Pub Date : 2023-11-16DOI: 10.1017/s136941542300033x
Jeremiah Alberg
I examine chapters I and II of the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason from the Critique of Practical Reason, to show that Kant resolved the antimony of practical reason by first giving an accurate representation of the cause of a properly moral act and then recognizing that this accurate representation raised further problems, problems that were anticipated by Rousseau, especially in his Reveries of a Solitary Walker. Rousseau’s reveries allowed Kant to explore, and to some extent overcome, the darker implications of their common understanding of virtue. In the second Critique this takes the form of explaining how one can understand and existentially achieve one’s own satisfaction based on contentment with oneself rather than enjoyment.
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Pub Date : 2023-11-13DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000304
Conrad Damstra
Abstract I examine Kant’s claim in part one of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason that moral reform requires both a ‘change of heart’ and gradual reformation of one’s sense ( R, 6: 47). I argue that Kant’s conception of moral reform is neither fundamentally obscure nor is it as vulnerable to serious objections as several commentators have suggested. I defend Kant by explaining how he can maintain both that we can choose our moral disposition via an intelligible choice and that we become good through a continuous struggle. I then provide an interpretation of how moral reform occurs in the phenomenal realm.
{"title":"The Change of Heart, Moral Character and Moral Reform","authors":"Conrad Damstra","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000304","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I examine Kant’s claim in part one of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason that moral reform requires both a ‘change of heart’ and gradual reformation of one’s sense ( R, 6: 47). I argue that Kant’s conception of moral reform is neither fundamentally obscure nor is it as vulnerable to serious objections as several commentators have suggested. I defend Kant by explaining how he can maintain both that we can choose our moral disposition via an intelligible choice and that we become good through a continuous struggle. I then provide an interpretation of how moral reform occurs in the phenomenal realm.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"44 23","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136281443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-07DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000377
Stefano Lo Re
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{"title":"Stefano Bacin, Kant e l’autonomia della volontà. Una tesi filosofica e il suo contesto. Bologna: il Mulino, 2021, Pp. 224. ISBN 9788815292957 (pbk) €20.00","authors":"Stefano Lo Re","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000377","url":null,"abstract":"An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"2 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135479875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-07DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000390
Dennis Schulting
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{"title":"Till Hoeppner, Urteil und Anschauung. Kants metaphysische Deduktion der Kategorien, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021. Pp. xvii + 410. ISBN 9783110556278 (hbk) $126.99","authors":"Dennis Schulting","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000390","url":null,"abstract":"An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"217 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135476246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-16DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000316
Vinicius Carvalho
Abstract Kant clearly endorses some version of the ‘old formula of the schools’, according to which all volition is sub ratione boni . There has been a debate whether he holds this only for morally good actions. I argue that a closer look at the distinction between the good and the agreeable does not support this conclusion. Considering Kant’s account of the detrimental and the correct use of this thesis, I argue that rational beings always will sub ratione boni , even when they act immorally, because they act on principles. I argue that Kant’s accounts of self-love and self-conceit support this view.
康德显然赞同“学派的旧公式”的某个版本，根据这个公式，一切意志都是理性的。人们一直在争论他是否只对道德上好的行为持这种观点。我认为，仔细研究好与好之间的区别并不支持这一结论。考虑到康德对这一命题的有害和正确使用，我认为理性的存在总是会sub - ratione boni，即使他们不道德地行动，因为他们是按原则行动的。我认为康德关于自爱和自负的论述支持了这一观点。
{"title":"Between ‘Indubitably Certain’ and ‘Quite Detrimental’ to Philosophy: Kant on the Guise of the Good Thesis","authors":"Vinicius Carvalho","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000316","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Kant clearly endorses some version of the ‘old formula of the schools’, according to which all volition is sub ratione boni . There has been a debate whether he holds this only for morally good actions. I argue that a closer look at the distinction between the good and the agreeable does not support this conclusion. Considering Kant’s account of the detrimental and the correct use of this thesis, I argue that rational beings always will sub ratione boni , even when they act immorally, because they act on principles. I argue that Kant’s accounts of self-love and self-conceit support this view.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136112341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-12DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000328
Nicholas Dunn
Abstract My aim in this article is to provide an account of practical judgement, for Kant, that situates it within his theory of judgement as a whole – particularly, with regards to the distinction between the determining and reflecting use of judgement. I argue that practical judgement is a kind of determining judgement, but also one in which reflecting judgement plays a significant role. More specifically, I claim that practical judgement arises from the cooperation of the reflecting power of judgement with the faculty of reason – the former assisting the latter in the application of its principle. I conclude by considering a possible role for feeling in practical judgement.
{"title":"Reflections of Reason: Kant on Practical Judgement","authors":"Nicholas Dunn","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000328","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract My aim in this article is to provide an account of practical judgement, for Kant, that situates it within his theory of judgement as a whole – particularly, with regards to the distinction between the determining and reflecting use of judgement. I argue that practical judgement is a kind of determining judgement, but also one in which reflecting judgement plays a significant role. More specifically, I claim that practical judgement arises from the cooperation of the reflecting power of judgement with the faculty of reason – the former assisting the latter in the application of its principle. I conclude by considering a possible role for feeling in practical judgement.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135969453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-12DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000389
Hauke Brunkhorst
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{"title":"Martin Welsch. Anfangsgründe der Volkssouveränität. Immanuel Kants Staatsrecht in der Metaphysik der Sitten, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2021, Pp. 476. ISBN 9783465045755 (hbk) €32.00","authors":"Hauke Brunkhorst","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000389","url":null,"abstract":"An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135969936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-09DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000341
Damian Melamedoff-Vosters
Abstract In this article, I take on a classic objection to Kant’s arguments in the Antinomy of Pure Reason: that the arguments are question-begging, as they draw illicit inferences from claims about representation to claims about reality. While extant attempts to vindicate Kant try to show that he does not make such inferences, I attempt to vindicate Kant’s arguments in a different way: I show that, given Kant’s philosophical backdrop, the inferences in question are not illicit. This is because the transcendental realists that Kant was arguing against have certain philosophical commitments about the nature of ground which, if true, warrant the inferences that Kant draws. This historical corrective not only allows us to better understand Kant’s own thinking in the Antinomies but it also has important upshots for our understanding of Kant’s transcendental idealism.
{"title":"Representation and Reality in Kant’s Antinomy of Pure Reason","authors":"Damian Melamedoff-Vosters","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000341","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, I take on a classic objection to Kant’s arguments in the Antinomy of Pure Reason: that the arguments are question-begging, as they draw illicit inferences from claims about representation to claims about reality. While extant attempts to vindicate Kant try to show that he does not make such inferences, I attempt to vindicate Kant’s arguments in a different way: I show that, given Kant’s philosophical backdrop, the inferences in question are not illicit. This is because the transcendental realists that Kant was arguing against have certain philosophical commitments about the nature of ground which, if true, warrant the inferences that Kant draws. This historical corrective not only allows us to better understand Kant’s own thinking in the Antinomies but it also has important upshots for our understanding of Kant’s transcendental idealism.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135095986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000419
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{"title":"KRV volume 28 issue 3 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000419","url":null,"abstract":"An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135737252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000213
Lea Ypi
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{"title":"Response to Critics: What is the Human Being? Kant’s Architectonic of Pure Reason and its Limitations","authors":"Lea Ypi","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000213","url":null,"abstract":"An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135304659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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