The review of international organizations最新文献

Countries today navigate a multipolar world defined by tensions between great powers. How do middle powers, small states, and Global South countries fare in this geopolitical landscape? Can they shape new international agreements on emerging, divisive topics, like trade-and-environment issues? To explore this question, I investigate the twenty years of negotiations that led to a new treaty seeking to preserve the global commons: the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (AFS). Using text-as-data analyses and a rich trove of WTO documents, I investigate the sources of the treaty text. I find that middle powers, small states, and countries from the Global South contributed to the agreement; they did so by forming coalitions with like-minded countries. The findings demonstrate that a wider range of states can effectively participate in international negotiations than traditionally assumed.

How do states react to adverse decisions resulting from human rights treaties’ individual complaint procedures? While recent scholarship has shown particular interest in states’ reactions to international court judgments, research on state behavior vis-à-vis an increasing treaty body output remains scarce. I argue that states generally want to avoid the costs implied by adverse decisions, or ‘views’. Rising numbers of rebukes lead them to update their beliefs about the costliness of complaint procedure acceptance in a Bayesian manner. As a result, states become less inclined to accept further petition mechanisms under different human rights treaties. I test these assumptions on an original dataset containing information on individual complaint procedure acceptance and the distribution of 1320 views for a total number of 169 countries ranging from the year 1965 to 2018. Results from Cox proportional hazards regressions suggest that both the number of views against neighboring states and against the examined state itself decrease the likelihood of acceptance of most of the six individual complaint procedures under observation. I also find evidence that this effect is exacerbated if states are more likely to actually bear the costs of implementation. Findings indicate that the omission of further commitment can be a negative spillover of the treaty bodies’ quasi-judicial output.

International organizations promoting democratic governance and human rights are increasingly challenged by some of their own member states. To better understand this dynamic, we propose a distinction between the illiberal ideology of political parties and their regime environment, aiming to examine the international behavior of actors extending beyond autocratic governments. We argue that the domestic regime environment plays a pivotal role in influencing the extent to which illiberal parties engage in contestation to undermine liberal norms on the international stage. We expect contestation behavior to be primarily driven by illiberal parties seeking to diminish the influence of liberal international politics on domestic power structures. Moreover, we contend that government participation moderates illiberal parties’ contestation behavior. To test our expectations empirically, we study roll call votes in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), one of the most powerful international parliaments promoting liberal values. Drawing on an original dataset that records approximately 500,000 individual votes cast in PACE decisions, we find evidence for substantive contestation by illiberal parties, especially those representing illiberal regimes. Only illiberal governments in liberal systems moderate themselves at the amendment stage. Our study has implications for the potential threat that emerging illiberal actors pose to international liberal institutions.

Illiberal regimes have become central players in international organizations. In this introduction to the special issue, we provide a unified framework for understanding their effects. We start by outlining the theoretical foundations of this work, focusing first on why regime type matters for international cooperation. We then show how differing memberships and decision-making processes within international organizations affect the influence illiberal regimes can wield, the activities they undertake, and the impact that they have on domestic political outcomes. Collectively and individually, the contributions to this special issue broaden the theoretical literature on illiberal regimes in international organizations and produce novel data about how they are implicated in the politics and operations of multilateral and regional IOs. This research has important implications for how democracies can and should cope with the challenges to global governance that arise from illiberal regimes.

Does the public care if their leaders fail to uphold or comply with their country’s standing international commitments? If so, under what conditions? I study this question in the context of attitudes toward institutionalized trade cooperation. Using survey experiments, I find that the public has a pronounced taste for compliance that is largely independent of the underlying political and economic context. The public is less willing to endorse the imposition of trade restrictions when doing so would violate standing trade agreements. This is the case even in contexts where the public would otherwise support protectionist policy: when the unemployment rate is high, when there are a large number of jobs at stake, and when the trade partner has recently failed to honor their own trade commitments. I find little in the way of copartisanship dynamics, but document strong dispositional effects in which those not predisposed to view international cooperation in a positive light impose systematically smaller punishments on leaders who violate treaty commitments.

The international election monitoring regime has become considerably more complex in the twenty-first century. Although the number of organizations engaged in high-quality election monitoring has plateaued, the number of low-quality monitors—commonly known as zombie monitors—has continued to grow. Low-quality election monitors threaten democracy because they validate flawed elections and undermine the legitimacy of the international election monitoring regime. This article argues that international politics have played a crucial role in the diffusion of low-quality election monitors. It hypothesizes that ties with autocratic powers that promote low-quality observers and membership in authoritarian regional organizations significantly increase the likelihood that a country will host low-quality monitors at its elections. To test the hypotheses, the article draws on original data on international election observation between 2000 and 2020 that identifies the most comprehensive set of groups of election monitors to-date. A statistical analysis of the dataset supports the argument.

Member states’ challenges to international organizations (IOs) are at the heart of the supposed crisis of our multilateral order – from the “African bias” debate surrounding the International Criminal Court, to the United Kingdom’s “Brexit” from the European Union, to Trump’s attacks on the World Health Organization during the COVID-19 pandemic. IOs are regularly challenged by their member states in different ways, ranging from verbal criticisms to withdrawals. But why are some IOs challenged more than others? An important – but so far largely theoretical – academic debate relates to the authority of IOs as an explanatory factor for why some face more challenges: Authoritative IOs may invite more challenges (for example, due to domestic contestation) or fewer challenges (due, in part, to the investment of member states and their greater capacity to resolve conflicts internally). Our article assesses these explanations using the Andersen-Gill approach for analyzing recurrent events of member states’ public criticisms and withdrawals. We do not find strong and consistent evidence that more authoritative IOs are more regularly challenged by their own member states. There is some evidence that authoritative IOs experience fewer withdrawals, but we find stronger evidence for alternative factors such as preference heterogeneity between members, the existence of alternative IOs, and the democratic composition of an IO’s membership. Our study is significant for scholarly debates and real-world politics, as it implies that granting IOs more authority does not make them more prone to member state challenges.

International organizations’ lives often extend far beyond the moment of their initial contracting. How IOs do adapt to shifting circumstances in their member states global geopolitical changes, and even internal dynamics within the IO itself? This special issue on the life cycle of international cooperation explores the ebbs and flows of the IOs that underpin the international system. Firm theory, organizational sociology, and agency theory all have incorporated life cycles perspectives into the study of organizations, but IR has yet to fully harness these frameworks. A life cycles approach centers on, first, incorporating the IO itself as the core unit of analysis and, second, the dynamic processes within IOs — including life stages such as false starts, consolidation, inertia, growth, revitalization, death, and succession. Incorporating these dynamic processes into our understanding of IOs reminds us that historically, IOs have always experienced periods of both flourishing and faltering. Grasping the mechanisms that drive these changes is indispensable for a thorough understanding of the international system’s vitality and resilience. Articles in this issue explore the durability of IOs in the face of crises; the measures that IOs deploy to legitimize their existence; the role of individual leaders’ rhetoric in IO vitality; the tradeoffs that member states face between pulling the plug on an IO versus creating a new institution; the effect of member-state IO withdrawal on the international system overall; and the mass public’s perceptions of such withdrawals.

Can international courts influence state policies and facilitate interstate cooperation? Existing literature argues that they can. Courts can make cooperative outcomes easier for states by formulating or endorsing rules around which state expectations and practice can converge. While it is widely assumed that court rulings may become focal points and play a role in harmonizing state practices, we know little about the conditions under which they have such an effect. We suggest that court rulings can often have an opposite, defocalizing effect, which may durably harm the prospects of convergence around what the law requires. We introduce defocalization as a process and discuss its possible types and implications. We argue that defocalization may be driven by incongruence of court rulings with existing treaty law and state practice and inconsistency of rulings over time. We illustrate our argument by examining the effect of key judicial rulings on the convergence of state views about the appropriate maritime delimitation rules by relying on an original dataset. Our findings show how defocalization unfolds and suggest that complexity can accumulate over time through legal rulings that are incongruent with existing state practice or treaty law, and can be maintained through inconsistent court decisions.

A large and growing number of international organizations (IOs) are made up and governed by illiberal or outright authoritarian regimes. Many of these authoritarian IOs (AIOs) formally adopt good governance mandates, linking goals like democracy promotion, anti-corruption policies and human rights to their broader mission. Why do some AIOs adopt good governance mandates that appear to conflict with the norms and standards these regimes apply at home? We argue that AIOs adopt good governance mandates when they face substantial pressure from inside or outside the IO to adopt them. Central to our argument is that not all aspects of good governance are inherently or equally threatening to autocratic regimes. They pursue strategies that minimize the threat by externalizing policy outside the membership and strategically defining the goals to avoid or enact. This allows autocratic governments to uptake good governance talk but lessen any deep commitment to the norms and sometimes even to use them strategically to project their own power outside of the organization. Using data on 48 regional IOs with primarily autocratic membership between 1945 and 2015, we demonstrate that AIOs facing pressure from external good governance promoters will adopt good governance mandates but strategically shape those mandates in their favor if they can form bargaining coalitions with like-minded governments. The findings have sobering implications for the future of good governance promotion through IOs.