Pub Date : 2024-06-19DOI: 10.1109/LES.2024.3416820
Ana Fernandes;Luís Crespo;Nuno Neves;Pedro Tomás;Nuno Roma;Gabriel Falcao
Data streaming and data-flow computing paradigms have been on the rise, aiming to improve the performance of general-purpose processors. However, providing support for data streaming typically requires the definition of new instruction set architecture (ISA) extensions, which must be thoroughly validated before being implemented in hardware. This step is usually carried out using instruction set simulators (ISSs), to which the necessary streaming support must be added. Accordingly, this work proposes a new validation simulator for the recently presented stream-based RISC-V ISA unlimited vector extension (UVE). The proposed tool is based on Spike, the golden reference instruction set simulator ISS for RISC-V extensions. It is capable of processing a wide range of memory access patterns and provides the necessary mechanisms to validate the target extension, as well as to evaluate the resulting instruction reduction gains.
{"title":"Functional Validation of the RISC-V Unlimited Vector Extension","authors":"Ana Fernandes;Luís Crespo;Nuno Neves;Pedro Tomás;Nuno Roma;Gabriel Falcao","doi":"10.1109/LES.2024.3416820","DOIUrl":"10.1109/LES.2024.3416820","url":null,"abstract":"Data streaming and data-flow computing paradigms have been on the rise, aiming to improve the performance of general-purpose processors. However, providing support for data streaming typically requires the definition of new instruction set architecture (ISA) extensions, which must be thoroughly validated before being implemented in hardware. This step is usually carried out using instruction set simulators (ISSs), to which the necessary streaming support must be added. Accordingly, this work proposes a new validation simulator for the recently presented stream-based RISC-V ISA unlimited vector extension (UVE). The proposed tool is based on Spike, the golden reference instruction set simulator ISS for RISC-V extensions. It is capable of processing a wide range of memory access patterns and provides the necessary mechanisms to validate the target extension, as well as to evaluate the resulting instruction reduction gains.","PeriodicalId":56143,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Embedded Systems Letters","volume":"17 1","pages":"2-5"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141937440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hardware Trojan insertion in high-level synthesis (HLS) generated intellectual property (IP) designs can pose strong security concern for the designers. Backdoor hardware Trojans can be inserted in the HLS design flow to compromise the produced register transfer level (RTL) IP design. This letter presents a novel malevolent HLS (M-HLS) framework introducing the possibility of two different hardware Trojan insertion [i.e., performance degradation hardware Trojan (PD-HT) and Denial of Service hardware Trojan (DoS-HT)] in multiplexer (mux)-based interconnect stage of HLS generated watermarked IP design. The proposed framework is validated on the watermarked MESA Horner Bezier’s IP, which indicates strong performance degradation and DoS achievable by an attacker at minimal area and power overhead.
{"title":"M-HLS: Malevolent High-Level Synthesis for Watermarked Hardware IPs","authors":"Anirban Sengupta;Aditya Anshul;Vishal Chourasia;Nitish Kumar","doi":"10.1109/LES.2024.3416422","DOIUrl":"10.1109/LES.2024.3416422","url":null,"abstract":"Hardware Trojan insertion in high-level synthesis (HLS) generated intellectual property (IP) designs can pose strong security concern for the designers. Backdoor hardware Trojans can be inserted in the HLS design flow to compromise the produced register transfer level (RTL) IP design. This letter presents a novel malevolent HLS (M-HLS) framework introducing the possibility of two different hardware Trojan insertion [i.e., performance degradation hardware Trojan (PD-HT) and Denial of Service hardware Trojan (DoS-HT)] in multiplexer (mux)-based interconnect stage of HLS generated watermarked IP design. The proposed framework is validated on the watermarked MESA Horner Bezier’s IP, which indicates strong performance degradation and DoS achievable by an attacker at minimal area and power overhead.","PeriodicalId":56143,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Embedded Systems Letters","volume":"16 4","pages":"497-500"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141937617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-18DOI: 10.1109/LES.2024.3415651
Jose Alejandro Galaviz-Aguilar;Cesar Vargas-Rosales;Francisco Falcone
The lock-in amplifier (LIA) instruments are designed to provide signal conditioning for precision measurement systems to extract signals from extremely noisy environments. The digital LIAs design often requires a verification process to ensure hardware performance. Thus, hardware description language (HDL) with functional verification strategies offers a powerful tool to provide an field-programmable gate array (FPGA) integrated solution. In this letter, we propose a methodology of design and verification of all-digital LIA and an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) module able to measure extremely lower levels of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of $approx $