Pub Date : 2025-12-18DOI: 10.1038/s44159-025-00525-y
Ximena Goldberg
{"title":"The knowledge–behaviour gap in stigma towards people with mental disorders","authors":"Ximena Goldberg","doi":"10.1038/s44159-025-00525-y","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44159-025-00525-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":74249,"journal":{"name":"Nature reviews psychology","volume":"5 1","pages":"5-5"},"PeriodicalIF":21.8,"publicationDate":"2025-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145950801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-12DOI: 10.1038/s44159-025-00522-1
Sabrina Piccolo
{"title":"Social change in science and the courtroom","authors":"Sabrina Piccolo","doi":"10.1038/s44159-025-00522-1","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44159-025-00522-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":74249,"journal":{"name":"Nature reviews psychology","volume":"5 1","pages":"8-8"},"PeriodicalIF":21.8,"publicationDate":"2025-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145950805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-08DOI: 10.1038/s44159-025-00518-x
Nelson Shen
Despite their popularity, terms such as ‘co-creation’, ‘co-design’ and ‘co-production’ are often misused, risking tokenism and downstream harm. Re-centring on the foundational principles of ‘co-approaches’ can restore conceptual clarity and promote meaningful engagement in mental health research and practice, regardless of the term used.
{"title":"Co-approaches in mental health need conceptual clarity","authors":"Nelson Shen","doi":"10.1038/s44159-025-00518-x","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44159-025-00518-x","url":null,"abstract":"Despite their popularity, terms such as ‘co-creation’, ‘co-design’ and ‘co-production’ are often misused, risking tokenism and downstream harm. Re-centring on the foundational principles of ‘co-approaches’ can restore conceptual clarity and promote meaningful engagement in mental health research and practice, regardless of the term used.","PeriodicalId":74249,"journal":{"name":"Nature reviews psychology","volume":"5 1","pages":"1-2"},"PeriodicalIF":21.8,"publicationDate":"2025-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145950800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-05DOI: 10.1038/s44159-025-00517-y
As artificial intelligence (AI) permeates society and daily life, psychologists are investigating interactions between AI and human cognition, behaviour and values.
{"title":"Artificial intelligence is not a substitute for human intelligence","authors":"","doi":"10.1038/s44159-025-00517-y","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44159-025-00517-y","url":null,"abstract":"As artificial intelligence (AI) permeates society and daily life, psychologists are investigating interactions between AI and human cognition, behaviour and values.","PeriodicalId":74249,"journal":{"name":"Nature reviews psychology","volume":"4 12","pages":"753-754"},"PeriodicalIF":21.8,"publicationDate":"2025-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.comhttps://www.nature.com/articles/s44159-025-00517-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145675705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-05DOI: 10.1038/s44159-025-00520-3
Jennifer M. Talarico
Undergraduate student samples in psychological research are commonly critiqued as ‘convenience samples’. However, they can also be ideally representative for certain research questions.
心理学研究中的本科生样本通常被批评为“方便样本”。然而,它们也可以是某些研究问题的理想代表。
{"title":"The merits of undergraduate student samples","authors":"Jennifer M. Talarico","doi":"10.1038/s44159-025-00520-3","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44159-025-00520-3","url":null,"abstract":"Undergraduate student samples in psychological research are commonly critiqued as ‘convenience samples’. However, they can also be ideally representative for certain research questions.","PeriodicalId":74249,"journal":{"name":"Nature reviews psychology","volume":"5 1","pages":"3-4"},"PeriodicalIF":21.8,"publicationDate":"2025-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145950758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-28DOI: 10.1038/s44159-025-00512-3
Wilma A. Bainbridge, Dirk B. Walther, Keisuke Fukuda, Lore Goetschalckx
Over the past decade, research has shown that the likelihood that an item will be remembered is highly consistent across viewers, tasks and stimulus types. This property is known as ‘memorability’ and is one of the strongest predictors of memory. However, it is still unknown what causes an item to be memorable and why this property is so consistent across people. In this Review, we consider the possibility that memorability measures tap into the efficiency with which visual information is processed and prioritized. We begin by discussing memorability effects on perception, working memory and long-term memory. We then unpack the concept of processing efficiency and suggest research directions to elucidate how processing efficiency can be quantified and related to memorability, and how memorability can be tested across other memory subprocesses. Certain items are better remembered than others across individuals, a property known as memorability. In this Review, Bainbridge and colleagues detail memorability effects in perception, working memory and long-term memory, and consider the role of processing efficiency in memory.
{"title":"Memorability of visual stimuli and the role of processing efficiency","authors":"Wilma A. Bainbridge, Dirk B. Walther, Keisuke Fukuda, Lore Goetschalckx","doi":"10.1038/s44159-025-00512-3","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44159-025-00512-3","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past decade, research has shown that the likelihood that an item will be remembered is highly consistent across viewers, tasks and stimulus types. This property is known as ‘memorability’ and is one of the strongest predictors of memory. However, it is still unknown what causes an item to be memorable and why this property is so consistent across people. In this Review, we consider the possibility that memorability measures tap into the efficiency with which visual information is processed and prioritized. We begin by discussing memorability effects on perception, working memory and long-term memory. We then unpack the concept of processing efficiency and suggest research directions to elucidate how processing efficiency can be quantified and related to memorability, and how memorability can be tested across other memory subprocesses. Certain items are better remembered than others across individuals, a property known as memorability. In this Review, Bainbridge and colleagues detail memorability effects in perception, working memory and long-term memory, and consider the role of processing efficiency in memory.","PeriodicalId":74249,"journal":{"name":"Nature reviews psychology","volume":"5 1","pages":"47-58"},"PeriodicalIF":21.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145950812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-24DOI: 10.1038/s44159-025-00514-1
Shari Liu, Seda Karakose-Akbiyik, Joseph Outa, Minjae J. Kim
Across the cognitive sciences, researchers have studied theory of mind (making sense of other people’s behaviours in terms of their mental states, or ‘naive psychology’) and physical reasoning (making sense of physical events in terms of their underlying mechanics and dynamics, or ‘naive physics’), as two separate processes. In this Perspective, we describe two ways in which psychological reasoning depends on physical reasoning. First, people represent the bodies of animate agents as objects, and their actions as physical events. Second, people use physical knowledge to make inferences about other minds, including what other people want, feel and know, how hard they are trying, and how much danger they are in. We review research from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience that provides evidence for the interaction between these two systems, and Bayesian computational models of theory of mind that articulate a formal hypothesis about how they work together. We propose that from early in human development people navigate the social world by using two distinct but interacting systems for reasoning about other agents’ ethereal minds and their physical bodies. Reasoning about minds and reasoning about physical objects are governed by two distinct systems. In this Perspective, Liu et al. review research from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience that provides evidence for the interaction between psychological and physical reasoning systems.
{"title":"How physical information is used to make sense of the psychological world","authors":"Shari Liu, Seda Karakose-Akbiyik, Joseph Outa, Minjae J. Kim","doi":"10.1038/s44159-025-00514-1","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44159-025-00514-1","url":null,"abstract":"Across the cognitive sciences, researchers have studied theory of mind (making sense of other people’s behaviours in terms of their mental states, or ‘naive psychology’) and physical reasoning (making sense of physical events in terms of their underlying mechanics and dynamics, or ‘naive physics’), as two separate processes. In this Perspective, we describe two ways in which psychological reasoning depends on physical reasoning. First, people represent the bodies of animate agents as objects, and their actions as physical events. Second, people use physical knowledge to make inferences about other minds, including what other people want, feel and know, how hard they are trying, and how much danger they are in. We review research from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience that provides evidence for the interaction between these two systems, and Bayesian computational models of theory of mind that articulate a formal hypothesis about how they work together. We propose that from early in human development people navigate the social world by using two distinct but interacting systems for reasoning about other agents’ ethereal minds and their physical bodies. Reasoning about minds and reasoning about physical objects are governed by two distinct systems. In this Perspective, Liu et al. review research from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience that provides evidence for the interaction between psychological and physical reasoning systems.","PeriodicalId":74249,"journal":{"name":"Nature reviews psychology","volume":"5 1","pages":"59-73"},"PeriodicalIF":21.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145950810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-18DOI: 10.1038/s44159-025-00515-0
Angus C. Burns
{"title":"Light as chronotherapy for depressed mood","authors":"Angus C. Burns","doi":"10.1038/s44159-025-00515-0","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44159-025-00515-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":74249,"journal":{"name":"Nature reviews psychology","volume":"5 1","pages":"7-7"},"PeriodicalIF":21.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145950803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-17DOI: 10.1038/s44159-025-00509-y
Milan Obaidi, Robin Bergh, Nora Cornelia Glerud Benningstad, John F. Dovidio
Research in psychology remains divided on whether some people are more susceptible to violent extremism than others and, if so, what characterizes these individuals. The central debate revolves around whether individuals who engage in violent extremism are mentally ill or ‘just like everyone else’. However, this debate misses the observation that healthy individuals respond differently when facing the same situations and conditions. This notion has prompted renewed attention to individual differences underlying violent extremism, particularly individual differences in social perception, motivation and cognition. In this Review, we argue that some individuals might not only be more susceptible to violent extremism in response to social circumstances but might also actively seek out extremist environments that resonate with their personality. We propose that understanding violent extremism requires integrating trait-descriptive models (such as Big Five and HEXACO) with process-oriented frameworks that outline mechanisms in social reactivity, needs and mindsets that make some individuals more at risk for engaging in violent extremism. This integrative perspective offers a nuanced foundation for future research and can inform targeted, psychologically informed interventions. In this Review, Obaidi et al. propose that understanding violent extremism requires integration of trait-descriptive models (such as Big Five and HEXACO) with process-oriented frameworks that outline mechanisms in social reactivity, needs and mindsets that make some individuals more at risk for engaging in violent extremism.
{"title":"Individual differences in violent extremism","authors":"Milan Obaidi, Robin Bergh, Nora Cornelia Glerud Benningstad, John F. Dovidio","doi":"10.1038/s44159-025-00509-y","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44159-025-00509-y","url":null,"abstract":"Research in psychology remains divided on whether some people are more susceptible to violent extremism than others and, if so, what characterizes these individuals. The central debate revolves around whether individuals who engage in violent extremism are mentally ill or ‘just like everyone else’. However, this debate misses the observation that healthy individuals respond differently when facing the same situations and conditions. This notion has prompted renewed attention to individual differences underlying violent extremism, particularly individual differences in social perception, motivation and cognition. In this Review, we argue that some individuals might not only be more susceptible to violent extremism in response to social circumstances but might also actively seek out extremist environments that resonate with their personality. We propose that understanding violent extremism requires integrating trait-descriptive models (such as Big Five and HEXACO) with process-oriented frameworks that outline mechanisms in social reactivity, needs and mindsets that make some individuals more at risk for engaging in violent extremism. This integrative perspective offers a nuanced foundation for future research and can inform targeted, psychologically informed interventions. In this Review, Obaidi et al. propose that understanding violent extremism requires integration of trait-descriptive models (such as Big Five and HEXACO) with process-oriented frameworks that outline mechanisms in social reactivity, needs and mindsets that make some individuals more at risk for engaging in violent extremism.","PeriodicalId":74249,"journal":{"name":"Nature reviews psychology","volume":"5 1","pages":"29-46"},"PeriodicalIF":21.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145950757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-14DOI: 10.1038/s44159-025-00506-1
Oliver Brady, Paul Nulty, Lili Zhang, Tomás E. Ward, David P. McGovern
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly embedded in everyday decision-making scenarios, altering how people make choices. Despite the seemingly ‘superhuman’ capabilities of LLMs in some domains, there are pitfalls in the decision-making performance of LLMs and they should therefore be used with caution. In this Review, we examine LLM outputs through the lens of dual-process theory and against the backdrop of human decision-making. We detail how in decision-making scenarios, LLMs mimic both System-1-like responses — exhibiting cognitive biases and employing heuristics — and System-2-like responses — slow and carefully reasoned — through specific prompting methods. However, LLM reasoning is not fully analogous to human dual-process cognition. For instance, the ‘cognitive’ biases observed in LLMs often reflect patterns in their training data and LLMs exhibit specific non-human biases, such as hallucinations, that constrain their use in real-world decision-making. Despite these limitations, LLMs have the potential to augment human decision-making when deployed responsibly. Thus, we conclude with recommendations for mitigating biases and improving reliability to enable the deployment of LLMs as effective decision-support systems. The performance of large language models (LLMs) is often compared to human performance on decision-making tasks. In this Review, Brady and colleagues examine LLM outputs through the lens of dual-process theory, considering the hallmarks of System 1 and System 2 human decision-making.
{"title":"Dual-process theory and decision-making in large language models","authors":"Oliver Brady, Paul Nulty, Lili Zhang, Tomás E. Ward, David P. McGovern","doi":"10.1038/s44159-025-00506-1","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44159-025-00506-1","url":null,"abstract":"Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly embedded in everyday decision-making scenarios, altering how people make choices. Despite the seemingly ‘superhuman’ capabilities of LLMs in some domains, there are pitfalls in the decision-making performance of LLMs and they should therefore be used with caution. In this Review, we examine LLM outputs through the lens of dual-process theory and against the backdrop of human decision-making. We detail how in decision-making scenarios, LLMs mimic both System-1-like responses — exhibiting cognitive biases and employing heuristics — and System-2-like responses — slow and carefully reasoned — through specific prompting methods. However, LLM reasoning is not fully analogous to human dual-process cognition. For instance, the ‘cognitive’ biases observed in LLMs often reflect patterns in their training data and LLMs exhibit specific non-human biases, such as hallucinations, that constrain their use in real-world decision-making. Despite these limitations, LLMs have the potential to augment human decision-making when deployed responsibly. Thus, we conclude with recommendations for mitigating biases and improving reliability to enable the deployment of LLMs as effective decision-support systems. The performance of large language models (LLMs) is often compared to human performance on decision-making tasks. In this Review, Brady and colleagues examine LLM outputs through the lens of dual-process theory, considering the hallmarks of System 1 and System 2 human decision-making.","PeriodicalId":74249,"journal":{"name":"Nature reviews psychology","volume":"4 12","pages":"777-792"},"PeriodicalIF":21.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145675708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}