Pub Date : 2022-10-11DOI: 10.1017/S1369415422000425
C. Hay
Abstract The standard attribution of ought implies can rules out the possibility of Kantianism permitting the existence of moral dilemmas. Against this, I argue that Kantianism both can and should permit the existence of moral dilemmas. This new take on moral dilemmas should be of particular urgency to those hoping to radicalize Kant, I argue, because the work of oppression theorists shows that moral dilemmas are particularly likely to strike those who are already most vulnerable. The insights of oppression theory also suggest that the heretofore overlooked social and political implications of moral dilemmas are just as philosophically significant as the metaethical and ethical implications.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-04DOI: 10.1017/S1369415422000413
Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović
Crusius, Christian August (1743) Dissertatio de usu et limitibus principii rationis determinantis vulgo sufficientis. Leipzig. Deligiorgi, Katerina (2021) ‘Freedom and Ethical Necessity: A Kantian Response to Ulrich (1788)’. In James A. Clarke and Gabriel Gottlieb (eds), Practical Philosophy from Kant to Hegel: Freedom, Right, and Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 28–45. Fichte, J. G. (1964–) J. G. Fichte: Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Gliwitsky. Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Fromann. Schierbaum, Sonja (2020) ‘Choosing for No Reason? An Old Objection to Freedom of Indifference’. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 37(2), 183–202.
Crusius，Christian August（1743），《普通和限制原则的论文》，《理性决定了足够的力量》。莱比锡。Deligiorgi，Katerina（2021）“自由与伦理必要性：康德对乌尔里希的回应（1788）”。James A.Clarke和Gabriel Gottlieb（编辑），《从康德到黑格尔的实践哲学：自由、权利和革命》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社），28-45。费希特，J.G.（1964–）费希特：《威斯森查芬的Bayerischen Akademie Gesamtausgabe》。Reinhard Lauth和Hans Gliwitsky编辑。斯图加特巴特坎斯塔特：弗罗曼。Schierbaum，Sonja（2020）“无端选择？“对冷漠自由的古老反对”。《哲学史季刊》，37（2），183-202。
{"title":"Milla Emilia Vaha , The Moral Standing of the State in International Politics. A Kantian Account Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2021 Pp. vi + 182 ISBN 9781786837868 (hbk) £75.00","authors":"Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović","doi":"10.1017/S1369415422000413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415422000413","url":null,"abstract":"Crusius, Christian August (1743) Dissertatio de usu et limitibus principii rationis determinantis vulgo sufficientis. Leipzig. Deligiorgi, Katerina (2021) ‘Freedom and Ethical Necessity: A Kantian Response to Ulrich (1788)’. In James A. Clarke and Gabriel Gottlieb (eds), Practical Philosophy from Kant to Hegel: Freedom, Right, and Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 28–45. Fichte, J. G. (1964–) J. G. Fichte: Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Gliwitsky. Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Fromann. Schierbaum, Sonja (2020) ‘Choosing for No Reason? An Old Objection to Freedom of Indifference’. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 37(2), 183–202.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45333342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-03DOI: 10.1017/s1369415422000383
J. Browning
{"title":"Daniel Baumeister, Kant on the Human Animal: Anthropology, Ethics, Race Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2022 Pp. 176 ISBN: 9780810144682 (hbk) $99.95","authors":"J. Browning","doi":"10.1017/s1369415422000383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415422000383","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44956052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-03DOI: 10.1017/S1369415422000358
Inés Valdez
Abstract This article explores the distinctions among European peoples’ character established in Kant’s anthropology and their connection with his politics. These aspects are neglected relative to the analysis of race between Europeans and non-Europeans, but Kant’s anthropological works portray the people of Mediterranean Europe as not capable of civilization because of the dominance of passion in their faculty of desire, which he ties to ‘Oriental’ influences in blood or government. Kant then superimposes this racialized anthropology over the historical geopolitics of Europe, obscuring the indebtedness of Northern European trade dominance to Mediterranean historical tactics and financial wealth. By relegating the Mediterranean to the margins and dismissing contentious commercial exchange in the region as mere violence spearheaded by North African corsairs, Kant gives us an elitist cosmopolitanism unable to cope with hierarchy and inequality, diminishing its potential for egalitarian global projects today.
{"title":"Toward a Narrow Cosmopolitanism: Kant’s Anthropology, Racialized Character and the Construction of Europe","authors":"Inés Valdez","doi":"10.1017/S1369415422000358","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415422000358","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article explores the distinctions among European peoples’ character established in Kant’s anthropology and their connection with his politics. These aspects are neglected relative to the analysis of race between Europeans and non-Europeans, but Kant’s anthropological works portray the people of Mediterranean Europe as not capable of civilization because of the dominance of passion in their faculty of desire, which he ties to ‘Oriental’ influences in blood or government. Kant then superimposes this racialized anthropology over the historical geopolitics of Europe, obscuring the indebtedness of Northern European trade dominance to Mediterranean historical tactics and financial wealth. By relegating the Mediterranean to the margins and dismissing contentious commercial exchange in the region as mere violence spearheaded by North African corsairs, Kant gives us an elitist cosmopolitanism unable to cope with hierarchy and inequality, diminishing its potential for egalitarian global projects today.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47946434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-30DOI: 10.1017/S1369415422000401
Aaron Wells
account of rationalization than the one currently on offer in existing Kant scholarship. Anyone at all convinced, in ordinary life, of our talents for self-deception, as well as our ability to get so many things wrong in moral matters, will want to find as expansive an account of rationalization as possible in Kant. On the other hand, readers may wonder how far Sticker can really push a Kantian account of rationalization. As Sticker himself notes, rationalization against the moral law can never be ‘allencompassing’ (p. 42). To quote: ‘An ideology is not adopted instead of the moral law, but as an addition’ or ‘modification’ (p. 42; Sticker’s emphasis). But does it make sense to think of Garve’s eudaimonism as an ‘addition’ to the categorical imperative? Or, consider another fascinating example from the very end of Sticker’s book, namely a moral ideology according to which our duty to be philanthropic is so demanding that we can lie, cheat and steal in the name of benevolence (p. 55). Such an extreme morality admittedly contains vestiges of a Kantian conception of duty insofar as it acknowledges the importance of helping others. But I am less confident than Sticker that this form of altruism would count as a distortion of morality that only ‘adds’ to our representation of the moral law. Nonetheless, Sticker’s challenge to Kantians to widen the scope of rationalization is a well-taken one that anyone writing on self-deception in Kant will have to wrestle with. And overall, his book is a first-rate philosophical work and an extremely important contribution to the field.
{"title":"Jörg Noller and John Walsh (eds), Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022 Pp. xlvii + 315 ISBN 9781108482462 (hbk) £74.99","authors":"Aaron Wells","doi":"10.1017/S1369415422000401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415422000401","url":null,"abstract":"account of rationalization than the one currently on offer in existing Kant scholarship. Anyone at all convinced, in ordinary life, of our talents for self-deception, as well as our ability to get so many things wrong in moral matters, will want to find as expansive an account of rationalization as possible in Kant. On the other hand, readers may wonder how far Sticker can really push a Kantian account of rationalization. As Sticker himself notes, rationalization against the moral law can never be ‘allencompassing’ (p. 42). To quote: ‘An ideology is not adopted instead of the moral law, but as an addition’ or ‘modification’ (p. 42; Sticker’s emphasis). But does it make sense to think of Garve’s eudaimonism as an ‘addition’ to the categorical imperative? Or, consider another fascinating example from the very end of Sticker’s book, namely a moral ideology according to which our duty to be philanthropic is so demanding that we can lie, cheat and steal in the name of benevolence (p. 55). Such an extreme morality admittedly contains vestiges of a Kantian conception of duty insofar as it acknowledges the importance of helping others. But I am less confident than Sticker that this form of altruism would count as a distortion of morality that only ‘adds’ to our representation of the moral law. Nonetheless, Sticker’s challenge to Kantians to widen the scope of rationalization is a well-taken one that anyone writing on self-deception in Kant will have to wrestle with. And overall, his book is a first-rate philosophical work and an extremely important contribution to the field.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43159181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-28DOI: 10.1017/S1369415422000371
Rachel E Zuckert
a of of theory and of justice; both a trenchant of Enlightenment liberalism with colonialism and chattel promoter realization of all individuals. and of interpersonal behaviour; above immensely witty conversationalist, dry by a wry sidelong glance, inviting shared
{"title":"Memorial for Charles W. Mills","authors":"Rachel E Zuckert","doi":"10.1017/S1369415422000371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415422000371","url":null,"abstract":"a of of theory and of justice; both a trenchant of Enlightenment liberalism with colonialism and chattel promoter realization of all individuals. and of interpersonal behaviour; above immensely witty conversationalist, dry by a wry sidelong glance, inviting shared","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44263038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-26DOI: 10.1017/S136941542200036X
Helga Varden
Abstract In our societies today, the prevalence of serious, untreated trauma means that we cannot reliably expect to receive or give unconditional love, understood as love which functions within a normative framework to protect each and all of us as having dignity. Serious, untreated trauma makes unconditional love (so understood) unreliable because each time the pattern of the psychological damage (trauma) is triggered in the traumatized person, in the wrongdoers or in the bystanders, their behaviour easily becomes self- and other-numbing, destructive and moralizing in an irrational and often self-deceived attempt to preserve or defend themselves or others against forces felt as threatening even though they are not. It is also common for someone who lives in societal conditions where it is impossible to avoid patterned, traumatizing behaviour to experience the emotional temptation to give up on the possibility of a better future for oneself, one’s loved ones or one’s community within the larger community or the state. For some, this is experienced as a draw towards suicide, while others experience it as a serious temptation to give up on working together with the good forces in society. This article seeks to continue Charles Mills’ work on radicalizing Kant by sketching a Kantian account of trauma and thereby develop philosophical resources that can help us fight historical oppression and violence.
{"title":"A Kantian Account of Trauma","authors":"Helga Varden","doi":"10.1017/S136941542200036X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S136941542200036X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In our societies today, the prevalence of serious, untreated trauma means that we cannot reliably expect to receive or give unconditional love, understood as love which functions within a normative framework to protect each and all of us as having dignity. Serious, untreated trauma makes unconditional love (so understood) unreliable because each time the pattern of the psychological damage (trauma) is triggered in the traumatized person, in the wrongdoers or in the bystanders, their behaviour easily becomes self- and other-numbing, destructive and moralizing in an irrational and often self-deceived attempt to preserve or defend themselves or others against forces felt as threatening even though they are not. It is also common for someone who lives in societal conditions where it is impossible to avoid patterned, traumatizing behaviour to experience the emotional temptation to give up on the possibility of a better future for oneself, one’s loved ones or one’s community within the larger community or the state. For some, this is experienced as a draw towards suicide, while others experience it as a serious temptation to give up on working together with the good forces in society. This article seeks to continue Charles Mills’ work on radicalizing Kant by sketching a Kantian account of trauma and thereby develop philosophical resources that can help us fight historical oppression and violence.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43799859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-22DOI: 10.1017/S1369415422000346
J. Shorter-Bourhanou
Abstract Immanuel Kant is often interpreted as a universal egalitarian who claims that all people, regardless of their differences, are equal. This view has been challenged by several scholars including Charles Mills and Robert Bernasconi, who note the persistent racist underpinning in Kant’s work; however, the standard reading is that Kant changed his mind about race and eventually reaffirmed his universalism. By considering Charles Mills’ notion of ‘Black Radical Kantianism’, as a way of reinventing Kant, I argue that continued engagement with Kant’s universalism must go hand in hand with recognizing his racism in order to make it truly inclusive.
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Pub Date : 2022-09-21DOI: 10.1017/S1369415422000310
Dilek Huseyinzadegan
Abstract This article shows that the methodology of Mills’ ‘Black Radical Kantianism’ (BRK) represents a major plot twist for Kant studies as well as contemporary political philosophy utilizing Kantian ideas. BRK is no mere upgrade of Kant’s or Kantian ideal theory for racial justice. Mills’ methodology requires us to posit both that the real Kant and establishment Kantianism have been racist, sexist and Eurocentric; and that only by first admitting and reckoning with the compatibility of white supremacy and liberal egalitarianism can we hope to radicalize Kant or Kantianism.
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