Abstract Fiduciary agents and trust-based institutions are increasingly proposed and considered in legal, regulatory, and ethical discourse as an alternative or addition to a control-based model of data management. Instead of leaving it up to the citizen to decide what to do with her data and to ensure that her best interests are met, an independent person or organization will act on her behalf, potentially also taking into account the general interest. By ensuring that these interests are protected, the hope is that citizens’ willingness to share data will increase, thereby allowing for more data-driven projects. Thus, trust-based models are presented as a win–win scenario. It is clear, however, that there are also apparent dangers entailed with trust-based approaches. Especially one model, that of data trusts, may have far-reaching consequences.
{"title":"Can we trust trust-based data governance models?","authors":"B. van der Sloot, Esther Keymolen","doi":"10.1017/dap.2022.36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/dap.2022.36","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Fiduciary agents and trust-based institutions are increasingly proposed and considered in legal, regulatory, and ethical discourse as an alternative or addition to a control-based model of data management. Instead of leaving it up to the citizen to decide what to do with her data and to ensure that her best interests are met, an independent person or organization will act on her behalf, potentially also taking into account the general interest. By ensuring that these interests are protected, the hope is that citizens’ willingness to share data will increase, thereby allowing for more data-driven projects. Thus, trust-based models are presented as a win–win scenario. It is clear, however, that there are also apparent dangers entailed with trust-based approaches. Especially one model, that of data trusts, may have far-reaching consequences.","PeriodicalId":93427,"journal":{"name":"Data & policy","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41245397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Digital identity systems are promoted with the promise of great benefit and inclusion. The case of the Ugandan digital identity system demonstrates that the impact of digital identity systems is not only positive but also has negative impacts, significantly affecting human lives for the worse. The impact on the human lives of digital identity systems can be assessed by multiple frameworks. A specific framework that has been mentioned is the capabilities approach (CA). This article demonstrates that the CA is a framework to assess the impact on human lives that can be operationalized for technology and information and communication technology, including digital identity systems. Further research is required to compare the CA with other candidate evaluation frameworks.
{"title":"Is the Capabilities Approach operationalizable to analyse the impact of digital identity on human lives","authors":"Henk Marsman","doi":"10.1017/dap.2022.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/dap.2022.37","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Digital identity systems are promoted with the promise of great benefit and inclusion. The case of the Ugandan digital identity system demonstrates that the impact of digital identity systems is not only positive but also has negative impacts, significantly affecting human lives for the worse. The impact on the human lives of digital identity systems can be assessed by multiple frameworks. A specific framework that has been mentioned is the capabilities approach (CA). This article demonstrates that the CA is a framework to assess the impact on human lives that can be operationalized for technology and information and communication technology, including digital identity systems. Further research is required to compare the CA with other candidate evaluation frameworks.","PeriodicalId":93427,"journal":{"name":"Data & policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42172914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Research that examines the impact of economic, social, and political factors on political corruption uses expert’ and citizen’ perceptions for measuring corruption and testing arguments. Scholars argue that the perception of corruption is a good proxy for actual corruption because data on actual corruption are limited and not entirely trustworthy. However, perception indexes do not allow for testing separate mechanisms driving citizen’ perceptions of corruption from actual levels of corruption in different government branches. To address this issue, I introduce a new index based on Latin American countries to measure the risk of corruption in political parties. Using a de jure analysis of laws and regulations, the Risk of Corruption (ROC) index evaluates the likelihood of political parties engaging in corrupt activities. Instead of measuring corrupt activities or perception directly, the ROC measures the risks of involving in corruption. The index has important implications for academics and practitioners in anti-corruption issues. First, it allows us to test arguments about the role of political parties and legislatures in reducing political corruption. Second, it helps to understand how political parties could improve their internal organization to decrease the risk of corrupt activities. Finally, it is a valuable instrument for cross-national studies in diverse fields that study political parties.
{"title":"Measuring the risk of corruption in Latin American political parties. De jure analysis of institutions","authors":"Giovanna Rodríguez-García","doi":"10.1017/dap.2022.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/dap.2022.33","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Research that examines the impact of economic, social, and political factors on political corruption uses expert’ and citizen’ perceptions for measuring corruption and testing arguments. Scholars argue that the perception of corruption is a good proxy for actual corruption because data on actual corruption are limited and not entirely trustworthy. However, perception indexes do not allow for testing separate mechanisms driving citizen’ perceptions of corruption from actual levels of corruption in different government branches. To address this issue, I introduce a new index based on Latin American countries to measure the risk of corruption in political parties. Using a de jure analysis of laws and regulations, the Risk of Corruption (ROC) index evaluates the likelihood of political parties engaging in corrupt activities. Instead of measuring corrupt activities or perception directly, the ROC measures the risks of involving in corruption. The index has important implications for academics and practitioners in anti-corruption issues. First, it allows us to test arguments about the role of political parties and legislatures in reducing political corruption. Second, it helps to understand how political parties could improve their internal organization to decrease the risk of corrupt activities. Finally, it is a valuable instrument for cross-national studies in diverse fields that study political parties.","PeriodicalId":93427,"journal":{"name":"Data & policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44055037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A proliferation of data-generating devices, sensors, and applications has led to unprecedented amounts of digital data. We live in an era of datafication, one in which life is increasingly quantified and transformed into intelligence for private or public benefit. When used responsibly, this offers new opportunities for public good. The potential of data is evident in the possibilities offered by open data and data collaboratives—both instances of how wider access to data can lead to positive and often dramatic social transformation. However, three key forms of asymmetry currently limit this potential, especially for already vulnerable and marginalized groups: data asymmetries, information asymmetries, and agency asymmetries. These asymmetries limit human potential, both in a practical and psychological sense, leading to feelings of disempowerment and eroding public trust in technology. Existing methods to limit asymmetries (such as open data or consent) as well as some alternatives under consideration (data ownership, collective ownership, personal information management systems) have limitations to adequately address the challenges at hand. A new principle and practice of digital self-determination (DSD) is therefore required. The study and practice of DSD remain in its infancy. The characteristics we have outlined here are only exploratory, and much work remains to be done so as to better understand what works and what does not. We suggest the need for a new research framework or agenda to explore DSD and how it can address the asymmetries, imbalances, and inequalities—both in data and society more generally—that are emerging as key public policy challenges of our era.
{"title":"Operationalizing digital self-determination","authors":"S. Verhulst","doi":"10.1017/dap.2023.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/dap.2023.11","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A proliferation of data-generating devices, sensors, and applications has led to unprecedented amounts of digital data. We live in an era of datafication, one in which life is increasingly quantified and transformed into intelligence for private or public benefit. When used responsibly, this offers new opportunities for public good. The potential of data is evident in the possibilities offered by open data and data collaboratives—both instances of how wider access to data can lead to positive and often dramatic social transformation. However, three key forms of asymmetry currently limit this potential, especially for already vulnerable and marginalized groups: data asymmetries, information asymmetries, and agency asymmetries. These asymmetries limit human potential, both in a practical and psychological sense, leading to feelings of disempowerment and eroding public trust in technology. Existing methods to limit asymmetries (such as open data or consent) as well as some alternatives under consideration (data ownership, collective ownership, personal information management systems) have limitations to adequately address the challenges at hand. A new principle and practice of digital self-determination (DSD) is therefore required. The study and practice of DSD remain in its infancy. The characteristics we have outlined here are only exploratory, and much work remains to be done so as to better understand what works and what does not. We suggest the need for a new research framework or agenda to explore DSD and how it can address the asymmetries, imbalances, and inequalities—both in data and society more generally—that are emerging as key public policy challenges of our era.","PeriodicalId":93427,"journal":{"name":"Data & policy","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44564568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Does digitalization reduce corruption? What are the integrity benefits of government digitalization? While the correlation between digitalization and corruption is well established, there is less actionable evidence on the integrity dividends of specific digitalization reforms on different types of corruption and the policy channels through which they operate. These linkages are especially relevant in high corruption risk environments. This article unbundles the integrity dividends of digital reforms undertaken by governments around the world, accelerated by the pandemic. It analyzes the rise of data-driven integrity analytics as promising tools in the anticorruption space deployed by tech-savvy integrity actors. It also assesses the broader integrity benefits of the digitalization of government services and the automation of bureaucratic processes, which contribute to reducing bribe solicitation risks by front-office bureaucrats. It analyzes in particular the impact of digitalization on social transfers. It argues that government digitalization can be an implicit yet effective anticorruption strategy, with subtler yet deeper effects, but there needs to be greater synergies between digital reforms and anticorruption strategies.
{"title":"Govtech against corruption: What are the integrity dividends of government digitalization?","authors":"C. Santiso","doi":"10.1017/dap.2022.31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/dap.2022.31","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Does digitalization reduce corruption? What are the integrity benefits of government digitalization? While the correlation between digitalization and corruption is well established, there is less actionable evidence on the integrity dividends of specific digitalization reforms on different types of corruption and the policy channels through which they operate. These linkages are especially relevant in high corruption risk environments. This article unbundles the integrity dividends of digital reforms undertaken by governments around the world, accelerated by the pandemic. It analyzes the rise of data-driven integrity analytics as promising tools in the anticorruption space deployed by tech-savvy integrity actors. It also assesses the broader integrity benefits of the digitalization of government services and the automation of bureaucratic processes, which contribute to reducing bribe solicitation risks by front-office bureaucrats. It analyzes in particular the impact of digitalization on social transfers. It argues that government digitalization can be an implicit yet effective anticorruption strategy, with subtler yet deeper effects, but there needs to be greater synergies between digital reforms and anticorruption strategies.","PeriodicalId":93427,"journal":{"name":"Data & policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41882139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract While many Latin American countries have a tradition of receiving migrants, including the countries selected as case studies, there are no institutionalized mechanisms for the integration and settlement of migrants. The objective of this article is to explore how to improve migration data collection and management in a region that does not have many migration integration policies in place. I assess the state of migration data collection and management in three case studies: the city of Cucuta in Colombia, the North Huetar Region in Costa Rica, and the city of Monterrey in Mexico. The three countries publish data exclusively at the national level, rather than the local or municipal. Despite all case studies having a variety of administrative data, mainly in the form of entries and exits by nationality, these data are not enough to properly identify the sociodemographic characteristics of migrant populations in a country, and much less in specific cities. I make recommendations divided into three main themes to improve migration data in Latin America.
{"title":"Migration data collection and management in a changing Latin American landscape","authors":"María E. Cervantes-Macías","doi":"10.1017/dap.2022.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/dap.2022.34","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract While many Latin American countries have a tradition of receiving migrants, including the countries selected as case studies, there are no institutionalized mechanisms for the integration and settlement of migrants. The objective of this article is to explore how to improve migration data collection and management in a region that does not have many migration integration policies in place. I assess the state of migration data collection and management in three case studies: the city of Cucuta in Colombia, the North Huetar Region in Costa Rica, and the city of Monterrey in Mexico. The three countries publish data exclusively at the national level, rather than the local or municipal. Despite all case studies having a variety of administrative data, mainly in the form of entries and exits by nationality, these data are not enough to properly identify the sociodemographic characteristics of migrant populations in a country, and much less in specific cities. I make recommendations divided into three main themes to improve migration data in Latin America.","PeriodicalId":93427,"journal":{"name":"Data & policy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"57162331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Corruption has pervasive effects on economic development and the well-being of the population. Despite being crucial and necessary, fighting corruption is not an easy task because it is a difficult phenomenon to measure and detect. However, recent advances in the field of artificial intelligence may help in this quest. In this article, we propose the use of machine-learning models to predict municipality-level corruption in a developing country. Using data from disciplinary prosecutions conducted by an anti-corruption agency in Colombia, we trained four canonical models (Random Forests, Gradient Boosting Machine, Lasso, and Neural Networks), and ensemble their predictions, to predict whether or not a mayor will commit acts of corruption. Our models achieve acceptable levels of performance, based on metrics such as the precision and the area under the receiver-operating characteristic curve, demonstrating that these tools are useful in predicting where misbehavior is most likely to occur. Moreover, our feature-importance analysis shows us which groups of variables are most important in predicting corruption.
{"title":"Predicting politicians’ misconduct: Evidence from Colombia","authors":"Jorge Gallego, M. Prem, Juan F. Vargas","doi":"10.1017/dap.2022.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/dap.2022.35","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Corruption has pervasive effects on economic development and the well-being of the population. Despite being crucial and necessary, fighting corruption is not an easy task because it is a difficult phenomenon to measure and detect. However, recent advances in the field of artificial intelligence may help in this quest. In this article, we propose the use of machine-learning models to predict municipality-level corruption in a developing country. Using data from disciplinary prosecutions conducted by an anti-corruption agency in Colombia, we trained four canonical models (Random Forests, Gradient Boosting Machine, Lasso, and Neural Networks), and ensemble their predictions, to predict whether or not a mayor will commit acts of corruption. Our models achieve acceptable levels of performance, based on metrics such as the precision and the area under the receiver-operating characteristic curve, demonstrating that these tools are useful in predicting where misbehavior is most likely to occur. Moreover, our feature-importance analysis shows us which groups of variables are most important in predicting corruption.","PeriodicalId":93427,"journal":{"name":"Data & policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42422017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Digital identity systems are not devised for their own sake, rather they are developed by institutions as part of their pursuit of specific goals—such as economic, social, and developmental outcomes through enabling individual rights and facilitating access to basic services and entitlements. A growing number of organizations and institutions are advancing specific principles, frameworks, and “imaginaries” of what “good” digital identity looks like—yet it is often not clear how much influence they have or what their underlying worldview is to those designing, developing, and deploying these systems. This paper introduces sociopolitical configurations as a means of studying these underlying worldviews. Sociopolitical configurations combine elements from technological frames, expectations, and imaginations as well as developmental discourses to provide a basis for critically examining three key documents in this space.
{"title":"On the sociopolitical configurations of digital identity principles","authors":"E. Whitley, E. Schoemaker","doi":"10.1017/dap.2022.30","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/dap.2022.30","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Digital identity systems are not devised for their own sake, rather they are developed by institutions as part of their pursuit of specific goals—such as economic, social, and developmental outcomes through enabling individual rights and facilitating access to basic services and entitlements. A growing number of organizations and institutions are advancing specific principles, frameworks, and “imaginaries” of what “good” digital identity looks like—yet it is often not clear how much influence they have or what their underlying worldview is to those designing, developing, and deploying these systems. This paper introduces sociopolitical configurations as a means of studying these underlying worldviews. Sociopolitical configurations combine elements from technological frames, expectations, and imaginations as well as developmental discourses to provide a basis for critically examining three key documents in this space.","PeriodicalId":93427,"journal":{"name":"Data & policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47079057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Nigeria commenced its national foundational digital identity project in 2007 and had enrolled 60 million people by July 2021. The project, led by the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC), seeks to unify the country’s public and private functional identity databases, and aims to improve government services and national security. Although the enrolment process had encountered initial challenges such as the absence of enrolment centers in some communities across the country, enrolment for the biometric ID had proceeded without any significant public objection to its objectives. Following the EndSARS protests of October 2020, where youths protesting police violence and perceived poor governance were shot at by government security forces and protesters placed under surveillance, the government announced an updated national identity policy mandating citizens link their National Identity Number (NIN) with their SIM card information. For the first time, significant pockets of resistance arose against the national ID project by sections of the public who perceived the EndSARS violence as signaling a change in government behavior, and the updated ID policy as a mechanism for empowering government surveillance and authoritarianism. The resistance to the ID project marked a shift in public perception which threatens its future. This paper argues that mistrust in government data collection projects grows when data collection is perceived to be increasing government power to the detriment of human rights and freedom. It also puts forward a proposal on how to restore trust within the low-trust environment in Nigeria including the passage of a data protection law and amendments to the NIMC Act and Policies/Regulations, establishing Federated identity providers which give choices to end-users, and delinking the NIN from functional identity databases.
{"title":"Mistrust of government within authoritarian states hindering user acceptance and adoption of digital IDs in Africa: The Nigerian context","authors":"Babatunde O. Okunoye","doi":"10.1017/dap.2022.29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/dap.2022.29","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Nigeria commenced its national foundational digital identity project in 2007 and had enrolled 60 million people by July 2021. The project, led by the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC), seeks to unify the country’s public and private functional identity databases, and aims to improve government services and national security. Although the enrolment process had encountered initial challenges such as the absence of enrolment centers in some communities across the country, enrolment for the biometric ID had proceeded without any significant public objection to its objectives. Following the EndSARS protests of October 2020, where youths protesting police violence and perceived poor governance were shot at by government security forces and protesters placed under surveillance, the government announced an updated national identity policy mandating citizens link their National Identity Number (NIN) with their SIM card information. For the first time, significant pockets of resistance arose against the national ID project by sections of the public who perceived the EndSARS violence as signaling a change in government behavior, and the updated ID policy as a mechanism for empowering government surveillance and authoritarianism. The resistance to the ID project marked a shift in public perception which threatens its future. This paper argues that mistrust in government data collection projects grows when data collection is perceived to be increasing government power to the detriment of human rights and freedom. It also puts forward a proposal on how to restore trust within the low-trust environment in Nigeria including the passage of a data protection law and amendments to the NIMC Act and Policies/Regulations, establishing Federated identity providers which give choices to end-users, and delinking the NIN from functional identity databases.","PeriodicalId":93427,"journal":{"name":"Data & policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47875106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Border artificial intelligence (AI)—biometrics-based AI systems used in border control contexts—proliferates as common tools in border securitization projects. Such systems classify some migrants as posing risks like identity fraud, other forms of criminality, or terrorism. From a human rights perspective, using such risk framings for algorithmically facilitated evaluations of migrants’ biometrics systematically calls into question whether these kinds of systems can be built to be trustworthy for migrants. This article provides a thought experiment; we use a bottom-up responsible design lens—the guidance-ethics approach—to evaluate if responsible, trustworthy Border AI might constitute an oxymoron. The proposed European AI Act only limits the use of Border AI systems by classifying such systems as high risk. In parallel with these AI regulatory developments, large-scale civic movements have emerged throughout Europe to ban the use of facial recognition technologies in public spaces to defend EU citizens’ privacy. The fact that such systems remain acceptable for states’ usage to evaluate migrants, we argue, insufficiently protects migrants’ lives. In part, we argue that this is due to regulations and ethical frameworks being top-down and technology driven by focusing more on the safety of AI systems than on the safety of migrants. We conclude that bordering technologies developed from a responsible design angle would entail the development of entirely different technologies. These would refrain from harmful sorting based on biometric identifications but would start from the premise that migration is not a societal problem.
{"title":"Contesting border artificial intelligence: Applying the guidance-ethics approach as a responsible design lens","authors":"Karolina La Fors, F. Meissner","doi":"10.1017/dap.2022.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/dap.2022.28","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Border artificial intelligence (AI)—biometrics-based AI systems used in border control contexts—proliferates as common tools in border securitization projects. Such systems classify some migrants as posing risks like identity fraud, other forms of criminality, or terrorism. From a human rights perspective, using such risk framings for algorithmically facilitated evaluations of migrants’ biometrics systematically calls into question whether these kinds of systems can be built to be trustworthy for migrants. This article provides a thought experiment; we use a bottom-up responsible design lens—the guidance-ethics approach—to evaluate if responsible, trustworthy Border AI might constitute an oxymoron. The proposed European AI Act only limits the use of Border AI systems by classifying such systems as high risk. In parallel with these AI regulatory developments, large-scale civic movements have emerged throughout Europe to ban the use of facial recognition technologies in public spaces to defend EU citizens’ privacy. The fact that such systems remain acceptable for states’ usage to evaluate migrants, we argue, insufficiently protects migrants’ lives. In part, we argue that this is due to regulations and ethical frameworks being top-down and technology driven by focusing more on the safety of AI systems than on the safety of migrants. We conclude that bordering technologies developed from a responsible design angle would entail the development of entirely different technologies. These would refrain from harmful sorting based on biometric identifications but would start from the premise that migration is not a societal problem.","PeriodicalId":93427,"journal":{"name":"Data & policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49598211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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