The review of international organizations最新文献

How do leaders address the world in service of international cooperation, and do their messages enhance or detract from the global agenda? Leaders increasingly appear at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), a deliberative forum meant for diplomacy, not politics. At the same time, the UNGA has long undergone revitalization efforts, and leaders’ contributions could potentially ensure more meaningful cooperation. Building on theories of leader communication, we argue that, in contrast to other country representatives, heads of state have more leeway to deviate from the assembly’s priorities; as politicians, they have incentives to discuss their own, more particularistic, topics. Drawing from novel data on leaders’ speeches in the UNGA, we use text analytics to show that leaders tend to depart from the policy agenda of the session. Furthermore, national political leaders speak more plainly, centering speech on themselves and departing from the general conventions of diplomatic debate. This suggests that, while leaders’ attendance potentially generates more publicity and visibility for the UNGA, their contributions may also undermine the general debate. Our findings shed light on the ways in which leaders can politicize mulitlateral cooperation, and we give evidence for the role of individuals in the vitality of international organizations.

By influencing beliefs about electoral quality, international election observation missions (EOMs) play an important role in shaping post-election contention. As the number and variety of international organizations (IOs) involved in election observation has grown, many elections host multiple missions and disagreement among them is common. This phenomenon of competing judgments is particularly prevalent in electoral authoritarian regimes, as leaders seek to invite ‘friendly’ IOs to counteract possible criticism from more established EOMs. Drawing from research about the varying domestic credibility of EOMs and the demobilizing effects of disinformation, we argue that compared to unified criticism, competing judgments among EOMs increase uncertainty about electoral quality, which in turn dampens post-election contention. Using newly available data on EOM statements as reported in the international media, we show that competing judgments reduce post-election contention in a sample of 115 countries from 1990–2012. A survey experiment in Turkey solidifies the micro-foundations of our argument: individuals exposed to competing judgments have more positive perceptions of election quality and less support for post-election mobilization, compared to those receiving information only about EOM criticism. Our findings provide systematic evidence that governments holding flawed elections have incentives to invite multiple election observation missions to hedge against the political risks of criticism.

Abstract

How does international shaming and praising affect domestic support for joining international agreements? Many scholars have examined the role of shaming in leading countries to support international agreements, and a wide literature on social opprobrium suggests that both governments and citizens are sensitive to being named and shamed. Yet far less is known about the dynamics of praise in international relations and how they compare to the dynamics of shame. This article uses a survey experiment to test and compare the effects of praising and shaming on individuals’ support for their government joining an international agreement. Specifically, it tests whether praising or shaming from other countries leads individuals to support their country joining a hypothetical international agreement that would ban the use of explosive weapons. It finds that praising is effective in increasing public support for joining the treaty, while shaming is not. By examining the extent to which praising and shaming can shape public opinion on international security agreements, this article provides new insights regarding how states and NGOs can use these rhetorical tools to build support for new legal norms. For policymakers and activists seeking to promote new norms and agreements, understanding the role of praising and shaming in changing public opinion can help them better direct their resources and improve their strategies.

What effect does populism have on public attitudes toward International Organizations (IOs)? In this article, we differentiate for the first time between populist communication – understood as IO criticism in line with populist core ideas – and populist voting as political behavior among citizens. We argue, first, that populist voters – that is, citizens voting for a populist party – are more critical of IOs. Second, IO-critical communication based on the democratic deficit of global governance and the loss of national sovereignty that populist parties often adopt have a substantially damaging impact on public IO attitudes. Third, we propose that the negative effect of IO-critical communication should be stronger among populist voters, and, fourth, considerably vary among groups of different educational levels. To test our theoretical expectations, we first turn to World Values Survey data (7th wave) and demonstrate that populist voters are significantly more skeptical of IOs than non-populist voters, while the effect of populist voting is strongest for more educated citizens. Second, we use a preregistered survey experiment to explore the effect of IO-critical communication on IO favorability and determine if populist voting and educational levels moderate these communication effects. Our findings reveal that IO-critical communication substantially decreases confidence in IOs. Populist and non-populist voters do not differ in their susceptibility, yet IO-critical communication exerts its greatest effects among the higher educated.

Territorial divisions are commonly believed to dominate the international realm, supposedly leaving no room for ideological distinctions to take shape. However, the formation of over fifty transnational political groups (TPGs) across thirteen international parliaments challenges this assumption, calling into question the previously accepted insignificance of ideology beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Previously unexplored in comparative perspective, this paper investigates TPGs’ puzzling existence and delineates the conditions for their emergence within international parliaments. The theoretical argument is that homogeneity across the member states of the international parliament along three dimensions – political systems, economic development levels and geographical proximity – fosters the creation of transnational political groups. Results from regression analysis on time series cross-sectional data lend support to the theory. With the rise of international parliamentary institutions and their increased involvement in supranational decision-making over time, it becomes highly important to understand how they organize as well as the implications of their institutional designs.

Countries prohibit firms’ transnational financial crime by coordinating their regulations under international organizations (IOs). Under these IOs, states threaten to prosecute firms’ foreign misconduct at home. Such threats can help conscript companies to diffuse sustainable business models abroad. This paper studies the effect of corporate criminal regulations on firms’ foreign direct investment (FDI). Critics of these policies claim they push firms’ investment away from host economies where financial crime is more likely to happen. Yet, regulations should also cut informal costs of crime and favor investment. I reconcile these opposed expectations and show they are special cases of the same argument. I claim that the effect of multilateral anti-bribery policies on FDI depends on the level of corruption of the host economy. It is null in non-corrupt countries. It is positive where corruption is moderate: here, laws provide legal leverage to refuse paying bribes and cut corruption costs. The effect is negative where corruption is endemic: here, anti-bribery laws expose firms to additional regulatory costs. I support the argument with multiple evidence. Company-level data on investment by 3871 firms between 2006 and 2011 show that regulated corporations have a (27%) higher probability of investing in moderately corrupt economies than unregulated firms, which plummets to (-52%) in extremely corrupt countries. A synthetic counterfactual design using country-dyadic FDI flows corroborates this finding. Results show that regulatory policies harmonized by IOs change international competition for FDI in ways that do not necessarily harm regulated firms.

The ability to borrow is important for government survival. Governments routinely resort to policies that privilege their own debt on financial markets, exploiting their dual role as borrowers and regulators. We label such policies as borrowing privileges. These borrowing privileges nudge investors to hold the government’s own debt. They share similarities with prudential regulation, but skew the market in favor of the government’s debt; and they share similarities with financial repression, but are less severe and thus consistent with the growth of financial markets. Introducing the first systematic dataset documenting the use of such policies across countries and over time, we demonstrate that governments implement borrowing privileges when their interactions with the global economy heighten fiscal needs: when borrowing costs indicate tightened access to credit, when trade liberalization undercuts revenue, and where fixed exchange rates increase the value of fiscal space. Despite the mobility of financial assets and constraints from global markets, governments retain latitude in regulating domestic markets to their own fiscal benefit.