Pub Date : 2022-11-18DOI: 10.1017/S1369415422000462
Maximilian Edwards
Abstract Within Kant scholarship, there is an entrenched tendency to distinguish, on Kant’s behalf, between pure and ‘schematized’ categories. There is also a widespread tendency to view the schematized categories as conceptually richer than the pure categories. I argue that this reading of the distinction, which I call the standard view, should be rejected. In its place, I draw on a neglected part of Kant’s theory of marks – namely, his account of ‘synthetic attributes’ – to propose an account of the distinction that preserves a strict identity between pure and schematized categories at the level of analysable content.
{"title":"Synthetic Attributes and the Schematized Categories","authors":"Maximilian Edwards","doi":"10.1017/S1369415422000462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415422000462","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Within Kant scholarship, there is an entrenched tendency to distinguish, on Kant’s behalf, between pure and ‘schematized’ categories. There is also a widespread tendency to view the schematized categories as conceptually richer than the pure categories. I argue that this reading of the distinction, which I call the standard view, should be rejected. In its place, I draw on a neglected part of Kant’s theory of marks – namely, his account of ‘synthetic attributes’ – to propose an account of the distinction that preserves a strict identity between pure and schematized categories at the level of analysable content.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"28 1","pages":"21 - 40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46520986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-17DOI: 10.1017/S1369415422000449
H. Kim
Abstract There is no consensus concerning how to understand the ‘two-step proof structure’ (§§15–20, 21–7) of the Transcendental Deduction in the B-edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. This disagreement invites a closer examination of what Kant might have meant by a ‘transcendental deduction’. I argue that the transcendental deduction consists of three tasks that parallel Kant’s broader project of a ‘critique’ of pure reason; first, an origin task to justify reason’s authority to use them; second, an analytical task that determines the conditions under which this authority can be legitimately exercised; and third, a dialectical task to determine the conditions under which this authority cannot be legitimately exercised. So long as we continue to read the B-Deduction solely in terms of its two-step proof structure, we overlook how Kant’s notion of ‘critique’ constitutes the real grounds for his argumentative strategy there.
{"title":"Revisiting the Proof-Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction","authors":"H. Kim","doi":"10.1017/S1369415422000449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415422000449","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is no consensus concerning how to understand the ‘two-step proof structure’ (§§15–20, 21–7) of the Transcendental Deduction in the B-edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. This disagreement invites a closer examination of what Kant might have meant by a ‘transcendental deduction’. I argue that the transcendental deduction consists of three tasks that parallel Kant’s broader project of a ‘critique’ of pure reason; first, an origin task to justify reason’s authority to use them; second, an analytical task that determines the conditions under which this authority can be legitimately exercised; and third, a dialectical task to determine the conditions under which this authority cannot be legitimately exercised. So long as we continue to read the B-Deduction solely in terms of its two-step proof structure, we overlook how Kant’s notion of ‘critique’ constitutes the real grounds for his argumentative strategy there.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"28 1","pages":"81 - 103"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46166352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-17DOI: 10.1017/S1369415422000437
Rodrigo Zanette de Araujo
Abstract Langton’s (1998) and Allais’ (2015) metaphysical interpretations of Kant’s idealism have given special relevance to Kant’s analysis of the inner/outer dichotomy in the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection, for they agree that this dichotomy is key to correctly grasping Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves. In this article I argue that Langton’s and Allais’ accounts of Kant’s analysis of the inner/outer dichotomy have major limitations, and therefore that the text should not be read in the way they propose. In order to show these limitations, I examine the overall structure of Kant’s argument in the Amphiboly. Furthermore, I aim to establish the contribution brought by the Amphiboly to the issue of noumenal knowledge and the nature of things in themselves. Langton’s and Allais’ accounts of the relation between appearances and things in themselves as the inner nature of things not only prove to be unwarranted, but indeed to some extent opposite to what I claim to be Kant’s actual stance on things in themselves in the Amphiboly.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-11DOI: 10.1017/S1369415422000425
C. Hay
Abstract The standard attribution of ought implies can rules out the possibility of Kantianism permitting the existence of moral dilemmas. Against this, I argue that Kantianism both can and should permit the existence of moral dilemmas. This new take on moral dilemmas should be of particular urgency to those hoping to radicalize Kant, I argue, because the work of oppression theorists shows that moral dilemmas are particularly likely to strike those who are already most vulnerable. The insights of oppression theory also suggest that the heretofore overlooked social and political implications of moral dilemmas are just as philosophically significant as the metaethical and ethical implications.
{"title":"Kant on Moral Dilemmas","authors":"C. Hay","doi":"10.1017/S1369415422000425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415422000425","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The standard attribution of ought implies can rules out the possibility of Kantianism permitting the existence of moral dilemmas. Against this, I argue that Kantianism both can and should permit the existence of moral dilemmas. This new take on moral dilemmas should be of particular urgency to those hoping to radicalize Kant, I argue, because the work of oppression theorists shows that moral dilemmas are particularly likely to strike those who are already most vulnerable. The insights of oppression theory also suggest that the heretofore overlooked social and political implications of moral dilemmas are just as philosophically significant as the metaethical and ethical implications.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"27 1","pages":"557 - 572"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46837283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-04DOI: 10.1017/S1369415422000413
Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović
Crusius, Christian August (1743) Dissertatio de usu et limitibus principii rationis determinantis vulgo sufficientis. Leipzig. Deligiorgi, Katerina (2021) ‘Freedom and Ethical Necessity: A Kantian Response to Ulrich (1788)’. In James A. Clarke and Gabriel Gottlieb (eds), Practical Philosophy from Kant to Hegel: Freedom, Right, and Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 28–45. Fichte, J. G. (1964–) J. G. Fichte: Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Gliwitsky. Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Fromann. Schierbaum, Sonja (2020) ‘Choosing for No Reason? An Old Objection to Freedom of Indifference’. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 37(2), 183–202.
Crusius，Christian August（1743），《普通和限制原则的论文》，《理性决定了足够的力量》。莱比锡。Deligiorgi，Katerina（2021）“自由与伦理必要性：康德对乌尔里希的回应（1788）”。James A.Clarke和Gabriel Gottlieb（编辑），《从康德到黑格尔的实践哲学：自由、权利和革命》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社），28-45。费希特，J.G.（1964–）费希特：《威斯森查芬的Bayerischen Akademie Gesamtausgabe》。Reinhard Lauth和Hans Gliwitsky编辑。斯图加特巴特坎斯塔特：弗罗曼。Schierbaum，Sonja（2020）“无端选择？“对冷漠自由的古老反对”。《哲学史季刊》，37（2），183-202。
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Pub Date : 2022-10-03DOI: 10.1017/S1369415422000358
Inés Valdez
Abstract This article explores the distinctions among European peoples’ character established in Kant’s anthropology and their connection with his politics. These aspects are neglected relative to the analysis of race between Europeans and non-Europeans, but Kant’s anthropological works portray the people of Mediterranean Europe as not capable of civilization because of the dominance of passion in their faculty of desire, which he ties to ‘Oriental’ influences in blood or government. Kant then superimposes this racialized anthropology over the historical geopolitics of Europe, obscuring the indebtedness of Northern European trade dominance to Mediterranean historical tactics and financial wealth. By relegating the Mediterranean to the margins and dismissing contentious commercial exchange in the region as mere violence spearheaded by North African corsairs, Kant gives us an elitist cosmopolitanism unable to cope with hierarchy and inequality, diminishing its potential for egalitarian global projects today.
{"title":"Toward a Narrow Cosmopolitanism: Kant’s Anthropology, Racialized Character and the Construction of Europe","authors":"Inés Valdez","doi":"10.1017/S1369415422000358","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415422000358","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article explores the distinctions among European peoples’ character established in Kant’s anthropology and their connection with his politics. These aspects are neglected relative to the analysis of race between Europeans and non-Europeans, but Kant’s anthropological works portray the people of Mediterranean Europe as not capable of civilization because of the dominance of passion in their faculty of desire, which he ties to ‘Oriental’ influences in blood or government. Kant then superimposes this racialized anthropology over the historical geopolitics of Europe, obscuring the indebtedness of Northern European trade dominance to Mediterranean historical tactics and financial wealth. By relegating the Mediterranean to the margins and dismissing contentious commercial exchange in the region as mere violence spearheaded by North African corsairs, Kant gives us an elitist cosmopolitanism unable to cope with hierarchy and inequality, diminishing its potential for egalitarian global projects today.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"27 1","pages":"593 - 613"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47946434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-30DOI: 10.1017/S1369415422000401
Aaron Wells
account of rationalization than the one currently on offer in existing Kant scholarship. Anyone at all convinced, in ordinary life, of our talents for self-deception, as well as our ability to get so many things wrong in moral matters, will want to find as expansive an account of rationalization as possible in Kant. On the other hand, readers may wonder how far Sticker can really push a Kantian account of rationalization. As Sticker himself notes, rationalization against the moral law can never be ‘allencompassing’ (p. 42). To quote: ‘An ideology is not adopted instead of the moral law, but as an addition’ or ‘modification’ (p. 42; Sticker’s emphasis). But does it make sense to think of Garve’s eudaimonism as an ‘addition’ to the categorical imperative? Or, consider another fascinating example from the very end of Sticker’s book, namely a moral ideology according to which our duty to be philanthropic is so demanding that we can lie, cheat and steal in the name of benevolence (p. 55). Such an extreme morality admittedly contains vestiges of a Kantian conception of duty insofar as it acknowledges the importance of helping others. But I am less confident than Sticker that this form of altruism would count as a distortion of morality that only ‘adds’ to our representation of the moral law. Nonetheless, Sticker’s challenge to Kantians to widen the scope of rationalization is a well-taken one that anyone writing on self-deception in Kant will have to wrestle with. And overall, his book is a first-rate philosophical work and an extremely important contribution to the field.
{"title":"Jörg Noller and John Walsh (eds), Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022 Pp. xlvii + 315 ISBN 9781108482462 (hbk) £74.99","authors":"Aaron Wells","doi":"10.1017/S1369415422000401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415422000401","url":null,"abstract":"account of rationalization than the one currently on offer in existing Kant scholarship. Anyone at all convinced, in ordinary life, of our talents for self-deception, as well as our ability to get so many things wrong in moral matters, will want to find as expansive an account of rationalization as possible in Kant. On the other hand, readers may wonder how far Sticker can really push a Kantian account of rationalization. As Sticker himself notes, rationalization against the moral law can never be ‘allencompassing’ (p. 42). To quote: ‘An ideology is not adopted instead of the moral law, but as an addition’ or ‘modification’ (p. 42; Sticker’s emphasis). But does it make sense to think of Garve’s eudaimonism as an ‘addition’ to the categorical imperative? Or, consider another fascinating example from the very end of Sticker’s book, namely a moral ideology according to which our duty to be philanthropic is so demanding that we can lie, cheat and steal in the name of benevolence (p. 55). Such an extreme morality admittedly contains vestiges of a Kantian conception of duty insofar as it acknowledges the importance of helping others. But I am less confident than Sticker that this form of altruism would count as a distortion of morality that only ‘adds’ to our representation of the moral law. Nonetheless, Sticker’s challenge to Kantians to widen the scope of rationalization is a well-taken one that anyone writing on self-deception in Kant will have to wrestle with. And overall, his book is a first-rate philosophical work and an extremely important contribution to the field.","PeriodicalId":54140,"journal":{"name":"Kantian Review","volume":"27 1","pages":"673 - 677"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43159181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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