Journal of Comparative Psychology最新文献

Unlike nonhuman primates, individual differences between humans in dominance do not appear as broad personality factors. This may be attributable to differences between the questionnaires used to study human and nonhuman primate personality. Alternatively, this may reflect differences in the organization of personality in humans and nonhuman primates. To determine which of these possibilities was most likely, 1,147 participants were recruited and asked to rate their personality and/or that of somebody else on the Hominoid Personality Questionnaire (HPQ), which has been used to study nonhuman primate personality. A large subset of these participants (~80%) also completed self- and/or rater reports of one of three questionnaires used to measure human personality. Exploratory factor analyses of HPQ rater report data yielded five factors. These factors correlated mostly in expected ways with scales from questionnaires used to study human personality. Exploratory factor analyses of HPQ self-report data yielded no clear number of factors and no consistent evidence with respect to the presence of a dominance factor. Subsequent analyses compared HPQ scales that represented dominance factors in chimpanzees, bonobos, mountain gorillas, and orangutans to scales derived from the Revised NEO Personality Inventory, including Fearless Dominance, which combined Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion facets, Emotional Stability (the inverse of Neuroticism), and Extraversion's Assertiveness facet. Fearless Dominance and Assertiveness were most like the great ape dominance factors. The absence of human dominance factors, therefore, appears to reflect present or past social conditions of our species. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

On the surface, the fields of animal communication and human linguistics have arrived at conflicting theories and conclusions with respect to the effect of social complexity on communicative complexity. For example, an increase in group size is argued to have opposite consequences on human versus animal communication systems: although an increase in human community size leads to some types of language simplification, an increase in animal group size leads to an increase in signal complexity. But do human and animal communication systems really show such a fundamental discrepancy? Our key message is that the tension between these two adjacent fields is the result of (a) a focus on different levels of analysis (namely, signal variation or grammar-like rules) and (b) an inconsistent use of terminology (namely, the terms "simple" and "complex"). By disentangling and clarifying these terms with respect to different measures of communicative complexity, we show that although animal and human communication systems indeed show some contradictory effects with respect to signal variability, they actually display essentially the same patterns with respect to grammar-like structure. This is despite the fact that the definitions of complexity and simplicity are actually aligned for signal variability, but diverge for grammatical structure. We conclude by advocating for the use of more objective and descriptive terms instead of terms such as "complexity," which can be applied uniformly for human and animal communication systems-leading to comparable descriptions of findings across species and promoting a more productive dialogue between fields. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Developmental psychologists have noted a similar timeline of change for children's use of different perspectives about the same objects or events, as in the use of different labels for the same object, an aspect of language, and in understanding other's knowledge or beliefs, an aspect of social cognition as reviewed in the study by Neiworth et al. Comparative psychologists are interested to know what cognitive flexibility looks like in other species and how such variation relates to life history, ecology, and phylogeny. The general pattern of results to date indicates that monkeys can master both intra- and interdimensional shifts, but intradimensional shifts are learned far more quickly than interdimensional shifts (reviewed in the study by Neiworth et al, 2022). Neiworth et al. report that they have conducted exactly this kind of comparative study: They examined cognitive flexibility in adult cotton-top tamarins and human children in three age groups as they participated in a modified version of the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS). Neiworth et al.'s study offers an example of careful consideration of one such possibility: that of using the experimenter's postural orientation to the cards as an inadvertent aid. Here the authors had the benefit of prior work showing that tamarins follow human-provided cues to make a spatially discriminated choice only if the experimenter's head, body, and eyes oriented to a particular location. Thus, in this study, the experimenter kept their head and body centered in the testing space between the two cards and looked at a point on the wall directly behind the midpoint of the testing tray. But the DCCS task, in abstract form, has potentially broader comparative value than to examine cognitive flexibility in primates alone. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

In avian brood parasitism, parasites lay their eggs in the nests of hosts, and many hosts in the wild respond by eliminating or abandoning foreign eggs in their clutch. However, a limitation upon the study of proximate, especially physiological and experience-dependent cognitive mechanisms of egg rejection, has been the lack of a suitable model system in captivity. Here, we tested whether laboratory-kept ringneck doves (Streptopelia risoria) respond to visually distinct egg types (through applying an ink treatment upon the doves' own eggs) by rejecting them. We found that in two of two experiments, brown eggs were more often rejected, through predominantly egg burial, relative to control eggs but were done so only by a subset of dove pairs. These results are supportive of ringneck doves to become a suitable captive model for the study of foreign-egg rejection, and open the way for future research on the integrative (e.g., genetic, endocrine, ontogenetic, and cognitive) study of egg-rejection responses in a tractable research system. However, the ecological validity and applicability of this model system for the analysis of host-parasite interactions in the wild remain narrowly limited. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

In the two-cup one-item task, subjects are shown a food item, which is then hidden inside one of two cups. Several species spontaneously select the baited cup above chance levels if shown that the other cup is empty. Although this response may indicate inference by exclusion (if not A, then B), another possibility is that subjects simply avoid choosing the empty cup, not because they expect the food to be in the other cup but because they have seen that cup to be empty. I tested whether this hypothesis explains great apes' responses in a three-cup one-item task. Subjects saw three opaque cups on a platform, with two of them located behind a barrier during baiting. After baiting one of the cups behind the barrier, I revealed the identity of the empty cup that had been located behind the barrier (Experiment 1) or revealed the contents of the center cup (baited in half of the trials), but always removed it before the subjects' choice (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, subjects preferentially selected the baited cup even though one of the other two cups had not been shown to be empty. In Experiment 2, subjects' preference for the cup that had been located behind the barrier during baiting was modulated by the contents of the removed cup. These results suggest that expectations about the food's location, not just the sight of the empty cup, as postulated by the "avoid the empty cup" hypothesis, determine apes' responses in the three-cup one-item task. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Large-brained birds, such as corvids and parrots, tend to fail tests for self-recognition (mirror self-recognition [MSR]), but the limited positive evidence for MSR in these species has been questioned due to methodological limitations. In the present study, we aimed to investigate MSR in ravens by performing three mirror tests: a mirror exposure test, a mirror preference test, and a mark test. Across all three tests, the ravens' behavior was not consistent with MSR. Three out of six ravens infrequently interacted with the mirror and the nonmirror surfaces. Two birds explored the mirror and occasionally displayed contingent behaviors. Finally, the ravens made very few social displays toward the mirror, suggesting that at this stage they did not treat their reflection as a conspecific. These findings, along with the current evidence available, raise further questions on the validity of relying on one test to establish self-recognition and call for the development of methods beyond mirror tests to explore self-recognition in nonhuman animals. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

A modified Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task was used to test cognitive flexibility in adult cotton-top tamarins and children aged 19 months to 60 months. Subjects had to infer a rule from the experience of selecting between two cards to earn a reward, and the pairs of stimuli defined the rule (e.g., pick blue ones, not red ones, or pick trucks, not boats). Two different tests measured subjects' ability to shift to a reversal of the rule (intradimensional shift) and to shift to a new rule defined by a dimension previously irrelevant (interdimensional shift). Both adult tamarins and children aged 49-60 months were able to learn the initial rule and switch to a reversal and to a rule based on a different dimension. In contrast, the two younger groups of children, aged 19-36 months and aged 37-48 months, could switch when a reversal was imposed but took significantly longer to learn a new rule on a former irrelevant dimension. Experiment 2 presented a wider set of novel stimuli which shared some features with the original set to further explore the basis of rule learning. The result was that tamarins and 52- to 60-month-old children both chose novel stimuli that fit the rule and had no a priori associative strength, suggesting a rule application not solely based on associative strength. Importantly, novel items introduced some risk for choice, and children showed themselves to be risk-averse, whereas tamarins were risk-prone within a novel context. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Inhibition tasks usually require subjects to exert control to act correctly when a competing action plan is prepotent. In comparative psychology, one concern about the existing inhibition tasks is that the relative contribution of inhibitory control to performance (as compared to learning or object knowledge) is rarely explicitly investigated. We addressed this problem by presenting chimpanzees with a spatial foraging task in which they could acquire food more efficiently by learning which objects were baited. In Experiment 1, we examined how objects that elicited a prepotent approach response, transparent cups containing food, affected their learning rates. Although showing an initial bias to approach these sealed cups with visible food, the chimpanzees learned to avoid them more quickly across sessions compared to a color discrimination. They also learned a color discrimination more quickly if the incorrect cups were sealed such that a piece of food could never be hidden inside them. In Experiment 2, visible food of 2 different types was sealed in the upper part of the cups: 1 type signaled the presence of food reward hidden underneath; the cups with the other type were sealed. The chimpanzees learned more quickly in a congruent condition (the to-be-chosen food cue matched the reward) than in an incongruent condition (the to-be-avoided food cue matched the reward). Together, these findings highlight that performance in inhibition tasks is affected by several other cognitive abilities such as object knowledge, memory, and learning, which need to be quantified before meaningful comparisons can be drawn. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).