Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1735019
K. Lippert‐Rasmussen, A. Vitikainen
Faced with the worst displacement crisis since the second world war, many states are unlikely to accept as many refugees as they ought, and very few are likely to accept more than they are required...
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Pub Date : 2019-11-29DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1702453
David Ingram
Before responding to my commentators, I would like to thank each of them for having taken time out of their busy lives to read a long and at times densely argued book. I chose them as my interlocutors because their reflections on selected topics had already served me well in composing my book. I expected quality commentary from them and have not been disappointed. Gottfried Schweiger’s research has pioneered new territory in the field of applied recognition theory, and his comments here and elsewhere have made me more aware of the complications associated with using recognition as one foundational category (along with discourse, which he does not discuss) for theorizing the injustices and pathologies associated with poverty and social marginalization. In prefacing his comments, Schweiger himself notes several features that seem to recommend recognition theory as at least a necessary supplement to standard liberal theories of distributive (in)justice, namely, its attempt to ascertain injustice by appeal to the ordinary experiences of indignation suffered by those who claim to be victims of injustice and its understanding that a part of justice concerns the psychology of human relationships, which is not a good or resource that can be measured and distributed in any straightforward way. All of this stands in stark contrast to liberalism’s concern with distributing basic primary goods, resources, and capabilities that individuals need (taken separately and abstractly as rational agents) according to general principles that have been constructed on the basis of what are taken to be widely (perhaps universally) accepted fixed judgements. The important and difficult challenge for recognition theory, as Schweiger makes clear in his comments, is whether its starting point in experience suffices to generate a theory of injustice and social pathology apart from an elitist theory of objective human development and/or a liberal theory of distributive justice. In other words, does recognition theory’s counter-intuitive approach to framing poverty as a psychological harm really provide an alternative or needed supplement to a liberal theory of distributive justice? Schweiger’s critical engagement with my book centres around two major theoretical claims I make in chapter one, specifically about the contribution recognition theory makes to understanding poverty as a form of injustice, and an example that I use to
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Pub Date : 2019-11-29DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1696112
Willy Moka-Mubelo, S.J.
ABSTRACT Should human rights be understood within a specific context? In order words, should the discourse on human rights be historically contingent? If so, isn’t there a risk that they will lose their universal character? I argue that the standard of human rights provided by major documents and treaties of human rights must be respected, but at the same time, there are rights that must be developed in accordance with a particular context and specific needs of the people. Some might object that in contextualizing human rights they run the risk of losing their universal character. The argument of the universal character of human rights does not always meet a unanimous consent of everyone. Some non-Westerners thinkers, for example, reject the idea of the universality of human rights because, they argue, human rights reflect and perpetrate the western culture, which is sometimes at odd with non-western cultures. They then advocate a reconstruction and clarification of the moral, political, and legal status of human rights. This requirement of clarifying the different aspects of human rights status appears in Ingram’s argument when he affirms that the theoretical clarification of the apparent incoherence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, regarding the moral, political, and legal status of human rights must be sensitive to the multiple functions and justificatory grounds of human rights. Thus, the leading question to be answered in this paper will be: should there be a definitive list of rights for all contexts and all circumstances?
{"title":"Towards a contextual understanding of human rights","authors":"Willy Moka-Mubelo, S.J.","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2019.1696112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1696112","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Should human rights be understood within a specific context? In order words, should the discourse on human rights be historically contingent? If so, isn’t there a risk that they will lose their universal character? I argue that the standard of human rights provided by major documents and treaties of human rights must be respected, but at the same time, there are rights that must be developed in accordance with a particular context and specific needs of the people. Some might object that in contextualizing human rights they run the risk of losing their universal character. The argument of the universal character of human rights does not always meet a unanimous consent of everyone. Some non-Westerners thinkers, for example, reject the idea of the universality of human rights because, they argue, human rights reflect and perpetrate the western culture, which is sometimes at odd with non-western cultures. They then advocate a reconstruction and clarification of the moral, political, and legal status of human rights. This requirement of clarifying the different aspects of human rights status appears in Ingram’s argument when he affirms that the theoretical clarification of the apparent incoherence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, regarding the moral, political, and legal status of human rights must be sensitive to the multiple functions and justificatory grounds of human rights. Thus, the leading question to be answered in this paper will be: should there be a definitive list of rights for all contexts and all circumstances?","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85044868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-29DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1693870
G. Schweiger
ABSTRACT My critical engagement with David Ingram’s book ‘World Crisis and Underdevelopment’ is divided into three parts. In the first part I will explore how experiences of misreognition are related to experiences of injustice. In the second part I will ask about the criteria that make experiences of non-recognition or misrecognition unjust. Finally, I will briefly discuss the ‘self-subordination social recognition paradox’.
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Pub Date : 2019-11-29DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1696120
A. Azmanova
ABSTRACT I briefly review the main parameters of the conceptual framework David Ingram builds, and then proceed to test its heuristic power by examining its capacity to address three types of domination (relational, structural and systemic) typical of contemporary capitalism.
{"title":"“Whose development? What hegemony? Tackling the structural dynamics of global social injustice.”","authors":"A. Azmanova","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2019.1696120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1696120","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I briefly review the main parameters of the conceptual framework David Ingram builds, and then proceed to test its heuristic power by examining its capacity to address three types of domination (relational, structural and systemic) typical of contemporary capitalism.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79712282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-29DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1693871
D. Thompson
ABSTRACT In this paper, I identify two key contributions that David Ingram makes to the migration ethics literature, one methodological and one substantive. Ingram’s methodological contribution is to model how non-ideal theorizing can be done without abstracting away the complexities surrounding migration, including how the motivation to migrate is tied to existing institutional structures. He does this by beginning with the powerlessness and coercion experienced by certain classes of migrants, which he analyses using a rich conception of agency as social freedom. From here, Ingram develops his substantive contribution. Ingram argues that cosmopolitan and communitarian analyses cannot fully capture the dilemma surrounding forced migration: migrate to improve welfare or remain for the sake of identity and community. Ingram identifies the injustice of borders as occurring within the context of an interconnected international order operating without discursive accountability to most of those affected by its policies. Ingram argues that until international institutions are suitably reformed, asylum is owed to economic refugees because of the coercive circumstances existing in their countries of origin. This allows him to show, too, why specific states have obligations to asylum seekers: because they participate in the institutions that have contributed to these circumstances. Although I agree with Ingram’s overall approach, I will question whether he downplays the demands of his conception of social freedom and consider the feasibility of institutionalizing his discourse theoretic framework.
{"title":"Social freedom and migration in a non-ideal world","authors":"D. Thompson","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2019.1693871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1693871","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper, I identify two key contributions that David Ingram makes to the migration ethics literature, one methodological and one substantive. Ingram’s methodological contribution is to model how non-ideal theorizing can be done without abstracting away the complexities surrounding migration, including how the motivation to migrate is tied to existing institutional structures. He does this by beginning with the powerlessness and coercion experienced by certain classes of migrants, which he analyses using a rich conception of agency as social freedom. From here, Ingram develops his substantive contribution. Ingram argues that cosmopolitan and communitarian analyses cannot fully capture the dilemma surrounding forced migration: migrate to improve welfare or remain for the sake of identity and community. Ingram identifies the injustice of borders as occurring within the context of an interconnected international order operating without discursive accountability to most of those affected by its policies. Ingram argues that until international institutions are suitably reformed, asylum is owed to economic refugees because of the coercive circumstances existing in their countries of origin. This allows him to show, too, why specific states have obligations to asylum seekers: because they participate in the institutions that have contributed to these circumstances. Although I agree with Ingram’s overall approach, I will question whether he downplays the demands of his conception of social freedom and consider the feasibility of institutionalizing his discourse theoretic framework.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75395236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-22DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1678800
Jonathan Josefsson
ABSTRACT The increased efforts of democratic states to enforce immigration control and deportations have sparked heated public debates about the rights of non-citizen children to be granted asylum. Local communities, anti-deportation movements, and children themselves have rejected the justifications provided by state authorities and have mobilized claims in the public sphere for the rights of non-citizen children to stay. To date, scholars have primarily analysed normative issues about the rights of non-citizen children with departure in legal positive rights as enshrined in domestic and international law; however, scholars have paid less attention to political theoretical aspects of the issue. This article takes its point of departure from claims for non-citizen children’s right to stay as formulated in the public sphere and uses discourse ethics to theorize in what ways these claims challenge state power and contemporary laws on asylum. In addition, this article contributes to the scholarly debates about the pressing global political issue of child migration and the political theory of human rights for children. Building on Seyla Benhabib’s concepts reciprocity and democratic iterations, this article develops a discourse theoretical approach that offers an alternative framework to a legalistic approach for the normative analysis of the rights of non-citizen children.
{"title":"Non-citizen children and the right to stay – a discourse ethical approach","authors":"Jonathan Josefsson","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2019.1678800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1678800","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The increased efforts of democratic states to enforce immigration control and deportations have sparked heated public debates about the rights of non-citizen children to be granted asylum. Local communities, anti-deportation movements, and children themselves have rejected the justifications provided by state authorities and have mobilized claims in the public sphere for the rights of non-citizen children to stay. To date, scholars have primarily analysed normative issues about the rights of non-citizen children with departure in legal positive rights as enshrined in domestic and international law; however, scholars have paid less attention to political theoretical aspects of the issue. This article takes its point of departure from claims for non-citizen children’s right to stay as formulated in the public sphere and uses discourse ethics to theorize in what ways these claims challenge state power and contemporary laws on asylum. In addition, this article contributes to the scholarly debates about the pressing global political issue of child migration and the political theory of human rights for children. Building on Seyla Benhabib’s concepts reciprocity and democratic iterations, this article develops a discourse theoretical approach that offers an alternative framework to a legalistic approach for the normative analysis of the rights of non-citizen children.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84517008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-19DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1668198
D. Held, Pietro Maffettone
ABSTRACT We start from, and expand on, a basic insight in negative dialectic, namely, that our main concern should be with the absolute worst in political life. We then consider how this might have an impact on the way we understand the role and grounds of moral equality. Subsequently, we move on to explain the importance of decency in political morality. Finally, we take a closer look to basic data about global poverty and inequality and what these might tell us in light of our analysis of the foundations of moral equality and its relationship to social cruelty.
{"title":"Prolegomena to a critical theory of the global order","authors":"D. Held, Pietro Maffettone","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2019.1668198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1668198","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We start from, and expand on, a basic insight in negative dialectic, namely, that our main concern should be with the absolute worst in political life. We then consider how this might have an impact on the way we understand the role and grounds of moral equality. Subsequently, we move on to explain the importance of decency in political morality. Finally, we take a closer look to basic data about global poverty and inequality and what these might tell us in light of our analysis of the foundations of moral equality and its relationship to social cruelty.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73334455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-19DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1667132
Johan Brännmark
ABSTRACT In recent years, several political theorists have argued that reasonable principles of justice are practice-dependent. In this paper it is suggested that we can distinguish between at least two main models for doing practice-dependent theorizing about justice, interpretivism and constructivism, and that they can be understood as based in two different conceptions of practices. It is then argued that the reliance on the notion of participants that characterizes interpretivism disables this approach from adequately addressing certain matters of justice and that a better way of developing the idea of practice-dependence can be found in a constructivism that starts from the Rawlsian idea of overlapping consensus, but which shifts the focus of that approach from societies to a more open-ended category of domains, and which understands the parties to a possible overlapping consensus as stakeholders in a certain set of interconnected practices.
{"title":"Principles of justice and the idea of practice-dependence","authors":"Johan Brännmark","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2019.1667132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1667132","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In recent years, several political theorists have argued that reasonable principles of justice are practice-dependent. In this paper it is suggested that we can distinguish between at least two main models for doing practice-dependent theorizing about justice, interpretivism and constructivism, and that they can be understood as based in two different conceptions of practices. It is then argued that the reliance on the notion of participants that characterizes interpretivism disables this approach from adequately addressing certain matters of justice and that a better way of developing the idea of practice-dependence can be found in a constructivism that starts from the Rawlsian idea of overlapping consensus, but which shifts the focus of that approach from societies to a more open-ended category of domains, and which understands the parties to a possible overlapping consensus as stakeholders in a certain set of interconnected practices.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78927466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-05DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1649958
G. Schweiger
ABSTRACT In this paper I am interested in the question of whether and why states should prioritize child refugees over adult refugees in cases where they are not able to grant refuge to all those who are entitled to it. In particular I discuss three grounds on which such a prioritization could be based: (a) vulnerability, (b) efficiency and (c) life phase and life span. As can be shown, these grounds also apply, to some extent, to particular groups of adults such as women, the elderly, or people with special needs. Based on this I conclude that states should invest significant resources into filtering out those who are the most needy and vulnerable although there are several limitations to doing that. Only if such a selection process were impossible, or so costly and time-consuming that it would result in significantly fewer refugees being admitted, would states have good moral reasons to prioritize children without further screening.
{"title":"Should states prioritize child refugees?","authors":"G. Schweiger","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2019.1649958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1649958","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper I am interested in the question of whether and why states should prioritize child refugees over adult refugees in cases where they are not able to grant refuge to all those who are entitled to it. In particular I discuss three grounds on which such a prioritization could be based: (a) vulnerability, (b) efficiency and (c) life phase and life span. As can be shown, these grounds also apply, to some extent, to particular groups of adults such as women, the elderly, or people with special needs. Based on this I conclude that states should invest significant resources into filtering out those who are the most needy and vulnerable although there are several limitations to doing that. Only if such a selection process were impossible, or so costly and time-consuming that it would result in significantly fewer refugees being admitted, would states have good moral reasons to prioritize children without further screening.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89868798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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