"D. G. Mironov","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-1-62-75","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-1-62-75","url":null,"abstract":"The article clarifies the reasons why A. Meinong expands the classification of mental phenomena proposed by F. Brentano and places the class of assumptions between the classes of presentations and judgments. Meinong understands acts of assumption as propositional acts, the specificity of which is that they lack the affirmative force or the moment of seriousness characteristic for acts of judgment. Meinong demonstrates the impossibility of reducing the acts of assumption to the acts of presentation on the example of negative assumptions: the negative characteristics of objects grasped in such assumptions are not captured by the presentations. It is demonstrated that the theory of modes of presentation put forward by Brentano and Marty in response to this argument of Meinong does not allow us to defend the thesis of the reducibility of assumptions to presentations: even with the help of a new notion of presentation, it is not possible to explain such phenomena as play, pretense and lies without artificial complications. The article goes on to discuss some of the details of Meinong’s semantic theory that are in need for resolving the issue of the difference between assumptions and judgments. The author points out the peculiarity of Meinong's understanding of words and sentences meanings, and gives a brief description of the theory of objectives. After the explanations made, an argument is discussed that allows Meinong to justify the difference between acts of assumption and acts of judgment. The argument is constructed as a sequential analysis of sentences, the task is to show that sentences of different types, both simple, and loaded with subordinate clauses, and composite, in different circumstances express a propositional attitude devoid of affirmative force.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"86 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74627029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.38.1.04
Morganna Lambeth
Against the consensus that Heidegger reads his own philosophical views into Kant, I argue that Heidegger takes up the main question posed by the first Critique and attempts to identify Kant's best answer to it. Heidegger's method resembles those of Gadamer and Davidson. But by reading the first Critique as offering two conflicting strands of argument, he abandons their aim of maximizing truth, and his theory of error explains why Kant offers the less-promising strand. Heidegger thus provides a distinctive model of charitable, reconstructive interpretation that avoids hermeneutic ventriloquism—a failure to recognize differences of view between interpreter and text.
{"title":"A Tale of Two Faculties: Heidegger's Method of Interpreting Kant","authors":"Morganna Lambeth","doi":"10.5406/21521026.38.1.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.1.04","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Against the consensus that Heidegger reads his own philosophical views into Kant, I argue that Heidegger takes up the main question posed by the first Critique and attempts to identify Kant's best answer to it. Heidegger's method resembles those of Gadamer and Davidson. But by reading the first Critique as offering two conflicting strands of argument, he abandons their aim of maximizing truth, and his theory of error explains why Kant offers the less-promising strand. Heidegger thus provides a distinctive model of charitable, reconstructive interpretation that avoids hermeneutic ventriloquism—a failure to recognize differences of view between interpreter and text.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41819242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2021-26-1-25-38
I. Blauberg
The article examines the philosophical concept of Jules Lachelier – one of the leading representatives of French spiritualism and neo-Kantianism of the 19th – early 20th centuries. Lachelier's teachings were largely associated with the ideas of his predecessors – Maine de Biran and F. Ravaisson. At the same time, it was marked by the strong influence of Kant's philosophy, which determined the originality of this form of spiritualism. Like Biran and Ravaisson, Lachelier relied on “pure psychology”, exploring the facts of consciousness, but highlighted thinking as the only ability to achieve reliable knowledge. Using the method of reflection, thanks to which thinking directly comprehends its own nature and its relationship with phenomena, Lachelier in his work “On the basis of induction” undertook the substantiation of spiritualist realism (Ravaisson's term) as a true philosophy of nature, emphasizing the importance of the law of finite causes, which explains nature and thinking. This concept was developed in the work “Psychology and Metaphysics”, which describes the process of constituting reality by thinking, a process driven by the striving of thinking for ever more complete self-realization and self-knowledge. Thus, the views of Lachelier, who followed his own theoretical path, in the late period turned out to be close to the ideas of the German post-Kantians.
本文考察了19世纪至20世纪初法国唯心论和新康德主义的主要代表人物之一朱尔斯·拉切利耶的哲学理念。拉切利耶的教诲在很大程度上与他的前辈——梅因·德·比兰和f·拉瓦松的思想有关。同时，它还受到康德哲学的强烈影响，这决定了这种唯心论形式的独创性。与比兰和拉瓦松一样，拉切利耶依靠“纯心理学”，探索意识的事实，但强调思维是获得可靠知识的唯一能力。拉切利耶在他的作品《在归纳法的基础上》(On the basis of induction)中运用反思的方法，将唯心主义实在论(Ravaisson的术语)作为一种真正的自然哲学进行了确证，强调了解释自然和思维的有限原因法则的重要性。正是反思的方法使思维直接理解了自身的本质及其与现象的关系。这一概念是在《心理学与形而上学》一书中发展起来的，它描述了通过思维构建现实的过程，这是一个由思维努力推动的过程，以实现更完整的自我实现和自我认识。因此，走自己的理论道路的拉切利耶在后期的观点与德国后康德主义者的思想非常接近。
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