Pub Date : 2023-05-22DOI: 10.1017/S1369415423000109
C. Onof
Abstract The article proposes an interpretation of Kant’s notions of form of, and formal intuition of space to explain and justify the claim that representing space as object requires a synthesis. This involves identifying the transcendental conditions of the analytic unity of consciousness of this formal intuition and distinguishing between it and its content. On this reading which builds upon recent proposals, footnote B160–1n. involves no revision of the Transcendental Aesthetic: space is essentially characterized by non-conceptual features. The article also addresses worries about the infinite magnitude and the unicity of space, by considering the characteristics and requirements of geometric constructions.
{"title":"The Unicity, Infinity and Unity of Space","authors":"C. Onof","doi":"10.1017/S1369415423000109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415423000109","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article proposes an interpretation of Kant’s notions of form of, and formal intuition of space to explain and justify the claim that representing space as object requires a synthesis. This involves identifying the transcendental conditions of the analytic unity of consciousness of this formal intuition and distinguishing between it and its content. On this reading which builds upon recent proposals, footnote B160–1n. involves no revision of the Transcendental Aesthetic: space is essentially characterized by non-conceptual features. The article also addresses worries about the infinite magnitude and the unicity of space, by considering the characteristics and requirements of geometric constructions.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46378140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-05DOI: 10.1017/S1369415423000080
Fiorella Tomassini
Abstract This article examines Kant’s theory of property through a comparative analysis of Gottfried Achenwall’s justification of ownership rights. I argue that at the core of Achenwall’s and Kant’s understanding of ownership rights lies the idea that rights are to be acquired through a juridical act (factum iuridicum, rechtlichen Act) of the will. However, while Achenwall thinks of this act as emerging from a private will, Kant holds that rights and obligations can only be brought about by an act of the general will. By contrasting these two views, I aim to illuminate one of the main features of Kant’s theory of property, namely, that ownership rights are only possible in a rightfully constituted state. I conclude with a suggestion regarding Kant’s view of the notion of ‘provisional’ possession in the state of nature.
{"title":"Property and the Will: Kant and Achenwall on Ownership Rights","authors":"Fiorella Tomassini","doi":"10.1017/S1369415423000080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415423000080","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines Kant’s theory of property through a comparative analysis of Gottfried Achenwall’s justification of ownership rights. I argue that at the core of Achenwall’s and Kant’s understanding of ownership rights lies the idea that rights are to be acquired through a juridical act (factum iuridicum, rechtlichen Act) of the will. However, while Achenwall thinks of this act as emerging from a private will, Kant holds that rights and obligations can only be brought about by an act of the general will. By contrasting these two views, I aim to illuminate one of the main features of Kant’s theory of property, namely, that ownership rights are only possible in a rightfully constituted state. I conclude with a suggestion regarding Kant’s view of the notion of ‘provisional’ possession in the state of nature.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48817196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-24DOI: 10.1017/S1369415423000134
Markus Kohl
Abstract In Kant’s idealism, all spatiotemporal objects depend on the human mind in a certain way. A central issue here is whether the existence of spatiotemporal things requires that these things are, at least at some point, objects of some actual experience or of a merely possible experience. In this essay, I argue (on textual and philosophical grounds) for the latter view: spatiotemporal things exist (or spatiotemporal events occur) if they are objects of a (suitably qualified) possible experience.
{"title":"Kant on Mind-Dependence: Possible or Actual Experience?","authors":"Markus Kohl","doi":"10.1017/S1369415423000134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415423000134","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In Kant’s idealism, all spatiotemporal objects depend on the human mind in a certain way. A central issue here is whether the existence of spatiotemporal things requires that these things are, at least at some point, objects of some actual experience or of a merely possible experience. In this essay, I argue (on textual and philosophical grounds) for the latter view: spatiotemporal things exist (or spatiotemporal events occur) if they are objects of a (suitably qualified) possible experience.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42256482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-20DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000043
Andrea Thiele
Robert B. Louden, Johann Bernhard Basedow and the Transformation of Modern Education: Educational Reform in the German Enlightenment. London: Bloomsbury, 2020. Pp. xiii + 226. ISBN 9781350163669 (hbk) £76.50 - Jürgen Overhoff, Johann Bernhard Basedow (1724–1790). Aufklärer, Pädagoge, Menschenfreund. Eine Biographie. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2020. Pp. 200. ISBN 9783835336193 (hbk) €16.00
Robert B. Louden, Johann Bernhard Basedow and the Transformation of Modern Education: Educational Reform in the German Enlightenment.伦敦：布鲁姆斯伯里，2020 年。xiii + 226. ISBN 9781350163669 (hbk) £76.50 - Jürgen Overhoff, Johann Bernhard Basedow (1724-1790).启蒙哲学家、教育家、慈善家。传记。哥廷根：pp.ISBN 9783835336193 (hbk) €16.00
{"title":"Robert B. Louden, Johann Bernhard Basedow and the Transformation of Modern Education: Educational Reform in the German Enlightenment. London: Bloomsbury, 2020. Pp. xiii + 226. ISBN 9781350163669 (hbk) £76.50 - Jürgen Overhoff, Johann Bernhard Basedow (1724–1790). Aufklärer, Pädagoge, Menschenfreund. Eine Biographie. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2020. Pp. 200. ISBN 9783835336193 (hbk) €16.00","authors":"Andrea Thiele","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000043","url":null,"abstract":"Robert B. Louden, Johann Bernhard Basedow and the Transformation of Modern Education: Educational Reform in the German Enlightenment. London: Bloomsbury, 2020. Pp. xiii + 226. ISBN 9781350163669 (hbk) £76.50 - Jürgen Overhoff, Johann Bernhard Basedow (1724–1790). Aufklärer, Pädagoge, Menschenfreund. Eine Biographie. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2020. Pp. 200. ISBN 9783835336193 (hbk) €16.00","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135613463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-20DOI: 10.1017/S1369415423000122
Aaron Halper
Abstract Kant’s moral philosophy both enjoins the acquisition of self-knowledge as a duty, and precludes certain forms of its acquisition via what has become known as the Opacity Thesis. This article looks at several recent attempts to solve this difficulty and argues that they are inadequate. I argue instead that the Opacity Thesis rules out only the knowledge that one has acted from genuine moral principles, but does not apply in cases of moral failure. The duty of moral self-knowledge applies therefore only to one’s awareness of one’s status as a moral being and to the knowledge of one’s moral failings, both in particular actions and one’s overall character failings, one’s vices. This kind of knowledge is morally salutary as an aid to discovering one’s individual moral weakness as well as the subjective ends for which one acts, and in this way for taking up the morally required end of treating human beings as human beings. In this way, moral self-knowledge can be understood as a necessary element of moral improvement, and I conclude by suggesting several ways to understand it thereby as genuinely primary among the duties to oneself.
{"title":"Self-Knowledge and the Opacity Thesis in Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue","authors":"Aaron Halper","doi":"10.1017/S1369415423000122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415423000122","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Kant’s moral philosophy both enjoins the acquisition of self-knowledge as a duty, and precludes certain forms of its acquisition via what has become known as the Opacity Thesis. This article looks at several recent attempts to solve this difficulty and argues that they are inadequate. I argue instead that the Opacity Thesis rules out only the knowledge that one has acted from genuine moral principles, but does not apply in cases of moral failure. The duty of moral self-knowledge applies therefore only to one’s awareness of one’s status as a moral being and to the knowledge of one’s moral failings, both in particular actions and one’s overall character failings, one’s vices. This kind of knowledge is morally salutary as an aid to discovering one’s individual moral weakness as well as the subjective ends for which one acts, and in this way for taking up the morally required end of treating human beings as human beings. In this way, moral self-knowledge can be understood as a necessary element of moral improvement, and I conclude by suggesting several ways to understand it thereby as genuinely primary among the duties to oneself.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42687161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-11DOI: 10.1017/S1369415423000146
Qiannan Li
Abstract In this article, I argue that the current literature on political hope overlooks its non-instrumental value. By proposing a Kant-inspired account of treating reasonable hopes as fundamental hopes, I argue that it is rational for people to hold certain political hopes not only because such hopes promote particular ends but also because they are constitutive of a person’s practical identity as a responsible political agent with limited power to make changes. This view reveals that victims of injustice face an affective injustice because the unjust social system forces them to face a double bind in upholding their fundamental political hopes.
{"title":"A Kantian Account of Political Hopes as Fundamental Hopes","authors":"Qiannan Li","doi":"10.1017/S1369415423000146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415423000146","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, I argue that the current literature on political hope overlooks its non-instrumental value. By proposing a Kant-inspired account of treating reasonable hopes as fundamental hopes, I argue that it is rational for people to hold certain political hopes not only because such hopes promote particular ends but also because they are constitutive of a person’s practical identity as a responsible political agent with limited power to make changes. This view reveals that victims of injustice face an affective injustice because the unjust social system forces them to face a double bind in upholding their fundamental political hopes.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45836740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-11DOI: 10.1017/S1369415423000110
L. Caranti
Abstract Kant’s criticism of democracy has been traditionally defused with the consideration that Kant’s aversion is not to democracy per se, but to direct democracy. However, what Kant says – ‘to prevent the republican constitution from being confused with the democratic one, as commonly happens’ (ZeF, 8: 351) – appears to count not only against direct democracy, but also against conceptions of democracy closer to the ones we are accustomed to. By offering a new account of what Kant sees as the real problem of democracy (direct or not), the article unpacks a lesson about the limits of democracy that has gone largely unnoticed among political theorists and Kant specialists.
{"title":"Why does Kant Think that Democracy is Necessarily Despotic?","authors":"L. Caranti","doi":"10.1017/S1369415423000110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415423000110","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Kant’s criticism of democracy has been traditionally defused with the consideration that Kant’s aversion is not to democracy per se, but to direct democracy. However, what Kant says – ‘to prevent the republican constitution from being confused with the democratic one, as commonly happens’ (ZeF, 8: 351) – appears to count not only against direct democracy, but also against conceptions of democracy closer to the ones we are accustomed to. By offering a new account of what Kant sees as the real problem of democracy (direct or not), the article unpacks a lesson about the limits of democracy that has gone largely unnoticed among political theorists and Kant specialists.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47668447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-04DOI: 10.1017/S1369415423000092
Nabeel Hamid
Abstract This article examines Kant’s treatment of the design argument for the existence of God, or physicotheology. It criticizes the interpretation that, for Kant, the assumption of intelligent design satisfies an internal demand of inquiry. It argues that Kant’s positive appraisal of physicotheology is instead better understood in terms of its polemical utility for rebutting objections to practical belief in God upon which Kant’s ethicotheological argument rests, and thus as an instrument in the transition from theoretical to practical philosophy. Kantian physicotheology plays this role (a) by criticizing alternative speculative accounts of the ground of nature, and (b) by analogizing from the structure of finite rational agency in order to represent more clearly the action of an ideal agent.
{"title":"Physicotheology in Kant’s Transition from Nature to Freedom","authors":"Nabeel Hamid","doi":"10.1017/S1369415423000092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415423000092","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines Kant’s treatment of the design argument for the existence of God, or physicotheology. It criticizes the interpretation that, for Kant, the assumption of intelligent design satisfies an internal demand of inquiry. It argues that Kant’s positive appraisal of physicotheology is instead better understood in terms of its polemical utility for rebutting objections to practical belief in God upon which Kant’s ethicotheological argument rests, and thus as an instrument in the transition from theoretical to practical philosophy. Kantian physicotheology plays this role (a) by criticizing alternative speculative accounts of the ground of nature, and (b) by analogizing from the structure of finite rational agency in order to represent more clearly the action of an ideal agent.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45831610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：