Pub Date : 2022-04-29DOI: 10.1163/25889567-20220406
T. Milligan
This article considers Bernard Rollin’s justification of the genetic modification of the telos of livestock animals for welfare purposes. While agreeing that a pragmatic approach to animal welfare might well reach this far, the claim is that Rollin’s approach leaves some important harms out of the picture. Section (1) will outline the rationale for a pragmatic approach towards animal rights. Section (2) will outline Rollin’s telos-based argument for allowing modification. Sections (3) and (4) will draw upon analogies that (respectively) lend support to and problematize Rollin’s telos-based argument: the production of anencephalic ‘Chicken Little’ lumps of animal tissue as a way to avoid suffering; and the manipulation of preferences by ‘hypnopaedia’ in Huxley’s Brave New World. Section (5) will suggest that this does not rule out modification, but it does require us to recognize that modification involves harms, even if they are sometimes outweighed by benefits.
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Pub Date : 2022-04-29DOI: 10.1163/25889567-20220408
P. Markie
With his account of the rights stemming from the telos-based interests of nonhuman animals, Bernard Rollin in, A New Basis for Animal Ethics, advances our understanding of animal ethics in a way that both can and should guide our behavior. Nonetheless, telos theory needs to be developed to capture the existence of moral rights that are not based in particular aspects of an animal’s telos. I argue for the existence and importance of such rights, propose a way to capture them within telos theory, and consider their implication for the argument from marginal cases.
{"title":"A Worry about Telos Theory","authors":"P. Markie","doi":"10.1163/25889567-20220408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/25889567-20220408","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000With his account of the rights stemming from the telos-based interests of nonhuman animals, Bernard Rollin in, A New Basis for Animal Ethics, advances our understanding of animal ethics in a way that both can and should guide our behavior. Nonetheless, telos theory needs to be developed to capture the existence of moral rights that are not based in particular aspects of an animal’s telos. I argue for the existence and importance of such rights, propose a way to capture them within telos theory, and consider their implication for the argument from marginal cases.","PeriodicalId":73601,"journal":{"name":"Journal of applied animal ethics research","volume":"159 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77144730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-19DOI: 10.1163/25889567-bja10028
Wilhelm Haihambo, N. N. Gabriel
This study aimed to study the effectiveness of different concentrations of sodium bicarbonate (baking soda) combined with acetic acid (vinegar) in three spotted tilapia (Oreochromis andersonii) fingerlings. Fingerlings (body weight 0.82 ± 0.00 g, and body length of 3.91 ± 0.03 cm) were subjected to three concentrations of sodium bicarbonate (30 g/L, 40 g/L and 60 g/L) combined with three concentrations of acetic acid (30 ml/L, 45 ml/L and 60 ml/L), each replicated five times to assess the anaesthesia induction and recovery time. Sodium bicarbonate and acetic acid induced anaesthesia in three spotted tilapia fingerlings regardless of the concentration used. However, high concentrations induced anaesthesia within a short period of time. Meanwhile, the full recovery time increased with concentration combinations. In essence, low concentrations of sodium bicarbonate and acetic could be recommended for anaesthetizing three spotted tilapia fingerlings. However, more studies on sodium bicarbonate and acetic acids as anaesthetics in aquaculture and fisheries is deemed necessary.
{"title":"Sodium Bicarbonate and Acetic Acid: An Effective Anaesthetic for Three Spotted Tilapia, Oreochromis andersonii Fingerlings","authors":"Wilhelm Haihambo, N. N. Gabriel","doi":"10.1163/25889567-bja10028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/25889567-bja10028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study aimed to study the effectiveness of different concentrations of sodium bicarbonate (baking soda) combined with acetic acid (vinegar) in three spotted tilapia (Oreochromis andersonii) fingerlings. Fingerlings (body weight 0.82 ± 0.00 g, and body length of 3.91 ± 0.03 cm) were subjected to three concentrations of sodium bicarbonate (30 g/L, 40 g/L and 60 g/L) combined with three concentrations of acetic acid (30 ml/L, 45 ml/L and 60 ml/L), each replicated five times to assess the anaesthesia induction and recovery time. Sodium bicarbonate and acetic acid induced anaesthesia in three spotted tilapia fingerlings regardless of the concentration used. However, high concentrations induced anaesthesia within a short period of time. Meanwhile, the full recovery time increased with concentration combinations. In essence, low concentrations of sodium bicarbonate and acetic could be recommended for anaesthetizing three spotted tilapia fingerlings. However, more studies on sodium bicarbonate and acetic acids as anaesthetics in aquaculture and fisheries is deemed necessary.","PeriodicalId":73601,"journal":{"name":"Journal of applied animal ethics research","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82916250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.5406/21601267.12.1.16
Ángela Fernández
{"title":"Beyond Cages: Animal Law and Criminal Punishment","authors":"Ángela Fernández","doi":"10.5406/21601267.12.1.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21601267.12.1.16","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":73601,"journal":{"name":"Journal of applied animal ethics research","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73303872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.5406/21601267.12.1.05
Ronald G. Oldfield
Abstract:In The Ultimate Betrayal: Is There Happy Meat?, Bohanec (2013) proposed that farmed animals raised humanely may experience betrayal when slaughtered. I argue based on personal experience that humans often betray trust relationships with farmed animals. Using published scientific literature, I find that typical farmed animals (mammals) and farmed fishes are both cognitively capable of a rudimentary experience of betrayal. However, the manner in which fishes are typically maintained does not present opportunities for human-fish trust relationships to develop. Eating farmed fishes presents fewer ethical implications than eating cows, at least in some cases.
{"title":"You Can't Betray a Fish: One Reason Eating Fish May Cause Less Harm Than Eating Cows","authors":"Ronald G. Oldfield","doi":"10.5406/21601267.12.1.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21601267.12.1.05","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In The Ultimate Betrayal: Is There Happy Meat?, Bohanec (2013) proposed that farmed animals raised humanely may experience betrayal when slaughtered. I argue based on personal experience that humans often betray trust relationships with farmed animals. Using published scientific literature, I find that typical farmed animals (mammals) and farmed fishes are both cognitively capable of a rudimentary experience of betrayal. However, the manner in which fishes are typically maintained does not present opportunities for human-fish trust relationships to develop. Eating farmed fishes presents fewer ethical implications than eating cows, at least in some cases.","PeriodicalId":73601,"journal":{"name":"Journal of applied animal ethics research","volume":"15 1","pages":"51 - 58"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87279078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.5406/21601267.12.1.15
Linda M. Johnson
• How would other nonhuman species who also share the environment engage and exist within these spaces? • Would or could there be any feasible ceding of land sovereignty to nonhuman species when the principle of land sovereignty is based on human-made political and legal principles and, indeed, while indigenous human populations continue to struggle for their sovereignty to be recognized and respected?
{"title":"Bringing the Dead Sea to Life: Art and Nature at the Lowest Place on Earth by Hadas Marcus and Yossi Leshem (review)","authors":"Linda M. Johnson","doi":"10.5406/21601267.12.1.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21601267.12.1.15","url":null,"abstract":"• How would other nonhuman species who also share the environment engage and exist within these spaces? • <bullet point>Would or could there be any feasible ceding of land sovereignty to nonhuman species when the principle of land sovereignty is based on human-made political and legal principles and, indeed, while indigenous human populations continue to struggle for their sovereignty to be recognized and respected?","PeriodicalId":73601,"journal":{"name":"Journal of applied animal ethics research","volume":"4 1","pages":"111 - 114"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81558763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.5406/21601267.12.1.12
Elena Past
fringing upon the autonomy of paradigmatic persons is wrong, infringing upon nonhuman animals’ autonomy is also wrong. The problem with this argument is that different kinds of autonomy are likely to be at stake. The wrongness of infringing upon paradigmatic persons’ autonomy is often explained by the facts that we are self-conscious, capable of abstract thought (including language use), and capable of intentionally choosing the kind of life that we want to live (e.g., relating to long-term projects or schemes of personal ethics). It could be argued that because nonhuman animals are not capable of exercising this kind of autonomy, they therefore cannot be harmed by its infringement. Some of the book’s authors chip away at this presumption, noting (inter alia) that nonhuman animals have desires to move around and do things that are thwarted by confinement or control, that these desires constitute a form of agency, and that (following previous scholarship) nonhuman animals possess some forms of self-awareness. Specifically, the chapters from Valéry Giroux and Carl Saucier-Bouffard, Lori Gruen, and Carlos Naconecy consider such arguments. Naconecy draws upon David DeGrazia’s (2009) analysis of animal self-awareness in making his argument. Though the issue deserves more treatment than I can give it here, it seems that nonhuman animals’ autonomy and self-awareness, even if granted, are of a different sort than that possessed by paradigmatic persons. Specifically, (most) nonhuman animals cannot feel wronged by having their preferences overridden because they are not the kinds of beings who are capable of abstractly considering themselves as autonomous and worthy of self-direction. They may desire things, and thwarting these desires might sometimes harm them, but that is a different kind of argument. Infringing upon nonhuman animals’ (more limited kind of) autonomy might nonetheless be wrong, but if different sorts of autonomy are at stake, then moral arguments relating to paradigmatic persons cannot be directly transposed to nonhuman animals. Some additional argument(s) must be supplied, but (on my reading) the book’s contributors stop short of this. Nonetheless, as stated above, the ethics of control and questions of nonhuman animals’ autonomy are not as well trod as other issues in animal ethics. Despite my taking issue with some of the details, the discussions contained in the book’s first two sections are worthy reading and help to advance the field. Overall, the book’s chapters are well written and cogently argued, and given its breadth, different readers will find different things to value in it. The Palgrave Handbook of Practical Animal Ethics is a welcome addition to the literature.
{"title":"Animals and Animality in Primo Levi's Work by Damiano Benvegnù (review)","authors":"Elena Past","doi":"10.5406/21601267.12.1.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21601267.12.1.12","url":null,"abstract":"fringing upon the autonomy of paradigmatic persons is wrong, infringing upon nonhuman animals’ autonomy is also wrong. The problem with this argument is that different kinds of autonomy are likely to be at stake. The wrongness of infringing upon paradigmatic persons’ autonomy is often explained by the facts that we are self-conscious, capable of abstract thought (including language use), and capable of intentionally choosing the kind of life that we want to live (e.g., relating to long-term projects or schemes of personal ethics). It could be argued that because nonhuman animals are not capable of exercising this kind of autonomy, they therefore cannot be harmed by its infringement. Some of the book’s authors chip away at this presumption, noting (inter alia) that nonhuman animals have desires to move around and do things that are thwarted by confinement or control, that these desires constitute a form of agency, and that (following previous scholarship) nonhuman animals possess some forms of self-awareness. Specifically, the chapters from Valéry Giroux and Carl Saucier-Bouffard, Lori Gruen, and Carlos Naconecy consider such arguments. Naconecy draws upon David DeGrazia’s (2009) analysis of animal self-awareness in making his argument. Though the issue deserves more treatment than I can give it here, it seems that nonhuman animals’ autonomy and self-awareness, even if granted, are of a different sort than that possessed by paradigmatic persons. Specifically, (most) nonhuman animals cannot feel wronged by having their preferences overridden because they are not the kinds of beings who are capable of abstractly considering themselves as autonomous and worthy of self-direction. They may desire things, and thwarting these desires might sometimes harm them, but that is a different kind of argument. Infringing upon nonhuman animals’ (more limited kind of) autonomy might nonetheless be wrong, but if different sorts of autonomy are at stake, then moral arguments relating to paradigmatic persons cannot be directly transposed to nonhuman animals. Some additional argument(s) must be supplied, but (on my reading) the book’s contributors stop short of this. Nonetheless, as stated above, the ethics of control and questions of nonhuman animals’ autonomy are not as well trod as other issues in animal ethics. Despite my taking issue with some of the details, the discussions contained in the book’s first two sections are worthy reading and help to advance the field. Overall, the book’s chapters are well written and cogently argued, and given its breadth, different readers will find different things to value in it. The Palgrave Handbook of Practical Animal Ethics is a welcome addition to the literature.","PeriodicalId":73601,"journal":{"name":"Journal of applied animal ethics research","volume":"35 1","pages":"105 - 108"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91326352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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