The review of international organizations最新文献

What effect does populism have on public attitudes toward International Organizations (IOs)? In this article, we differentiate for the first time between populist communication – understood as IO criticism in line with populist core ideas – and populist voting as political behavior among citizens. We argue, first, that populist voters – that is, citizens voting for a populist party – are more critical of IOs. Second, IO-critical communication based on the democratic deficit of global governance and the loss of national sovereignty that populist parties often adopt have a substantially damaging impact on public IO attitudes. Third, we propose that the negative effect of IO-critical communication should be stronger among populist voters, and, fourth, considerably vary among groups of different educational levels. To test our theoretical expectations, we first turn to World Values Survey data (7th wave) and demonstrate that populist voters are significantly more skeptical of IOs than non-populist voters, while the effect of populist voting is strongest for more educated citizens. Second, we use a preregistered survey experiment to explore the effect of IO-critical communication on IO favorability and determine if populist voting and educational levels moderate these communication effects. Our findings reveal that IO-critical communication substantially decreases confidence in IOs. Populist and non-populist voters do not differ in their susceptibility, yet IO-critical communication exerts its greatest effects among the higher educated.

Territorial divisions are commonly believed to dominate the international realm, supposedly leaving no room for ideological distinctions to take shape. However, the formation of over fifty transnational political groups (TPGs) across thirteen international parliaments challenges this assumption, calling into question the previously accepted insignificance of ideology beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Previously unexplored in comparative perspective, this paper investigates TPGs’ puzzling existence and delineates the conditions for their emergence within international parliaments. The theoretical argument is that homogeneity across the member states of the international parliament along three dimensions – political systems, economic development levels and geographical proximity – fosters the creation of transnational political groups. Results from regression analysis on time series cross-sectional data lend support to the theory. With the rise of international parliamentary institutions and their increased involvement in supranational decision-making over time, it becomes highly important to understand how they organize as well as the implications of their institutional designs.

Countries prohibit firms’ transnational financial crime by coordinating their regulations under international organizations (IOs). Under these IOs, states threaten to prosecute firms’ foreign misconduct at home. Such threats can help conscript companies to diffuse sustainable business models abroad. This paper studies the effect of corporate criminal regulations on firms’ foreign direct investment (FDI). Critics of these policies claim they push firms’ investment away from host economies where financial crime is more likely to happen. Yet, regulations should also cut informal costs of crime and favor investment. I reconcile these opposed expectations and show they are special cases of the same argument. I claim that the effect of multilateral anti-bribery policies on FDI depends on the level of corruption of the host economy. It is null in non-corrupt countries. It is positive where corruption is moderate: here, laws provide legal leverage to refuse paying bribes and cut corruption costs. The effect is negative where corruption is endemic: here, anti-bribery laws expose firms to additional regulatory costs. I support the argument with multiple evidence. Company-level data on investment by 3871 firms between 2006 and 2011 show that regulated corporations have a (27%) higher probability of investing in moderately corrupt economies than unregulated firms, which plummets to (-52%) in extremely corrupt countries. A synthetic counterfactual design using country-dyadic FDI flows corroborates this finding. Results show that regulatory policies harmonized by IOs change international competition for FDI in ways that do not necessarily harm regulated firms.

The ability to borrow is important for government survival. Governments routinely resort to policies that privilege their own debt on financial markets, exploiting their dual role as borrowers and regulators. We label such policies as borrowing privileges. These borrowing privileges nudge investors to hold the government’s own debt. They share similarities with prudential regulation, but skew the market in favor of the government’s debt; and they share similarities with financial repression, but are less severe and thus consistent with the growth of financial markets. Introducing the first systematic dataset documenting the use of such policies across countries and over time, we demonstrate that governments implement borrowing privileges when their interactions with the global economy heighten fiscal needs: when borrowing costs indicate tightened access to credit, when trade liberalization undercuts revenue, and where fixed exchange rates increase the value of fiscal space. Despite the mobility of financial assets and constraints from global markets, governments retain latitude in regulating domestic markets to their own fiscal benefit.

Communication departments of international organizations (IOs) are important intermediaries of global governance who increasingly use social media to reach out to citizens directly. Social media pose new challenges for IO communication such as a highly competitive economy of attention and the fragmentation of the audiences driven by networked curation of content and selective exposure. In this context, communication departments have to make tough choices about what to communicate and how, aggravating inherent tensions between IO communication as comprehensive public information (aimed at institutional transparency)—and partisan political advocacy (aimed at normative change). If IO communication focuses on advocacy it might garner substantial resonance on social media. Such advocacy nevertheless fails to the extent that it fosters the polarized fragmentation of networked communication and undermines the credibility of IO communication as a source of trustworthy information across polarized “echo chambers.” The paper illustrates this argument through a content and social network analysis of Twitter communication on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). Remarkably, instead of facilitating cross-cluster communication (“building bridges”) Twitter handles run by the United Nations Department of Global Communications (UNDGC) seem to have substantially fostered ideological fragmentation (“digging the trench”) by their way of partisan retweeting, mentioning, and (hash)tagging.

The European Union (EU) is a democratic organization but faces severe cases of democratic backsliding. The literature deems the EU a hospitable environment for and reluctant to reign in backsliding. This study focuses on the tactics that backsliding governments employ to preserve this hospitable environment and the conditions under which they succeed. I argue that backsliding governments seek to repurpose the practice of accommodation that permeates EU decision-making for the protection of their backsliding projects. Doing so promises backsliders an escape from their precarious bargaining position in a democratic organization but comes with constraints. Backsliders must limit opposition carefully to a subset of EU competences, backsliding-inhibiting competences, that threaten their backsliding projects the most. Moreover, they can only rely on accommodation in the Council if the democratic member states perceive opposition as justified and remain insulated from political accountability by Europe’s parliaments. I present evidence based on quantitative and qualitative analyses of bargaining positions, processes, and outcomes in EU decision-making. The results have implications for understanding the EU’s autocratic predicament, the opportunities of backsliding governments, and the role of autocracies in regional and international organizations.