Pub Date : 2026-01-19DOI: 10.1007/s11558-025-09612-4
Timon Forster
To what extent do states act differently through international organizations based in their own country relative to those located abroad? Building on scholarship on headquarters as ecosystems, city diplomacy, and informal power, I argue that states are more lenient vis-à-vis international organizations with headquarters in their own country. States are likely to opt for loose, rather than stringent, delegation of authority in everyday decision-making—holding the promise of increased informal influence and greater mutual trust and embeddedness over time. In the context of earmarked funding by Western donors—my empirical case—I hypothesize that donors are likely to provide less stringent funding to international organizations with headquarters in their own countries. Examining voluntary contributions from 32 donors to 255 international organizations between 1990 and 2020, I find support for my argument: international organizations receive less stringent earmarked funding from the donor-country in which the organization is headquartered. In additional analyses, I show that these effects are driven by thematic earmarking, and that the magnitude of the effects increases over time. I also discuss the two extreme cases of the United States and Switzerland to illustrate potential mechanisms. Taken together, my findings have important implications for our understanding of the micro-foundations of state action, the geography of international organizations, and earmarked funding.
{"title":"Home turf: Headquarters of international organizations and earmarked funding","authors":"Timon Forster","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09612-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09612-4","url":null,"abstract":"To what extent do states act differently through international organizations based in their own country relative to those located abroad? Building on scholarship on headquarters as ecosystems, city diplomacy, and informal power, I argue that states are more lenient vis-à-vis international organizations with headquarters in their own country. States are likely to opt for loose, rather than stringent, delegation of authority in everyday decision-making—holding the promise of increased informal influence and greater mutual trust and embeddedness over time. In the context of earmarked funding by Western donors—my empirical case—I hypothesize that donors are likely to provide less stringent funding to international organizations with headquarters in their own countries. Examining voluntary contributions from 32 donors to 255 international organizations between 1990 and 2020, I find support for my argument: international organizations receive less stringent earmarked funding from the donor-country in which the organization is headquartered. In additional analyses, I show that these effects are driven by thematic earmarking, and that the magnitude of the effects increases over time. I also discuss the two extreme cases of the United States and Switzerland to illustrate potential mechanisms. Taken together, my findings have important implications for our understanding of the micro-foundations of state action, the geography of international organizations, and earmarked funding.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"58 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146006107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-04DOI: 10.1007/s11558-025-09614-2
Lisa Dellmuth, Jonas Tallberg
{"title":"Public opinion and international organizations","authors":"Lisa Dellmuth, Jonas Tallberg","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09614-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09614-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145893943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-27DOI: 10.1007/s11558-025-09607-1
Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, Tom Hunter, Sujeong Shim
International organizations (IOs) are considered ideal scapegoats for opportunistic member state governments. Yet we know surprisingly little about whether and when governments indeed shift blame onto IOs. We argue that IO scapegoating is not as pervasive as commonly assumed because blaming IOs is costly. Blaming IOs undermines governments’ credibility and threatens their cooperation gains. To reap cooperation gains, governments can instead defend the IO and bear public discontent. We theorize a Cooperation-Contestation Trade-Off that explains when governments blame or defend IOs: governments that rely heavily on international cooperation are more likely to defend IOs while governments that expect costly domestic contestation are more likely to blame them. We assess our theory by examining governments’ communication about the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – an IO commonly assumed to be a perfect scapegoat. With an originally collected dataset of more than 800 statements referring to the IMF made by heads of governments in major IMF borrower countries, we find supportive evidence for our expectations. Crucially, we observe that whilst governments do frequently blame the IMF, they in fact defend the Fund more than they blame it. Our findings yield important implications for international cooperation in times of heightened politicization of IOs.
{"title":"Perfect scapegoats? Blaming and defending the International Monetary Fund","authors":"Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, Tom Hunter, Sujeong Shim","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09607-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09607-1","url":null,"abstract":"International organizations (IOs) are considered ideal scapegoats for opportunistic member state governments. Yet we know surprisingly little about whether and when governments indeed shift blame onto IOs. We argue that IO scapegoating is not as pervasive as commonly assumed because blaming IOs is costly. Blaming IOs undermines governments’ credibility and threatens their cooperation gains. To reap cooperation gains, governments can instead <jats:italic>defend</jats:italic> the IO and bear public discontent. We theorize a <jats:italic>Cooperation-Contestation Trade-Off</jats:italic> that explains when governments blame or defend IOs: governments that rely heavily on international cooperation are more likely to defend IOs while governments that expect costly domestic contestation are more likely to blame them. We assess our theory by examining governments’ communication about the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – an IO commonly assumed to be a perfect scapegoat. With an originally collected dataset of more than 800 statements referring to the IMF made by heads of governments in major IMF borrower countries, we find supportive evidence for our expectations. Crucially, we observe that whilst governments do frequently blame the IMF, they in fact defend the Fund <jats:italic>more</jats:italic> than they blame it. Our findings yield important implications for international cooperation in times of heightened politicization of IOs.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145836058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-23DOI: 10.1007/s11558-025-09613-3
Adrianna Pineda, Florian Egli, Tobias S. Schmidt
This paper investigates how technology differences shape the relationship between donor export interests and the allocation of official development assistance (ODA) for green electricity technologies (GETs). Utilizing ODA and export data from 22 OECD donor countries between 2006 and 2020, we employ quasi-binomial regression to examine how commercial interests influence bilateral and earmarked multilateral ODA commitments across wind, solar PV, hydropower, and grid technologies. Our findings reveal systematic variation in export-aid relationships across technologies. Stronger wind and hydropower export interests are associated with significantly higher aid shares. Evidence for this relationship is especially strong for ODA committed through directly donor-controlled bilateral channels, while tentative for project-earmarked multilateral aid. Conversely, solar PV exports are associated with reduced aid shares, while grid technology exports show no significant relationship with aid allocation. Notably, the association of aid and exports varies significantly across technologies, reflecting differences in technology and market characteristics. The positive relationships for wind and hydropower align with donor countries’ competitive advantages in complex, design-intensive technologies with high barriers to entry. The negative solar PV relationship reflects less competitive donor exports and the relevance of solar PV technologies for broader development objectives, likely leading exporters to prefer alternative promotion mechanisms. In the case of grid technologies, the lack of a statistically significant export-aid relationship is consistent with their role as enabling infrastructure benefiting diverse commercial and developmental interests. Our analysis indicates that commercial motivations in aid allocation vary systematically across technologies, including in donors’ commitments to international organizations. The results underscore the need for recipient countries and international organizations to consider technology-specific donor incentives when anticipating resource mobilization patterns. These findings have important implications for climate finance, as green industrial policies may stimulate aid flows for complex technologies while creating potential tensions between donor export strategies and recipient localization objectives.
{"title":"Donors’ technology interests and the allocation of development aid for climate change mitigation","authors":"Adrianna Pineda, Florian Egli, Tobias S. Schmidt","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09613-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09613-3","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates how technology differences shape the relationship between donor export interests and the allocation of official development assistance (ODA) for green electricity technologies (GETs). Utilizing ODA and export data from 22 OECD donor countries between 2006 and 2020, we employ quasi-binomial regression to examine how commercial interests influence bilateral and earmarked multilateral ODA commitments across wind, solar PV, hydropower, and grid technologies. Our findings reveal systematic variation in export-aid relationships across technologies. Stronger wind and hydropower export interests are associated with significantly higher aid shares. Evidence for this relationship is especially strong for ODA committed through directly donor-controlled bilateral channels, while tentative for project-earmarked multilateral aid. Conversely, solar PV exports are associated with reduced aid shares, while grid technology exports show no significant relationship with aid allocation. Notably, the association of aid and exports varies significantly across technologies, reflecting differences in technology and market characteristics. The positive relationships for wind and hydropower align with donor countries’ competitive advantages in complex, design-intensive technologies with high barriers to entry. The negative solar PV relationship reflects less competitive donor exports and the relevance of solar PV technologies for broader development objectives, likely leading exporters to prefer alternative promotion mechanisms. In the case of grid technologies, the lack of a statistically significant export-aid relationship is consistent with their role as enabling infrastructure benefiting diverse commercial and developmental interests. Our analysis indicates that commercial motivations in aid allocation vary systematically across technologies, including in donors’ commitments to international organizations. The results underscore the need for recipient countries and international organizations to consider technology-specific donor incentives when anticipating resource mobilization patterns. These findings have important implications for climate finance, as green industrial policies may stimulate aid flows for complex technologies while creating potential tensions between donor export strategies and recipient localization objectives.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145808096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-06DOI: 10.1007/s11558-025-09611-5
Alexandra Domike Blackman, Aytuğ Şaşmaz, Renu Singh, Scott Williamson
International aid is a key resource for local development, and project implementation is influenced by local political elites. However, we know little about how these elites view aid and whether they are more likely to prefer some funding sources over others. We explore elite attitudes toward aid in Tunisia, arguing that local politicians are less likely to prefer development programs funded by the United States compared to other domestic or foreign sources. Through a conjoint experiment embedded in a survey of local Tunisian politicians, we find a strong aversion to local development projects funded by USAID. Analysis of subgroup effects and comparisons to other international donors suggests the negative reaction is driven by ideological rather than material concerns. This research provides insights into elite perceptions of foreign aid in recipient countries and contributes to our understanding of how anti-Americanism can affect policymaking in the Middle East.
{"title":"Anti-Americanism and foreign aid preferences among political elites: Evidence from Tunisia","authors":"Alexandra Domike Blackman, Aytuğ Şaşmaz, Renu Singh, Scott Williamson","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09611-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09611-5","url":null,"abstract":"International aid is a key resource for local development, and project implementation is influenced by local political elites. However, we know little about how these elites view aid and whether they are more likely to prefer some funding sources over others. We explore elite attitudes toward aid in Tunisia, arguing that local politicians are less likely to prefer development programs funded by the United States compared to other domestic or foreign sources. Through a conjoint experiment embedded in a survey of local Tunisian politicians, we find a strong aversion to local development projects funded by USAID. Analysis of subgroup effects and comparisons to other international donors suggests the negative reaction is driven by ideological rather than material concerns. This research provides insights into elite perceptions of foreign aid in recipient countries and contributes to our understanding of how anti-Americanism can affect policymaking in the Middle East.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145680297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-20DOI: 10.1007/s11558-025-09605-3
Sevdenur Koru, Diana C. Mutz
{"title":"Polarization in American support for International Organizations, 2017–2024","authors":"Sevdenur Koru, Diana C. Mutz","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09605-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09605-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145553298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-15DOI: 10.1007/s11558-025-09610-6
Andrea Knapp
{"title":"Twin diplomacy: Strategic co-author selection and resolution outcomes at the UNSC","authors":"Andrea Knapp","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09610-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09610-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145515847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-11DOI: 10.1007/s11558-025-09606-2
Sojun Park, Minju Kim
How does transparency affect the behavior of international bureaucrats tasked with facilitating negotiations? Existing theories offer opposing expectations—greater transparency might induce international bureaucrats to engage more with contentious issues that matter to the public or lead them to avoid those issues whenever possible. We assess these competing perspectives by analyzing the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s 2002 document de-restriction reform that enhanced transparency to the public. Specifically, we examine how prompt public disclosure of documents shapes the way the WTO Secretariat writes reports about the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Using network statistics to estimate the state preference distributions on key topics, we find that, after the reform, the WTO Secretariat is more likely to issue reports on polarized topics in negotiations, using accountability-enhancing words. Our analysis at the country-year level shows that the reform led to greater national newspaper coverage of the WTO TRIPS, which in turn raised public awareness. The results suggest that transparency could empower international bureaucrats to tackle divisive issues in times of member-state gridlock.
{"title":"International bureaucrats under transparency: The case of the WTO TRIPS Council","authors":"Sojun Park, Minju Kim","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09606-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09606-2","url":null,"abstract":"How does transparency affect the behavior of international bureaucrats tasked with facilitating negotiations? Existing theories offer opposing expectations—greater transparency might induce international bureaucrats to engage more with contentious issues that matter to the public or lead them to avoid those issues whenever possible. We assess these competing perspectives by analyzing the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s 2002 document de-restriction reform that enhanced transparency to the public. Specifically, we examine how prompt public disclosure of documents shapes the way the WTO Secretariat writes reports about the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Using network statistics to estimate the state preference distributions on key topics, we find that, after the reform, the WTO Secretariat is more likely to issue reports on polarized topics in negotiations, using accountability-enhancing words. Our analysis at the country-year level shows that the reform led to greater national newspaper coverage of the WTO TRIPS, which in turn raised public awareness. The results suggest that transparency could empower international bureaucrats to tackle divisive issues in times of member-state gridlock.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145485627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-05DOI: 10.1007/s11558-025-09609-z
Jiseon Chang, Mirko Heinzel, Daniel Nielson
International organizations (IOs) face growing resource constraints amid increasing scrutiny and legitimacy challenges from member states. In response, many IOs are seeking to diversify their funding sources by appealing to non-state actors, including individual donors. Yet, little is known about what motivates the public to contribute financially to IOs. This study investigates whether IOs’ efforts at self-legitimation influence donation behavior, distinguishing among three forms of legitimacy: (a) procedural, (b) performance-based, and (c) mandate-based. We examine the effects of legitimacy messaging on public donations to UNICEF through a series of pre-registered survey, field, and survey-based field experiments involving over 22 million Facebook users across five countries—Brazil, Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. Our findings indicate that legitimacy appeals have limited impact on individuals’ willingness or actual decisions to donate. These results suggest a need for further research into the practical implications of legitimacy in global governance.
{"title":"Experimental evidence on the financial consequences of international organization legitimacy","authors":"Jiseon Chang, Mirko Heinzel, Daniel Nielson","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09609-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09609-z","url":null,"abstract":"International organizations (IOs) face growing resource constraints amid increasing scrutiny and legitimacy challenges from member states. In response, many IOs are seeking to diversify their funding sources by appealing to non-state actors, including individual donors. Yet, little is known about what motivates the public to contribute financially to IOs. This study investigates whether IOs’ efforts at self-legitimation influence donation behavior, distinguishing among three forms of legitimacy: (a) procedural, (b) performance-based, and (c) mandate-based. We examine the effects of legitimacy messaging on public donations to UNICEF through a series of pre-registered survey, field, and survey-based field experiments involving over 22 million Facebook users across five countries—Brazil, Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. Our findings indicate that legitimacy appeals have limited impact on individuals’ willingness or actual decisions to donate. These results suggest a need for further research into the practical implications of legitimacy in global governance.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145441163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-09DOI: 10.1007/s11558-025-09594-3
Jan Philipp Krügel, Nicola Maaser
We explore, both theoretically and through a laboratory experiment, the impact of different forms of higher-order punishment on third-party behavior and cooperation levels within a public goods game. This investigation may shed light on how norms influence national governments, as monitored by international organizations or disciplined by electoral competition, and how these norms are subsequently enforced on and followed by domestic agents, e.g., businesses. Specifically, we compare two main treatments that represent the effects of competitive elections and external monitors in a stylized form. These treatments are contrasted with a control condition that lacks an additional layer of norm enforcement. While both higher-order punishment institutions enhance cooperation compared to the control, our findings reveal differences between the two scenarios: Evaluation of the third party by an uninvolved agent leads to heightened punishment and reduced free-riding, whereas competition between two third-party candidates results in more strategic and selective punitive actions.
{"title":"How do higher-order punishment institutions shape cooperation and norm-enforcement?","authors":"Jan Philipp Krügel, Nicola Maaser","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09594-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09594-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explore, both theoretically and through a laboratory experiment, the impact of different forms of higher-order punishment on third-party behavior and cooperation levels within a public goods game. This investigation may shed light on how norms influence national governments, as monitored by international organizations or disciplined by electoral competition, and how these norms are subsequently enforced on and followed by domestic agents, e.g., businesses. Specifically, we compare two main treatments that represent the effects of competitive elections and external monitors in a stylized form. These treatments are contrasted with a control condition that lacks an additional layer of norm enforcement. While both higher-order punishment institutions enhance cooperation compared to the control, our findings reveal differences between the two scenarios: Evaluation of the third party by an uninvolved agent leads to heightened punishment and reduced free-riding, whereas competition between two third-party candidates results in more strategic and selective punitive actions.</p>","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"173 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143927243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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