Pub Date : 2023-12-15DOI: 10.1017/s136941542300047x
Kristi Sweet
In this article, I offer a novel and in-depth account of how, for Kant, free speech is the mechanism that moves a society closer to justice. I argue that the criticism of the legislator preserved by free speech must also be the result of collective agreement. I further argue that structural features of judgements of taste and the sensus communis give guidance for how we should communicate publicly to succeed at the aims Kant has laid out, as judgements of taste, like politics, belong fundamentally to a transitional sphere between nature and freedom.
{"title":"Kant on Free Speech: Criticism, Enlightenment, and the Exercise of Judgement in the Public Sphere","authors":"Kristi Sweet","doi":"10.1017/s136941542300047x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s136941542300047x","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I offer a novel and in-depth account of how, for Kant, free speech is the mechanism that moves a society closer to justice. I argue that the criticism of the legislator preserved by free speech must also be the result of collective agreement. I further argue that structural features of judgements of taste and the <jats:italic>sensus communis</jats:italic> give guidance for how we should communicate publicly to succeed at the aims Kant has laid out, as judgements of taste, like politics, belong fundamentally to a transitional sphere between nature and freedom.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138683696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-13DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000432
Zhengmi Zhouhuang
Different from the autonomy of understanding in cognition and the autonomy of practical reason in praxis, the heautonomy in the judgement of taste is reflexive. The reflexivity consists not only in the fact that the power of judgement legislates to its own usage but also, and more importantly, it legislates to itself through its own operative process. This normativity, based on the self-referential structure of pure aesthetic judgement and the a priori principle of subjective, internal purposiveness, can be regarded as a self-discovering and self-flourishing principle that organically grows out of the aesthetic experience and, at the same time, regulates its growth in return. In this scenario, aesthetic freedom can be identified as a third kind of freedom different from Kant’s transcendental freedom and practical freedom – a flexible and living freedom with spontaneous legislation, but not bound by any determinate laws.
{"title":"Living Freedom: The Heautonomy of the Judgement of Taste","authors":"Zhengmi Zhouhuang","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000432","url":null,"abstract":"Different from the autonomy of understanding in cognition and the autonomy of practical reason in praxis, the heautonomy in the judgement of taste is reflexive. The reflexivity consists not only in the fact that the power of judgement legislates to its own usage but also, and more importantly, it legislates to itself through its own operative process. This normativity, based on the self-referential structure of pure aesthetic judgement and the a priori principle of subjective, internal purposiveness, can be regarded as a self-discovering and self-flourishing principle that organically grows out of the aesthetic experience and, at the same time, regulates its growth in return. In this scenario, aesthetic freedom can be identified as a third kind of freedom different from Kant’s transcendental freedom and practical freedom – a flexible and living freedom with spontaneous legislation, but not bound by any determinate laws.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138628539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-13DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000468
Jon Mandle
Although maxims are central to Kant’s ethical theory, his account of them remains obscure. We can make progress towards understanding Kantian maxims by examining not only their role as the object of moral judgement but also their connection to freedom of the will and causality. This requires understanding maxims as causal laws that explain the actions that we impute to agents. In this way, they are analogous to causal laws of nature, but they are limited in scope to the agents who are responsible for them. Understanding maxims in this way explains our limited epistemic access to them and helps to clarify Kant’s account of virtue and character as well as how they mediate the relationship between practical and theoretical reason.
{"title":"Maxims: Responsibility and Causal Laws","authors":"Jon Mandle","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000468","url":null,"abstract":"Although maxims are central to Kant’s ethical theory, his account of them remains obscure. We can make progress towards understanding Kantian maxims by examining not only their role as the object of moral judgement but also their connection to freedom of the will and causality. This requires understanding maxims as causal laws that explain the actions that we impute to agents. In this way, they are analogous to causal laws of nature, but they are limited in scope to the agents who are responsible for them. Understanding maxims in this way explains our limited epistemic access to them and helps to clarify Kant’s account of virtue and character as well as how they mediate the relationship between practical and theoretical reason.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138628232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-11DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000420
Laurenz Ramsauer
On the currently dominant reading of the Groundwork, Kant’s derivation of ‘imperatives of duty’ exemplifies a decision procedure for the derivation of concrete duties in moral deliberation. However, Kant’s response to an often-misidentified criticism of the Groundwork by G. A. Tittel suggests that Kant was remarkably unconcerned with arguing for the practicality of the categorical imperative as a decision procedure. Instead, I argue that the main aim of Kant’s derivation of imperatives of duty was to show how his analysis of the form of moral judgement is indeed presupposed in the four types of moral imperative that philosophers of his time recognized.
根据目前对《基础》的主流解读，康德对 "义务要求 "的推导体现了在道德思考中推导具体义务的决策程序。然而，康德对 G. A. Tittel 经常被误认为是对《基础》的批评所做的回应表明，康德对论证绝对命令作为一种决策程序的实用性显然并不关心。相反，我認為康德引申出義務命令的主要目的，是要說明他對道德判斷形式的分析，如何確實預設了他那個時代的哲學家所認同的四種道德命令。
{"title":"Kant’s Derivation of Imperatives of Duty","authors":"Laurenz Ramsauer","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000420","url":null,"abstract":"<p>On the currently dominant reading of the <span>Groundwork,</span> Kant’s derivation of ‘imperatives of duty’ exemplifies a decision procedure for the derivation of concrete duties in moral deliberation. However, Kant’s response to an often-misidentified criticism of the <span>Groundwork</span> by G. A. Tittel suggests that Kant was remarkably unconcerned with arguing for the practicality of the categorical imperative as a decision procedure. Instead, I argue that the main aim of Kant’s derivation of imperatives of duty was to show how his analysis of the form of moral judgement is indeed presupposed in the four types of moral imperative that philosophers of his time recognized.</p>","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138567391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-30DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000444
Wolfgang Ertl
While Kant’s position concerning human freedom and divine foreknowledge is perhaps the least Molinist element of his multifaceted take on free will, Kant’s Molinism (minimally defined) is undeniable when it comes to the threat ensuing from the idea of creation. In line with incompatibilism and with careful qualifications in place, he ultimately suggests regarding free agents as uncreated. Given the limitations of our rational insight, this assumption is indispensable for granting that finite free agents can acquire their intelligible characters by themselves. Nonetheless, Kant concedes that creation may, as a matter of fact, be compatible with what for Molina is the pre-volitionality of the counterfactuals of freedom.
{"title":"Free Will, Foreknowledge, and Creation: Further Explorations of Kant’s Molinism","authors":"Wolfgang Ertl","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000444","url":null,"abstract":"While Kant’s position concerning human freedom and divine foreknowledge is perhaps the least Molinist element of his multifaceted take on free will, Kant’s Molinism (minimally defined) is undeniable when it comes to the threat ensuing from the idea of creation. In line with incompatibilism and with careful qualifications in place, he ultimately suggests regarding free agents as uncreated. Given the limitations of our rational insight, this assumption is indispensable for granting that finite free agents can acquire their intelligible characters by themselves. Nonetheless, Kant concedes that creation may, as a matter of fact, be compatible with what for Molina is the pre-volitionality of the counterfactuals of freedom.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138506781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-21DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000365
Emily Fitton
A key theme throughout Maimon’s works is a circularity he diagnoses at the heart of Kant’s response to Hume. The objective validity of Kant’s category of causality ultimately rests, Maimon argues, upon the logical status of the hypothetical judgement – on its inclusion among the forms of pure general logic. In turn, however, the inclusion of the hypothetical within pure general logic itself rests upon the objective validity of causal judgements. This article examines Maimon’s diagnosis and traces it back to a debate that has its origins in Wolff’s German Logic, concerning the relationship between categorical and hypothetical judgements.
{"title":"Kantian Circularity: Maimon on Causal Scepticism and the Status of the Hypothetical Judgement","authors":"Emily Fitton","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000365","url":null,"abstract":"A key theme throughout Maimon’s works is a circularity he diagnoses at the heart of Kant’s response to Hume. The objective validity of Kant’s category of causality ultimately rests, Maimon argues, upon the logical status of the hypothetical judgement – on its inclusion among the forms of pure general logic. In turn, however, the inclusion of the hypothetical within pure general logic itself rests upon the objective validity of causal judgements. This article examines Maimon’s diagnosis and traces it back to a debate that has its origins in Wolff’s <jats:italic>German Logic</jats:italic>, concerning the relationship between categorical and hypothetical judgements.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138506782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-16DOI: 10.1017/s136941542300033x
Jeremiah Alberg
I examine chapters I and II of the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason from the Critique of Practical Reason, to show that Kant resolved the antimony of practical reason by first giving an accurate representation of the cause of a properly moral act and then recognizing that this accurate representation raised further problems, problems that were anticipated by Rousseau, especially in his Reveries of a Solitary Walker. Rousseau’s reveries allowed Kant to explore, and to some extent overcome, the darker implications of their common understanding of virtue. In the second Critique this takes the form of explaining how one can understand and existentially achieve one’s own satisfaction based on contentment with oneself rather than enjoyment.
{"title":"The Effect of Rousseau on Kant’s Resolution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason","authors":"Jeremiah Alberg","doi":"10.1017/s136941542300033x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s136941542300033x","url":null,"abstract":"I examine chapters I and II of the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason from the <jats:italic>Critique of Practical Reason</jats:italic>, to show that Kant resolved the antimony of practical reason by first giving an accurate representation of the cause of a properly moral act and then recognizing that this accurate representation raised further problems, problems that were anticipated by Rousseau, especially in his <jats:italic>Reveries of a Solitary Walker</jats:italic>. Rousseau’s reveries allowed Kant to explore, and to some extent overcome, the darker implications of their common understanding of virtue. In the second <jats:italic>Critique</jats:italic> this takes the form of explaining how one can understand and existentially achieve one’s own satisfaction based on <jats:italic>contentment with oneself</jats:italic> rather than enjoyment.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138506773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-13DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000304
Conrad Damstra
Abstract I examine Kant’s claim in part one of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason that moral reform requires both a ‘change of heart’ and gradual reformation of one’s sense ( R, 6: 47). I argue that Kant’s conception of moral reform is neither fundamentally obscure nor is it as vulnerable to serious objections as several commentators have suggested. I defend Kant by explaining how he can maintain both that we can choose our moral disposition via an intelligible choice and that we become good through a continuous struggle. I then provide an interpretation of how moral reform occurs in the phenomenal realm.
{"title":"The Change of Heart, Moral Character and Moral Reform","authors":"Conrad Damstra","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000304","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I examine Kant’s claim in part one of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason that moral reform requires both a ‘change of heart’ and gradual reformation of one’s sense ( R, 6: 47). I argue that Kant’s conception of moral reform is neither fundamentally obscure nor is it as vulnerable to serious objections as several commentators have suggested. I defend Kant by explaining how he can maintain both that we can choose our moral disposition via an intelligible choice and that we become good through a continuous struggle. I then provide an interpretation of how moral reform occurs in the phenomenal realm.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136281443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-07DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000377
Stefano Lo Re
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{"title":"Stefano Bacin, Kant e l’autonomia della volontà. Una tesi filosofica e il suo contesto. Bologna: il Mulino, 2021, Pp. 224. ISBN 9788815292957 (pbk) €20.00","authors":"Stefano Lo Re","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000377","url":null,"abstract":"An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135479875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-07DOI: 10.1017/s1369415423000390
Dennis Schulting
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{"title":"Till Hoeppner, Urteil und Anschauung. Kants metaphysische Deduktion der Kategorien, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021. Pp. xvii + 410. ISBN 9783110556278 (hbk) $126.99","authors":"Dennis Schulting","doi":"10.1017/s1369415423000390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415423000390","url":null,"abstract":"An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135476246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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