The review of international organizations最新文献

Abstract

While international historians and policy practitioners regularly highlight the utility of multilateral diplomacy as a quintessential “strategy of the weak,” International Relations (IR) scholars have generally downplayed the impact of diplomatic choices. The tools within IR theory to assess the impact of diplomacy remain underdeveloped, contributing to an inability to account for a highly proximate source of international influence. This article argues for a theoretical reengagement with the subject of multilateral diplomacy and, using insights from Social Network Analysis, develops a Diplomatic Impact Framework. Building on the novel concept of replaceability, the article contributes theoretically to the literature on diplomacy, as well as on small and middle powers. This framework captures the fundamentally relational character of diplomacy, isolating analytically this form of structural power from the influence conferred by superior material or institutional resources. Drawing extensively on a multinational collection of diplomatic documents and first-hand accounts, this multidisciplinary article probes the plausibility of the framework through a detailed comparative case study of Canada’s diplomatic influence at the United Nations General Assembly throughout two international security crises: the Korean War and the Suez Crisis.

Many proposals advocate linking climate and trade policy to improve climate cooperation. Since climate mitigation is non-excludable, mitigation cannot be enforced through issue-specific reciprocity, but linking mitigation with trade penalties on non-participants could incorporate trade’s enforcement powers into a climate club. However, this perspective has overlooked the relationship between climate policy preferences and existing trade flows. Using a model of issue linkage in climate and trade motivated by findings from the domestic political economy of international trade, I show that the necessary conditions for climate clubs are exacting. Effective climate–trade clubs require members with high levels of climate policy ambition, export leverage over laggards, and insulation from trade retaliation. However, I show that these three attributes do not necessarily co-occur theoretically or empirically. States that support the club’s goals on one dimension may undermine them on another. The findings provide insights into institutional design, climate politics, and the constraints on issue linkage in international cooperation.

The article presents the first systematic comparative study on the growing involvement of international organizations in national constitution making around the world. Over the past three decades, the emerging field of international constitutional advising has undergone an intense process of institutionalization and professionalization, mirroring the increasing role constitution making is playing in both national and international politics. Despite the vast scope of the phenomenon, the involvement of foreign constitutional advisors in domestic constitution-drafting or constitutional reforms has received little scholarly attention. This article takes the first steps towards addressing this lacuna empirically, by introducing a new dataset on 46 international organizations involved in 730 constitutional advising projects in 145 countries between 1989 and 2017. We classified the organizations based on their type, their headquarters’ location, the countries they target, the kind of advising activities they perform and the level of directness of the advising intervention. While generally, we find a significant correlation between more direct constitutional advising activities and larger relative changes in the quality of democracy and larger numbers of constitutional systems in a country, the article suggests avenues for more nuanced research to better understand constitutional advising’s impact.

By nearly every measure, power in the international system is concentrated, meaning that most states lack significant power resources. And yet international relations theory tends to focus on the behavior of great powers. This special issue instead explores the strategies that “weak” states use in the context of international organizations both to advance their interests and to resist pressure from stronger states. We define weakness as a relative lack of power across one or more dimensions. While the literature, to the extent it has focused on weak actors, has too often defined weakness solely in material terms, we adopt a broader conception that builds on the influential typology of power by Barnett and Duvall (Barnett and Duvall, 2005a, Barnett and Duvall, International Organization 59, 39–75, 2005b). A multidimensional conceptualization of power allows analysts to show how actors that are weak in one dimension (often material power) may be stronger on other dimensions, giving them greater capacity for action than is often recognized. From this framework we create a typology of “strategies of the weak” that emphasizes the agency of weaker actors to make the most of their positions. The contributions to the special issue, summarized here, illuminate and substantiate many of these strategies across a diverse range of international organizations, understood as both forums and actors. As the articles show, these alternative theoretical mechanisms help explain how and why seemingly weak states sometimes fare better than a simplistic assessment of their material capabilities might suggest. By deepening our understanding of weakness and how it influences state behavior, the volume advances our theoretical understanding of how power is built, wielded, and resisted in and through international organization.

How do intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) evolve? Cooperation through IGOs is difficult to maintain, as membership dynamics change dramatically over time, leading to dissatisfaction with the status quo. This paper argues that IGO members states create new affiliated bodies, which I call linked intergovernmental organizations (LIGOs), to “re-contract” their cooperation. This helps IGOs adapt to changing membership dynamics, including the addition of new members and shifting constellations of power and preference. LIGOs are particularly useful for weak or formerly weak states seeking to alter the institutional status quo. Several features of LIGOs incentivize their creation: (1) they bypass difficult-to-enact reforms at existing IGOs; (2) flexible design features increase the voice of dissatisfied constituencies; and (3) they are politically viable for dissatisfied and status quo members of IGOs. To test my argument, I analyze original data on 1,200 LIGOs created between 1945 and 2012. Multivariate statistical analyses show that LIGOs are created in response to shifting membership environments that create demands for change at existing IGOs. I complement the quantitative analysis with case studies of two significant LIGOs: The International Development Agency (IDA) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). My theory suggests a dramatic rethinking of how international cooperation evolves and has broad implications for global governance in an increasingly multipolar world.

This article explores how weak countries deflect systemic pressure towards change and even succeed in preserving old institutions to their advantage. By expanding Goddard’s theory of embedded revisionism to smaller powers, the study identifies strategies these states deploy to improve access and brokerage. We use the UN General Assembly Sponsorship Dataset to locate multilateral brokers and, after detecting Cuba’s centrality in this arena, we proceed to a heuristic case study. Havana’s maneuvers to offset its vulnerability during and after the Cold War reveal a mix of structural, institutional, and compulsory power. Specifically, its renewal of the Non-Aligned Movement even after the end of bipolarity, its maintenance of autocracy amidst the pressures for democratization, and later support of radicalized Latin American leaders provide insight regarding unexpected sources of network power available to a resilient rogue state.

Given high costs of negotiating formal international institutions, states are widely expected to adapt, reform, and repurpose existing institutions rather than create new ones. Nevertheless, during the past century some 60 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have been directly replaced by a legal successor. Why do states sometimes dissolve an existing IGO only to replace it with a new one that takes over the incumbent organization’s mandate and assets—a practice known as institutional succession? We offer a theory of institutional succession and illustrate with examples. Against the dominant belief that creating new IGOs is a choice of last resort, we argue that reform and succession are equally expedient tools for achieving institutional change but address different negotiating hurdles. By creating a new institution (as opposed to amending an existing one) succession bypasses veto players that may stunt reform. However, succession suffers from potential diseconomies-of-scale (since not every member of an existing IGO may join the successor) which reform does not. Depending on which negotiation hurdle prevails, reform will be preferred to succession or vice versa. Our analysis advances existing understandings of institutional contestation and change within the life cycle of an international organisation.

How do leaders address the world in service of international cooperation, and do their messages enhance or detract from the global agenda? Leaders increasingly appear at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), a deliberative forum meant for diplomacy, not politics. At the same time, the UNGA has long undergone revitalization efforts, and leaders’ contributions could potentially ensure more meaningful cooperation. Building on theories of leader communication, we argue that, in contrast to other country representatives, heads of state have more leeway to deviate from the assembly’s priorities; as politicians, they have incentives to discuss their own, more particularistic, topics. Drawing from novel data on leaders’ speeches in the UNGA, we use text analytics to show that leaders tend to depart from the policy agenda of the session. Furthermore, national political leaders speak more plainly, centering speech on themselves and departing from the general conventions of diplomatic debate. This suggests that, while leaders’ attendance potentially generates more publicity and visibility for the UNGA, their contributions may also undermine the general debate. Our findings shed light on the ways in which leaders can politicize mulitlateral cooperation, and we give evidence for the role of individuals in the vitality of international organizations.

By influencing beliefs about electoral quality, international election observation missions (EOMs) play an important role in shaping post-election contention. As the number and variety of international organizations (IOs) involved in election observation has grown, many elections host multiple missions and disagreement among them is common. This phenomenon of competing judgments is particularly prevalent in electoral authoritarian regimes, as leaders seek to invite ‘friendly’ IOs to counteract possible criticism from more established EOMs. Drawing from research about the varying domestic credibility of EOMs and the demobilizing effects of disinformation, we argue that compared to unified criticism, competing judgments among EOMs increase uncertainty about electoral quality, which in turn dampens post-election contention. Using newly available data on EOM statements as reported in the international media, we show that competing judgments reduce post-election contention in a sample of 115 countries from 1990–2012. A survey experiment in Turkey solidifies the micro-foundations of our argument: individuals exposed to competing judgments have more positive perceptions of election quality and less support for post-election mobilization, compared to those receiving information only about EOM criticism. Our findings provide systematic evidence that governments holding flawed elections have incentives to invite multiple election observation missions to hedge against the political risks of criticism.

Abstract

How does international shaming and praising affect domestic support for joining international agreements? Many scholars have examined the role of shaming in leading countries to support international agreements, and a wide literature on social opprobrium suggests that both governments and citizens are sensitive to being named and shamed. Yet far less is known about the dynamics of praise in international relations and how they compare to the dynamics of shame. This article uses a survey experiment to test and compare the effects of praising and shaming on individuals’ support for their government joining an international agreement. Specifically, it tests whether praising or shaming from other countries leads individuals to support their country joining a hypothetical international agreement that would ban the use of explosive weapons. It finds that praising is effective in increasing public support for joining the treaty, while shaming is not. By examining the extent to which praising and shaming can shape public opinion on international security agreements, this article provides new insights regarding how states and NGOs can use these rhetorical tools to build support for new legal norms. For policymakers and activists seeking to promote new norms and agreements, understanding the role of praising and shaming in changing public opinion can help them better direct their resources and improve their strategies.