Die afgelope paar jaar het die samelewing toenemend staatgemaak op moderne tegnologie – veral sedert Covid-19 en die reeks beperkinge ingevolge die Wet op Rampbestuur 57 van 2002. Daar word selfs na data verwys as die wêreld se nuwe vorm van olie. In die lig van hierdie paradigmaskuif, word daar al hoe meer gebruik gemaak van elektroniese handtekeninge. Die hoogste hof van appèl het onlangs, by twee gelenthede, elektroniese handtekeninge en die toepaslike wetlike raamwerk oorweeg: eerstens in November 2014 in Spring Forest Trading CC v Wilberry (Pty) Ltd t/a Ecowash en tweedens in Maart 2020 in Global & Local Investments Advisors (Pty) Ltd v Fouche. Ongelukkig het die jongste uitspraak gelei tot ’n mate van onsekerheid oor die manier waarop die regsraamwerk geïnterpreteer moet word. Op die oog af blyk die Global & Local-saak teenstrydig te wees met die Spring Forest-saak en artikel 13 van die Wet op Elektroniese Kommunikasie en Transaksies 25 van 2002. Die oogmerk van die outeur met hierdie artikel is om die toepaslike wetlike raamwerk met betrekking tot elektroniese handtekeninge te evalueer en krities kommentaar te lewer op die bevindings wat in die Spring Forest– en Global & Local-sake gemaak is, met die doel om voorstelle te maak oor: i) die wyse waarop hierdie twee uitsprake van die hoogste hof van appèl geïnterpreteer moet word, in die lig van die wet en ander relevante regspraak en ii) die pad vorentoe vir toekomstige regsgedinge. Na die beslissing in die Spring Forest-saak, is algemeen aanvaar dat waar ’n kommersiële ooreenkoms gebruik maak van die begrippe “skrif” en “handtekening”, databoodskappe aan hierdie vereistes kan voldoen, as daar aan die spesifieke vereistes in die wet voldoen word. Hierdie bevinding was sinvol en het rekening gehou met moderne ontwikkelinge. Na die uitspraak in die Global & Local-saak bestaan daar egter twyfel of ’n “handtekening” uitgevoer kan word deur ’n elektroniese handtekening via databoodskap te gebruik. Die jongste uitspraak dui daarop dat as partye elektronies ’n ooreenkoms wil onderteken, ’n elektroniese “handtekening” (spesifiek met die uitsluiting van die woord elektronies) uitdruklik in die ooreenkoms vermeld moet wees: met ander woorde, hierdie uitspraak vereis dat partye vooraf ooreenkom dat ’n elektroniese ooreenkoms toelaatbaar is, en dit veroorsaak twyfel of die begrip “handtekening” ’n elektroniese handtekening insluit. Hierdie artikel voer aan dat die Global & Local-saak regsekerheid ondermyn. Wat word benodig om vorentoe te beweeg? Eerstens, duidelikheid of die begrip “handtekening” ’n elektroniese handtekening insluit. Tweedens, ’n bevestiging dat ’n elektroniese handtekening, soos dit tans verwoord is, nie gebruik kan word om ’n ooreenkoms vir die verkoop van vaste eiendom, ingevolge Wet 25 van 2002, aan te gaan nie. Twyfel is geskep in die onlangse beslissing in Borcherds v Duxbury 2021 1 SA 410 (OKP). Derdens, bevestiging van ’n hooggeregshof oor watter faktore in ag geneem moet word b
{"title":"Electronic signatures: where to next?","authors":"L. Swales","doi":"10.47348/tsar/2022/i1a4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47348/tsar/2022/i1a4","url":null,"abstract":"Die afgelope paar jaar het die samelewing toenemend staatgemaak op moderne tegnologie – veral sedert Covid-19 en die reeks beperkinge ingevolge die Wet op Rampbestuur 57 van 2002. Daar word selfs na data verwys as die wêreld se nuwe vorm van olie. In die lig van hierdie paradigmaskuif, word daar al hoe meer gebruik gemaak van elektroniese handtekeninge. Die hoogste hof van appèl het onlangs, by twee gelenthede, elektroniese handtekeninge en die toepaslike wetlike raamwerk oorweeg: eerstens in November 2014 in Spring Forest Trading CC v Wilberry (Pty) Ltd t/a Ecowash en tweedens in Maart 2020 in Global & Local Investments Advisors (Pty) Ltd v Fouche. Ongelukkig het die jongste uitspraak gelei tot ’n mate van onsekerheid oor die manier waarop die regsraamwerk geïnterpreteer moet word. Op die oog af blyk die Global & Local-saak teenstrydig te wees met die Spring Forest-saak en artikel 13 van die Wet op Elektroniese Kommunikasie en Transaksies 25 van 2002. Die oogmerk van die outeur met hierdie artikel is om die toepaslike wetlike raamwerk met betrekking tot elektroniese handtekeninge te evalueer en krities kommentaar te lewer op die bevindings wat in die Spring Forest– en Global & Local-sake gemaak is, met die doel om voorstelle te maak oor: i) die wyse waarop hierdie twee uitsprake van die hoogste hof van appèl geïnterpreteer moet word, in die lig van die wet en ander relevante regspraak en ii) die pad vorentoe vir toekomstige regsgedinge. Na die beslissing in die Spring Forest-saak, is algemeen aanvaar dat waar ’n kommersiële ooreenkoms gebruik maak van die begrippe “skrif” en “handtekening”, databoodskappe aan hierdie vereistes kan voldoen, as daar aan die spesifieke vereistes in die wet voldoen word. Hierdie bevinding was sinvol en het rekening gehou met moderne ontwikkelinge. Na die uitspraak in die Global & Local-saak bestaan daar egter twyfel of ’n “handtekening” uitgevoer kan word deur ’n elektroniese handtekening via databoodskap te gebruik. Die jongste uitspraak dui daarop dat as partye elektronies ’n ooreenkoms wil onderteken, ’n elektroniese “handtekening” (spesifiek met die uitsluiting van die woord elektronies) uitdruklik in die ooreenkoms vermeld moet wees: met ander woorde, hierdie uitspraak vereis dat partye vooraf ooreenkom dat ’n elektroniese ooreenkoms toelaatbaar is, en dit veroorsaak twyfel of die begrip “handtekening” ’n elektroniese handtekening insluit. Hierdie artikel voer aan dat die Global & Local-saak regsekerheid ondermyn. Wat word benodig om vorentoe te beweeg? Eerstens, duidelikheid of die begrip “handtekening” ’n elektroniese handtekening insluit. Tweedens, ’n bevestiging dat ’n elektroniese handtekening, soos dit tans verwoord is, nie gebruik kan word om ’n ooreenkoms vir die verkoop van vaste eiendom, ingevolge Wet 25 van 2002, aan te gaan nie. Twyfel is geskep in die onlangse beslissing in Borcherds v Duxbury 2021 1 SA 410 (OKP). Derdens, bevestiging van ’n hooggeregshof oor watter faktore in ag geneem moet word b","PeriodicalId":53590,"journal":{"name":"Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg","volume":"114 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77582367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.47348/tsar/2022/i4a10
M. Van Eck
Die regsberoep word deur etiese en professionele beginsels onderlê. Een van die beginsels wat in hierdie bespreking uitgelig word, is die van handhawing en beskerming van die publiek se persepsie van die regsberoep, onder andere om ’n goeie en eerbare beroep te wees. Dit kan negatief beïnvloed word indien litigasie tussen regspraktisyns as ’n vorm van binnegevegte beskou word en kan moontlik ’n interne krisis binne die professie skep. Alhoewel Solomon v Junkeeparsad (2022 3 SA 526 (GJ)) maar een voorbeeld van litigasie tussen regspraktisyns is, beklemtoon die saak, hoewel indirek, die konseptuele vraag of litigasie tussen regspraktisyns as ’n vorm van binnegevegte beskou kan word. Dit sal skadelik wees vir die persepsie van die regsprofessie indien sodanige litigasie ’n nuwe norm geword het en nou aanvaarbaar is binne die ontwikkelende professie in die moderne samelewing. In die aanspreek van hierdie vraag hou die outeur rekening met die feit dat in Suid-Afrika, soos in Australië en ander regsbestelle gebaseer op die Engelse “common law”, sprake is van onderskeidelike professies van die balie en die sybalie. Dié geskeie balies beïnvloed moontlik die regsverhouding tussen kliënte, prokureurs en advokate. Dit bepaal ook die bron van aanspreeklikheid vir die betaling van ’n advokaat se fooi. Alhoewel die bron van ’n prokureur se aanspreeklikheid in die verlede oor die algemeen as kontraktueel beskou is (in beide die Suid-Afrikaanse en die Australiese regspraktyk), rus ’n verpligting op prokureurs in Suid-Afrika om ’n advokaat se fooi te betaal wat nou weerspieël word in die gedragskode (soos vasgestel ingevolge artikel 35 van die Regspraktykwet 28 van 2014). ’n Prokureur het sowel ’n professionele as etiese plig om die verskuldigde betaling van derde partye se fooie (insluitend die van advokate) onverwyld te maak. ’n Versuim om hierdie plig stiptelik na te kom, reflekteer op swak bestuur van die prokureur se regspraktyk. Alhoewel ’n advokaat wel ’n reg het om regstappe in te stel teen iedere prestasieskuldenaar ook waar professionele fooie uitstaande is, rus daar ’n kollektiewe en etiese verantwoordelikheid op die lede van die regsprofessie om die beeld en reputasie van die professie te beskerm. Met hierdie aantekening dui die outeur daarop dat dit dalk tyd is om alternatiewe geskilbeslegtingsprosesse te vind om dispute tussen regspraktisyns, as lede van die regsberoep, aan te spreek.
{"title":"Regspraak: A cautionary tale of litigation, liability and ethical responsibilities in the legal profession","authors":"M. Van Eck","doi":"10.47348/tsar/2022/i4a10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47348/tsar/2022/i4a10","url":null,"abstract":"Die regsberoep word deur etiese en professionele beginsels onderlê. Een van die beginsels wat in hierdie bespreking uitgelig word, is die van handhawing en beskerming van die publiek se persepsie van die regsberoep, onder andere om ’n goeie en eerbare beroep te wees. Dit kan negatief beïnvloed word indien litigasie tussen regspraktisyns as ’n vorm van binnegevegte beskou word en kan moontlik ’n interne krisis binne die professie skep. Alhoewel Solomon v Junkeeparsad (2022 3 SA 526 (GJ)) maar een voorbeeld van litigasie tussen regspraktisyns is, beklemtoon die saak, hoewel indirek, die konseptuele vraag of litigasie tussen regspraktisyns as ’n vorm van binnegevegte beskou kan word. Dit sal skadelik wees vir die persepsie van die regsprofessie indien sodanige litigasie ’n nuwe norm geword het en nou aanvaarbaar is binne die ontwikkelende professie in die moderne samelewing. In die aanspreek van hierdie vraag hou die outeur rekening met die feit dat in Suid-Afrika, soos in Australië en ander regsbestelle gebaseer op die Engelse “common law”, sprake is van onderskeidelike professies van die balie en die sybalie. Dié geskeie balies beïnvloed moontlik die regsverhouding tussen kliënte, prokureurs en advokate. Dit bepaal ook die bron van aanspreeklikheid vir die betaling van ’n advokaat se fooi. Alhoewel die bron van ’n prokureur se aanspreeklikheid in die verlede oor die algemeen as kontraktueel beskou is (in beide die Suid-Afrikaanse en die Australiese regspraktyk), rus ’n verpligting op prokureurs in Suid-Afrika om ’n advokaat se fooi te betaal wat nou weerspieël word in die gedragskode (soos vasgestel ingevolge artikel 35 van die Regspraktykwet 28 van 2014). ’n Prokureur het sowel ’n professionele as etiese plig om die verskuldigde betaling van derde partye se fooie (insluitend die van advokate) onverwyld te maak. ’n Versuim om hierdie plig stiptelik na te kom, reflekteer op swak bestuur van die prokureur se regspraktyk. Alhoewel ’n advokaat wel ’n reg het om regstappe in te stel teen iedere prestasieskuldenaar ook waar professionele fooie uitstaande is, rus daar ’n kollektiewe en etiese verantwoordelikheid op die lede van die regsprofessie om die beeld en reputasie van die professie te beskerm. Met hierdie aantekening dui die outeur daarop dat dit dalk tyd is om alternatiewe geskilbeslegtingsprosesse te vind om dispute tussen regspraktisyns, as lede van die regsberoep, aan te spreek.","PeriodicalId":53590,"journal":{"name":"Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85219620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Die eiseres, moeder en voog van ’n 11-jarige seun, het skadevergoeding gevorder van ’n persoon (N) wat herstelwerk aan ’n beskadigde elektriese leiding in ’n meenthuis verrig het, die eienaar van die betrokke meenthuis (D) en die beheerliggaam van die deeltitelkompleks (BC). Die eienaar (C) van ’n onderneming wat kombuiskaste installeer, is as derde party tot die geding gevoeg. Een middag, terwyl die seun aan ’n kraan in die kompleks geraak het toe hy sy moeder se motor wou was, is hy ernstig beseer as gevolg van ’n enorme elektriese skok wat hy ontvang het. Dit was te wyte aan die feit dat C se werkers die elektrisiteitsleiding tydens werk in die meenthuis van die eiseres se buurvrou (R) beskadig het toe hulle besig was om kombuiskaste te installeer. Omdat R self daarna ook geskok is toe sy aan krane geraak het, het sy die elektrisiteitstoevoer afgeskakel. C se werkers was daarvan bewus. R het dadelik D se verteenwoordiger (M), wat gewoonlik as skakel tussen haar en D opgetree het, van die gevaartoestand verwittig en hy het onderneem om dadelik vir D daarvan in kennis te stel sodat hy spoedig reëlings vir herstelwerk aan die elektriese leiding kon tref. M het egter versuim om die berig aan D deur te gee. Die volgende oggend het C se werkers die elektrisiteit weer aangeskakel om aan te gaan met hul werk en derhalwe die gevaartoestand laat herleef, wat uiteindelik die tragedie as afloop gehad het. Die hof het tot die volgende beslissings geraak: Wat N (die eerste verweerder) betref, is bevind dat ofskoon sy brouwerk (die feit dat hy die elektriese leiding van die aardlekkasiestelsel ontkoppel het) die grondoorsaak vir die elektrifisering van die kraan was, dit nie vir ’n redelike persoon in sy skoene voorsienbaar sou wees dat die werkers wat van die gevaartoestand bewus was, so onverstandig sou wees om die elektrisiteit weer aan te skakel nie en dat ’n voldoende juridiese kousale verband derhalwe tussen N se handeling en die kind se beserings ontbreek het. Die werkers se handeling is dus as ’n novus actus interveniens beskou. Hierdie beslissing word gekritiseer as strydig met die regspraak betreffende juridiese kousaliteit. In BC (die derde verweerder) se geval was die omstandighede van sodanige aard dat daar nie redelikerwys van BC wat geen kennis van die gevaartoestand gehad het, verwag kon word om voorkomende stappe te doen nie en in hierdie geval is die eiser se vordering verwerp. Met hierdie bevinding word daar akkoord gegaan. Wat D (die tweede verweerder) betref, is bevind dat hy aanspreeklik is vir die eiser se nadeel. Oor die juridiese grondslag waarop die hof sy beslissing gevestig het, bestaan daar onsekerheid. In breë trekke is daar tot ’n bevinding van middellike aanspreeklikheid gekom, maar die hof het gewik en geweeg tussen werkgewersaanspreeklikheid en dié van ’n verteenwoordiger, ofskoon daar ter aanvang duidelik afwysend teenoor laasgenoemde grondslag gestaan is. Die ratio decidendi is in hierdie opsig uitermate verwarrend. Daar w
{"title":"Regspraak: Delictual liability resulting from the incompetence of artisans and misplaced trust","authors":"J. Scott","doi":"10.47348/tsar/2022/i3a9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47348/tsar/2022/i3a9","url":null,"abstract":"Die eiseres, moeder en voog van ’n 11-jarige seun, het skadevergoeding gevorder van ’n persoon (N) wat herstelwerk aan ’n beskadigde elektriese leiding in ’n meenthuis verrig het, die eienaar van die betrokke meenthuis (D) en die beheerliggaam van die deeltitelkompleks (BC). Die eienaar (C) van ’n onderneming wat kombuiskaste installeer, is as derde party tot die geding gevoeg. Een middag, terwyl die seun aan ’n kraan in die kompleks geraak het toe hy sy moeder se motor wou was, is hy ernstig beseer as gevolg van ’n enorme elektriese skok wat hy ontvang het. Dit was te wyte aan die feit dat C se werkers die elektrisiteitsleiding tydens werk in die meenthuis van die eiseres se buurvrou (R) beskadig het toe hulle besig was om kombuiskaste te installeer. Omdat R self daarna ook geskok is toe sy aan krane geraak het, het sy die elektrisiteitstoevoer afgeskakel. C se werkers was daarvan bewus. R het dadelik D se verteenwoordiger (M), wat gewoonlik as skakel tussen haar en D opgetree het, van die gevaartoestand verwittig en hy het onderneem om dadelik vir D daarvan in kennis te stel sodat hy spoedig reëlings vir herstelwerk aan die elektriese leiding kon tref. M het egter versuim om die berig aan D deur te gee. Die volgende oggend het C se werkers die elektrisiteit weer aangeskakel om aan te gaan met hul werk en derhalwe die gevaartoestand laat herleef, wat uiteindelik die tragedie as afloop gehad het. Die hof het tot die volgende beslissings geraak: Wat N (die eerste verweerder) betref, is bevind dat ofskoon sy brouwerk (die feit dat hy die elektriese leiding van die aardlekkasiestelsel ontkoppel het) die grondoorsaak vir die elektrifisering van die kraan was, dit nie vir ’n redelike persoon in sy skoene voorsienbaar sou wees dat die werkers wat van die gevaartoestand bewus was, so onverstandig sou wees om die elektrisiteit weer aan te skakel nie en dat ’n voldoende juridiese kousale verband derhalwe tussen N se handeling en die kind se beserings ontbreek het. Die werkers se handeling is dus as ’n novus actus interveniens beskou. Hierdie beslissing word gekritiseer as strydig met die regspraak betreffende juridiese kousaliteit. In BC (die derde verweerder) se geval was die omstandighede van sodanige aard dat daar nie redelikerwys van BC wat geen kennis van die gevaartoestand gehad het, verwag kon word om voorkomende stappe te doen nie en in hierdie geval is die eiser se vordering verwerp. Met hierdie bevinding word daar akkoord gegaan. Wat D (die tweede verweerder) betref, is bevind dat hy aanspreeklik is vir die eiser se nadeel. Oor die juridiese grondslag waarop die hof sy beslissing gevestig het, bestaan daar onsekerheid. In breë trekke is daar tot ’n bevinding van middellike aanspreeklikheid gekom, maar die hof het gewik en geweeg tussen werkgewersaanspreeklikheid en dié van ’n verteenwoordiger, ofskoon daar ter aanvang duidelik afwysend teenoor laasgenoemde grondslag gestaan is. Die ratio decidendi is in hierdie opsig uitermate verwarrend. Daar w","PeriodicalId":53590,"journal":{"name":"Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86942430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the last few years our courts have increasingly handed down judgments dealing with employers’ vicarious liability for delicts committed by their employees during so-called “frolics of their own”. In these judgments the standard requirements for vicarious liability were regularly confirmed, with the exception that the requirement that the delict should have been committed within the course and scope of the employee’s employment underwent major development. In the constitutional court judgment of K v Minister of Safety and Security handed down in 2005 the so-called “standard test” was transformed: the second tier of the test which is applied to establish a sufficiently close link between the employee’s delict and the business activities of the employer was developed from a purely factual test to one incorporating mixed questions of fact and law in which public policy in terms of the constitution plays a major role. Following this judgment our courts increasingly began giving favourable judgments to plaintiffs who had suffered harm flowing from the actions of employees deviating from their normal duties to pursue their own objectives, against their employers (so-called “deviation” cases). This tendency presented itself not only where such actions were instituted against the state in its capacity as employer, but also against private institutions such as a security company, as in the recent judgment of the supreme court of appeal in the case of Stallion Security (Pty) Ltd v Van Staden in 2020. In Oudehoutkloof Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Venter ((1649/2018) 2021 ZAECGHC 85 (16 September 2021)) the salient facts were that the defendant was the sole proprietor of JLC Cruisers, a business selling restored Toyota vehicles. The defendant’s son was his only employee, with wide-ranging tasks such as marketing, bookkeeping and the general running of affairs. The plaintiffs had previously deposited certain amounts into JLC Cruiser’s bank account following oral agreements for the sale to them of certain vehicles. Thereafter the defendant’s son made unauthorised withdrawals from the bank and misappropriated all the deposited funds for his own use. Shortly before this became known, he committed suicide. The plaintiffs then successfully instituted a delictual claim against the defendant based on the latter’s vicarious liability for the actions of his employee son committed while the latter was on a “frolic of his own”. It is pointed out that the court failed to consider two fundamental requirements for vicarious liability, viz that the employee should have committed a delict against the plaintiffs and that an employeremployee relationship should have existed between the defendant and the perpetrator. It is argued that although the son definitely committed wrongful acts of misappropriation of funds against his father’s (the defendant’s) sole proprietorship, such acts were in fact not delicts committed against the plaintiffs, in particular due to the absence of the d
{"title":"Aantekeninge: Weer eens middellike aanspreeklikheid weens ’n werknemer se opsetlike optrede in eie belang – raak ons regspraktisyns én die howe in hierdie verband dalk oorywerig?","authors":"J. Scott","doi":"10.47348/tsar/2022/i3a5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47348/tsar/2022/i3a5","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last few years our courts have increasingly handed down judgments dealing with employers’ vicarious liability for delicts committed by their employees during so-called “frolics of their own”. In these judgments the standard requirements for vicarious liability were regularly confirmed, with the exception that the requirement that the delict should have been committed within the course and scope of the employee’s employment underwent major development. In the constitutional court judgment of K v Minister of Safety and Security handed down in 2005 the so-called “standard test” was transformed: the second tier of the test which is applied to establish a sufficiently close link between the employee’s delict and the business activities of the employer was developed from a purely factual test to one incorporating mixed questions of fact and law in which public policy in terms of the constitution plays a major role. Following this judgment our courts increasingly began giving favourable judgments to plaintiffs who had suffered harm flowing from the actions of employees deviating from their normal duties to pursue their own objectives, against their employers (so-called “deviation” cases). This tendency presented itself not only where such actions were instituted against the state in its capacity as employer, but also against private institutions such as a security company, as in the recent judgment of the supreme court of appeal in the case of Stallion Security (Pty) Ltd v Van Staden in 2020. In Oudehoutkloof Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Venter ((1649/2018) 2021 ZAECGHC 85 (16 September 2021)) the salient facts were that the defendant was the sole proprietor of JLC Cruisers, a business selling restored Toyota vehicles. The defendant’s son was his only employee, with wide-ranging tasks such as marketing, bookkeeping and the general running of affairs. The plaintiffs had previously deposited certain amounts into JLC Cruiser’s bank account following oral agreements for the sale to them of certain vehicles. Thereafter the defendant’s son made unauthorised withdrawals from the bank and misappropriated all the deposited funds for his own use. Shortly before this became known, he committed suicide. The plaintiffs then successfully instituted a delictual claim against the defendant based on the latter’s vicarious liability for the actions of his employee son committed while the latter was on a “frolic of his own”. It is pointed out that the court failed to consider two fundamental requirements for vicarious liability, viz that the employee should have committed a delict against the plaintiffs and that an employeremployee relationship should have existed between the defendant and the perpetrator. It is argued that although the son definitely committed wrongful acts of misappropriation of funds against his father’s (the defendant’s) sole proprietorship, such acts were in fact not delicts committed against the plaintiffs, in particular due to the absence of the d","PeriodicalId":53590,"journal":{"name":"Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87584106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The deeply ingrained precedent used by many legal advisors to credit providers in South Africa in securing the claim of the latter to their debtors as legal persons with a surety agreement that binds the directors of the legal person as sureties and co-principal debtors, is of doubtful use. In reality, this agreement provides a false sense of security that does not merit the paper on which it is written. If the same legal subject is involved in both personae, a court cannot ignore the trite principle that a party cannot stand surety for itself. In the Radiant case, the original “business entity” was in reality the alter ego of M because it was not registered as any legal person; M was merely trading as Xelmar FXN. Although M signed as surety, as co-principal debtor and also as the agent representing the business, in reality, only one legal subject was involved apart from the creditor R – M. M could not have signed as surety for his own debt albeit in the name of the business as his alter ego. When a company was incorporated a year later with almost the same firm name as the original entity, R neglected to insist on the conclusion of new credit agreements and surety agreements because M had misrepresented to R that the name change of the business entity did not impact on the business arrangements already in place. Allegedly, it merely underwent a change from sole proprietor to (Pty) Ltd! According to the pleadings, the second defendant M represented to the plaintiff by words, alternatively by conduct, that the entity remained the same and that the incorporation was “as a going concern” with no inherent change to debtors and creditors. The plaintiff relied on this misrepresentation to its detriment. The court correctly held that M could not be bound as surety for the debt of the company because no surety agreement was in place regarding that liability. Notwithstanding R’s reliance on the misrepresentation to its detriment, the court held that the reliance on estoppel could not succeed because the misrepresentation could not be maintained. It was held that maintaining the misrepresentation would be in conflict with section 6 of Act 50 of 1956. It is submitted that M was still responsible for the debt of his alter ego as the original business entity because he bound himself as principal debtor. In the absence of another legal subject, M was not “co-principal debtor” but the sole debtor. By postponing to inform R of the completed change in the business entity for more than five months after the company was incorporated and registered, M misrepresented to R that no change had occurred. In these circumstances estoppel was the applicable defence, notwithstanding the court’s finding. Creditors will be better off when they refrain from using old precedents containing contradictory formulations. They should rather compel the natural persons involved with their debtors as legal persons to sign only as principal or co-principal debtors and not as sureties. It
{"title":"Aantekeninge: Borgstelling deur ’n skuldenaar vir eie skuld bly nietig ongeag vermeende skynverwekking en enkele ander aspekte van borgstelling","authors":"J. Sonnekus","doi":"10.47348/tsar/2022/i3a8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47348/tsar/2022/i3a8","url":null,"abstract":"The deeply ingrained precedent used by many legal advisors to credit providers in South Africa in securing the claim of the latter to their debtors as legal persons with a surety agreement that binds the directors of the legal person as sureties and co-principal debtors, is of doubtful use. In reality, this agreement provides a false sense of security that does not merit the paper on which it is written. If the same legal subject is involved in both personae, a court cannot ignore the trite principle that a party cannot stand surety for itself. In the Radiant case, the original “business entity” was in reality the alter ego of M because it was not registered as any legal person; M was merely trading as Xelmar FXN. Although M signed as surety, as co-principal debtor and also as the agent representing the business, in reality, only one legal subject was involved apart from the creditor R – M. M could not have signed as surety for his own debt albeit in the name of the business as his alter ego. When a company was incorporated a year later with almost the same firm name as the original entity, R neglected to insist on the conclusion of new credit agreements and surety agreements because M had misrepresented to R that the name change of the business entity did not impact on the business arrangements already in place. Allegedly, it merely underwent a change from sole proprietor to (Pty) Ltd! According to the pleadings, the second defendant M represented to the plaintiff by words, alternatively by conduct, that the entity remained the same and that the incorporation was “as a going concern” with no inherent change to debtors and creditors. The plaintiff relied on this misrepresentation to its detriment. The court correctly held that M could not be bound as surety for the debt of the company because no surety agreement was in place regarding that liability. Notwithstanding R’s reliance on the misrepresentation to its detriment, the court held that the reliance on estoppel could not succeed because the misrepresentation could not be maintained. It was held that maintaining the misrepresentation would be in conflict with section 6 of Act 50 of 1956. It is submitted that M was still responsible for the debt of his alter ego as the original business entity because he bound himself as principal debtor. In the absence of another legal subject, M was not “co-principal debtor” but the sole debtor. By postponing to inform R of the completed change in the business entity for more than five months after the company was incorporated and registered, M misrepresented to R that no change had occurred. In these circumstances estoppel was the applicable defence, notwithstanding the court’s finding. Creditors will be better off when they refrain from using old precedents containing contradictory formulations. They should rather compel the natural persons involved with their debtors as legal persons to sign only as principal or co-principal debtors and not as sureties. It","PeriodicalId":53590,"journal":{"name":"Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83867057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.47348/tsar/2022/i1a14
N. Ismail
None
没有一个
{"title":"Boekbesprekings: DJ Mcquoid-Mason (ed): Street Law and Public Legal Education: A Collection of Best Practices from around the World in Honour of Ed O’Brien","authors":"N. Ismail","doi":"10.47348/tsar/2022/i1a14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47348/tsar/2022/i1a14","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>None</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":53590,"journal":{"name":"Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg","volume":"105 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79242166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to the headnote attached to the most recent decision under discussion, the litigation turned on the quantification of the total loss suffered by M as alleged holder of a right of habitatio after S as reputed owner of the farm revoked the verbal agreement between the parties entitling M to occupy the dwelling ad infinitum on condition that he renovates the dwelling to a habitable state. Notwithstanding the conviction of the judges involved, it is clear that at no stage were any of the requirements for the acquisition or vesting of a limited real right of habitatio complied with. No limited real right was registered against the farm and S as the alleged grantor of the limited real right was at no stage the owner of the property. He could not have been entitled to burden the property of another with such limited real right. A contractual arrangement between the parties, however, did exist granting the claimant an entitlement to occupy the dwelling. The initially friendly relations between the litigants soured abruptly in February 2013 when S evicted M from the farm because of a supposed blasphemous comment by M. This happened after the claimant had already invested significantly in the restoration and modernisation of the old dilapidated dwelling. “The plaintiff regarded this as a repudiation of the contract between him and the defendant, accepted it as such and left the farm, effectively halting the renovation project” (par 14 read with par 5.4 of the 2016-decision). His claim for compensation of the loss suffered was held by the court to be limited to the amounts reflected in the receipts representing the cost of building material when it was acquired. It is submitted that the court should also have taken note of the loss suffered as positive interest, because the claimant forfeited the calculated benefit of life-long free occupation in the restored dwelling. Because of the underlying agreement between the parties to the litigation, the patrimonial benefit that accrued to the estate of the owner of the farm due to the objective rules of accessio cannot be classified as actionable unjustified enrichment. The principles of unjustified enrichment do not apply – the resulting detriment or loss of M was cum causa and not sine causa. The remarks of the court pointing to unjustified enrichment do not convince. Damages should have been calculated to cover the loss in positive interest of the claimant and not merely his negative interest, ie the amounts paid for the building material used in the renovation. The court, however, held: “I’m satisfied that the plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to prove his claim for the costs of renovating the farmhouse on a balance of probabilities” (par 23). The last mentioned mode of quantification of the loss suffered would have been more in place where merely a delict was involved, as eg where the damaged motor vehicle should be repaired to the state it was in before the accident occurred. Had the judges
{"title":"Aantekeninge: Verblyfvergunning is nie outomaties habitatio nie en totale skade omvat skade gely weens inbreuk op die eiser se vervullingsbelang","authors":"J. Sonnekus","doi":"10.47348/tsar/2022/i1a8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47348/tsar/2022/i1a8","url":null,"abstract":"According to the headnote attached to the most recent decision under discussion, the litigation turned on the quantification of the total loss suffered by M as alleged holder of a right of habitatio after S as reputed owner of the farm revoked the verbal agreement between the parties entitling M to occupy the dwelling ad infinitum on condition that he renovates the dwelling to a habitable state. Notwithstanding the conviction of the judges involved, it is clear that at no stage were any of the requirements for the acquisition or vesting of a limited real right of habitatio complied with. No limited real right was registered against the farm and S as the alleged grantor of the limited real right was at no stage the owner of the property. He could not have been entitled to burden the property of another with such limited real right. A contractual arrangement between the parties, however, did exist granting the claimant an entitlement to occupy the dwelling. The initially friendly relations between the litigants soured abruptly in February 2013 when S evicted M from the farm because of a supposed blasphemous comment by M. This happened after the claimant had already invested significantly in the restoration and modernisation of the old dilapidated dwelling. “The plaintiff regarded this as a repudiation of the contract between him and the defendant, accepted it as such and left the farm, effectively halting the renovation project” (par 14 read with par 5.4 of the 2016-decision). His claim for compensation of the loss suffered was held by the court to be limited to the amounts reflected in the receipts representing the cost of building material when it was acquired. It is submitted that the court should also have taken note of the loss suffered as positive interest, because the claimant forfeited the calculated benefit of life-long free occupation in the restored dwelling. Because of the underlying agreement between the parties to the litigation, the patrimonial benefit that accrued to the estate of the owner of the farm due to the objective rules of accessio cannot be classified as actionable unjustified enrichment. The principles of unjustified enrichment do not apply – the resulting detriment or loss of M was cum causa and not sine causa. The remarks of the court pointing to unjustified enrichment do not convince. Damages should have been calculated to cover the loss in positive interest of the claimant and not merely his negative interest, ie the amounts paid for the building material used in the renovation. The court, however, held: “I’m satisfied that the plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to prove his claim for the costs of renovating the farmhouse on a balance of probabilities” (par 23). The last mentioned mode of quantification of the loss suffered would have been more in place where merely a delict was involved, as eg where the damaged motor vehicle should be repaired to the state it was in before the accident occurred. Had the judges","PeriodicalId":53590,"journal":{"name":"Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88502482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This contribution summarises and considers recent South African labour law cases from June 2021 to May 2022. It focuses on several important decisions handed down by South African courts on a range of labour law matters. The cases addressed here were chosen because they establish new standards, expand on existing ones or establish new legal tests. These judgments have a notable effect on labour law and the employment relationship. They are anticipated to be particularly influential in future cases. Although facts have been shortened where possible, findings of reasonableness and fairness are often dependent on the specific circumstances and relevant facts have therefore been set out where necessary. As in the previous update, the labour courts were again tasked to deal with several cases involving Covid-19 related facts, particularly mandatory vaccinations. There was also a significant increase in constitutional court judgments in labour-related matters.
{"title":"Aantekeninge: An update of recent labour law developments from South African courts 2022","authors":"MJ Van Staden","doi":"10.47348/tsar/2022/i4a6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47348/tsar/2022/i4a6","url":null,"abstract":"This contribution summarises and considers recent South African labour law cases from June 2021 to May 2022. It focuses on several important decisions handed down by South African courts on a range of labour law matters. The cases addressed here were chosen because they establish new standards, expand on existing ones or establish new legal tests. These judgments have a notable effect on labour law and the employment relationship. They are anticipated to be particularly influential in future cases. Although facts have been shortened where possible, findings of reasonableness and fairness are often dependent on the specific circumstances and relevant facts have therefore been set out where necessary. As in the previous update, the labour courts were again tasked to deal with several cases involving Covid-19 related facts, particularly mandatory vaccinations. There was also a significant increase in constitutional court judgments in labour-related matters.","PeriodicalId":53590,"journal":{"name":"Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg","volume":"128 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88487488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Het Belgische erfrecht is door de Erfwet 2017 en de Wet Huwelijksvermogensrecht 2018 voor het eerst in twee eeuwen grondig aangepakt. Een alomvattende hervorming moest het erfrecht terug in overeenstemming brengen met de maatschappelijke realiteit. De gehele hervorming wordt in dit artikel systematisch besproken, met focus op de verschillende hedendaagse tendensen die aan de basis liggen ervan. Ten eerste is er de toename van het aantal nieuw samengestelde gezinnen, waardoor de wetgever onder andere voor inbreng en inkorting door de langstlevende echtgenote het huwelijk voortaan als startpunt neemt en een nieuwe omzettingsmodaliteit voor het erfrechtelijk vruchtgebruik van de langstlevende echtgenote heeft ingevoerd. Ten tweede is er de toenemende nood aan mechanismen om vermogen van grootouders naar kinderen te laten overgaan (de zogenaamde “generatiesprong”). De wetgever heeft in drie nieuwe mechanismen voorzien om dit te bewerkstelligen: de inbreng ten behoeve van een derde, de globale erfovereenkomst en in het algemeen een vergroting van het beschikbaar deel. Ten derde blijkt er vanuit de bevolking in het algemeen de vraag naar een vergroting van de beschikkingsvrijheid. Om dat te bewerkstelligen, werd de reserve van de ascendenten afgeschaft, de reserve van de afstammelingen vastgesteld op de helft van de nalatenschap onafhankelijk van het aantal afstammelingen en het verbod op erfovereenkomsten versoepeld. Ten slotte is er steeds meer focus op het kerngezin (bestaande uit de erflater, zijn echtgenote en de kinderen) in de plaats van op verdere bloedverwanten. Om die reden werd onder andere het intestaat erfrecht van de langstlevende echtgenote bij samenloop met verre bloedverwanten uitgebreid. Het artikel biedt een overzicht van alle wijzigingen in vijf verschillende delen: (1) de regels over de inkorting, (2) de regels over de inbreng, (3) de regels over de verdeling van de nalatenschap, (4) de regels over de erfovereenkomsten en (5) de regels met betrekking tot de erfrechtelijke positie van de langstlevende echtgenote. De wijzigingen worden waar nodig kritisch onderzocht en ruimer gekaderd in het Belgische erfrecht.
{"title":"Belgium’s inheritance law reform of 2017 and 2018","authors":"R. Barbaix, D. Leire","doi":"10.47348/tsar/2022/i3a1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47348/tsar/2022/i3a1","url":null,"abstract":"Het Belgische erfrecht is door de Erfwet 2017 en de Wet Huwelijksvermogensrecht 2018 voor het eerst in twee eeuwen grondig aangepakt. Een alomvattende hervorming moest het erfrecht terug in overeenstemming brengen met de maatschappelijke realiteit. De gehele hervorming wordt in dit artikel systematisch besproken, met focus op de verschillende hedendaagse tendensen die aan de basis liggen ervan. Ten eerste is er de toename van het aantal nieuw samengestelde gezinnen, waardoor de wetgever onder andere voor inbreng en inkorting door de langstlevende echtgenote het huwelijk voortaan als startpunt neemt en een nieuwe omzettingsmodaliteit voor het erfrechtelijk vruchtgebruik van de langstlevende echtgenote heeft ingevoerd. Ten tweede is er de toenemende nood aan mechanismen om vermogen van grootouders naar kinderen te laten overgaan (de zogenaamde “generatiesprong”). De wetgever heeft in drie nieuwe mechanismen voorzien om dit te bewerkstelligen: de inbreng ten behoeve van een derde, de globale erfovereenkomst en in het algemeen een vergroting van het beschikbaar deel. Ten derde blijkt er vanuit de bevolking in het algemeen de vraag naar een vergroting van de beschikkingsvrijheid. Om dat te bewerkstelligen, werd de reserve van de ascendenten afgeschaft, de reserve van de afstammelingen vastgesteld op de helft van de nalatenschap onafhankelijk van het aantal afstammelingen en het verbod op erfovereenkomsten versoepeld. Ten slotte is er steeds meer focus op het kerngezin (bestaande uit de erflater, zijn echtgenote en de kinderen) in de plaats van op verdere bloedverwanten. Om die reden werd onder andere het intestaat erfrecht van de langstlevende echtgenote bij samenloop met verre bloedverwanten uitgebreid. Het artikel biedt een overzicht van alle wijzigingen in vijf verschillende delen: (1) de regels over de inkorting, (2) de regels over de inbreng, (3) de regels over de verdeling van de nalatenschap, (4) de regels over de erfovereenkomsten en (5) de regels met betrekking tot de erfrechtelijke positie van de langstlevende echtgenote. De wijzigingen worden waar nodig kritisch onderzocht en ruimer gekaderd in het Belgische erfrecht.","PeriodicalId":53590,"journal":{"name":"Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78709947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hierdie artikel ondersoek die bedryf van aanlyn musiekstroomdienste, en in die besonder tot watter mate outeursreghebbendes en kunstenaars vergoed word vir die gebruik van hul beskermde werk deur musiekstroomdienste. Soos tegnologie ontwikkel, het die gebruik van musiekstroomdienste die oorwegende manier geword waarop luisteraars omgaan met musiek. Hoewel die aantal musiekstroomdiensgebruikers beduidend toeneem, is daar nie ’n ooreenstemmende toename in die tantieme wat outeursreghebbendes en kunstenaars ontvang vir die gebruik van hul werke deur musiekstroomdienste nie. Daar is ’n wêreldwye poging om hierdie waardeverskil aan te spreek. Die artikel ontleed die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing rakende die verhouding tussen outeursreghebbendes en kunstenaars, en die tantieme waarop hul geregtig is. Daar word ondersoek of hierdie partye effektief beskerm word in die lig van hoe aanlyn musiekstroomdienste bedryf word. Die outeur voer aan dat daar ’n duidelike verskil is in die mate waartoe outeursreghebbendes en kunstenaars beskerm word in terme van die Wet op Outeursreg en die Wet op die Beskerming van Kunstenaars. Kunstenaars het slegs ’n reg op vergoeding vir die gebruik van hul optredes, waar outeursreghebbendes eksklusiewe regte het tot die gebruik en uitbuiting van hul werk. Gebaseer op die voorstelle en wysigings van die Wêreld Intellektuele Goedere Organisasie en die Europese Unie, voer die outeur aan dat ʼn addisionele reg tot vergoeding vir die gebruik van hul werk in die geval van die interaktiewe manier waarop musiekstroomdienste bedryf word, ingesluit moet word in die raamwerk van outeursregwetgewing. Hierdie voorgestelde wysiging verseker dat Suid- Afrikaanse musikante billike vergoeding ontvang vir die gebruik van hul werk in die bedryf van aanlyn musiekstroomdienste en verseker ook dat die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewende raamwerk op gelyke voet met internasionale standaarde kan wees.
{"title":"Copyright owners, performers and streaming: a South African perspective on addressing the value gap","authors":"G. Jansen","doi":"10.47348/tsar/2022/i3a4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47348/tsar/2022/i3a4","url":null,"abstract":"Hierdie artikel ondersoek die bedryf van aanlyn musiekstroomdienste, en in die besonder tot watter mate outeursreghebbendes en kunstenaars vergoed word vir die gebruik van hul beskermde werk deur musiekstroomdienste. Soos tegnologie ontwikkel, het die gebruik van musiekstroomdienste die oorwegende manier geword waarop luisteraars omgaan met musiek. Hoewel die aantal musiekstroomdiensgebruikers beduidend toeneem, is daar nie ’n ooreenstemmende toename in die tantieme wat outeursreghebbendes en kunstenaars ontvang vir die gebruik van hul werke deur musiekstroomdienste nie. Daar is ’n wêreldwye poging om hierdie waardeverskil aan te spreek. Die artikel ontleed die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing rakende die verhouding tussen outeursreghebbendes en kunstenaars, en die tantieme waarop hul geregtig is. Daar word ondersoek of hierdie partye effektief beskerm word in die lig van hoe aanlyn musiekstroomdienste bedryf word. Die outeur voer aan dat daar ’n duidelike verskil is in die mate waartoe outeursreghebbendes en kunstenaars beskerm word in terme van die Wet op Outeursreg en die Wet op die Beskerming van Kunstenaars. Kunstenaars het slegs ’n reg op vergoeding vir die gebruik van hul optredes, waar outeursreghebbendes eksklusiewe regte het tot die gebruik en uitbuiting van hul werk. Gebaseer op die voorstelle en wysigings van die Wêreld Intellektuele Goedere Organisasie en die Europese Unie, voer die outeur aan dat ʼn addisionele reg tot vergoeding vir die gebruik van hul werk in die geval van die interaktiewe manier waarop musiekstroomdienste bedryf word, ingesluit moet word in die raamwerk van outeursregwetgewing. Hierdie voorgestelde wysiging verseker dat Suid- Afrikaanse musikante billike vergoeding ontvang vir die gebruik van hul werk in die bedryf van aanlyn musiekstroomdienste en verseker ook dat die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewende raamwerk op gelyke voet met internasionale standaarde kan wees.","PeriodicalId":53590,"journal":{"name":"Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72635792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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