{"title":"Special Section: Perceptions of the EU in Its Eastern Neighbourhood (Part 1) Perceptions of the EU in Its Eastern Neighbourhood: 30 Years on from the Collapse of the Soviet Union","authors":"James Headley, N. Chaban","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021042","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46043509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Strengthening ties with Africa has become a top priority for the current geopolitical European Commission. The focus on Africa is not new: Since 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has gradually developed a framework for political dialogue and reforms in Northern African countries, which form part of the Southern Neighbourhood. The conclusion of association agreements and free trade agreements (FTAs) at the end of the previous century brought these countries closer to the European Union (EU) in commercial terms. In February 2021, the EU launched a renewed agenda for the South Mediterranean with a view to integrating these economies further to the EU edifice. Against this backdrop, this Article discusses how economic integration manifests itself in the region. It further pinpoints the economic fundamentals and political realities that will shape further economic integration between the EU and Northern Africa. A central element of EU’s renewed strategy in the region is the conclusion of deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (DCFTAs) with Northern African countries. It is argued that the conclusion of such agreements will constitute a litmus test for EU’s new assertive approach in trade matters in line with the newly adopted concept of open strategic autonomy. European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Southern Neighbourhood, Northern Africa, EU trade policy, EU foreign policy, strategic autonomy, deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (DCFTAs), South Mediterranean, economic integration
{"title":"A Partnership of Equals? ‘Deeper’ Economic Integration Between the EU and Northern Africa","authors":"Panagiotis Delimatsis","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021040","url":null,"abstract":"Strengthening ties with Africa has become a top priority for the current geopolitical European Commission. The focus on Africa is not new: Since 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has gradually developed a framework for political dialogue and reforms in Northern African countries, which form part of the Southern Neighbourhood. The conclusion of association agreements and free trade agreements (FTAs) at the end of the previous century brought these countries closer to the European Union (EU) in commercial terms. In February 2021, the EU launched a renewed agenda for the South Mediterranean with a view to integrating these economies further to the EU edifice. Against this backdrop, this Article discusses how economic integration manifests itself in the region. It further pinpoints the economic fundamentals and political realities that will shape further economic integration between the EU and Northern Africa. A central element of EU’s renewed strategy in the region is the conclusion of deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (DCFTAs) with Northern African countries. It is argued that the conclusion of such agreements will constitute a litmus test for EU’s new assertive approach in trade matters in line with the newly adopted concept of open strategic autonomy.\u0000European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Southern Neighbourhood, Northern Africa, EU trade policy, EU foreign policy, strategic autonomy, deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (DCFTAs), South Mediterranean, economic integration","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42259409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the nature and implications of the current information/propaganda battle between Russia and the EU by placing it in the context of conceptions of argument and dialogue in international politics. Both sides are engaged in ‘perception management’ by which they try to defend their actions and influence positively the opinions of foreign publics. This seems far removed from ‘communicative action’, the Habermasian notion of engagement in argument and dialogue between equals. The article argues that the current crisis in Russia-EU relations is partly the result of the perception on the Russian side that there never was such communicative action – because Russia was not treated as an equal partner in dialogue, and its views/interests were ignored in a number of cases. On this account, Russia therefore became more assertive, culminating in the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s outright aggression which it tried to defend using perception management, echoed by the EU’s counter-disinformation campaign. We are therefore closer to ‘communicative distraction’ – attempts to control image and opinion – rather than the debate and dialogue inherent in communicative action. Nevertheless, the article argues that even within these rival perception managements, there is engagement in argument over norms and the application of norms in specific cases. In the present crisis of Russia-EU relations, we cannot expect more; but the fact that there is some form of argument might still provide a potential basis for fuller dialogue in the future. Russia, EU, Perception Management, Information Warfare, Communicative Action
{"title":"Communicative Distraction?: Russia’s and the European Union’s Rival Perception Managements","authors":"James Headley","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021043","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the nature and implications of the current information/propaganda battle between Russia and the EU by placing it in the context of conceptions of argument and dialogue in international politics. Both sides are engaged in ‘perception management’ by which they try to defend their actions and influence positively the opinions of foreign publics. This seems far removed from ‘communicative action’, the Habermasian notion of engagement in argument and dialogue between equals. The article argues that the current crisis in Russia-EU relations is partly the result of the perception on the Russian side that there never was such communicative action – because Russia was not treated as an equal partner in dialogue, and its views/interests were ignored in a number of cases. On this account, Russia therefore became more assertive, culminating in the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s outright aggression which it tried to defend using perception management, echoed by the EU’s counter-disinformation campaign. We are therefore closer to ‘communicative distraction’ – attempts to control image and opinion – rather than the debate and dialogue inherent in communicative action. Nevertheless, the article argues that even within these rival perception managements, there is engagement in argument over norms and the application of norms in specific cases. In the present crisis of Russia-EU relations, we cannot expect more; but the fact that there is some form of argument might still provide a potential basis for fuller dialogue in the future.\u0000Russia, EU, Perception Management, Information Warfare, Communicative Action","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49613982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Case C-134/19 P Bank Refah Kargaran, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) made an important pronouncement over its jurisdiction on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as it held that it can hear an action for damages allegedly suffered by a natural or legal person because of restrictive measures adopted under CFSP. This article reflects on this important development in the case law of the CJEU, by putting it in the context of what scholarship on the topic has referred to as the ‘normalization’ of CFSP. In addition, the article comments upon the potential significance of the decision in Bank Refah for the EU’s external posture. The decision, this article argues, recognizes the opportunity to seek damages stemming from CFSP acts – including decisions adopted under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), that is decisions establishing military operations of civilian missions, and, in those contexts, acts or conduct attributable to EU bodies. damages, non-contractual liability, CFSP acts, normalization, CSDP missions and operations, restrictive measures, jurisdiction, CJEU, sanctions.
在C-134/19 P Bank Refah Kargaran案中，欧盟法院就其对共同外交与安全政策的管辖权发表了重要声明，因为它认为，它可以审理据称自然人或法人因共同外交与安保政策采取的限制措施而遭受的损害的诉讼。本文通过将其放在有关该主题的学术界所称的CFSP的“正常化”的背景下，反思了欧盟法院判例法中的这一重要发展。此外，文章还评论了Refah银行的决定对欧盟外部态势的潜在意义。本文认为，该决定承认了寻求CFSP行为损害赔偿的机会，包括根据共同安全与防务政策（CSDP）通过的决定，即建立民事任务军事行动的决定，以及在这些情况下可归因于欧盟机构的行为。损害赔偿、非合同责任、CFSP行为、规范化，CSDP任务和行动、限制措施、管辖权、CJEU、制裁。
{"title":"Non-Contractual Liability For EU Sanctions: Towards the Normalization of CFSP","authors":"L. Lonardo, A. Carrozzini","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021037","url":null,"abstract":"In Case C-134/19 P Bank Refah Kargaran, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) made an important pronouncement over its jurisdiction on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as it held that it can hear an action for damages allegedly suffered by a natural or legal person because of restrictive measures adopted under CFSP. This article reflects on this important development in the case law of the CJEU, by putting it in the context of what scholarship on the topic has referred to as the ‘normalization’ of CFSP. In addition, the article comments upon the potential significance of the decision in Bank Refah for the EU’s external posture. The decision, this article argues, recognizes the opportunity to seek damages stemming from CFSP acts – including decisions adopted under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), that is decisions establishing military operations of civilian missions, and, in those contexts, acts or conduct attributable to EU bodies.\u0000damages, non-contractual liability, CFSP acts, normalization, CSDP missions and operations, restrictive measures, jurisdiction, CJEU, sanctions.","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49615007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Editorial: Qualified Majority Voting in CFSP: A Solution to the Wrong Problem?","authors":"R. Wessel, K. Pomorska","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021031","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42849733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Union’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EUGHRSR), adopted in December 2020, is expected to augment the Union’s role in global normative diplomacy. Although the Council has a long history of responding to human rights violations through geographic sanctions regimes, the EUGHRSR is the first thematic sanctions regime on the topic with a general scope of applicability. This article investigates what distinctive added value the thematic design of the EUGHRSR brings compared to the longstanding geographic approach. The EUGHRSR is envisaged as a more legalized accountability mechanism and its added value is presumed to lie in helping depoliticize sanctions by shifting the target focus away from states. The article shows that this presumption can be unattainable or undesirable as the successful implementation of the EUGHRSR necessitates bringing the state into the centre of analysis. The article in particular shows that in order to successfully deploy the EUGHRSR as an integral part of the EU common foreign and security policy, the Council has to (i) align the designation of targets with the EU’s foreign policy strategies, and (ii) take pro-human rights reforms in third countries as a ground for de-listing, even in the absence of individual accountability. Taking these positions, however, blurs the line between the EUGHRSR and geographic sanctions, therefore requires careful coordination and trade-off. damages, non-contractual liability, CFSP acts, normalization, CSDP missions and operations, restrictive measures, jurisdiction, CJEU, sanctions.
{"title":"What Is the Added Value of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime?","authors":"Nathanael Tilahun","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021038","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EUGHRSR), adopted in December 2020, is expected to augment the Union’s role in global normative diplomacy. Although the Council has a long history of responding to human rights violations through geographic sanctions regimes, the EUGHRSR is the first thematic sanctions regime on the topic with a general scope of applicability. This article investigates what distinctive added value the thematic design of the EUGHRSR brings compared to the longstanding geographic approach. The EUGHRSR is envisaged as a more legalized accountability mechanism and its added value is presumed to lie in helping depoliticize sanctions by shifting the target focus away from states. The article shows that this presumption can be unattainable or undesirable as the successful implementation of the EUGHRSR necessitates bringing the state into the centre of analysis. The article in particular shows that in order to successfully deploy the EUGHRSR as an integral part of the EU common foreign and security policy, the Council has to (i) align the designation of targets with the EU’s foreign policy strategies, and (ii) take pro-human rights reforms in third countries as a ground for de-listing, even in the absence of individual accountability. Taking these positions, however, blurs the line between the EUGHRSR and geographic sanctions, therefore requires careful coordination and trade-off.\u0000damages, non-contractual liability, CFSP acts, normalization, CSDP missions and operations, restrictive measures, jurisdiction, CJEU, sanctions.","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47122800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Is the European Union (EU) best seen as a ‘normal’ power in global politics and is the way the EU develops and implements foreign policy akin to other actors on the international stage? In this article we explore these issues in the context of EU-Central Asia relations and use the process of developing the EU strategy on Central Asia as a case. Grasping some of the mechanisms of what may be termed ‘normalization’ in EU foreign policy is of particular relevance in increasingly contested world regions such as Central Asia – Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan – where Chinese, European, Russian and US interests intersect, albeit in varying degrees. Drawing on a set of twenty-eight semistructured interviews conducted with members of the diplomatic service of the EU and its Member States in the capitals of Central Asian republics as well as in Brussels, we seek to gauge the scope of normalization at the stage of strategy formulation vis-à-vis this region. The article explores two internal dimensions which we distil from the concept of ‘normal power Europe’, namely hierarchical centralization of power and the pre-eminence of larger Member States in the making of EU foreign policy. The article challenges notions of the prominent role small states in European foreign policy making may assume. Exploring the development of the Central Asia Strategy, adopted in 2019, it finds first that the strategy-making process was highly centralized and led by the EU headquarters in Brussels; second that a set of larger EU Member States had considerable leverage in the strategy-making process in contrast to assumptions that small EU Member States could eventually punch above their weight. European External Action Service (EEAS), Central Asia, EU Strategy for Central Asia, small states, EU normal power
{"title":"The Making of a European Union Strategy for Central Asia: Towards ‘Normalization’ in Foreign Policy?","authors":"T. Birkeland, Stefan Gänzle, Stina Torjesen","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021033","url":null,"abstract":"Is the European Union (EU) best seen as a ‘normal’ power in global politics and is the way the EU develops and implements foreign policy akin to other actors on the international stage? In this article we explore these issues in the context of EU-Central Asia relations and use the process of developing the EU strategy on Central Asia as a case. Grasping some of the mechanisms of what may be termed ‘normalization’ in EU foreign policy is of particular relevance in increasingly contested world regions such as Central Asia – Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan – where Chinese, European, Russian and US interests intersect, albeit in varying degrees. Drawing on a set of twenty-eight semistructured interviews conducted with members of the diplomatic service of the EU and its Member States in the capitals of Central Asian republics as well as in Brussels, we seek to gauge the scope of normalization at the stage of strategy formulation vis-à-vis this region. The article explores two internal dimensions which we distil from the concept of ‘normal power Europe’, namely hierarchical centralization of power and the pre-eminence of larger Member States in the making of EU foreign policy. The article challenges notions of the prominent role small states in European foreign policy making may assume. Exploring the development of the Central Asia Strategy, adopted in 2019, it finds first that the strategy-making process was highly centralized and led by the EU headquarters in Brussels; second that a set of larger EU Member States had considerable leverage in the strategy-making process in contrast to assumptions that small EU Member States could eventually punch above their weight.\u0000European External Action Service (EEAS), Central Asia, EU Strategy for Central Asia, small states, EU normal power","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48827885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article advances a context-sensitive, critical approach to (1) conceptualizing, (2) assessing and (3) explaining participatory inclusiveness of multistakeholder mechanisms, and applies it to the empirical case of the Domestic Advisory Group (DAG) established in Georgia in the framework of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the European Union (EU). Such multistakeholder mechanisms, promoted by the EU, are expected to democratize trade policymaking and refute criticism concerning the negative impact of trade on sustainable development. Our conceptual perspective highlights the importance of not only formal rules, but also micro-level power relations among stakeholders and their ties to macro-level power relations existing in a society, as well as the linkage between social and material sides of power. In our typology, ‘genuine’ multistakeholderism enables just consideration of diverse perspectives through high de jure and de facto horizontal and vertical inclusiveness. Yet our empirical analysis, based on extensive interviews and secondary sources, exemplifies difficulties in reaching ‘genuine’ inclusiveness. Situating the Georgian DAG in the broader societal context helps explain the low degree of inclusiveness we observe, and lack of significant progress in advancing a genuine multistakeholder debate as well as the trade and sustainable agenda in Georgia. Trade, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, sustainable development, multistakeholderism, civil society, participation, inclusiveness, Georgia, European Union, critical institutionalism
{"title":"Inclusion in EU-Georgia Trade Relations: A Critical Institutionalist Analysis of the Georgian Domestic Advisory Group","authors":"Diana Potjomkina","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021035","url":null,"abstract":"This article advances a context-sensitive, critical approach to (1) conceptualizing, (2) assessing and (3) explaining participatory inclusiveness of multistakeholder mechanisms, and applies it to the empirical case of the Domestic Advisory Group (DAG) established in Georgia in the framework of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the European Union (EU). Such multistakeholder mechanisms, promoted by the EU, are expected to democratize trade policymaking and refute criticism concerning the negative impact of trade on sustainable development. Our conceptual perspective highlights the importance of not only formal rules, but also micro-level power relations among stakeholders and their ties to macro-level power relations existing in a society, as well as the linkage between social and material sides of power. In our typology, ‘genuine’ multistakeholderism enables just consideration of diverse perspectives through high de jure and de facto horizontal and vertical inclusiveness. Yet our empirical analysis, based on extensive interviews and secondary sources, exemplifies difficulties in reaching ‘genuine’ inclusiveness. Situating the Georgian DAG in the broader societal context helps explain the low degree of inclusiveness we observe, and lack of significant progress in advancing a genuine multistakeholder debate as well as the trade and sustainable agenda in Georgia.\u0000Trade, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, sustainable development, multistakeholderism, civil society, participation, inclusiveness, Georgia, European Union, critical institutionalism","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42011853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2018, the Californian government adopted a new data protection framework. The flagship of this framework is the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). As this new framework is widely considered to resemble the European Union’s (EU’s) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), this article intends to investigate whether the Brussels Effect could explain this resemblance. We apply process-tracing to test if the Brussels Effect causally connects the GDPR with the CCPA. The analysis is based on a careful evaluation of three sets of evidence. Firstly, privacy policies of Apple, Facebook, and Google are examined. Secondly, lobbying concerning the alignment of the implementation of the CCPA with the GDPR is scrutinized. Lastly, it is investigated whether the Californian government has used arguments linked to the Brussels Effect while drafting the CCPA and its subsequent implementing regulations. It is concluded that the Brussels Effect has indeed played a role in the adoption of the CCPA. Nevertheless, it has become clear that the impact of the Effect varies depending on exactly which provision of the GDPR is examined. Brussels Effect, process-tracing, California, CCPA, European Union, GDPR, Data Protection, Lobbying, Big Tech
{"title":"The Brussels Effect: How the GDPR Conquered Silicon Valley","authors":"Simon Gunst, Ferdi De Ville","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021036","url":null,"abstract":"In 2018, the Californian government adopted a new data protection framework. The flagship of this framework is the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). As this new framework is widely considered to resemble the European Union’s (EU’s) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), this article intends to investigate whether the Brussels Effect could explain this resemblance. We apply process-tracing to test if the Brussels Effect causally connects the GDPR with the CCPA. The analysis is based on a careful evaluation of three sets of evidence. Firstly, privacy policies of Apple, Facebook, and Google are examined. Secondly, lobbying concerning the alignment of the implementation of the CCPA with the GDPR is scrutinized. Lastly, it is investigated whether the Californian government has used arguments linked to the Brussels Effect while drafting the CCPA and its subsequent implementing regulations. It is concluded that the Brussels Effect has indeed played a role in the adoption of the CCPA. Nevertheless, it has become clear that the impact of the Effect varies depending on exactly which provision of the GDPR is examined.\u0000Brussels Effect, process-tracing, California, CCPA, European Union, GDPR, Data Protection, Lobbying, Big Tech","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42129374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Beatriz Pérez de las Heras, David Fernández Rojo, Inmaculada Herbosa Martínez
The Asia Pacific is not only the world’s largest and most populous region, it is also home to some of its fastest growing economies. At the same time, it is also a region that contains complex security hotspots, including tensions on the Korean Peninsula and maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. The United States and China are vying for economic and military influence in the region, affecting the balance of power and security dynamics on a global scale. In recent years, the European Union (EU) has become a key trading partner for most countries in the Asia-Pacific region and is also seeking to play a relevant role as a security actor. Both regions face the same challenges and share an interest in preserving peace in their respective areas, while upholding the rules-based international order. Specifically, the EU wants to step up its security role in the Asia-Pacific by boosting cooperation with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and other strategic partners. In the current context of huge global shifts, this article argues that the area in which the EU can make a valuable contribution to stability in the region is in supporting Asia-Pacific nations to address non-traditional security challenges. European Union, Asia Pacific, Indo Pacific, non-traditional security, interregional cooperation, ASEAN, Strategic Partnerships
{"title":"European Union-Asia Pacific: Working Together on Global Security","authors":"Beatriz Pérez de las Heras, David Fernández Rojo, Inmaculada Herbosa Martínez","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021032","url":null,"abstract":"The Asia Pacific is not only the world’s largest and most populous region, it is also home to some of its fastest growing economies. At the same time, it is also a region that contains complex security hotspots, including tensions on the Korean Peninsula and maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. The United States and China are vying for economic and military influence in the region, affecting the balance of power and security dynamics on a global scale. In recent years, the European Union (EU) has become a key trading partner for most countries in the Asia-Pacific region and is also seeking to play a relevant role as a security actor. Both regions face the same challenges and share an interest in preserving peace in their respective areas, while upholding the rules-based international order. Specifically, the EU wants to step up its security role in the Asia-Pacific by boosting cooperation with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and other strategic partners. In the current context of huge global shifts, this article argues that the area in which the EU can make a valuable contribution to stability in the region is in supporting Asia-Pacific nations to address non-traditional security challenges.\u0000European Union, Asia Pacific, Indo Pacific, non-traditional security, interregional cooperation, ASEAN, Strategic Partnerships","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48498170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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