We explore a relatively lightweight scheme to prevent key recovery by fault attacks on the advanced encryption standard (AES) cipher. We employ a transformed key (derived from the original key through a nonlinear and possibly one-way mapping) for AES encryption hardware. The mapping combines processing using a pseudorandom bitstream generator (the keystream generator of the Grain-128a stream cipher), followed by a self-shrinking generator (SSG). We provide formal proof of security of the scheme, based on the assumed difficulty of inverting the output of the proposed key transformer. The design of the key transformer ensures that it is itself resistant to fault-attack. Our scheme requires a 96-bit secret initial value (IV), a one-time initial latency (approximately 256 clock cycles for a 128-bit key) of generating the transformed key, and a key transformation layer. However, the core AES hardware is left unchanged. We present hardware platform-based experimental results for an FPGA implementation, which incurs less hardware overhead than previously proposed fault attack prevention/detection schemes.
{"title":"A Provably Secure Scheme to Prevent Master Key Recovery by Fault Attack on AES Hardware","authors":"Sneha Swaroopa;Sivappriya Manivannan;Rajat Subhra Chakraborty;Indrajit Chakrabarti","doi":"10.1109/LES.2024.3472673","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/LES.2024.3472673","url":null,"abstract":"We explore a relatively lightweight scheme to prevent key recovery by fault attacks on the advanced encryption standard (AES) cipher. We employ a transformed key (derived from the original key through a nonlinear and possibly one-way mapping) for AES encryption hardware. The mapping combines processing using a pseudorandom bitstream generator (the keystream generator of the Grain-128a stream cipher), followed by a self-shrinking generator (SSG). We provide formal proof of security of the scheme, based on the assumed difficulty of inverting the output of the proposed key transformer. The design of the key transformer ensures that it is itself resistant to fault-attack. Our scheme requires a 96-bit secret initial value (IV), a one-time initial latency (approximately 256 clock cycles for a 128-bit key) of generating the transformed key, and a key transformation layer. However, the core AES hardware is left unchanged. We present hardware platform-based experimental results for an FPGA implementation, which incurs less hardware overhead than previously proposed fault attack prevention/detection schemes.","PeriodicalId":56143,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Embedded Systems Letters","volume":"16 4","pages":"521-524"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142777518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-23DOI: 10.1109/LES.2024.3452551
Phu Khanh Huynh;Ilknur Mustafazade;Francky Catthoor;Nagarajan Kandasamy;Anup Das
Large-scale neuromorphic architectures consist of computing tiles that communicate spikes using a shared interconnect. We propose ADIONA, a dynamic segmented bus interconnect to address design scalability while reducing energy and latency of spike traffic. ADIONA consists of parallel bus lanes arranged in a ladder-shaped structure that allows any tile to connect to another, offers multiple routing options for communication links, and provides a high level of customization for different mapping scenarios and use cases. Each lane in the ladder bus is partitioned into segments using lightweight bufferless switches. Based on compile-time communication information, these switches can be dynamically reconfigured at runtime to execute the target application. Our dynamic segmented bus interconnect substantially enhances hardware utilization, improves fault tolerance, and offers adaptability to execute different applications on a single hardware platform. We evaluate ADIONA using three synthetic and three realistic machine learning workloads on a cycle-accurate neuromorphic simulator. Our results show that ADIONA reduces energy consumption by $2.1times $